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ABSTRACT 
 
SPINOZA’S ETHOLOGY: 
RECOGNIZING DYNAMIC TRANSITIONS BETWEEN 
IMAGINATION, REASON, AND INTUITION 
 
 
By 
Christina Rawls 
December 2015  
 
Dissertation supervised by Dr. Daniel J. Selcer 
 Seventeenth Century lens grinder and Dutch philosopher, Benedictus Spinoza, 
illuminates a rigorous and dynamic theory of knowledge and action in his major system the 
Ethics. What we adequately understand by learning Spinoza’s epistemology is that within it is a 
proto-physics of ideational force between the three kinds of knowledge expressed by the attribute 
of thought and, simultaneously, expressed as ratios of motion and rest, speed and slowness, 
intensity and transformation by the attribute of extension. Such dynamic processes or ways lead 
to one’s capacity for increased rational thought and action, increased uses of creativity, and the 
enhanced ability to join with others in powerfully effective, affirmative ways. This is Spinoza’s 
proto-physics of force. The outcome of the enhanced ideational force and extensive action 
includes an increase in one’s overall singular conatus, the capacity for continuous understanding, 
and perseverance, joy and energy, not only for oneself but also for the benefit of all of Nature. In 
 v 
the end, Spinoza rigorously demonstrates that all of Nature is one organic substance with infinite 
varieties of expressive power. We are singular, conscious expressions of that power in our own 
determinate ways. Our mind does not have ideas, it is ideas, and our ratios of motion and rest 
expressed in extension are multiple yet maintain a homeostatic balance for bodily integrity and 
comportment. Combined, the two attributes create affects that influence the increases and 
decreases in our power of continued thought and action. Affects cannot be explained by any 
theory of representation. Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology requires such an understanding. 
In the end, Spinoza’s ethology involves an enhancement in our ability for creativity and 
experimentation as well. Such expressions and affects are not possible without other minds and 
bodies, but they are also not possible without a singular power and enhanced capacity for 
increasing ideational power and rational conscious reflection. As Paulo Freire writes, “Liberating 
education consists in acts of cognition, not transferrals of information.”1 For Spinoza, acts of 
enhanced cognition (and thus action) are increases in our overall conatus through continued 
understanding of natural phenomena. Our love of Nature (or God) is transformed into actions of 
real living experiences, joy and levity, peace of mind, and an acute interest in all expressions of 
the laws of Nature. Still, we cannot possibly approach or exhaust the totality of causal processes 
and effects in Nature. In our awareness of this fact, we are transformed to create and understand 
our individual human affects and relations with other bodies in our environments towards 
freedom of thought, happiness, and safety while living amidst a diversity of interests. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Paulo Freire, pedagogy of the oppressed, trans. Myra Bergman Ramos (New York: Continuum Press, 1970), 79. 
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INTRODUCTION 
SPINOZA’S ETHOLOGY 
 
“Free of metaphor and myth, he grinds a stubborn crystal:  
the infinite map of the One who is all His stars.”   
-Jorge Luis Borges 
 
In Seventeenth Century Dutch philosopher and lens grinder, Benedictus Spinoza’s, 
magnum opus, the Ethics, we read, “An affect which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon 
as we form a clear and distinct idea of it.”1 Forming and arranging more powerful chains of clear 
and distinct ideas are what Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology strives to accomplish in its readers. 
In this way we can say that we create various ways of knowing. Yet, Spinoza’s theory of 
knowledge is composed of more than our striving for clear and distinct knowledge. Spinoza’s 
method also includes strengthening certain kinds of imaginative knowledge, and putting all three 
kinds of ideas we are capable of, imaginative, rational, and intuitive, to use in effective, efficient, 
and creative ways. In my reading, the entirety of the Ethics requires that our understanding of its 
dynamic epistemology must repeatedly include reflecting on propositions and demonstrations 
regarding human affects specifically, as well as singular conscious transformation, and not only 
on abstract laws of Nature. Affects are the combination of thought and extension into an 
experience we can reflect on which increase or decrease our conatus, our perseverance and our 
tendencies.  
This thesis examines how singular, human consciousness and reflection play a 
foundational role in the development of affirmative thought and extension, as well as how to 
adequately understand Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology. My reading demonstrates that there is a 
                                                 
1 Spinoza, Ethics, trans. Edward Curley (London: Penguin Books, 1996), 5p3: 163. 
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theory and practice of an ideational proto-physics of force and motion in Spinoza’s Ethics. This 
force is expressed simultaneously along with continually shifting ratios of motion and rest in 
extension. The result is more or less powerful transformations in one’s conatus, as well as how 
much we can be affected by other ideas and actions or motions of bodies in our environment. In 
the end, what one discovers is that Spinoza’s epistemology emphasizes the methods of reasoning 
that strengthen understanding and the capacity to act with more rational and imaginative power, 
bodily motion, creativity, and effectiveness. For Spinoza, truth is not a measure of adequate 
knowledge. Adequate thinking is a power of its own kind, and all of its expressions are eternal. 
To adequately understand myself as the cause of arranging kinds of knowledge as expressions in 
order to manipulate the laws of thought and extension to my benefit and the benefit of the greater 
whole is what I am capable of as a human mind and body. Spinoza also notes that we do not 
know all of what bodies can do. This enhanced awareness brings me eternal joy and types of 
creative expressions that can be shared with other human minds and bodies. Such expressions 
include the increasing perfection of the expressions of substance, which is always in existence. 
All of substance is one organic and interconnected whole with infinite attributes of which human 
beings know and use only two. Nonetheless, the two attributes we express, thought and 
extension, can be separately expressed in infinite ways. Where they come together is in the 
experience of our affects. It is our affects that give or take away our power. 
Friendship and love of one’s neighbor, tolerance of diverse opinions, freedom of thought 
and of speech, radical democracy, and the enhancement of singular and collective reasoning in 
powerfully imaginative ways are at the forefront of Spinoza’s philosophy. In an early letter to 
Henry Oldenburg, Spinoza writes that all good friends who share the same purpose should share 
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everything, especially spiritual things.2 In this and other ways, Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology 
cannot be divorced from his monist ontology and the intellectual love of God or Nature. We are 
finite, but as we learn about the laws of thought and extension we understand how all of Nature’s 
expressions are perfect and eternal, even if only partial in their force of power. What we learn is 
that we are not separate from Nature or God, but are expressions of Nature at every turn. 
Therefore, we are God, as is everything else to varying degrees of power.  
One application of learning in this way is the production of new knowledge and further 
understanding, but also greater uses of creativity. In the preface to his translation of Spinoza’s 
collected works, Samuel Shirley writes, “Can the essence of God be seen as the source of the ill-
understood phenomena that we call artistic creativity? In the ‘conatus’ of human beings, a 
conatus that derives from God’s potential, do we see a shadow, an image, of God’s creativity, 
finding expression most markedly in the process of artistic creativity?”3 So one can ask: what 
might we do if we had access to using Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology in creative new ways 
both philosophically and practically in the everyday? What could be generated? 
  
                                                 
2 Spinoza, Letter 2, trans. Sam Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 761. It should be noted that Steve Nadler, in 
his biography of Spinoza, translates this letter as saying friends should share all things spiritual, but Sam Shirley 
makes it a point to translate the same passage as “…especially when I reflect that between friends all things, and 
particularly things of the spirit, should be shared…” This, of course, is a very different meaning than Nadler’s and 
the difference should be taken into serious consideration. All things of the human spirit are not all things spiritual.  
3 Samuel Shirley, Spinoza: Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002) viii. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
SPINOZA ON THE FREEDOM TO PHILOSOPHIZE: 
A NEW SCIENCE OF THOUGHT AND ACTION 
 
“Probably no philosopher of repute has been worse served by his expositors and commentators 
than Spinoza. Monist, pantheist, atheist, acosmist, ethical nihilist, mechanist, mystic, and even 
dialectical materialist, are among the epithets more or less commonly used to describe and 
pigeon-hole a doctrine which, nevertheless, though neglected, misinterpreted, and deplored, has   
never been despised as a mere curiosity of philosophical history.”  
-H. F. Hallett 
 
“Spinoza's world is motion, and motion once more.”  
- W. Klever 
 
Geen ketter sonder letter1 
French philosopher Gilles Deleuze once wrote to Reda Bensmaia about Seventeenth 
Century philosopher and lens grinder, Benedictus Spinoza: 
The Ethics is a book of concepts...but of affects...and percepts...too...Thus the paradox in 
Spinoza is that he's the most philosophical of philosophers...but also the one who more 
than any other addresses nonphilosophers and calls forth the most intense nonphilosophical 
understanding. This is why absolutely anyone can read Spinoza, and be very moved, or see 
things differently afterward, even if they can hardly understand Spinoza's concepts...2 
 
Other contemporary Seventeenth Century scholarship on Spinoza aligns with Deleuze's claim. 
For example, Julie Klein writes that today “Spinoza's readers are numerous and diverse, and their 
interpretations of his work follow suit.” Klein continues, “...a reasonably comprehensive list 
would include the Cartesian-Spinoza, the Hobbesian Spinoza, the Judaeo-Islamic Spinoza, the 
Protestant Spinoza, the atheist and pantheist Spinoza, the neoplatonist or idealist Spinoza...”3 The 
list grows with several more legitimate categories of interpretation, including a work of public art 
                                                 
1 Old Dutch saying: “No heretic without a book.” 
2 Gilles Deleuze, negotiations, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia, 1995), 165-166. 
3 Julie Klein, “Philosophizing Historically/Historicizing Philosophy” in Philosophy and Its History, ed. Morgens 
Laerke et al. (Oxford: Oxford, 2013), 134-135. 
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in the Netherlands by Thomas Hirschhorn titled Spinoza Monument.  
My interpretation in this thesis is, therefore, merely one exercise, an experiment, a singular 
reading and example that is most closely aligned with the sentiments of Gilles Deleuze above. I 
write to further support what such a system as Spinoza's found in the Ethics and other works can 
accomplish in its readers on a transformational level, that is, how it is still relevant today and 
what it can do to affect its readers. We read in Letter 37 among Spinoza's correspondence with 
other scientists, friends, and thinkers of his time, “...there is needed constant meditation and a 
most steadfast mind and purpose, to acquire which it is most important to establish a fixed way 
and manner of life, and to have a definite aim in view.”4 As Eugene Marshall has recently 
pointed out, “…if David Hume can be considered ‘the Newton of the mind,’ then Spinoza is its 
Galileo.”5 
This chapter focuses on how Spinoza was influenced by specific theories of knowledge 
and systems of philosophy immediately prior to his own. In his original system, Spinoza was 
interested in teaching us how to better reflect on which type of knowledge we are relying on in 
order to enhance our power of thought, action, and overall sense of joy, well-being, activity, 
creativity, and peace of mind. This is a type of philosophical reflection which enhances the power 
of our affirmative affects as well. For Spinoza, true philosophical reflection never begins with 
conjectures: 
In the common round of life we have to follow what is probable, but in speculative thought 
we have to follow what is true. A man would perish of hunger and thirst if he refused to eat 
or drink until he had obtained perfect proof that food and drink would be good for him, 
but this does not hold in the field of contemplation… When one false proposition is 
allowed entry, innumerable others follow...6 
                                                 
4 Spinoza, Letter 37, in Spinoza: Collected Works, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002), 861. 
5 Eugene Marshall, The Spiritual Automaton: Spinoza’s Science of the Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), 3. This is a recent work which deserves much attention. Unfortunately, it does not emphasize the importance 
of imaginative knowledge in adequately understanding Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology in any real depth. 
6 Spinoza, Letter 56: 904. 
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The Seventeenth Century was a time of profound and diverse change, with significant 
developments in science, religion, education, literature, nautical navigation and trade, 
mathematics, medicine, and philosophy, to name a few. With the proliferation of pamphlets and 
books through modern advancements such as the availability of printing presses, publishers, 
book stores, and increased means for trading between countries, various attempts at censorship 
also became more prevalent. The Pauline, Tridentine, and Clementine Indexes, for example, were 
put into place by the Catholic Church in Rome during the Renaissance, banning hundreds of 
books in science, philosophy, politics, medicine, and other religious texts. Poetry and literary 
works were deemed especially troublesome. In addition, anyone who wrote against the Church 
put their lives at risk while their works were labeled heretical. “Political dissent was one thing, 
heresy another... Heresy threatened the souls of believer and nonbeliever alike as well as the 
fabric of society itself... The Index condemned heretical religious works and attacks on the 
papacy.”7 Spinoza’s works would also be condemned.  
Catholics were not the only religion to ban new research or divergent opinions. 
“Professors and university students were expected to conform outwardly to the local religion... 
Intellectuals might hold any heterodox conclusions they wished privately, but could not 
articulate them in lecture hall or in print without risk or dismissal or worse.”8 Just about 
everyone conformed outwardly, but, despite the influence (and violence) of organized religion, 
some secret societies and marginal scholarly groups continued to explore every area of 
existence in every way they could, like a planet all their own in the ultimate glass bead game. 
“Nevertheless, men found ways to circumvent censorship. The philosophical heritage of an 
                                                 
7 Paul Grendler, “Printing and Censorship,” in Cambridge History to Renaissance Philosophy, ed. Charles Schmitt 
et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1988), 42, 47. The primary Index was not abolished until 1966! 
8 Ibid. 51. 
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optimistic view of man's potentiality favoured an open search for learning...”9 Although the 
practice of a true and open freedom of inquiry “did not exist” during the Renaissance, by the 
end of the Sixteenth Century the ability to read what one desired to read (should they have the 
time and means to do so that is), study new areas, have more publication possibilities, and find 
environments for new inventions or experiments became more and more prevalent. By the end 
of the Seventeenth Century, scholars and scientists, at the least, were afforded much more 
freedom of inquiry than ever before. None-the-less, many other people and cultures of 
individuals were left out of such privileges and freedoms, especially all women. 
With these transformations came radical changes in the social, economic, and overall 
psychological development of individuals and cultures. Seventeenth Century Europe in 
particular gained increased tolerance for diverse religious practices, and weakened the 
dominion and influence of religious leaders over large masses of individual beliefs. More 
democratic ideals and diverse scientific practices (a general respect for science) seeped into 
new forms of politics, law, education, and philosophy. An increase in tolerance for diverse 
ideas and cultural practices took shape. Academia too was under attack and radically 
transforming, both internally and from non-academic circles. “The attack on scholasticism's 
barbarous jargon and the argument that its dialectic was irrelevant to genuine human concerns 
were also assertions of a different way of thinking; one that promoted the arts useful to civic 
life and made them central to education and the basis for training new intellectual classes 
outside traditional academic hierarchies.”10 Spinoza was not a professional academic. 
One problem is that we may think we have true knowledge and act on it accordingly, 
when, in fact, we are in error (with an inability to recognize our errors) in reasoning. The 
                                                 
9 Grendler, “Printing and Censorship,” 53. 
10 Cesare Vasoli, “The Renaissance Concept of Philosophy,” in Cambridge History to Renaissance Philosophy, ed. 
Charles Schmitt et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1988), 59. 
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ability to reason well with ideational force is not the same as simply having the ability to 
reason. It is one thing to be able to use reason, to have the right to do something because one 
has the power to do so, but it is something else all-together to be able to use reason well, 
efficiently, and in creative ways which affect multiple individuals and not only ourselves. As 
Spinoza writes in the TP: 
We are not asserting that everything that is done by right is also done in the best way, it 
is one thing to till a field by right, another thing to till it in the best way. It is one thing, I 
say, to defend oneself, to preserve oneself, to give judgment, etc., by right, another thing 
to defend and preserve oneself in the best way and to give the best judgment.11 
 
In many ways, most individuals use reasoning daily in trying to persevere in their 
existence. One way to enhance the capacity to reason well would be to learn about how 
adequate knowledge is generated and recognized. This call to enhancement includes the ability 
to recognize that we are embodied individuals embedded within a social context and community 
of which we can be affected by other bodies and ideas continuously. This kind of learning is 
complex and more difficult, but it is one that involves a proto-physics of force and motion in 
producing powerful, singular effects.12 The Ethics 4p37s2 and Letter 50 are good examples 
which demonstrate that seeking your own advantage for preservation is only compatible to your 
survival and experience of joy if, and only if, others around you are acting rationally.13 
Therefore, the more we surround ourselves with others who value the use of rationality, the 
more we have a better chance of not only surviving, but also ensuring that we are living in the 
best ways possible. There is a better way to preserve oneself by using rational power regularly. 
The discovery of, and empirical evidence for, various laws of nature changed the face of 
                                                 
11 Spinoza, Tractatus Politicus, trans. Sam Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 5: 699.  
12 Spinoza was very interested in physics, evident by his deep concentration on Rene Descartes’ work in PP. 
13 Spinoza, Ethics, 4p37s2: 135-136. This is also one reason why some who have written on Spinoza found ways to 
justify acts of suicide, such as A. Kiarina Kordela argues in Spinoza Now (2011). I have an alternate reading that 
does not allow for suicide as a rational choice as easily and point to Spinoza’s demonstrations in E4p18s and 4p20s 
for support. 
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science and philosophy at this time. As Early Modern historian, Stephen Gaukroger, writes, 
within philosophical circles there was a pressing need to address the difference between natural 
and supernatural knowledge and experiences in particular.14 The more specific issue was how to 
better understand the relation between activity and matter. If one could not show how matter 
and activity truly go together, as the Aristotelian doctrine was deemed no longer adequate 
enough to fit with the new science of the times, then one would have to resort to more 
supernatural explanations. 
The Netherlands (Holland) experienced the most of every type of change in all domains. 
Spinoza was born into, and fully immersed within, many of these developments. He would be 
condemned as a heretic by his young twenties for reasons still not completely known, and was 
born within the same years as the papal condemnation of Galileo.15 It is in the1630s that the 
doctrines of Copernicus, Galileo, and Descartes, among others, were being read widely, and, as 
a result, causing tremendous turmoil among various intellectual, theological, and political 
circles.16 In less than a decade the world would change forever. In addition, the notions of 
cause and effect in scientific, mathematical, and philosophical circles became much more 
                                                 
14 Stephen Gaukroger, Descartes: an intellectual biography (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 146-152. 
15 It is my belief that the final blow that caused Spinoza’s excommunication was the help he was giving the Society 
of Friends, today known as the Quakers. In 1655 through 1657, Amsterdam witnessed Quaker missionaries sent 
from England by the one of the founders of the Quakers, Margaret Askew Fell Fox. They were sent to have her 
pamphlet, A Loving Salutation, translated from English into both Dutch and Hebrew. Spinoza had many friends who 
were both Quaker missionaries and of the Mennonite religion. He also befriended several Quaker missionaries. In 
1656, the year Spinoza would be excommunicated, it was well known that the new religion of the Quakers were 
preparing to distribute their literature widely, literature which included many details of living which were against 
Jewish doctrine. By 1657, over seventy translated Quaker pamphlets (in Hebrew) were distributed throughout 
Amsterdam. To date, no scholar knows why Spinoza was excommunicated with any certainty so my interpretation is 
as viable as others.   
16 Jonathan Israel, The Dutch Republic (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 582-583. Israel writes, “Dutch freedom was real 
but had stringent limits.” In an article from 2009, Simon Duffy writes, “What Israel contends is that 'the 
Enlightenment should be understood as a series of protracted struggles between a host of political and religious 
authorities, on the one hand, and four competing philosophical systems – Cartesianism, Newtonianism, Leibnizian-
Wolffism, and Spinozist-radicalism – on the other. The spectre of Spinozist radicalism at the center of European 
culture in this period is treated by Israel not only as an immanent intellectual danger but also as an active 
philosophical movement.” 
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pressing. As Jonathan Israel writes: 
The mechanistic world-view, a mode of abstraction whereby all worldly reality is 
reducible to terms of extension, mass, and movement which can be expressed 
mathematically, first emerged in the years around 1630 in the minds of Rene Descartes 
(1596-1650) and [Isaac] Beeckman [In Holland]...The war of Cartesianism and 
Aristotelianism now pervaded not only the whole of Dutch science, philosophy, and 
theology but was beginning to invade civic politics and the confrontation of party-
factions, not only within city council, and university, but also the States, consistory, and 
beyond...Cartesianism was thus now inseparable from the general ideological and 
political battle in progress in Utrecht and therefore the Republic.17 
 
Everyone had to take a stand on what part of Cartesianism they either agreed or disagreed with 
during the very years Spinoza was a child and adolescent. Cartesianism was everywhere. 
 Spinoza relied on a version of Euclidean geometry as a respected method of doing 
philosophy to write the Ethics and had a rather nice library, including many books in the 
history of philosophy, theology, and science. There is considerable debate as to what his use of 
the geometric method entails specifically, as well as how he altered this method and 
incorporated algebraic thinking developed by Descartes into this system. Benno Artmann has 
complicated this issue, writing that the name Euclid is ambiguous: “On the one hand, it means 
the author of the Elements who lived about 300 B.C.E. On the other hand, 'Euclid' stands for a 
collection of mostly unknown Greek mathematicians who lived between 500 and 300 B.C.E. 
And contributed most of the material contained in the Elements...”18 Further, Artmann 
references a statement by Proclus that the author(s) of the Elements “avoided proportion.”19  
                                                 
17 Israel, The Dutch Republic, 583, 585. Nature cannot be explained by only mathematics for Spinoza because its 
combinations and expressions are infinite, as one example. In the Appendix to E1 he writes, “And besides 
mathematics, we can assign other causes also...” 
18 Benno Artmann, Euclid-The Creation of Mathematics (New York: Springer, 1999), xvi.  
19 Ibid. 141. Artmann also writes, “It has always been a mystery why Euclid started all over again in Book VII with a 
theory of proportion for numbers (p. 130).” Considering the definitions of Book V of Euclid's, a book that is 
considered very different from all the other books (“Book V is much more abstract... Its propositions apply to various 
kinds of magnitudes like lines, surfaces, solids...”), it is fun to wonder if what Spinoza meant by ratio was something 
other than logos, something closer to a magnitude between equal values of force or power which can then be 
measured as proportions? One reason is because of how difficult it would be to measure any continually shifting 
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If this is true, then it is another way to show that, although Spinoza may have relied on a 
Euclidean geometric method in ways later influenced by Galen (emphasizing definition, 
analysis, and synthesis), it was not his intention to rely solely on a form of geometry as the 
only means for the deductive, synthetic force of his arguments.  
What Spinoza seems to have appreciated was the axiomatic method of definition used 
by Euclid, but only as a starting point. One cannot mathematize human creativity and novelty, 
for example. Therefore, some form of genetic definitions is required. Ursula Renz supports 
this view when, in a 2012 interview, she comments: 
Spinoza is always very clear about the implications of a certain claim for claims in other 
fields. Hence I do not think that the systematicity of Spinoza’s works is simply due to 
his usage of the geometrical method. On the contrary, his usage of the geometrical 
method is, in my view, a matter of the exposition of this systematicity, rather than of 
proof. Still, his usage of this method shows that he had a firm idea of how things cohere 
with each other.20 
 
How things cohere with each other is an element of demonstration and clarity that we can also 
find, in certain respects, in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics and in Cicero, both who also 
influenced Spinoza to some degree. Nonetheless, as Gilles Deleuze has written, Spinoza's 
geometric method produces a sort of immanent methodology because words, being a part of 
imaginative partial knowledge, are not themselves representative of reality as much as they are 
a way reality is expressed. This is why some believe Spinoza is a productive nominalist. Consider 
how far Christopher Long takes this in a 2001 essay when he concludes: 
The geometrical mode of presentation lends an aura of necessity to the systematic 
strategy and tends to eclipse the rhetorical strategy that functions as a critique of 
                                                                                                                                                             
relation between magnitudes which effect each other? Reference to a static type of measurement would be 
mathematically impossible for continually shifting magnitudes, but ideas about proportions of force could work well.  
Perhaps Spinoza is not too far from Aristotle's sentiments about what mathematics cannot capture, as Carla Rita 
Palmerino points out briefly in her article “Galileo's and Gassendi's Solutions to the Rota Aristotelis Paradox: A 
Bridge Between Matter and Motion Theories.” There Palmerino cites Aristotle's De anima 1.1, Metaphysica 2.2, and 
De caelo 3.8 in footnote 3 as such evidence  
20 Ursula Renz, “After Spinoza: wiser, freer, happier,” interview by Richard Marshall, 3:AM Magazine, September 
17, 2012, http:www.3ammagazine.com/3am/after-spinoza-wiser-freer-happier/2/ 
 12 
Cartesian dualism. To this extent, the systematic strategy itself functions rhetorically. 
On the other hand, to the extent that any seventeenth-century attempt to establish a 
monistic system would inevitably have had to involve a critique of Cartesian dualism, 
the rhetorical strategy itself functions systematically. Thus, although two distinct 
strategies are simultaneously discernible in the opening passages of the Ethics, the two 
work together, each arguing on a different front, to establish Spinoza’s monism. By 
focusing on the rhetorical side of this double strategy, the underlying nature of 
Spinoza’s critique of Descartes can be clarified and certain gaps in the systematic, 
geometrical argument for monism can be explained.21 
 
We might ask what the metaphysical status of language is in the Ethics if words are a part of 
imaginative knowledge and cannot be said to “represent” reality. It seems the content of the 
definitions must be capable of being demonstrated in a deductive manner, but what is the 
nature of this level of demonstration when the knowledge we acquire is also being expressed 
corporeally through the use of words? It seems the process of adequate concept construction 
and our understanding of the causal processes and natural phenomena involved are profoundly 
intertwined. In this way, different definitions of causality have room to logically emerge.22 
This is, as we will read, exactly what Spinoza asks us to consider, to approach ever closer to 
adequately understanding more and more natural phenomena. It is of our essence to generate 
more powerful, useful, and creatively intense knowledge in this way. That knowledge, in turn, 
is also a real experience and, therefore, an expression of natural phenomena, including the joy 
and pleasure such knowledge produces. 
This is a good place to consider other important figures from the history of philosophy 
                                                 
21 Christopher Long, “The Rhetoric of the Geometric Method: Spinoza's Double Strategy,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 
54, no. 4 (2001): 292-307. 
22 Spinoza, TIE, trans. Sam Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992), 25-26. In the KV (part 1), we read, “First of all, then, 
they say that a correct definition must consist of a 'genus' and 'differentia.' Now, although all the Logicians admit this, 
I do not know where they get it from. And, to be sure, if this must be true, then we can know nothing whatever. For if 
it is through a definition consisting of genus and differentia that we can first get to know a thing perfectly, then we can 
never know perfectly the highest genus, which has no genus above it. Now then: If the highest genus, which is the 
cause of all our knowledge of all other things, is not known, much less, then, can the other things be understood or 
known which are explained by that genus...” As we will read in chapter two, language is part of imaginative, partial 
knowledge. We use language to formulate definitions for our understanding. If we classify things according to genus, 
Spinoza is worried, then we will have to logically admit there is a highest genus yet we will not be able to define or 
understand it even when named. This is a significant logical inconsistency for Spinoza. 
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with which Spinoza was familiar. His system differs in significant ways from Aristotle's natural 
philosophy and theory of substantial forms, as well as the relation of natural philosophy to 
human motivation, knowledge, and ethics, as is evident in comments made in the PPD and 
preface to the TTP. 23 In addition, for Aristotle, a scientific explanation about the structure of 
nature that relies on a discourse common to all would be more about metaphysics than 
physics.24 This is not the case for Spinoza. This is indeed the shift we see in vocabulary in the 
Seventeenth Century, a shift away from more metaphysical definitions to those of natural 
science and terms of the new physics. Dan Selcer notes the transition from the meaning of the 
terms in the metaphysics of Scholasticism to new meanings of the same terms in the Early 
Modern period combining metaphysics with physics: 
As the Scholastic-Aristotelian language of potentia and dynamis is reinscribed within a 
vocabulary of force and power organized by the newly emerging science of dynamics, a 
fundamental metaphysical shift takes place. While several terms of the vocabulary 
remain the same, their significations change. What for the Scholastics designated the 
essential passivity of matter in contrast to its activated form or the various modalities of 
its operation, becomes a systematic language for describing a world of bodies in motion 
that is fundamentally and fully active. This transformation of vocabulary means that 
seventeenth-century materialisms writ large...do not seek to escape from metaphysics as 
such, but rather to transform it.25 
 
According to Peg Rawes, Spinoza's system also differs from Greek philosophies, particularly 
from the Stoics, in two significant ways: “first, because it is an ontology of absolute 
affirmation, and second, because nature is not just subsumed to intellectual forms of 
discursivity. Spinoza therefore transforms the disembodied Stoic forms of intellectual 
geometric knowledge into embodied geometric figures (that is, bodies, emotions and corporeal 
                                                 
23 See Spinoza's Appendix to the PPD and Letter 56 for additional support as well. Unlike Aristotle, Spinoza did not 
believe common notions arise from a character of our soul as another example. 
24 John Fitzgerald, “‘Matter’ in nature and the knowledge of Nature…” in The Concept of Matter in Greek and 
Medieval Philosophy (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 1965), 61.  
25 Dan Selcer, Philosophy and the Book: Early Modern Figures of Material Inscription (New York: Continuum, 
2010), 103. Dr. Selcer used Spinoza’s system to affect and alter my education and intellectual developement as I 
will demonstrate in the following chapters. Learning Spinoza with good teachers can affirmatively change lives. 
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experience) so that both the human subject and the geometric figure are understood to be 
nature in process.”26  
In the geometric style of the Ethics, Spinoza employs some of Euclid's method but not 
the exact form. This coheres logically if the above observations are correct. Euclid, for 
example, believed that beginning with general definitions is not adequate enough and could 
weaken a system, whereas for Spinoza this type of beginning is permissible. There is some 
evidence for Spinoza's critique of Euclid's method in his dismissal of those who believe the 
latter's proofs substantially influence complete measurements found in E2p40s2.27 Then again, 
Piet Steenbakkers writes, in reference to a passage in the TEI on reflexive knowledge and 
method (including a footnote that the terms geometry and mathematics are not 
interchangeable): 
...virtually all seem to agree that the geometrical (or mathematical) order is to be 
understood as a method, rather than as a form... I would suggest here that it is expedient 
to distinguish between Spinoza's method on the one hand, and the geometrical form he 
gave to some of his writings on the other... Method, as a technical term, has a history of 
its own in early modern philosophy and science... For an understanding of Spinoza's 
notion of method, we must take into account the crucial Cartesian development of this 
theme. It is in this climate that Spinoza's conception of method is to be situated.28 
 
I will return to the important question of method throughout the thesis.  
By his young twenties, Spinoza was highly versed in several of the new works in 
science, theology, mathematics, and philosophy. He had inherited and then abandoned his 
father's shipping business, began writing original works of philosophy as well as theological and 
political criticism, and became known by 1661 not only for his expert lens grinding, but also as 
                                                 
26 Peg Rawes, Spinoza Beyond Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh, 2012), 73. 
27 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p40s2, 57. 
28 Piet Steenbakkers, Spinoza's Ethica from manuscript to print... (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1994), 148, 150. 
Steenbakkers continues, “In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the concept of method is determined by the 
central position of the twin concepts analysis and synthesis.” 
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someone building actual microscopes and telescopes.29 By this time he was also condemned as a 
heretic by the Jewish community surrounding him, but “Spinoza was always deeply offended by 
the accusation that he was an atheist.”30 The condemnation would not stop Spinoza from 
investigating the truth. Ken Clatterbaugh notes, “Spinoza’s views were well known in Europe 
by 1665.”31 The concept of atheism in the Seventeenth Century “has no bearing on the existence 
of or belief in God which is rather the content of the contemporary idea of atheism. When the 
theologians of the seventeenth century speak of atheism, they are not referring to someone who 
doesn't believe in God... They are referring rather to someone who does not believe in the God 
of revelation...”32 The decade following his ex-communication was the beginning of a lifelong 
productive period. Benedictus, the heretic, kept busy. 
 Many other important thinkers of this time period had access to libraries, publishers, and 
circles of friends to compare ideas with, but not everyone was as fortunate. What became so 
important for Spinoza was to create a system that was not only a new way of thinking about 
essence, existence, man, and nature, or all that is as natural, but to include in such a system that 
which can assist us in the increased capacity to think for ourselves by learning how to recognize 
types of knowledge with more logical force and efficiency. In this way, Spinoza was 
significantly influenced by Descartes' methods. For example, as Dan Selcer writes:  
Descartes' claim is not merely that we can be aware of our own ignorance, but that this 
ignorance is a decisive and definitive aspect of methodological thinking in general...the 
subordination of limitation and finitude to method does more than this. It also 
instantiates the necessity by which methodological thinking turns back on itself; 
reflexively inventorying its own capacity for thought, method's first task soon becomes 
                                                 
29 Steven Nadler, Spinoza: A Life (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1999), 182. Nadler’s is the most extensive and accurate 
biography of Spinoza to date. 
30 Ibid. 246. “Spinoza's sensitivity to the charge of atheism was one of the motivating factors behind his decision to 
put aside the Ethics for a while in order to compose a treatise on theological and political matters (246).”  
31 Ken Clatterbaugh, The Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy 1637-1739 (London: Routledge, 1999), 130. 
32 Simon Duffy, “Spinoza Today…” in Spinoza Now, ed. Dimitris Vardoulakis (Minnesota: Minnesota, 2011), 119. 
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its self-articulation.33 
 
As I will demonstrate, Spinoza's dynamic epistemology also emphasizes method, learning how 
to develop and better recognize the power of reflexive knowledge between the three types of 
knowledge we are capable of having (imaginative, rational, intuitive).  
For Spinoza there are no simple ideas, but only relations between combinations of types 
of ideas. As Alexandre Lefebvre writes, “For Spinoza there are no simple (i.e., noncomposite) 
bodies; likewise, thanks to his doctrine of parallelism, there are no simple noncomposite minds 
or ideas.”34 One can turn to E1ax3 for support. As social beings, we need other ideas and 
interactions in order for our finite ideas and actions to unfold or be fully comprehended. This 
does not entail that we all have the same innate ideas. Descartes' influence on Spinoza is, at 
times, a difficult subject to address adequately, but Ursula Renz sums up that influence nicely: 
Descartes is an epistemological fundamentalist, and his rationalism is tied up with what 
is also called ‘innativism’. He thinks that in order to acquire true knowledge we have to 
rebuild the whole system of knowledge. In doing this, we have to rely on a few 
indubitable ideas, so called ‘innate ideas’ which are essentially distinct from ideas which 
are either acquired or fictitious. In his early works Spinoza seemed to be impressed by 
Descartes’ epistemology, but later he rejected the idea that we can separate innate ideas 
from acquired or fictitious ideas. Finally, there are differences in their theories of 
emotions which are too numerous to be dealt with here. Nonetheless, we should not 
merely focus on the differences between Descartes and Spinoza, there is also much 
continuity. Many of the differences just mentioned grew out of Spinoza’s attempts to 
further develop Cartesian concepts.35 
 
 
In the TTP and throughout his correspondences, Spinoza demonstrates differences from both 
                                                 
33 Selcer, Philosophy and the Book, 147. “Thus, those capable of striving after good thinking (bona mens) - and this 
includes everyone, according to Descartes - are already locked within an ordered and rule-governed structure of 
thought.” This ordered and rule-governed structure includes errors in reasoning and recognizing those errors as well. 
34 Alexander Lefebvre, The Image of Law: Deleuze, Bergson, Spinoza (Stanford: Stanford, 2008), 203 
35 Renz, 3:AM Magazine, http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/after-spinoza-wiser-freer-happier/2/ 
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Thomas Hobbes and Descartes in various places.36 In the last year of his life, in a letter to 
Tschirnhaus, Spinoza writes, “That is why Descartes is wrong in defining matter through 
Extension; it must necessarily be explicated through an attribute which expresses eternal and 
infinite essence.”37  
One example of where Spinoza agrees with Hobbes can be found in Chapter 16 of the 
TTP . He writes:  
Furthermore, there is nobody who does not desire to live in safety free from fear, as far 
as possible. But this cannot come about as long as every individual is permitted to do 
just as he pleases, and reason can claim no more right than hatred or anger. For there is 
no one whose life is free from anxiety in the midst of feuds...[as] it will become quite 
clear to us, in order to achieve a secure and good life, men had necessarily to unite in 
one body.38  
 
This is what Spinoza calls “the best way” among rational humans. We can read his 
epistemology as the ways in which we understand things and act accordingly. Theo Verbeek 
and Dimitris Vardoulakis have also argued that Spinoza's TTP is influenced in significant ways 
by Hobbes, and, at times, is a direct response to Hobbes.39  
Another important place where Hobbes and Spinoza are similar is in their conception of 
constructive, generative definitions, that is, how definitions must act as efficient causes for our 
chains of rational, adequate ideas.40 The reason I note their similarity here is because the next 
chapters of my thesis will deal with the methodological importance of definitions in Spinoza’s 
                                                 
36 There are important debates regarding Spinoza’s debt to Hobbes, especially regarding what is found in the second 
half of the TTP. A good example is a 2013 conference panel on this influence between Susan James and Dimitris 
Vardoulakis in the resources of the Spinoza Research Network.  
37 Spinoza, Letter 83, 958. As Pierre Macherey also writes, “We see then how laughable it is to present the Spinozist 
‘monism’ as a supersession of Cartesian dualism: the mode of thought put to work by Spinoza produces its effects 
on a completely different terrain, where these old questions of philosophy are simply invalid (106).” This reading 
includes understanding the dynamic epistemology in the form of ‘ways’ of knowing. 
38 Spinoza, TTP, 16: 528. 
39 See Verbeek's Spinoza's Theologico-Political Treatise. Exploring the Will of God (2003) and Vardoulakis' 
seminar discussion “The Politics of the Text: Writing and Singularity,” Spinoza Research Network (2010). 
40 See, for example, Letter 60. In the Sam Shirley translation we read in a footnote that, for Spinoza, definitions 
are constructive. We also read, “Spinoza's understanding of geometrical construction follows closely that of 
Thomas Hobbes (913).” In Hobbes see De Corpore, 1.vi.13. 
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epistemology, but I will not return to the specific influence of Hobbes. It is sufficient enough to 
point to where that influence can be found. In Letter 34, for example, Spinoza is clear how his 
conception of definition functions: 
1. The true definition of each single thing includes nothing other than the simple 
nature of the thing defined. Hence it follows that: 
2. No definition involves or expresses a plurality, or a fixed number of 
individuals, since it involves and expresses only the nature of the thing as it is 
in itself... 
3. There must necessarily be a positive cause of each thing, through which it exists. 
4. This cause must either be placed in the nature and definition of the thing itself 
(because in effect existence belongs to its nature or is necessarily included in it) 
or outside the thing41 
 
Spinoza's ideas about types of definitions are also made clear in Letter 9 to Simon de Vries in 
1663. There, he distinguishes between two forms a definition can take. One form is for a 
definition to describe the essence of something real and, therefore, will automatically be true. The 
other form is what one may start with to make clear what they are about to prove or demonstrate 
after the definition of a thing is hypothesized. Spinoza uses the nature of definition to distinguish 
between formal and objective reality, as Descartes had done before him. We read: 
Therefore a definition either explicates a thing as it exists outside the intellect – and 
then it should be a true definition, differing from a proposition or axiom only in that 
the former is concerned only with the essences of things or the essences of the 
affections of things, whereas the latter has a wider scope, extending also to eternal 
truths – or it explicates a thing as it is conceived by us, or can be conceived. And in 
that case it also differs from an axiom and proposition in requiring merely that it be 
conceived, not conceived as true, as in the case of an axiom.42 
 
Spinoza differentiates himself from the Scholastic view of definitions with regard to 
scholasticism's dependence on proximate genus and specific difference (as already noted in a 
footnote above). He argues that one cannot define the highest genus of Being (this is an 
                                                 
41 Spinoza, Letter 34, 854. Keep in mind that all attributes express substance for Spinoza, and substance is eternal. 
42 Spinoza, Letter 9, 781-782. Further, Spinoza writes, in Chapter Seven of the TTP, “Nature does not give us 
definitions of natural things…the definitions of natural things must be inferred from the diverse actions of nature.” 
Letter 10 is key to understanding the requirements of definitions, which I will return in the next chapter, but it is 
good to recall that our “freedom” is “a mode of affirmation or denial.” The less indifference, the more we are free. 
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impossibility), which also has no differentiation, at least any we can be aware of with 
certainty. We must begin with an approximation of Being (a general definition not in axiomatic 
or propositional form). We begin this way because Being is something complex and perfect 
knowledge of it may not be possible, especially not at the start of our contemplative processes. 
Nonetheless, our knowledge of Being is generative, even if proximate at the start. This is 
because our knowledge of Being, according to Spinoza, is expressive in its existence while we 
gather more true knowledge about it. This includes learning the procedures of adequate 
knowing which are discussed throughout the rest of this thesis.  
The main point is that Spinoza's definitions are affirmative. True definitions relate to 
both Being and particular affirmative essences (i.e. my adequate knowledge which increases 
my conatus). Therefore, they cannot be conceived as negative in any sense, such as the nature 
of specific difference can be. We cannot grasp particulars at the start, but we learn that God or 
Nature, as self-caused and self-causing, generates and expresses those particulars as part of its 
(and our) nature. We learn to understand that our thought is, in some way, inseparable from 
Being and its expressions. As I write in later chapters, Spinoza introduces proximate cause to 
account for the properties of other created things because only Nature (or God), by definition, 
can be both the cause of itself and include its own essence. 
Definitions must be capable of producing all the properties of the thing in question, that 
is, they can also be seen as a cause of ideational effects and corporeal expressions because of 
their force of truth, as well as being expressions of fixed natural laws. As I discuss in the 
following chapters, a system like Spinoza's requires concepts found within metaphysics 
because the system provides our point of departure in order to reach further points of 
understanding about Nature. To deny this is to deny the intelligibility of Being. That which is 
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immanent cannot be understood by using equations of transcendence or teleology, and, 
therefore, the infinite and the finite are one and the same thing. An expression of substance 
can never be a privation for Spinoza because its essence is to always be in existence. That 
which is expressing itself must be in existence.43 As finite modes of substance (modifications), 
we are always expressing ourselves. When we cease to exist as the combination that we are 
now (in finite death) we simply take on a new combination of expressions of substance. 
The above is a definitive break with both Descartes and Hobbes. We also witness some 
of the more specific differences between Hobbes and Spinoza clearly in Letters 21 and 50 of 
Spinoza’s correspondence. In Letter 50 Spinoza writes the following very important 
conceptual distinction when thinking about God or Nature as the same thing: 
...that God can only improperly be called one or single, I reply that a thing can be called 
one or single only in respect of its existence, not of its essence. For we do not conceive 
things under the category of numbers unless they are included in a common class. For 
example, he who holds in his hand a penny and a dollar will not think of the number 
two unless he can apply a common name to the penny and dollar... Hence it is clear 
that a thing can not be called one or single unless another thing has been conceived 
which, as I have said, agrees with it. Now since the existence of God is his very 
essence, it is certain that he who calls God one or single has no true idea of 
God...matter in its totality, considered without limitation, can have no figure...44 
 
Spinoza’s ontology is one of immanence, but to classify it as “one” of anything (substance 
included) is to rely on ideas of number. Such numerical ideas are an aspect of imaginative 
(partial) knowledge as we will read in Chapter Two of this thesis next.45 The ontological truth 
                                                 
43 There is much to be said about some overlaps with Neoplatonic emanationist meatphysics and its influence, 
regions of being, and relations to the finite that thinks Being immanently. Yet, Seventeenth Century thinkers created 
new definitions for terms that cannot be used in direct comparison with older systems. It was the age of rigorous 
scientific thought and Spinoza was at the forefront of creating a bridge between elements of the physics of ideational 
and physical force with a system that included the expression of Nature in each finite modal modification. There is 
nothing negative and there is no privation in his system. God (or Nature) is an immanent cause and not a transitive 
one for Spinoza, that is, a cause that remains in its effects (as in “involves”) but is not exhausted by them. 
44 Spinoza, Letter 50, 892. 
45 As Pierre Macherey writes in his work Hegel or Spinoza, “To say there is a single substance is to speak from the 
imagination that can only consider the absolute negativity, from nothingness, that is from the part of the possible 
which it envelops (104).” 
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concerns the nature of thought and extension (the attributes in their essence) to perceive the 
nature of Being in its expressions. Thus, the truth we express and seek is something other than 
that which is representational in the form of ideas. That is, our ideas are not representations of 
reality. Our ideas are reality in the ways in which they are expressed. I briefly mention this here 
because it is one of the central concerns of Chapter Four of my thesis. 
Letter 64 from Spinoza to Schuler confirms this ontological thesis when Spinoza cites 
E1p10s and how it is related only to the idea we can have of “an absolutely infinite Entity, and 
not from the fact that there are, or may be, entities having three, four, or more attributes.”46 One 
absolute (infinite) entity is an affirmative concept without any lack or measure and, therefore, 
such concepts cannot be applied to it. To posit the lack of any one thing requires a sufficient 
reason why it is lacking this or that. This also coheres with the idea that the attributes, which are 
substance, are frameworks for thinking through and expressing substance and not properties or 
qualities of substance. I mention this here briefly because it is one main point about different 
kinds of definitions that I was referring to above.47 
 It is clear that Spinoza was influenced by both Descartes and Hobbes in certain 
respects, but the former had a unique philosophy of his own. Another way to demonstrate this 
is by pointing to a place where Spinoza differs from Hobbes in other unique ways. Early 
Modern scholar Warren Montag, for example, has written on the similarities and differences 
between Hobbes and Spinoza, particularly regarding their respective views on theological 
matters and textual interpretation. In his work Bodies, Masses, Power, Montag writes that both 
                                                 
46 Spinoza, Letter 64, 919. 
47 As we read in E1p15s, “...there is no vacuum in Nature...all its parts must so concur that there is no 
vacuum...corporeal substance, insofar as it is a substance, cannot be divided (12).” According to Harold Skulsky, the 
concept of a unified monist ontology without real parts of any significant, logical distinction was made by two pre-
Socratic thinkers: Melissus of Samos and Parmenides, as well as can be found briefly in Plato's Theaetetus, but it is 
not clear they can be related to Spinoza's conception as a proto-physics of force using his new definitions. 
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thinkers wrote on Scripture in order to rationally flatten any attempts by religious institutions to 
use such things against the people of a civil and free society. He also writes, “But there the 
similarity ends. Hobbes...spent the last forty years of his life defending absolute monarchy. 
...Hobbes's discussion of religious matters, both doctrinal and institutional, occupies fully half 
of Leviathan, a fact until very recently ignored by commentators...”48  
Montag continues to address the importance of mystery and its role in interpreting 
Scripture for Hobbes, something also different from Spinoza: “...not only is it wrong to interpret 
the Bible [for Hobbes], it is strictly speaking impossible to do so.”51 Whereas, for Spinoza, this 
is completely the opposite, as is evident in the TTP. The only exception is that Spinoza is clear 
throughout his works that one can only understand a text if they are familiar with the language 
and/or correct definitions of the terms being used by the author of the text. Interpreting any text, 
including the Bible, is possible for Spinoza if one addresses the literal textual meanings of what 
is written: “Thus, to return to the theme with which we began our discussion of Spinoza's 
interpretive procedure, the 'parallelism' of nature and Scripture...we see an abandonment of the 
theme, essential to any hermeneutic, or the interior and exterior of Scripture. There is no reserve 
meaning, no residue beyond its surface. Meaning and form coincide exactly in the graphic 
materiality apart from which Scripture has no existence.”49 This is further evidence of the 
collapse of method and form and ontology and epistemology. 
 When we consider Descartes' influence on Spinoza the matter becomes more nuanced, 
especially in light of the method of approaching a text and reading/writing in its materiality and 
corporeality. As for this latter topic, Spinoza and Descartes might have more in common than 
was previously believed in many respects. Daniel Selcer writes, “In the Cartesian context, we 
                                                 
48 Warren Montag, Bodies, Masses, Power: Spinoza and His Contemporaries (New York: Verso, 1999), 17. 
49 Ibid. 19-20. 
 23 
need God to create matter, set it in motion, and establish the laws of nature governing motion... 
Natural order need not be due to the perfection of the created world...all we need is extended 
matter in motion and the persistence of 'ordinary laws of nature.' Together these generate an 
orderly and regular world.”50 As already noted, Spinoza's system is a response to Cartesianism, 
but, as Steven Nadler writes, Spinoza was too original a thinker to be an “uncritical follower” of 
Cartesianism. He was well versed in Descartes' philosophy by the 1650s and found the latter's 
work “liberating” in many ways. In the preface of the PPD, Spinoza held Descartes' intellectual 
capacities in high regard early in his life, being influenced by the totality of Descartes' system. 
Nadler continues, “The new dualistic metaphysical picture of the world that, with the complete 
separation of the mental from the material, provided the foundations for a purely mechanistic 
physics would allow for fruitful, clear, and nonabstruse explanations of the phenomena of 
nature... The unity of the Cartesian scientific enterprise...would promote the quest for certainty 
in various disciplines...”51  
As chapters Three and Four of this thesis will demonstrate, we can start to recognize a type of 
physical mechanics and proto-physics of ideational force in Spinoza’s system if we conceive of 
the mechanics between actions and ideas as those effects which are produced by organic 
combinations of bodies in interaction with each other. We also accomplish this if we conceive of 
physics as those continuous microscopic and macroscopic interactions between parts of bodies 
(and certain kinds of ideas) which create the larger organic arrangements of mechanics in 
expression. It is not hard to consider Spinoza’s scientific mind when we read what Ken 
Clatterbaugh writes when he notes, “Like Descartes, Spinoza was a serious scientist; his work 
in optics was both theoretical and practical. Spinoza was widely respected by his 
                                                 
50 Selcer, Philosophy and the Book, 112. 
51 Nadler, Spinoza, 166, 167. 
 24 
contemporaries for the microscopes and telescopes that he constructed.”52 
Consider what Helen Hattab writes about the renewed study of mechanistic principles of 
nature in the Renaissance leading up to the Early Modern period: “In recasting mechanics as a 
science between mathematics and physics as opposed to an art, these commentators brought to 
the foreground a form of explanation that combined geometrical principles with considerations 
regarding the physical causes of motion.”53 This is yet another reason why I categorize 
Spinoza's system as a type of philosophical physics. Gordon Chalmers writes, “In 1649 Pierre 
Gassendi was to rationalize the new experiments of all sciences under the complete atomic 
system of Epicurus.”54 It is unclear how influential Pierre Gassendi's texts were on Spinoza, but 
we do know the latter greatly admired Greek atomism, including De Rerum Natura by 
Lucretius.55  
Jumping ahead to the movements of the new Western scientific method, in Francis Bacon 
we find the beginning of a formal scientific method and many references to what it is to think 
about true knowledge of the world in a scientific manner. According to Bacon, knowledge is 
power. Gaining true knowledge involves an increase in our intellectual and material power. 
Gassendi, on the other hand, challenges Aristotle's definition “quatenus in potential” for it was 
                                                 
52 Clatterbaugh, The Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy, 129-130. Clatterbaugh continues, “Spinoza went 
beyond the construction of scientific instruments and employed them to observe astronomical bodies as well as 
small bodies in the human blood.” 
53 Helen Hattab, “From Mechanics to Mechanism: The Quaestiones Mechanicae and Descartes' Physics,” in  The 
Science of Nature in the Seventeenth Century, ed.., Peter Anstey et al. (Netherlands: Springer, 2005), 100. There are 
interesting debates about Greek origins in mathematics and the methods employed by philosophers then and now. 
For example, Benno Artmann, in his work on Euclidean geometry, writes, “Mathematicians tend to stress 
isomorphisms; they like to see the same structure in different guises. By contrast, a philologist puts great value on 
expression and literary form. Mathematicians are accustomed to separating the content of a proposition from its 
form of expression, whereas philologists are likely to stress the particularity of different forms of expression (pp. 
146-147).” 
54 Gordon Chalmers, “The Loadstone and the Understanding of Matter…,” Philosophy of Science 4, no. 1 (1937), 
75-95. 
55 It might be noted here that Robert Boyle’s work The Origin of Forms and Qualities re-introducd mechanical 
philosophy with force, including “the belief that changes in the physical realm are best understood in terms of matter 
(corpuscles) in motion and that the physical world is a well-ordered machine.” Ken Clatterbaugh, The Causation 
Debate in Modern Philosophy 1637-1739, 157-158. 
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not logical to him.56 One reason I mention this brief historical point is because there are 
continuous debates within Spinoza scholarship on both the influence of atomism on his 
systematic philosophy and because of debates regarding how similar to (or different from) 
Spinoza was with Aristotelian philosophy. Again, Spinoza’s system is unique and occurs within 
the context of both the new scientific method, as well as versions of scholastic vocabulary that 
he alters. 
Within philosophical circles in the Seventeenth Century novel debates on the nature of 
causality, force, and motion arose with fervor. Ken Clatterbaugh writes, “Aristotle's views on 
causation had a far-reaching effect in the causation debate of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries... [His] idea that the efficient cause is a particular substance creates considerable 
mischief throughout much of the debate, since it runs counter to modern scientific explanations 
that typically identify states of substances as the (efficient) cause.”57  
The topic of causality and matter in motion dominated science and philosophy 
throughout the Sixteenth through Eighteenth Centuries. As Clatterbaugh notes, Descartes 
“represents the beginnings of the modern concern about causation, and he makes a conscious 
effort to transform philosophical thinking about causation. Hume, on the other hand, represents 
the culmination of several tendencies in the debate...”58 
Where Descartes made cause an eternal truth of the universe and the idea of God 
understood as the first cause to which all else are effects, Spinoza's system has several 
variations of ways to think about causality as we will read in the following chapters. More 
                                                 
56 This particular reference to Gassendi is referenced by D. Des Chene in Chapter 2 of the work Physiologia... Des 
Chene also calls Aristotle's definition actus entis in potentia “mysterious” at best. 
57 Clatterbaugh, The Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy, 11.  
58 Ibid. 2-3. Of course, arguments about and systems which rely on issues of causality do not culminate in David 
Hume’s philosophy at all, as is evident in the work of Immanuel Kant, G. W. F. Hegel, and even current debates in 
quantum physics as just a few examples. 
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importantly, Spinoza believes that substance, God, nature, and modal expressions of the laws of 
nature are all immanent in their unfolding; they vary only in their expressions of perfection and 
degrees of power. After, G. W. Leibniz deemed causality a “self-evident logical law” and David 
Hume demonstrated how issues of causation are products of a sensing, perceiving human mind 
(of which real cause and effect processes are, in the end, necessary fictions of the imagination). 
Of course, Immanuel Kant attempted to provide us with a combination of these necessary 
empirical and automatically rational processes of the creation of concepts. Later, G. W. F. Hegel 
would expand our definition of cause and effect to include and subsume each other within their 
otherwise respective definitions, and Bertrand Russell argued in 1913 that advanced sciences 
never employ the term in any seriously useful manner in the contemporary world. For Spinoza, 
every effect involves its cause(s). In addition, as we understand our own power of thought and 
action as an adequate cause, the meaning and definitions of human powered causes and effects 
can alter. 
Two fundamental notions that must be properly understood as always in connection to 
each other in order to consider Spinoza's proto-physics of force and motion are the concepts of 
“cause” and “conatus.” As Ed Curley writes, “...unraveling Spinoza's concept of causation is 
absolutely fundamental to understanding his philosophy...the crucial notion for understanding 
Spinoza's concept of causation is that of a law of nature.”59 As we will read in this thesis, we 
can add to our understanding of causality as well. Curley continues:  
Ordinary thinking about causality identifies the event instantiating the antecedent as the 
cause of the effect. Spinoza's conception of causality regards it as only a partial cause 
and insists that we regard the aspect of reality which the law of nature describes as (at 
least) equally necessary to the occurrence of the effect and, hence (at least) equally 
entitled to be regarded as a cause...Spinoza regarded the series of fixed and eternal 
                                                 
59 Ed Curley, “Donagan's Spinoza,” Ethics 4, no. 1 (1993): 114-134. Curley believes Spinoza's definition of Nature 
can be explained as something more than “the totality of finite things,” but does not go so far as to believe in an 
atomistic conception of Nature. This last conclusion is debatable. 
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things as really a more fundamental cause than the series of singular, changeable 
things...60 
 
God is not a concept which stands alone (as a real thing) causing all other things to occur unless 
the added concept of one organic whole (“Nature”) is paired with it at all times. This is Spinoza’s 
monism. The effects and expressions we find as nature involve their cause, but an eternal undivided 
substance does not fall under a category of numerical distinction.  
One of his primary goals incorporates the new scientific understanding of the universe 
with the structures of human knowledge and actions as laws of Nature. In one of his letters we 
read about his dedication to scientific and philosophical thought, “Deep speculative thought, in 
my view, has nothing to do with Scripture.”61 And, as Herman De Dijn writes, “For a 
seventeenth-century thinker like Spinoza, philosophy was fundamentally the same as science.”62 
The problem becomes what concept of “God” is best to use with the concept of “cause?” How 
would they both work alongside laws of Nature and the dynamics of human psychology at the 
same time, especially if such a system is absent of teleology or an anthropomorphic God? This 
is not a new concern in the history of philosophy, but how Spinoza handles it is novel. Steven 
Nadler writes: 
Questions about the nature of causal relations occupy a central position in early modern 
philosophy. The prominence of this topic in seventeenth-and eighteenth-century thought 
can, in large measure, be traced to a specific historical problem: the need to reconcile an 
emerging scientific view of the natural world – mechanistic physics – with traditional 
beliefs about the relation between God and his creation.63 
 
The order we find in Nature, for Spinoza, will include what it is for finite individuals to 
                                                 
60 Curley, “Donagan's Spinoza,” 126. 
61 Spinoza, Letter 21, 827. 
62 Herman De Dijn, Spinoza: The Way to Wisdom (Chicago: Purdue, 1996), introduction. 
63 Steven Nadler, Causation in Early Modern Philosophy (State College: PSU, 1993), introduction. Spinoza seems to 
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gain and express clear and distinct knowledge with increasing force and activity. This is only 
possible, at least at first, if one develops the ability to think axiomatically (analytically and 
synthetically) in a deductive manner about the definitions of God, Nature, attribute, mode, 
human essence, and perseverance. Spinoza writes in the TTP that an idea about God's existence 
“is not self-evident,” and, therefore, axiomatic truths of logical deduction are necessary for a 
finite mind to adequately understand both the essence and existence of God (as Nature). 
Axiomatic truths of logical deduction are necessary, and these truths and deductions are “so 
firm and incontrovertible that there can neither be, nor be conceived, any power that could call 
them into question.”64 At first glance, this sounds like an appeal to a type of mathematical 
certainty, but how can one put human passions and the imagination into an exact mathematical 
formula? As this thesis will discuss, we become the adequate causes of our transformations if 
we understand these relations in the right way, but we are neither completely free of the 
passions nor of imaginative knowledge (as sense perception, language, memory etc.). In E4p4, 
for example, we read, “The power by which singular things (and consequently any man) 
preserve their being is the power itself of God, or Nature (by 1P24C), not insofar as it is 
infinite, but insofar as it can be explained through the man's actual essence (by 3P7). The 
man's power, therefore...is part of God's or Nature's infinite power, that is (by 1P34), of its 
essence.”65 In other words, God is Nature. 
 Because the actions of thought (intellectual affections and patterns) and extension 
(ratios of motion and rest) are simultaneous for Spinoza, and because our understanding of 
what definitions constitute is involved in how we continue to comprehend cause and effect, 
what becomes important to focus on is how we understand enduring patterns of motion and 
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rest in our habits of both thought and extension. This understanding increases or decreases our 
power to exist and thrive (our conatus). Thus, our understanding of the ontological and the 
epistemological collapse can be understood adequately as one organic whole, especially if our 
only reference in the attribute of thought are our own singular chains of ideas. 
If there is no real concept of causality except that which is applicable to particular things 
(because of the collapse of ontology with epistemology), then Spinoza's insistence that there is 
no causality between the attributes (which are fixed, eternal expressions of natural laws) 
becomes intriguing. I address why exactly in the following chapters in depth. This insight is 
especially important in light of the Dutch translation used during Spinoza's life of inblijvende 
oorzaak for causa immanens –“a cause which remains in its effects” – if particular (singular) 
things and their essence are understood as the effects of Nature's laws. If these effects are our 
knowledge (and what we gather other forms of knowledge from), then one cannot conclude that 
Spinoza was an epistemological naturalist (or that he was not one).  
Spinoza extracts and produces real knowledge using experience (imagination) and 
combining it with knowledge from reason (second kind of knowing) into one formulation of 
conceptual force. And, although each kind of knowledge is distinct, they are combined to create 
more powerful effects if one understands how to apply such combinations with more force and 
creativity or efficiency. Concepts are never simple. They are complex combinations and 
arrangements of various types of knowledge at once. To be an epistemic naturalist, Spinoza 
would have to reduce all knowledge claims to scientific fact. As much as his system was 
influenced by both mathematics and the scientific method, he does not reduce all human 
knowledge and experience to scientific fact alone.  
To combine cause with conatus in the way Spinoza does is an original contribution to 
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philosophy, as I will demonstrate in chapters Three through Five. His notion of conatus and the 
affects are central to the Ethics. In addition, his doctrine of the passions and their balance with 
reasoning capacities is also unique, although influenced by Descartes' category of the passions 
specifically. Spinoza seems to have interpreted Descartes's work with his own system already in 
mind, yet is very clear in the PPD that he feels he understands Descartes correctly. One 
significant claim that Spinoza will continue to work with (although alter) which is also found in 
Descartes's system includes that the “chief rule [for Descartes] was to enumerate the simple 
ideas out of which all others are compounded and to scrutinize each one separately. For when he 
could perceive simple ideas clearly and distinctly, he would doubtless understand with the same 
clarity and distinctness all the other ideas compounded from those simple ideas.”66  
What a “clear and distinct idea” is defined and understood as in the Early Modern period 
seems to shift in description from earlier philosophical systems. According to Stephen 
Gaukroger, for Descartes, the better we become at intuitive knowing (which includes a form of 
strong image-making coupled with an analysis of rational deductions), the more reliable our 
deductive processes will be as a result.67 This sounds very similar to what we find in Spinoza, 
but in a completely different material expression of force between types of knowing. That is, 
Spinoza defines substance very differently from Descartes. Ideas are not expressions of matter 
in the material sense but are of “substance” conceived as force and motion occurring 
simultaneously among respective attributes. Clear and distinct ideas in Descartes, according to 
Gaukroger, are not to be understood in relation to their external causes, though this is not true 
for Spinoza in the same way. Where these two thinkers truly differ is on the definition of matter 
and the expression of matter in motion. Yet, both overlap in their epistemological agreement to 
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some degree. For example, they agree that we must find the best way that we are capable of by 
recognizing not only the simplest elements of things in our most powerful, deductive ideas, but 
also discovering the best method for gaining true knowledge.68 The topic of method is crucial 
because, for example, in Spinoza’s epistemology we discover that our mind does not have 
ideas, it is ideas. Therefore, having only one single (simple) idea without any other ideas 
accompanying it is an impossibility in Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology. 
Further, in Spinoza we find that the internal/external distinction, especially where it 
involves the nature of which cause is responsible for which effect, will dissipate. Laws of 
Nature include external causes, but they also include what we might think of as internal causes 
as well, yet all is one substance. For Descartes, we are to focus on strengthening our personal, 
internal method of the most efficient analysis of information. In Spinoza, by contrast, we learn 
that with an increased power of rational thought we are able to become more aware of the 
chains of causal connections between our ideas with more force. The awareness of rational force 
is a kind of vividness or distinctness in recognition and power. It is a synthesis of types of 
knowledge. As I explore in later chapters, Spinoza is much more interested in what it means to 
synthesize knowledge in order to create larger, more powerful bodies of ideas. He uses the term 
“bodies,” but this notion is not meant to designate material borders of separate entities (although 
it can mean this when needed as well). The concept of “body,” among other things, designates 
constant transformations of ratios of motion and rest between varying interactions in Nature and 
different kinds of bodies. Further, without ideational synthesis between types of knowledge, the 
increased power of rational thought is not possible. The synthesis itself creates more power 
because it is a combination of increasingly adequate knowledge into one body of homeostatic 
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expression continually in motion with greater force. 
In this and other ways, Spinoza’s system is not a historical continuation of the unfolding 
of rationality from Descartes' system to his own. Still, Spinoza did refine and respond to 
Descartes' epistemology, as did many of his time. As Pierre Macherey writes:  
The geometric 'translation' that Spinoza gives Cartesian philosophy is thus not a way of 
saying the same thing in another way: it is even then a way of taking a position to 
distance himself in relation to it. The Ethics, in which Spinoza develops a philosophical 
content completely different from that of the Cartesian system, is itself ordine 
geometrico demonstrata, that is, argued synthetically, in a progression that goes from 
cause to effects.69 
 
If we are speaking about only “method,” then they both believe in synthesis through analysis, 
but, as Gaukroger writes, Descartes's rejection of deductive synthesis was specific to that 
Aristotelian tradition passed down to him of using a certain kind of syllogistic logic in order to 
produce and convince oneself of their clear and distinct knowledge: 
Syllogistic [reasoning] relies on rules imposed from the outside, in Descartes' view, 
whereas his rules are designed to capture an internal process which operates with a 
criterion of truth and falsity that is beyond question. This is that we accept as true all and 
only that of which we have a 'clear and distinct' perception... Descartes' advocacy of 
analysis at the expense of synthesis is an extremely important feature of his method, for 
it amounts to the advocacy of a problem-solving approach as the method of discovery, 
and the rejection of a deductive approach… Synthesis, on the other hand, shows how a 
solution is to be derived from first principles...70 
 
The question of the production of certain knowledge is what is at issue above. There is a 
difference between learning the rules for expressing and demonstrating what one knows as 
compared to what it is to produce something well. Spinoza's method is more about synthesis 
between types of knowledge and their corresponding motions or arrangements in ways that 
enhance one's capacity for more adequate knowing and more intense forms of expression.71  
                                                 
69 Pierre Macherey, Hegel or Spinoza, trans. Susan Ruddick (Minneapolis: Minnesota, 2011), 55. 
70 Gaukroger, Descartes…, 117, 124, 125. 
71 For similarities between the two on the importance of the method of analysis and synthesis see Dan Selcer's work 
Philosophy and the Book... already noted in this chapter. 
 33 
 There are other major differences from Descartes that should be addressed in this 
opening chapter. Spinoza, unlike Descartes, does not have a notion of substance dualism in any 
respect. Free will and the soul are illusions for him as well, but “free necessity” is something 
that is what all of Nature does: “...that thing is free which exists and acts solely from the 
necessity of its own nature... So you see that I place freedom, not in free decision, but in free 
necessity.”72 He differs starkly from Descartes in this respect. “Descartes, for example, believed 
that if the freedom of the human being is to be preserved, the soul must be exempt from the 
kind of deterministic laws that rule over the material universe.”73 In a letter to Oldenburg, 
Spinoza writes that “the will differs from this or that volition in the same way as...humanity 
differs from this or that human being...the will is nothing more than a mental construction (ens 
rationis), it can in no way be said to be the cause of this or that volition. Particular volitions, 
since they need a cause to exist, cannot be said to be free...”74  
As well, Spinoza's concept of the first kind of knowledge of the imagination must be 
classified as real ideas, however partial or inadequate. This is not always the case for Descartes 
according to certain interpretations. In addition, Richard Popkin writes that although Spinoza 
was influenced by Descartes, they differ greatly on the nature of essence (and substance) in 
particular.75 Our mind, for example, is not an independent substance for Spinoza, as it is for 
Descartes. Our mind (as ideas) is about our body and its affections, but this interaction of 
concepts and processes (as an affect) will result in that which is also in relation to our adequate 
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conception of God and Nature in original ways.76 Spinoza is clear how he feels about Descartes 
in this respect in a letter to Oldenburg in late 1661: 
Secondly, you ask me what errors I see in the philosophy of Descartes and Bacon. In 
this request, too, I shall try to oblige you, although it is not my custom to expose the 
errors of others. The first and most important error is this, that they have gone far astray 
from knowledge of the first cause and origin of all things. Second, they have failed to 
understand the true nature of the human mind. Thirdly, they have never grasped the true 
cause of error. Only those who are completely destitute of all learning and scholarship 
can fail to see the critical importance of true knowledge of these three points.77 
 
Clearly Spinoza was interested in demonstrating how the concept of substance can act as a 
first cause for all effects to follow, but first causes are not the issue. The point is that Spinoza 
felt his understanding and development of a theory of knowledge was novel in comparison to 
some of the influential epistemological systems of his time. 
 How, then, can Spinoza incorporate any metaphysics into his otherwise substance 
monism which is one organic, infinitely moving and transforming whole? What this 
metaphysics is understood as is still an important debate in Early Modern scholarship. Is it 
pantheism, as so many have claimed, or something more spiritually related? Spinoza notes 
specifically in Letter 73 that he is not a pantheist. He writes that his treatise on theology and 
politics (the TTP) does not identify God with Nature, by which his critics of such claims 
tended to includes “mass-matter disposed into bodies...” On this assumption, Spinoza writes, 
“they have gone totally astray.”78 These are absolutely telling passages for understanding all of 
Spinoza's works. He is clearly stating that he is not a materialist. That is, his concept of 
substance cannot be defined as (or reduced to) actual physical matter.  
 Spinoza's materially dynamic system of motion and force (as a system of effects) 
continues to be relevant for our understanding of Nature, including human nature, today. We 
                                                 
76 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p11: 13. Also, for his argument against dualism one can see E2p7 and 3p2. 
77 Spinoza, Letter 2, 762. 
78 Spinoza, Letter 73, 942. 
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can achieve more adequate understanding with the support of the most recent interdisciplinary 
scholarship on what it is to learn something, as well as what it is to use the imagination in 
increasingly powerful and rationally productive ways. In Chapter 4 of the TTP we read, 
“...everything in Nature involves and expresses the conception of God in proportion to its 
essence and perfection; and therefore we acquire a greater and more perfect knowledge of God 
as we gain more knowledge of natural phenomena.”79 The more we learn about Nature and 
ourselves as natural phenomena the more we gain perfect knowledge of God. The more we gain 
perfect knowledge of God, the more we are expressing God's (and Nature's) power at that 
moment. There is a distinctly non-teleological, yet metaphysical character in all of Spinoza's 
epistemology. As Beth Lord writes, “...to call Spinoza a materialist would ignore the central 
place of immaterial ideas in his system.”80  
Dan Selcer agrees, writing that Spinoza's conception of materiality includes 
understanding that “...in the physical, metaphysical, and political registers materiality must be 
understood as a dynamic, dispositional theory of constitutive motion rather than as a 
straightforward thesis of the reducibility of sensible entities to their micro-level physical 
constituents.” Selcer continues that Spinoza's dynamic materialism includes:  
…the position that nature may be explicated by reference to bodies conceived as 
complex patterns of movement as well as equally complex and constantly mutating 
articulations of a power or force to act and to exist... It does not dispense with 
immaterial objects such as ideas and minds, but it does involve the claim that nature (or 
being) is fully explicable from the perspective of matter conceived as productive 
power.81 
 
The above sentiment is carried on throughout the rest of the TTP and several of Spinoza's other 
works. It is also consistent with what is found in the Ethics more systematically as I will 
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demonstrate in the following chapters. In a footnote to Chapter 6 of the TTP, Spinoza reminds 
us, “Here, by Nature, I do not mean simply matter and its modifications, but infinite other 
things besides matter.”82 Clearly Spinoza's notion of substance is not restricted to ideas about 
matter as material/physical substance, but is more about the relationships between bodies in 
motion (physics) and the production of adequate forms and uses of knowledge (ideas as 
effects). Even more intriguing is a comment Spinoza makes in Letter 75 in 1675 (two years 
before his death) to Henry Oldenburg when he writes, “...do we petty men have such an 
understanding of Nature that we can determine how far its force and power extend, and what is 
beyond its power?”83 Spinoza wanted us to interpret his system according to the language most 
relied on by philosophers and scientists of his day only, including the new ways various terms 
(such as “substance”) could be re-defined.  
Descartes, for example, in his efforts to transform our thinking about causation, seems 
to be very clear about the power of the intellect and use of rationality in his conclusions in the 
third meditation of his Meditations on First Philosophy, and in his replies to Arnauld's 
objections of his system. Descartes' position on the nature of all ideas includes: 
...the mode of being by which a thing exists objectively <or representatively> in the 
intellect by way of an idea, imperfect though it may be, is certainly not nothing, and so it 
cannot come from nothing. And although the reality which I am considering in my ideas 
is merely objective reality, I must not on that account suppose that the same reality need 
not exist formally in the causes of my ideas, but that it is enough for it to be present in 
them objectively... And although one idea may perhaps originate from another, there 
cannot be an infinite regress here; eventually one must reach a primary idea, the cause of 
which will be like an archetype which contains formally <and in fact> all the reality <or 
perfection> which is present only objectively <or representatively> in the idea. So it is 
clear to me...that the ideas in me are like <pictures or> images which can easily fall short 
of the perfection of the things from which they are taken...84 
                                                 
82 Spinoza, TTP, 6: 446. 
83 Spinoza, Letter 75, 946. 
84 Rene Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. John Cottingham et al. (New York: Cambridge, 
1984), 3:29. In Meditation Six, Descartes also writes, “…for by ‘nature,’ taken generally, I understand nothing other 
than God himself or the ordered network of created things which was instituted by God.” 
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It is clear in this passage that Descartes is distinguishing between the ideas he has about things and the 
perfection of things themselves. He is using a concept of representation in a way Spinoza does not use. 
We can have an adequate idea, for example, of what an infinite mode is in Spinoza's system, 
and this idea cannot possibly be an image. Ed Curley writes, “It is a striking feature of 
Spinoza's ontology that his infinite modes seem to have no analogue in Cartesian ontology... 
[Descartes] makes no distinction between infinite and finite modes.”85 The above passage 
shows that Descartes believed our modes of finite thinking (in the form of ideas) are imperfect 
in some way, but that they have derived from a perfect “primary idea” whose formal essence is 
in them objectively. Yet, can we conclude that Descartes and Spinoza differ here completely? 
In some ways I think we can. Take, for example, what Spinoza writes about modes in the 
opening of the Ethics. In 1p8s2 he is clear: 
But if men would attend to the nature of substance, they would have no doubt at all of 
the truth of P7 [that it pertains to the nature of substance to exist]. Indeed, this 
proposition would be an axiom for everyone, and would be numbered among the 
common notions. For by substance they would understand what is in itself and is 
conceived through itself, that is, that the knowledge of which does not require the 
knowledge of any other thing. But by modifications they would understand what is in 
another, those things whose concept is formed from the concept of the thing in which 
they are.86 
 
In Descartes we find that there are images of sense data that are corporeal and there are images 
of ideas. But what is an image of an idea exactly? This question is important to consider in 
Spinoza and for the rest of this thesis as well. Detlev Patzold writes that, for Descartes, 
“...imagination works with 'pictures' in the sense of mental images. They are mental or inner 
psychological images of ideas, to be distinguished from images of sense perception. The latter 
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have a more direct connection to external objects, of which they are representations...”87 Ideas 
for Descartes are never true nor false in-themselves, but, as we will read in later chapters, for 
Spinoza adequate ideas are always true in-themselves. The point is that, for Spinoza, 
imaginative ideas are more than just images, one of the three kinds of thought we are capable 
of. In other words, for Spinoza imaginative ideas can be images (in identity), but they can also 
be something else too. I elaborate on this in depth in Chapter Two next.  
Regarding the distinction from Descartes here, Pierre Macherey writes, “...taken as 
themselves, ideas are nothing but passive representations. They are neither true nor false; truth is 
a function of judgment, which animates ideas through the intermediary of will.”88 As noted 
above, Spinoza, unlike Descartes, does not believe in real free will but only free necessity. For 
Spinoza, the parallelism between thought and extension is more important anyway. Some 
aspects of imaginative knowledge are connected to external objects in the form of sense 
perceptions, which are experienced internally as one's mind and are about the affections of our 
body. But the images of the imagination are also the product and production of one's memories 
and language use, the latter of which makes the issues of both imaginative knowledge and 
representation much more complex. 
 For Spinoza, the question remains if ideas are representations of their objects (as images 
or otherwise) or are they singular things in-themselves that cannot be defined as or reduced to 
mere representations? This will be the case, for example, if he can demonstrate that our ideas 
can also be adequately understood as affects. If so, and if it is the case that we can increase and 
decrease our conatus according to the force of our affects, then we are no longer talking about 
only types of ideas and their content or perfection. To speak about affects in Spinoza is to 
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88 Macherey, Hegel or Spinoza, 66, 67.  
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understand both types of knowledge (ideas) and the affections they are coupled with at all 
times. I demonstrate the importance of this in chapters Three and Four specifically.  
In a similar way, I demonstrate in later chapters that just because we need and rely upon 
reflexive knowledge in order to increase our power of thought and action does not entail that all 
ideas and knowledge can be defined as representations of reality. On the contrary, reflexive 
knowing can produce new knowledge as an effect(s). The new combination of ideas hold the 
increased levels of ideational and corporeal power. Truth is not a measure of adequacy, in other 
words; it is adequacy and power itself. Reflexive knowing does not mean that we are relying on 
ideas as representational for the sole reason that, in reflection, we produce new ideas and new 
information that we did not have before. Further, as William Sacksteder writes, “The logic of 
each concept presupposes relation to other things: they (with whatever self so views them) are 
necessarily more than one.”89  
There are other ways in which Descartes' writings affected Spinoza's development, one 
of which is the way Descartes continues to prioritize the nature of our ideas about the power and 
reality of substance. He writes, “...I clearly understand that there is more reality in an infinite 
substance than in a finite one, and hence that my perception of the infinite, that is God, is in 
some way prior to my perception of the finite, that is myself.”90 I find a parallel here with the 
very first proposition of Spinoza's Ethics that is striking. In E1p1 we read, “A substance is prior 
in nature to its affections.”91 In fact, this proposition must be conceptually prior in our 
understanding in order for the logic of the axiomatic method to work in producing new 
knowledge. The idea of my body is the primary idea that I am aware of, but I learn that my 
                                                 
89 William Sacksteder, “Simple Wholes and Complex Parts: Limiting Principles in Spinoza,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 45, no. 3 (1985): 398. 
90 Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, 31. 
91 Spinoza, Ethics, 1p1: 2. 
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ideas and ratios of motion and rest are also expressions of one unified substance. As I 
demonstrate in chapters three and four, when I learn this I also learn that the affect becomes the 
perceived cause of my new ideas. To perceive myself as a (proximate) cause is to perceive 
substance in its essence for Spinoza. The former is a modal modification as an expression of 
substance and the latter is substance itself. They are, of course, “one and the same thing” 
expressed in different ways. As Nadler writes, this too relates to Descartes in a sense because 
Spinoza found “that within a basically Cartesian framework he could begin to pursue his own 
philosophical agenda...”92 Piet Steenbakkers writes that Spinoza's “mature doctrine is original 
and cannot be reduced to its Cartesian context.”93 Spinoza's own writings support this 
conclusion. For example, at the end of Letter 58, late in Spinoza's young life, he writes that his 
system is not Cartesian, as well as that his ideas on both necessity and free will are logically 
consistent throughout his work: “If you will examine my opinions attentively, you will see that 
they are quite consistent.”94 
For both Descartes and Spinoza, the first and true idea we are aware of is that we have a 
body and that we are thinking. We are aware that there is something doing the thinking and that 
we are having ideas about the ways in which our mind and body are affected as an organic 
whole. The difference, for Spinoza, is that our mind is ideas, instead of being understood as a 
separate entity or container that has ideas. We continuously reflect on our interactions with 
others and with our own ideas. Both Descartes and Spinoza each turn their focus to the 
awareness that one is having thoughts, ideas about other ideas, ideas about one's environment, 
ideas of sense perception, and ideas about the ways our bodies are affected by other bodies. 
Spinoza writes that a mind cannot conceive anything unless it also perceives itself as having the 
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ability to have ideas about the world. In other words, to have ideas about things in the world is to 
already understand a certain type of ideational force about singular causes and effects.  
In the following chapters I will argue for a type of proto-physics of ideational force and 
motion found in Spinoza’s Ethics specifically. Perhaps he does not have a system of physics as 
we would define it today, but it certainly was, in its time, a new system of philosophy concerned 
with principles of motion, rest, matter, change, proportion, and dynamics of force between ideas 
and actions. In addition, Spinoza's notion of substance can be understood epistemologically and 
ontologically as immanent. As we will read, Spinoza's system is a truly dynamic, vibrant, and 
deductively lucid philosophy if you can tolerate the strict axiomatic format it uses to create real 
material and ideational effects in its readers. Nadler writes: 
Spinoza's conception of adequate knowledge reveals an unrivaled optimism in the 
cognitive powers of the human being. Not even Descartes believed that we could know 
all of Nature and its innermost secrets with the degree of depth and certainty that 
Spinoza thought possible... Most remarkably, because Spinoza thought that the adequate 
knowledge of any object, and of Nature as whole, involves a thorough knowledge of 
God...he also had no scruples about claiming that we can, at least in principle, know God 
perfectly and adequately.95 
 
Although this is true, Spinoza also felt that it would be ignorant to believe that we can know 
about all of Nature, for there are infinite ways in which it can be expressed. 
As noted above, Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology includes three types of knowledge, 
imaginative, adequate (rational), and intuitive. We are seeking adequate knowledge about the 
laws of thought and extension, which includes what he calls the intellectual love of God. 
Adequate knowledge for a finite individual is knowledge (common notions) about laws of 
Nature and the common properties between things. Adequate ideas can include knowledge of 
both universals and particulars at once. For example, in E1ax5 we read, “Things that have 
nothing in common with one another also cannot be understood through one another, or the 
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concept of one does not involve the concept of the other.”96 There is a question as to how much 
Spinoza was influenced by Euclid's use of common notions. Euclid’s common notions have 
been defined as “axioms about the behavior of general magnitudes, not only geometric 
objects.”97 The idea of magnitude can be assessed in Spinoza in relation to his concept of the 
proportions and ratios of motion and rest, as well as in relation to the force between types of 
ideas. I take up this topic specifically in Chapter Three.  
Intuitive knowledge is more efficient knowledge of singular activity and essences, where 
one is certain that this activity increases the power of Nature in some way. This latter type of 
knowledge is the only kind that Spinoza felt could be called the intellectual love of God. I 
discuss all three types of knowledge (or ways of knowing) separately in chapters Two through 
Five. I take up the nature of ideational force between types of ideas, the production of affects, 
and the problem of representation in chapter Four specifically. 
This brings up an important epistemological point about the nature of how we define 
what an idea or concept is, how ideas can be used, and how ideas can be transformed or 
combined to create ever more powerfully clear and distinct singular effects. As Hasana Sharp 
writes, “Importantly, [for Spinoza] our ideas are no less natural than our bodies. Being parts of 
nature, our ideas encounter resistance and assistance to their thriving from nonhuman as well 
as human sources.”98 Although this is true, in a letter dated 1666, Spinoza also writes: 
...there must necessarily be a method whereby we can direct and interconnect our clear 
and distinct perceptions, and that the intellect is not, like the body, at the mercy of 
chance... Indeed, all the clear and distinct perceptions that we form can arise only from 
other clear and distinct perceptions which are in us, and they acknowledge no other 
cause outside us.99 
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If this is true then how can we find any similarities between the parallelism of thought and 
extension at all? I will demonstrate in Chapter Four that it is through understanding the combination 
of the two attributes into affects that allow us to adequately reflect on our ideas and actions. I believe 
this is Spinoza’s point about method in the above citation. 
Spinoza's concentration on how to recognize and reflect upon dynamic transitions 
between types of ideas is how we can enhance our power of comprehension in reflective 
awareness and “control our evaluations.” When our power of comprehension is enhanced, our 
power of acting in affirmative, rational, and creative ways is simultaneously also enhanced.  
Spinoza asks us to consider the “best ways” to use reason. As found in chapters Three 
and Five of the TP, to conclude that a people (or nation) are not at war is one thing, but to say 
they are enjoying peace is quite another matter. In other words, one does not automatically 
follow from the other when we are reasoning well. I realize this might include drawing some 
consistency between Spinoza’s many works that could be problematic. There are better ways for 
reason to continue to enhance its power. This includes creating real effects in which we are truly 
experiencing joy from our ideas. Rational actions will involve learning what the best ways are 
for our understanding to thrive. As I demonstrate in the next chapter and in my conclusion, this 
is why learning how reason can enhance certain elements of imaginative knowledge is so 
important. 
 I read Spinoza's second kind of knowledge to include a proto-physics of force between 
types of ideas, as well as of the perpetuation of adequate understanding and joy. Beth Lord 
writes, “When the mind considers its power of thinking, it is necessarily active, and so we feel 
joy...”100 This type of joy has multiple dimensions, some of which directly involve an educated 
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imagination which is capable of using more powerful and affirmative imaginings (memories, 
words, images etc.) over those ideas that are less powerful or reduce our power. An informed 
use of the imagination only produces stronger imaginings, which reason understands and uses to 
its benefit. This takes practice, habit formation in recognizing idea-types that we are relying on 
(and why we are relying on them), and enhanced attention in conscious reflection.  
In summary, the main point is that the use of rationality plays a distinctive role in shaping 
its discriminative powers. How we reflect on what we are thinking about, especially in more 
trying times, becomes particularly important. Included in this are the possible differences in the 
level of power of our imagination based on cultural conditioning and the environments in which 
we learn. This is not just a matter of recognizing that a better education is good for us. It is a 
matter of truly comprehending how the attributes of thought and extension behave according to 
respective laws of Nature, yet act in parallel to each other in a combined way as affects. These 
affects are what increase or decrease our power to think well, creatively with more force, and, 
therefore, to act with more reason and power as well. 
When the intellect educates itself about how to eliminate reactions and passions that 
diminish its power or the power of others, and instead consider everything that is occurring 
according to the laws of thought and extension, then we can understand with more deductive 
force to our benefit. What we recognize is that the logic involved in understanding how laws of 
Nature work proves what is already necessarily the case, as well as what then can result from that 
level of understanding as ideational effects, physical behaviors, and the power of the two 
combined as affects. This is why I take up the power of imaginative knowledge and the topic of 
racism in the conclusion of this thesis. Spinoza can be read as a white ally in this history of Western 
philosophy because, as one example, his system teaches us how to better recognize when our 
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imaginative (partial) knowledge is decreasing our power to thrive. If our rational adequate 
knowledge and actions can help transform passive imaginative ideas, the errors in our knowledge 
and reflective power will diminish. As Beth Lord notes, we are not “defined by” our rationality: 
“Affectivity means we are intermeshed with things outside our physical and mental boundaries – 
things that affect and change us constantly.”101 I use Spinoza’s theory of affectivity and dynamic 
epistemology to demonstrate, in the end, that such a system can eliminate racist ideas and notions. 
The joy we experience from our increased power of thought and action is a force which 
propels us. Yet, as we read in Chapter 16 of the TTP, “...Nature's bounds are not set by the laws 
of human reason which aim only at man's true interest and his preservation, but by infinite other 
laws which have regard to the eternal order of the whole of Nature, of which man is but a 
particle.”102 To “think in Spinoza” is to think about the infinity of an organic substance with 
finite modal modifications and the essence of singular things, and to do so in a way that allows 
for the rational comprehension of what it is to be a finite expression of substance with greater 
individual and collective vitality. The next chapter evaluates the nature of imaginative knowledge 
specifically and describes how to better recognize and use the ideas of the imagination in order to 
strengthen our capacities to reason with more force. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF IMAGINATIVE KNOWLEDGE 
IN SPINOZA’S DYNAMIC EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
 “What is now proved was once only imagined...”  
-William Blake  
 
“Without fantasy, reality itself disintegrates, and the subject confronts the Real  
as a traumatic and incomprehensible force.” -Japhy Wilson 
 
 
Introduction and History of the Concept of Imaginative Knowledge 
 Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology found in his magnum opus, the Ethics, includes only 
three types of ideas or kinds of knowledge: imaginative, rational common notions, and intuitive. 
This chapter focuses solely on imaginative, partial knowledge, or what Spinoza calls 
“inadequate” ideas. The first half of the chapter specifically focuses on summarizing the nature 
of imaginative knowledge as Spinoza defines it. The second half focuses on the specific 
mechanisms from the Ethics that demonstrate how imaginative knowledge works in conjunction 
with other types of knowledge to create greater affects. Human affects are a combination of both 
ideas (thought) and affections (ratios of motion and rest in extension) for Spinoza.1 
Imaginative ideas are defined as ideas about sense data and image making, but they are 
also defined as all language, memory, fantasy, and errors in reasoning. They can either 
strengthen or weaken our conatus (our tendency towards persevering in existence). As Beth Lord 
writes, “...conatus is what makes each particular thing what it is.”2 Understanding imaginative 
knowledge and how it operates according to its own laws of nature is not only crucial to 
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adequately comprehending Spinoza’s epistemological system, but such understanding aids 
reason and creates more affirmative and powerful affects, increasing our conatus. When truly 
grasping Spinoza’s epistemology one discovers that certain types of imaginative knowledge are 
as important as ideas of reason for strengthening our power to produce affirmative affects. 
  In many areas of our lives, the use of the imagination is something positive, inspirational, 
creative, enlightening, capable of sudden insight, experimental, and the one way to convey all 
those subtleties and practically unnamable experiences of life which we encounter in the 
ontology of the everyday.3 Although Spinoza spent much of his short life attempting to 
deductively prove that imaginative knowledge can result in error, falsity, confusion, and 
anthropomorphic, teleological conceptions of nature, the implications of which create human 
pain and suffering, this chapter demonstrates that he also felt ideas of the imagination can be 
transformative and empowering when those ideas are arranged in ways reason can recognize 
and use to its benefit.  
In the end, it is clear that Spinoza felt certain aspects of imaginative knowing are a part of 
how reason can develop more beneficially and joyously. He writes, “...an imagination is an idea 
which indicates the present constitution of the human body... [imaginings] are not contrary to 
the true, and do not disappear on its presence.”4 What we will read about next includes how 
one can join an image with both another imaginative idea and with adequate ideas of reason to 
transform an affect we are experiencing from something passive to that which is more active 
when we comprehend and reflect on the kinds of knowledge we are using.5  
Rationally understood, certain ideas of the imagination can contribute to the development 
                                                 
3 This is a phrase I will refer to often and is used by Clair Colebrook in “The Politics and Potential of Everyday Life: 
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of reason. This capacity can then move us with real joy and power in our thoughts and actions 
to create other ideas and actions with more strength. This occurs not only in the effectiveness of 
our actions, but also in the creative force of our understanding. Imaginative ideas can be 
experimented with in an enjoyable, informed manner, and re-arranged or re-imagined to our 
benefit and to the benefit of others. The production of images are defined by or as corporeal 
motions in relation to sense data and memory, for example.6 That words are part of the 
imagination becomes a particularly interesting problem when one uses rational knowledge and 
language to construct an explanation or description about what one understands. The first kind 
of knowledge is also the only source of falsity or error, that is, of privation: “And indeed, most 
errors consist only in our not rightly applying names to things.”7 Yet, language consists of both 
images of letters and the memory of meaning, both a part of imaginative knowledge. Spinoza 
goes so far as to say, “So if something in Nature appears to us as ridiculous, absurd, or evil, this 
is due to the fact that our knowledge is only partial, that we are for the most part ignorant of the 
order and coherence of Nature as a whole, and that we want all things to be directed as our 
reason prescribes.”8 In other words, when we do not understand something and judge it as 
absurd, we are relying more heavily on partial, imaginative knowledge (ideas which are 
incomplete) than on reason and understanding. Imaginative knowledge includes ideas which are 
incomplete or partial. It is in this way that they are defined as “inadequate.” 
There are many important references to imaginari, imaginatio, imago, and imaginarius in 
the Ethics throughout all five books, but some references include in the preface of part 3, 3p2s, 
p9, p12, p15, p16, p18s, p25, p27, p28, p30, p31, p32, p34, p42, p49, p52, p53, p58, the 
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opening definitions and axioms of part 4, 4p1, p11, p59, 4 Appendix, and 5p3, p5, p10, p13, 
p14, p20s, p28, p34, and p40c (among many other places). There is an even more extensive use 
and reliance on understanding imaginative knowing in Book Two of the Ethics of which I will 
concentrate on specifically throughout this chapter. Imaginative ideas work in conjunction with 
the understanding throughout the Ethics. Therefore, to ignore the importance of imaginative 
knowledge in this system is to misunderstand Spinoza’s epistemology. Spinoza scholar, Piet 
Steenbakkers, notes that there are 232 references to the imagination in Book Three of the Ethics 
alone.9 
The mind does not cause the body to act and the body does not cause ideas in the mind in 
Spinoza’s system. The attributes of thought and extension run parallel with each other. They are 
both expressions of one substance (God or Nature). The relations (connections) we rely upon 
between finite ideas about the laws of thought are how we form a more adequate understanding 
about the imagination and its power. Spinoza’s system emphasizes understanding the structures 
of all three types of knowledge we are capable of in order to strengthen both the force and joy 
of our ideas and the power of our motions and actions. Because of this, any reading that labels 
his system as strictly “rationalist” is inaccurate. As Spinoza scholar Ed Curley writes, “The 
view that Spinoza was a rationalist...is not just mildly inaccurate, it is wildly inaccurate. 
Experience has a much greater role to play in Spinoza's theory of knowledge than this view can 
allow for.”10 As we will read next, we require imaginative knowledge in order to process all of 
our experiences.  
                                                 
9 Piet Steenbakkers, “Spinoza and the Imagination,” in Imagination in the Later Middle Ages and Early Modern 
Times, ed. Lodi Nauta, et al. (Leuven: Peeters Publishers, 2004), 188. Every true reader of Spinoza must contend 
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10 Ed Curley, “Experience in Spinoza's Theory of Knowledge,” in Spinoza: A Collection of Essays, ed. Marjorie 
Grene (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), 26. Curley continues, “Experience, for a rationalist, 
plays no fundamental role, either in the discovery or in the verification of scientific truth (25).” 
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As a flexible form of more certain knowledge, reason can understand with fluidity how 
the imagination can create stronger, more useful ideas that are productive and creative. This 
type of understanding and practical application is not a causal interaction in the usual sense that 
we understand cause and effect. Adequate ideas can only cause other adequate ideas, 
imaginative ideas cause other imaginative ideas. The effect of understanding the causes of our 
ideas is that we tend towards more adequate conceptions of both how to think well and with 
more force. When the intellect understands and recognizes its own flexibility between varying 
forces of types of ideas, the imagination can produce stronger ideas (and better descriptions) 
that cooperate with what reason already knows to be true in increasing its power. One benefit of 
this increased strength in the capacity to use types of ideas is the increase in varieties of 
expression of those ideas. As a result of such a combination in stronger idea types, an increase 
in our power of thought and action occur by the necessity of the laws of thought and extension. 
As Beth Lord writes, “Imagination has a central role to play [for Spinoza], in building true 
understanding, in representing it, and in limiting and obfuscating it.11 
Yet, as with anything in Nature, too much power can be destructive.12 If the mind has too 
many imaginative ideas or too many ideas of a conflicting nature, the mind will become more 
and more confused. What we will learn is that the proportional power between ideas of reason 
and ideas of the imagination will include those ideational effects which enhance rational 
                                                 
11 Lord, Spinoza Beyond Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 4. Lord continues, “Through 
and in philosophical thinking, multiple other ways of thinking come to be. This is what emerges in Spinoza’s major 
work, the Ethics, where ‘pure’ philosophical thinking about being becomes, through an inner necessity, thinking 
about scientific knowledge and imaginative fiction, embodiment, relations to other things, and the complex systems 
of relations that are ethics and politics.” 
12 Consider what Spinoza writes in Chapter 2 of the TP: “So from the fact that the power of natural things by which 
they exist and act is the very power of God, we can readily understand what is the right of Nature… By the right of 
Nature, then, I understand the laws or rules of Nature…that is, the very power of Nature. So the natural right of 
Nature as a whole, and consequently the natural right of every individual, is coextensive with its power. 
Consequently, whatever each man does from the laws of his own nature, he does by the sovereign right of Nature, 
and he has as much right over Nature as his power extends… But men are led by blind desire more than by reason, 
and therefore their natural power or right must be defined not by reason but by any appetite by which they may be 
determined to act and by which they try to preserve themselves.” 
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capacities and affirmative bodily actions simultaneously if the laws of thought are understood 
with respect to the three idea types. Therefore, the application of the law of proportion, as we 
will read about in the next chapter on reason, is extremely important for how ideas can 
influence each other. In Chapter Two of the TTP Spinoza writes: 
Those with a more powerful imagination are less fitted for purely intellectual activity, 
while those who devote themselves to the cultivation of their more powerful intellect, 
keep their imagination under greater control and restraint, and they hold it in rein, as it 
were, so that it should not invade the province of intellect... Imagination by itself, unlike 
every clear and distinct idea, does not of its own nature carry certainty with it. In order 
that we may attain certainty of what we image, there has to be something in addition to 
imagination, namely, reasoning.13 
 
 The mind must find ways to be certain of what it is imagining (along with true causes) 
and not only that it is imagining. A common notion of reason and an image can surely co-exist in 
the mind at one time. Reason can identify the type of imaging one is doing, for example, with 
rational reflection about the structure of different types of the three kinds of ideas we can have. 
Spinoza deduces, “By idea I understand a concept of the mind which the mind forms because it 
is a thinking thing.”14 Note that Spinoza does not say that ideas are images. They are concepts. 
This will become more important as we proceed. Understanding how the imagination and its 
laws operate produces greater effects and joy within reasoning capacities. As we will read next 
in chapter three, greater joy and power produced by our ideas simultaneously runs parallel to an 
increase in power and capacities for actions which benefit both ourselves and all of Nature. 
When we learn about how the mind works by necessity, for example, we learn how to joyfully 
and rationally manipulate its structure to our benefit and the benefit of others. Experiencing a 
cause is involving that cause in its effect (which is expression). 
Because of Spinoza’s parallelism between the attributes, it is important to incorporate an 
                                                 
13 Spinoza, TTP, 2: 404, 405, emphasis added. 
14 Spinoza, Ethics, 2D3: 32. 
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understanding of what a “body” is in his dynamic epistemology. He writes, “By body I 
understand a mode that in a certain and determinate way expresses God's essence insofar as he is 
considered as an extended thing (see 1p25c).”15 All of our bodily actions, both internal and 
external, express God’s (Nature’s) essence but in the form of modal modifications of substance 
(modes). This is exactly why Spinoza writes that the content of a text, including his own, is not 
as important in its intention (mathematical or otherwise) as is its power to move us with love and 
joy: “As Spinoza remarked of Scripture, a text is to be judged sacred and profane, good or evil, 
not by virtue of what it says, or even its truth, but by its power to move people to mutual love 
and support. A philosophical work is thus always an intervention in a concrete situation and is to 
be judged by the effects it produces in this situation.”16 In this vein, the reader of Spinoza’s work 
and of this thesis will find continual references to what it is to increase our capacities for power, 
joy, and more understanding as these affects relate to the necessary processes of the laws of 
Nature of the attributes of thought and extension. Thus, as we learn about the structure and 
power of our ideas, we experience both intellectual and physical pleasure simultaneously. As 
Stuart Hampshire summarizes, “Reason by itself cannot move to action without the motive force 
of passion, but we can become passionately reasonable...and reasonably passionate... When on 
reflection a person perceives the inadequacy, the emotion is immediately changed.”17 
Before learning more about the mechanics of this dynamic epistemology, a little more on 
the history of the concept of the imagination in Western philosophy is needed. The imagination 
has often been understood in the history of Western philosophy (particularly for Rene Descartes 
                                                 
15 Spinoza, Ethics, 2D1: 31. 
16 Warren Montag, preface to Spinoza and Politics, Etienne Balibar (New York: Verso, 2008), xi. As Beth Lord also 
notes in Spinoza Beyond Philosophy, “Spinoza reflected on the affective power of his own texts because he is 
fascinated by the power of texts – particularly the Bible – to determine feelings and actions.” Because of this, as Dan 
Selcer has also written about, Spinoza is acutely aware of the force between ideas if expressed in powerful ways. His 
system in the Ethics can affect us with lasting effects if understood and applied correctly. 
17 Stuart Hampshire, in Spinoza’s Ethics, trans. Ed Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), xi. 
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for example) as a mediator between the senses and the understanding. Detlev Patzold, in an essay 
titled “Imagination in Descartes's Meditations,” writes that the imagination “continues to play an 
active and cognitive role” in Descartes's philosophy, especially in his mature work, and functions 
as a “mediating principle between sense perception and pure understanding.”18 As in Descartes, 
the mark of a true idea for Spinoza is clarity and distinctness, which I discuss in more depth in 
the next chapter. Each type of knowledge in Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology includes what it is 
we are thinking about; sensations, images, memories, common notions, the cause of our ideas, or 
the essence of singular things, for example. Piet Steenbakkers writes, “Without the imagination, 
the mind would be deprived of all knowledge of its body and of external things. This knowledge 
is essential for interacting with the world around us and thus forms part of our essential striving 
to maintain our existence... The power to imagine is proportional to the degree of complexity of 
the individual body...”19 In Spinoza, imaginative knowledge is not only defined as images. 
The use of the imagination both appealed to and terrified religious leaders, while at the 
same time fascinated those who sought political power. On the development of the Early Modern 
imagination in Europe, Todd Butler writes, “What is thereby revealed is a society deeply 
concerned and fascinated with the fundamentally imaginative nature of politics, for to understand 
– let alone to employ – the imagination was to gain access to a power that modern critics of the 
period have too often ignored.”20 It was organized religion, though, that fundamentally wanted to 
control what the masses believed about the employment of their own imaginative ideas and 
images, and this was done by generating other images which produced fear and submission. This 
was the motivation for Spinoza writing the TTP, where he evaluates the intersection between 
religion, politics, and the use of imaginative ideas, and calls for greater separation and structural 
                                                 
18 Patzold, “Imagination in Descartes’ Meditations,” 157. 
19 Steenbakkers, “Spinoza and the Imagination,” 182-183, emphasis added. 
20 Todd Butler, Imagination and Politics in Seventeenth-Century England (London: Ashgate, 2008), 3.  
 54 
understanding of each through the strengthening of reasoning capacities. As Spinoza writes, the 
prophets of dominant religious texts and circles “were not endowed with a more perfect mind, 
but with a more vivid power of imagination.”21 He intends this sentiment in the negative sense. 
Those who confuse imaginative images with the use of reason were not able to imagine 
themselves as causes of their own actions, actions without teleological or transcendental ends or 
purposes. They were also not able to imagine all of Nature as eternal and perfect, nor as self-
causing. In addition, Spinoza may have been responding to the Early Modern obsession with 
angels, miracles, and various other anthropomorphic notions about the divine. John Milton's 
Paradise Lost was very influential at the time, for example, and both public circles and those 
more educated had a tendency to talk about transcendent entities. Almost everyone believed in a 
God of some kind, but Spinoza was tolerant of diversity in human belief system nonetheless. In 
Book Three of the Ethics, when listing the multiple types of affects we can have and why, 
Spinoza writes, “Experience itself also confirms this. For not everyone has the same custom and 
religion, and reason understands this. What among some is holy, among others is unholy; and 
what among some is honorable, among others is dishonorable. Hence, according as each one has 
been educated, so he either repents of a deed or exults at being esteemed for it.”22  
 There has been extensive work done on the history of the concept of the imagination 
from a more philosophical perspective, such as by Eva Brann and Murry Bundy, for example.23 
In many of these works, Spinoza's actual contribution to this topic is rarely recognized, 
minimally referenced, or poorly understood. Under the heading “Juvenile Thinking: The 
Rationalist Tradition and Spinoza,” Brann concludes, “Spinoza furnishes a prime example of a 
                                                 
21 Spinoza, TTP, 2: 404. 
22 Spinoza, Ethics, 3 Def Aff XXVII, 108. 
23 See Eva Brann’s The World of Imagination and Murry Bundy’s The Theory of Imagination in Classical and 
Medieval Thought (New York: Roman & Littlefield, 1991). 
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certain intellectual contempt for the imagination.”24 This assessment could not be further from a 
correct and examined understanding of Spinoza's epistemological system. In his work on the 
history of the concept of the imagination in Western philosophy and culture, Richard Kearney 
mentions Spinoza's system in reference to the inferiority of ideas of the imaginative sort, stating 
that Spinoza believed these types of ideas were only about that which is wholly contingent, and 
therefore completely insignificant.25 This is a completely inaccurate interpretation. 
 An accurate English translation of Spinoza's works did not appear until the nineteenth 
century. Only recently, in 2010, have we discovered the earliest known copy of the Ethics tucked 
neatly away in the Vatican for centuries.26 Although some early interpretations made genuine and 
systematic attempts at understanding Spinoza's system, nonetheless quite a few are riddled with 
error and contributed to overlooking the importance of the first kind of knowledge. C. De Deugd, 
in his extensive treatment about the significance of imaginative knowledge in Spinoza, noted as 
early as 1966 that the otherwise indispensable bibliography of Spinoza scholarship collected by 
Adolph Oko, which includes over seven thousand entries, “does not have so much as a separate 
heading for 'imagination.'”27 The point is, how is this possible? It is a real problem in the 
scholarship. De Deugd devoted all of his energy to demonstrating the significance of imaginative 
knowledge in conjunction with reasoning adequately in Spinoza’s system. He demonstrates this 
to such an extent as to conclude “that none of the ideas of the imagination are pseudo-
knowledge.”28 
De Deugd is the best work to date on the importance of imaginative knowledge in 
                                                 
24 Brann, The World of Imagination, 685-688. 
25 Richard Kearney, The Wake of Imagination: Ideas of Creativity in Western Culture (Florence: Routledge, 1988), 
162. 
26 Pina Totaro, The Vatican Manuscript (Leiden: Brill, 2011). 
27 De Deugd, The Significance of Spinoza’s First Kind of Knowledge (Van Gorcum, 1966), introduction. 
28 Steenbakkers, “Spinoza and the Imagination,” 127. 
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Spinoza, but he gives more credit to G. H. R. Parkinson, whose work on Spinoza's theory of 
knowledge from 1954 is also significant in this regard. Included in these rare interpretations is 
also the 1957 publication by H. F. Hallett, who described Spinoza's first kind of knowledge as 
crucial to understanding his overall epistemological system on several occasions. Parkinson 
particularly references Spinoza's own use of Descartes' system in the CM and PDP on this 
matter, citing Descartes' insistence about the use of hypotheses as an aid to reasoning processes. 
This works only as long as the individual is aware that they are relying upon imaginative ideas 
heavily or that they are doing so for a certain reason (such as the suspension of judgment, for 
example, as we will read about later in the chapter). After several examples of this kind, Hallett 
concludes, “Thus true knowledge of the world may be embodied in a fictional account of its 
genesis and history – a fiction that differs from the truth only in the order in which the forms of 
things appear. And in that case, 'there is no fear of error from a false hypothesis.'”29 The key term 
in this statement is “order” because it is the recognition of the order and causes of our idea types 
which can increase our conatus.  
 In 1973, as a part of a collection of critical essays on Spinoza edited by Marjorie Grene, 
R. G. Blair writes, “Spinoza's [epistemological] system cannot teach us much today if it is taken 
as a whole.”30 Yet, in 1985, R. J. Delahunty wrote that it may be of significant importance to 
investigate what Spinoza truly intends in his epistemological system; “The result is far from clear 
what [Spinoza] means to be saying when he alleges that imaginations regarded in themselves are 
free from error.”31 In 1988, although only briefly stated, Ed Curley concludes that the 
imagination, in all its ways of expression, is an integral part of Spinoza's system:  
                                                 
29 H. F. Hallett, Benedic de Spinoza: The Elements of His Philosophy (Atlantic Highlands: Athlone Press, 1957), 93. 
30 R. G. Blair, “Spinoza’s Account of Imagination,” in Marjorie Grene’s Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays 
(Indianapolis: Notre Dame Press, 1979), 324.  
31 R. J. Delahunty, Spinoza (New York: Routledge, 1985), 49. 
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...what Spinoza wishes chiefly to emphasize is that the mind's knowledge of other things - 
its knowledge of bodies other than its own in sense perception (P16), its memory of the 
past (P18), its knowledge of itself (PP20-23), its knowledge of the common properties of 
all material objects (PP37-39), even its knowledge of the essence of God (PP45-47) – all 
of these depend on the fact that it first has knowledge of its own body... So imagination 
(P17), too, is explained as a function of the mind's knowledge of the states of its own 
body. It is hard to see how any philosopher could give a greater priority to knowledge of 
the body than Spinoza has.32 
 
In addition, for Spinoza, using reason well is not an automatic capacity or inclination for 
everyone. He believes we are not naturally inclined to use reason in a continuous and regular 
manner. We may desire to know more, and many are born with the faculty to reason, but it takes 
learning how adequate ideas and common notions are produced by necessary laws of Nature in 
order to be capable of using this faculty and all types of knowledge in the best way. As we will 
read in Chapter Three next, adequate common notions are shared by all because they are eternal 
truths about the properties of things, but imaginative ideas are distinctly singular. Our sense 
experiences are our own. At the very least, we can mimic the habits of others who are rational. At 
our very best, we can use the ideas of all three types of knowledge in their affirmative capacities 
more regularly, experimenting with new arrangements of knowledge and their expression.  
This observation distinguishes Spinoza from other rationalist or idealist systems that 
place only reasoning capacities as the foundation of the highest qualitative human experience. In 
other words, reasoning well is not our only desire. We also desire to persevere and thrive in 
existence regardless of reason, to stay alive. If it were common for everyone to reason well on a 
regular basis, society “would stand in no need of any laws.”33 Human beings, by nature, desire 
more than only to reason, and even less of us will be capable of maintaining a continuous 
rational disposition in the shifting external influences of the ontology of the everyday. Spinoza 
writes that human nature, for most, is “far differently constituted” than that which acts from 
                                                 
32 Ed Curley, Behind the Geometric Method (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 77. 
33 Spinoza, TTP, 5: 438. 
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reason alone. In the TTP he concludes, “All men do, indeed, seek their own advantage, but by no 
means from the dictates of sound reason.”34 
Understanding the Power of Imaginative Knowledge  
The key for using reason well is to be able to “justify” our percepts through ordered 
rational processes, which work as (and can be understood as) the laws of Nature of the attributes 
of thought and extension.35 Developing rational capacities will include not only a desire to 
understand how the imagination works, but the developed ability to recognize imaginative ideas 
that can be used in conjunction with reason, strengthening our knowledge and diversifying our 
experiences and our joy and creativity. This type of recognition uses and requires both 
imaginative and rational ideas. This aspect of my thesis is the most original element because this 
is an interpretation of Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology most commentators do not allow. As 
Steenbakkers writes, “Because Spinoza labels imagination or opinion as the lowest kind of 
cognition and the sole source of inadequate ideas, commentators have inferred that he despised it 
and was interested exclusively in the higher levels of cognition. In view of the importance 
Spinoza attaches to the imagination, however, this interpretation is hardly tenable.”36 
Consider, for example, what we read in E3p12: “The mind as far as it can, strives to 
imagine those things that increase or aid the body's power of acting.”37 Imagining our power to 
act includes, among other things, imagining what is involved in building our capacities to reason 
(and experimenting with both types of knowledge). This level of imagining involves our 
experiencing pleasure and joy. Joy, as pleasure (laetitia), can occur because of a passion. It can 
                                                 
34 Spinoza, TTP 5: 438. 
35 As we’ll read in later chapters, this deductive conclusion will be helpful for furthering certain elements of 
philosophy found in critical race theory. Spinoza can be read as a white ally, for example. 
36 Steenbakkers, “Spinoza and the Imagination,” 175. 
37 Spinoza, Ethics, 3p12: 77. He continues, “Hence, so long as the mind imagines those things that increase or aid 
our body’s power of acting, the body is affected with modes that increase or aid its power of acting…and 
consequently (by P11) the mind’s power of thinking is increased or aided.” 
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be the result of an increase in our power of thinking, acting, and recognizing the causes of our 
adequately powerful sets of notions. Joy can also be interpreted as elation and not mere pleasure, 
just as pain or a lesser perfection (tristitia) can be interpreted as dejection. Thus, the topic of joy, 
including intellectual joy, is highly complex in its relations between ideas.38  
The imagination is much more than a series of passive sensations or collections of 
flickering images. It has the power to inspire greatness as much as cripple us, and there are 
elements of it that are not composed of images at all. For example, when we use language to 
speak with each other. In the conversation we are not necessarily using or having images, but we 
are using language to understand each other. Language is always imaginative knowledge for 
Spinoza. Our uses of language are inherently only partial knowledge.  
 The imagination is a critical, often beautiful aspect of human experience and thought. It 
also has an extensive and complicated history as a concept in philosophy and otherwise. “One 
may think of magic, the vernacular literary traditions, the use of the imagination in mathematics 
and science, imagination used in the composition of works of art, or terminological and more 
linguistic questions about the relationship between imaginatio and phantasia, and other related 
concepts in the vernacular such as 'fancy' and 'fantaisie.' Indeed, there is no lack of literature on 
the theme.”39 
In Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology, affects are not something which mediate between 
sense perception and the understanding in the same way as they do for Descartes. Affects include 
the affections of our bodies (corporeal motions) along with the idea of the affection that we are 
                                                 
38 I will include the difference between joyful passive affections and passionate joys, the latter of which is closer to 
an accurate interpretation of the relation between passive affections and joy within Spinoza's dynamic epistemology, 
later in this chapter and again in other chapters in this thesis. 
39 Nauta Patzold, Imagination in Medieval and Early Modern Times, introduction. Spinoza's philosophy has inspired 
many artistic endeavors, such as can be found in the writing of William Wordsworth, William Blake, Samuel 
Coleridge, and George Elliot, to name only a few novelists who relied on Spinoza’s system and incorporated it into 
their artistic work. 
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having in conscious awareness.40 Affects are not reducible by definition to our affections. They 
are also not defined as emotions nor as special kinds of ideas. Some bodily affections are passive 
and some are active, but all expressions are also affirmative modes of the existence of substance. 
We are not consciously aware of all the affections of our body, but the mind can only be aware of 
its body through the affects it is having which it is aware of. The idea of an affection we are 
aware of which is adequately conceived is a part of a more powerful or active affect. As a result, 
the ideas about our affections that are active affects can produce more chains of adequate ideas 
and joyous experiences as a result. This effect of more powerful affects reduces the proportion 
and power of the weaker chains of imaginative ideas that could possibly overpower reason. 
Alexandre Lefebvre summarizes Spinoza’s epistemology well, “If we suffer affections [affectio] 
that we neither determine nor understand, we experience a separation from our powers and 
become sad; if, on the other hand, we experience affections of which we are the cause or of 
which we know the cause, we experience a connection to our powers and become joyful. 
Existence, in this sense, is an effort to experience a maximum of active affections.”41  
Affects are also both uniquely singular and a part of any combined collective. My affects 
are experienced by me on a singular level, but your ideas and actions can affect me. If we are 
adequately understanding something, then our mind is active and our singular awareness and 
body experiences joy because of the increase in our power. Yet, if we understand how to create 
stronger, more useful ideas in the imagination, then our minds automatically have an increased 
capacity for thought and are more active, although this activity, as we will read in Chapter Three 
next, may vary. Caroline Williams writes, “As transitive links between states of affairs, affects 
                                                 
40 Spinoza, Ethics, 3D3: 70. 
41 Alexandre Lefebvre, The Image of Law: Deleuze, Bergson, Spinoza (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 221. Lefebvre 
continues, “For Spinoza, it is fundamental that the experience of a composition, the discovery of a power, and the formation of an 
adequate idea (all these things go together) always provoke an affect [affectus] of joy… A finite mode at once exists in a 
continuous variation of its power given the encounters it experiences, and these variations of power find a continuous psychical 
expression in an affective flow of becoming joyful and becoming sad.” 
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pass through subjects communicating and unfolding images and intensities.”42 
In part 2 of the KV, Spinoza distinguishes between what he calls opinion (error, falsity), 
experience (a type of combination of reason along with experimentation), true belief (that which 
requires outside reasons in order to be known), and clear knowledge (a way we can have 
knowledge in and through the things themselves in reflective awareness).43 Some of these 
distinctions get collapsed in many respects in his later works. What he develops in his later work 
is the concept that the imagination can be transformed, at least those elements of it that are 
beyond passive sense data; it can be transformed through our understanding of the laws of the 
attribute of thought, such as how ideas of the first kind are generated and operate. The mind, in 
understanding that it is nothing but ideas and desiring to increase its power, can (in conscious 
reflection about the laws of thought) have better ideas that act as aids to the imagination (auxilia 
imaginationis).  
The imagination, although incomplete and fragmented knowledge, is not wholly 
inadequate for Spinoza. The associations we make between ideas are largely based on memory, 
experience, experiment, and learning. Although our memories can also be in error or influence 
other finite ideas in ways that decrease our power, there is a crucial role which memory plays in 
Spinoza's entire epistemology. If this is true, then certain aspects or elements of imaginative 
knowledge are as important for the development of strong common notions as reason is. Spinoza 
writes, “For there is something else I wish particularly to note here, that we can do nothing from 
a decision of the mind unless we recollect it...”44 Recollection is an element of imaginative 
knowledge, but learning is a part of both the imagination and reasoning. We cannot learn and 
strengthen our capacity to reason with force if we cannot recollect or imagine. As we will read in 
                                                 
42 Caroline Williams, “Subjectivity Without a Subject,” in Spinoza Beyond Philosophy, 18. 
43 Spinoza, KV, trans. Sam Shirley, 2:1, 2, 60-63. 
44 Spinoza, Ethics, 3p2s: 73. 
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Chapter Five, active ideas of the imagination that are useful for reason come together with the 
most force in intuitive knowledge. Etienne Balibar, noting that reading Spinoza's doctrine of the 
first kind of knowledge as that which is merely passive and riddled with only error is 
problematic, writes:  
However, if we look more closely at the argument of the Ethics and the TTP, we will see 
that this simple presentation is too mechanical. In reality, all men live in both the world of 
the imagination and that of reason. In every man there is already some reason (that is, 
some true ideas and some joyful passions), if only because of the partial knowledge he 
has of his own usefulness; and in every man there is some imagination...if only because 
of his own inability to dominate all external causes...45 
 
Learning about the laws of thought, reason can transform some aspects of imaginative 
knowledge to its benefit and greater use. Although reason can evaluate ideas of the imaginative 
sort, the same process does not occur for those who rely upon only imaginative ideas. In such a 
disposition our capacity to reason well is diminished in intensity and the imagination dominates 
in proportion between our chains of ideas. In other words, we are not thinking rationally as much 
as we could be in such a state and we might not have the rational power to recognize this fact.  
Imaginative ideas should only occupy the “smallest part of our mind.”46 Spinoza deals in 
ratios of motion and rest as the structure of the attribute of extension, something I examine in 
more detail in the next chapters. Yet, due to the parallelism between thought and extension, when 
the body's ratio of motion increases in activity, the mind simultaneously increases in its force of 
activity. We should consider what ideas one focuses on in reflective awareness. If thought is 
relying upon rational common notions, the body has more power to act, and act with more 
diversity and creativity. There is an identity between the attributes of thought and extension. The 
identity is only that both are expressions of one substance, as is clear in E3p2 and elsewhere.47 
                                                 
45 Balibar, Spinoza and Politics, 109-110. 
46 Spinoza, Ethics, 5p20s: 170. 
47 Ibid. 3p2s, 71. 
 63 
Spinoza’s monism is not a cosmological constant. Although all is one substance, Spinoza’s 
substance is dynamic in its varying transformations and animated expressions. Dynamism and 
transformations are occurring continuously and in infinite ways. The interactions between our 
three kinds of knowledge are transformed by way of arrangement and dispositions taken, 
producing more forceful or less forceful rational thought and action. 
 There are many ways to categorize the types of inadequate ideas in Spinoza's 
epistemology, specifically found within certain parts of the Ethics, the TIE, the KV, and 
especially the TTP. Errol Harris clearly explains that there are at least three types of inadequate 
ideas in Spinoza: those that are considered fictions, those that are categorized as errors, and ideas 
that are a part of a method of doubt. But we might add another, namely that this type of 
knowledge can be understood as partial. The words we use to create language, for example, are 
an aspect of imaginative knowledge because they could not possibly capture what we adequately 
conceive with clarity and certainty in its totality. This aspect of an epistemological system will 
complicate how we then conceive of our explanations for what we know using reason. Yet, we 
might ask if imaginative ideas can be experimented with on the level of operational knowledge, 
and, if so, then can we find increasingly affective and rationally powerful ways to use the 
imagination? 
 Each type of inadequate idea has its own level of power in association with other ideas, 
and one type does not necessarily involve all of the other types. As Harris notes regarding ideas 
of fiction, for example, “they do not necessarily involve any error.”48 This is true particularly if 
reason already understands that they are fictions. This level of recognition occurs with intuitive 
knowing also, as we will read more about in Chapter Five. Spinoza discusses briefly how this 
recognition occurs in Chapter 15 of part 2 of the KV, but did not fully develop that concept. 
                                                 
48 Errol Harris, Spinoza’s Philosophy: An Outline (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1999), 44. 
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Harris continues, “The capacity to imagine things that do not exist, as long as we know that they 
do not exist, may be considered an accomplishment rather than a defect of mind...”49 Spinoza 
confirms this in various works noting how important singular conscious reflection is in this 
regard. An inadequate idea is often in error not because of what is stated in the idea, but because 
of “what it leaves out,” which is a clear and distinct conception of the adequate cause of the 
object of the idea (ideatum). This is also why the first kind of knowledge is “inadequate.” 
 I argue that these claims are consistent both in the definitions of inadequate knowledge in 
the Ethics and in other works where Spinoza discusses the imagination. Note, for example, the 
large problem Spinoza discovers between memory and language cited in Chapter 6 of the TTP. 
All too often “chronicles and histories reflect the writer's own beliefs rather than the actual facts, 
and one and the same occurrence is so differently related by two men holding different beliefs 
that they seem to be speaking of two different events...”50 As Harris recognizes, ideas of doubt 
are the real problem for partial knowledge because such ideas lead to the vacillation of the mind. 
They lack certain knowledge about the essence of things and their true causes. Vacillation of the 
mind decreases its power to think well. In the TIE Spinoza emphasizes that if we do not use the 
right method of consciously distinguishing between how we form types of knowledge (and also 
remain aware of which type of idea we are relying on and why), we will confuse ourselves, as 
well as possibly harbor doubts about true ideas! For these reasons Herman De Dijn emphasizes a 
specific passage from the TIE: 
Let us begin, therefore, from the first part of the Method, which is, as we have said, to 
distinguish and separate true ideas from all other perceptions, and to restrain the mind 
from confusing false, fictitious, and doubtful, ideas with true ones. It is my intention to 
explain this fully here, so as to engage my Readers in the thought of a thing so necessary, 
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and also because there are many who doubt even true ideas, from not attending to the 
distinction between a true perception and all others.51 
 
The problem of the vacillation of the mind is also directly related to the temporal sense in 
which we consider our ideas. If we conceive our ideas in relation to the past or future, we fall 
into more inadequate thinking for Spinoza, that is, we compare things to (and about) our duration 
and doubt the necessary knowledge we are considering.52 On the other hand, if we conceive 
things from a certain species of eternity (sub specie aeternitatus) and as expressions of laws of 
Nature, then we can understand more adequately. This leads to the production of more adequate 
ideas.53 
Ideas of sense and their expression in words can be false or lead us to doubt, but they can 
also be sources of inspiration, adequate explanation, and pleasure, particularly when combined 
with ideas of reason. Errol Harris writes, “The greater part of human experience is confined to 
what Spinoza calls imaginatio... In fact, the truth is already implicit in our imaginal ideas 
because their positive content is in God, their causes are available to our kin, and their relations 
to other ideas are not altogether hidden but can be developed by thinking in the right order.”54 
There are subtle differences regarding the nature and validity of experience as it pertains to true 
knowledge. As Spinoza writes in the KV, opinion can be distinguished from experience in that 
the latter can take up experimentation in order to discover more reasons for ways of 
understanding. The former, by contrast, does not typically take up experimenting in order to 
demonstrate what is thought to be known, and opinion is often the product of imaginative beliefs 
based on the senses and conditioned by external causes.55  
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54 Harris, Spinoza’s Philosophy, 46. 
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Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology is also about modal modifications of substance (modes) 
in the form of finite ideas and actions, including ideas conceived as actions. Note what Charles 
Huenemann observes regarding Spinoza’s system of necessity in relation to ideas of the first kind 
of knowledge: “...Spinoza's commentators agree that Spinoza thought all things were necessary, 
in some sense... Commentators disagree, however, about the status of finite modes.” What is 
important to reflect on is the logic involved in thinking about things that we feel as affections of 
one's body only, as Spinoza notes in E2p28 for example. To reflect on only our affections and 
not understand the underlying structure and causes of our affects is to have only partial 
knowledge. It is also problematic to think about things only in relation to our own ideas, as is 
evident throughout Book Two of the Ethics. We should think of things in their differences and 
agreements as they are internally determined and as they are understood in relation to Nature as 
the immanent cause of all things. These are two separate processes of thought which can run 
parallel to each other, yet that can also work in conjunction with each other. These cognitive 
processes involve a high level of reflective awareness and rational capacities to compare sets of 
ideas between types of knowledge. In this way we can experience joy that accompanies our 
stronger imaginings. 
In the Ethics we read that there is nothing in Nature that is truly contingent, although 
there are degrees of contingency within the first kind of knowledge when understood modally. 
For example, the degree of contingency is illustrated in the ways in which we can imagine 
“particular things.”56 Because ideas can be conceived as types of knowledge and events (actions) 
of conscious reflection, ideas of the imagination of finite individuals must be capable of being 
conceived as necessary in some sense (because these ideas are an expression of Nature). In 
addition, certain types of imaginative ideas can bring us great joy, combining with reason to 
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create stronger bodies of knowledge and power. For Spinoza, what we can truly enjoy and feel in 
the intellectual love of Nature and its laws while increasing our power to exist is based on the 
ideas we imagine and rationally understand together. As we read in Book Two of the Ethics, 
falsity involves the privation of knowledge, but all ideas conceived through the understanding of 
or related to God as first cause and as self-causing are always true, and can exist in each of us 
conceived as internally determined. In E2p36, Spinoza writes, “Inadequate and confused ideas 
follow with the same necessity as adequate, or clear and distinct ideas.”57  
Within our environment we are conscious of our striving, but with attention we can 
become more reflective about the ability to embrace our power to exist with increasing joy and 
energy beyond mere survival. In E3p9 Spinoza writes, “But since the mind (by 2p23) is 
necessarily conscious of itself through ideas of the body's affections, the mind (by p7) is 
conscious of its striving...”58 In 3p9 we continue to read about both rationally understood and 
imaginative knowledge: “The mind, both insofar as it has clear and distinct ideas and also insofar 
as it has confused ideas, strives to persevere in being; it does so for an indefinite duration; and it 
is conscious of this, its striving.”59 Spinoza defines “appetite” as the conscious consideration of 
both our ideas and our bodily actions together (affects), and appetite is “nothing but the very 
essence of man.”60 In one way, appetite can be defined as the mind being conscious of its 
striving through its ideas. But in another way, Spinoza writes that appetite can also be “devoid of 
reason.”61 If our appetite can be devoid of reason, then the adequate understanding of our 
conatus must include elements in addition to defining it as appetite that incorporates the best 
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ways to use both imaginative knowledge and reflective reasoning. Even so, this interpretation 
does not contradict what we understand about Nature’s order (all expressions are ruled by laws 
of Nature) but conforms to it in a certain way and as expressed by a certain disposition.62  
Our sense of free will is also a product of the imagination, but Spinoza's system of 
necessity does not eliminate the psychological experience of deliberation and personal freedom. 
In fact, in the TP he writes that the strength of mind is “freedom of spirit.”63 As we will read in 
the next three chapters and the conclusion of this thesis, if our sense of freedom of spirit arises 
with an increasing strength of mind (understanding about how to combine idea types), then 
learning how to enhance our series of ideas is the logical aim a creatively rational mind will 
automatically have as an effect. The imagination plays a vital role in how we approach our sense 
of free will. The real joy, though, is in rationally understanding that we are an expression of 
Nature (God, substance), and that all of Nature is an expression of its own laws by necessity. Not 
only do we experience joy on this level of understanding, but this joy is both a feeling and an 
idea together (idea reflexiva). This is a feeling of being capable of a certain level of 
understanding about Nature and one's perseverance.64 In other words, it is an affect where what 
we are reflecting on is our increasing, rationally joyous conatus. As we will read in Chapter 
Three and Four next, these reflexive affects exist according to the order of our adequate ideas 
and are, therefore, virtuous: “Freedom, in fact, is virtue or perfection; so anything that signifies 
weakness in man cannot be referred to his freedom.”65  
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Spinoza understood that some individuals suffer from extreme conditions of the 
imagination that decrease their power to exist and live well. As noted in E2p39c, the more 
properties of things that are common to both oneself and other bodies, the more ideas we are 
singularly capable of conceiving adequately as a result.66 If our mind takes on “another nature” 
from what it is capable of, the mind does not lose its singular access to personal memories and 
sense experiences. Yet, according to 4p39s, when we take on completely new ratios of increasing 
motion and rest our old self no longer exists in any substantial sense. Spinoza writes, “But here it 
should be noted that I understand the body to die when its parts are so disposed that they acquire 
a different proportion of motion and rest to one another.”67 Later in the same proposition he 
continues to explain that a human body which changes in these ways “[can] be changed into 
another nature entirely different from its own.”68  
Spinoza relies heavily on the principle of non-contradiction throughout the Ethics. For 
him, there are real differences between logical contradictions, true opposition between relations, 
and negative ontological determination. Each of these distinctions requires its own definition and 
each is related to the inherent truth as common notions in different ways. They each maintain 
their own distinct difference that cannot be collapsed into any of the other two. They can be held 
as separate adequate concepts and each has a separate epistemological function. I return to the 
necessity of these distinctions in chapters Three and Four, but for now what is important to 
understand is that imaginative ideas (even if they are, in part, negations) are ways for the 
attribute of thought of an eternally existing substance to express itself (in infinite ways). 
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Imaginative ideas are not parts of substance but are modal modifications (modes) of the 
attribute of thought according to its laws. Everything that can be said of Spinoza's monism is not 
categorized as a part of the whole; it is understood as an expression of power and a degree or 
ratio of motion and rest. This interpretation, noted extensively in Letter 32 written by Spinoza 
and addressed to Henry Oldenburg of the Royal Society in England in 1665, includes our 
understanding of how “the least possible opposition” exists between things in relation to each 
other as to create a stronger force as one body together.69 For Spinoza, difference is a part of 
Nature and we use it to compare ideas that are in opposition to each other, but true negation is an 
idea of the imagination (because substance as always in existence is an absolute affirmation). 
This distinction is closely related to the ways in which we use words and form definitions, as 
well as how we understand the productive uses of imaginative knowledge.  
For ideas to be defined or understood as opposites does not also include those concepts 
negating each other. The understanding of opposites and our ability to compare and contrast 
ideas is necessary for the success of a logically deductive method, but the point is that if their 
power were equal and they were truly opposites, they would cancel each other or negate their 
own power. They would, as it were, be at a standstill. This capacity of recognition is also critical 
to the ways in which we draw new associations, compare images, and re-arrange our descriptions 
of things in order to enhance our capacities for thought and action. As Spinoza concludes in 
Chapter Seven, Twelve, and Fourteen of the TTP, the ways in which we formulate our 
descriptions of things is largely based on what we have both experienced and what we have 
learned: “Words acquire a fixed meaning solely from their use...”70 The use of common terms 
and definitions is a form of repetition. This is something which takes both understanding of how 
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these practices shape reason and control our passions in conscious awareness, but also how such 
repetition shapes our memory in the re-formulation of our habit(s) in action and thought in the 
ontology of the everyday. 
Certain imaginative ideas can have a different relation to ideas of reason depending on 
the object of the adequate idea being reflected upon. Although opposites, imaginative ideas do 
not contradict reason as much as they can overpower reason if the majority of our thoughts (our 
mind as we are aware of it) are composed of more ideas of the first kind. It is interesting to 
consider that which is known in the literature as passive or inadequate as being capable of 
overpowering ideas of reason, but that is exactly why power and reason are two very different 
concepts in Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology. All things strive to exist or persist, even our ideas 
regardless of type. In other words, there are moments reason and power can differ in definition. 
Certain types of imaginative ideas are indispensable for enhancing the powers of reason. 
In other words, the different kinds of knowledge are not necessarily in opposition to each other 
in an equal way or they would cancel each other out. Imaginative ideas, although often “fleeting 
and inconsistent,” are not strictly opposed to reason. They are just of a different kind of 
knowledge. Our capacity to reason includes within its nature the rational ability to distinguish 
between ideas of different kinds of knowledge. Something that is active moves with more speed 
or intensity (and fluidity or more easily). That which is more passive (striving with less force) 
decreases in its intensity in proportion to the increases in activity to the things it is in relation to 
elsewhere. If two things are in relation to each other and one of them speeds up in its force, the 
other may either also speed up because its relationship is enhanced or it might slow down as a 
result if the relationship is between two things which are opposite. That is, the slowness or rest in 
effect cannot be conceived as a negation of one thing over another. Rather, the relationship 
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should be understood as a relation between two levels of intensity which separate functions 
within their own type (in this case, within their own idea type) where one has more force and, 
therefore, can move more readily. Therefore, as Beth Lord writes, negation “cannot be the basis 
of agreement” with relations between things for Spinoza’s ontology or epistemology. 
A finite individual in this system is defined by, in part, those interactions and relations to 
other finite modes of thought and other finite bodies, in a way that is mediated, qua modal, yet 
distinctly causal within each respective attribute. Moira Gatens writes, “Each individual body 
exerts a causal force on others, and each is in turn constantly impinged on by others.”71 We exist 
as expressions of substance, and this can be adequately understood as patterns of ratios of 
motion and rest and ideational powers that combine to create greater affects. We cannot 
possibly conceive of the totality of all causes and effects that occur in a monist system such as 
Spinoza’s that exists in the form of infinite combinations of expressions. Therefore, the rational 
deduction is that we can conceive what applies to all of Nature in our own determinate way only, 
that is, as witness to our singular associations, experiences of power, ideational force, and 
patterns of action (motion and rest) if we are paying attention. As we will read in the next two 
chapters, this is why human conscious reflection is a necessary element of correctly interpreting 
Spinoza. 
The Mechanics of Ideational Force as Imaginative Knowledge 
There is a force between our thoughts, an actual intellectual power, although Spinoza 
does not define this in the same manner as the motion of extension. In the attribute of thinking, 
the effects of our ideas have the power to produce other ideas and associations between them, 
including an increased awareness of the transition and intensity that is possible between ideas. In 
reference to E2p13 L7s, Gatens writes: 
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On this model the human body is understood to be a relatively complex individual, made up 
of a number of other bodies. The body’s identity cannot be viewed as a final or finished 
product because it is a body whose constituent parts are in constant interchange with its 
environment. The human body is radically open to its surroundings and can be composed, 
recomposed, and decomposed by other bodies.72 
 
Our ideas can also be compared, combined, and recomposed, just like the combinations 
of motion and rest of our bodies in our actions and with other bodies. Fully comprehending all of 
one’s imaginative ideas is impossible, but adequately comprehending the structures of how 
imaginative ideas work and using this to one’s advantage is possible. In his introduction to the 
recent anthology Spinoza Now, Dimitris Vardoulakis (in discussing the work of Warren Montag) 
writes, “There is no independent space of reason that remains outside a causality that includes 
the imagination and all the faults that characterize the human's mind and actions.”73 The result is 
that we cannot ever escape imaginative knowledge regardless of how well we use reason. 
 A more in depth analysis of Books Two and Three of the Ethics is required to understand 
the mechanics of the first kind of knowledge. This is where Spinoza defines imaginative 
knowledge in detail. Recall that he writes, “By body I understand a mode that in a certain and 
determinate way expresses God's essence insofar as he is considered as an extended thing (see 
1p25c).”74 All bodies express God’s essence, but only when understood as modal modifications 
of substance. Our bodies express God's (Nature’s) essence in their own determinate manner. 
There is no lack or negation in Nature’s necessary and continual existence. Therefore, our bodies 
cannot be said to be acting teleologically in any way because substance is eternally perfect and 
expresses itself according to its attributes of thought and extension (the only two attributes we 
have access to). In addition, as noted above, a modal modification of substance cannot be 
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adequately conceived as the essence of substance because it is conceived through something else, 
namely, the attributes.  
We can reflect on ideas as true in several different respects. Common notions are 
universal truths that exist regardless of the existence of our bodies, yet the first idea of a human 
mind is that it has a body. Therefore, imaginative knowledge can be understood as experienced 
singularly in our own determinate but unique ways. An object of an idea can also be another 
idea. Beth Lord writes, “Each idea in the infinite intellect is a true idea of some object (see IA6). 
But it is not their correspondence to an object that makes ideas true...”75 They are already 
eternally true ideas. Our adequate ideas are not representations of eternity, they are eternal, 
necessary, and perfect. They express the eternal laws of Nature to varying degrees of power in 
their own determinate ways. Learning about idea types enhances our capacities for reflective 
awareness and our conatus. Stuart Hampshire writes: 
I come to realize that all my knowledge of causes in the common order of Nature is to 
some degree fragmented and partial, and that I concentrate irrationally on only a few 
proximate causal factors. So a balance between the active and the passive in the mind 
characterizes my empirical knowledge...which Spinoza characterizes as the level of 
imagination. The laws of thought operating at this level are both the laws of logic and the 
laws of the association of ideas, one pressing against the other...76 
 
 I will now turn to a more specific demonstration of the nature of imaginative knowledge 
and how it can strengthen our capacity to reason. Realizing that I discuss the other two types of 
knowledge in later chapters, it is still necessary to discuss reasoning and reflective awareness in 
order to understand how imaginative knowledge shapes itself according to necessary laws.  
Spinoza opens the Ethics with eight “metaphysical” definitions. What we later learn is 
that we are to return to them after we finish all five books in order to more adequately 
understand how important definitions operate to structure deductive logic. This too is an 
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effective method of repetition and a place for adequate knowing to work on strengthening its 
capacities. Many other demonstrations will be needed to prove their logical connections. This 
will also aid the force of rationally comprehending the ways in which imaginative knowledge 
works.  
Recall that in E3p9 Spinoza defined the striving of all types of our knowledge as part of 
our appetite and conatus, that this is also something we can be aware of and that occurs as an 
“indefinite duration.” The idea of the “indefinite” is not the same as “indeterminate,” nor is it the 
same as some limited sense of a contained whole. The consequence of duration being included in 
striving to exist includes an element of the undetermined, and, therefore, of the possibility of a 
novel arrangement which did not exist before as one acts. The structures for this possible novel 
arrangement of ideas and actions are determined, they are expressions of the laws of thought and 
extension, but the arrangement itself is undetermined until it is in action. The power to live well, 
for example, will automatically enhance our power to survive, which, by necessity, will enhance 
our imaginative capacities with more affirmative and creative force in conjunction with reason. 
How else do we imagine possibilities that have never existed before? 
The first place I find a significant need to rationally reflect on imaginative knowledge 
occurs early in Book One of the Ethics in 1p8. This is missed in the secondary literature. In 1p8, 
under the rubric of demonstrating how substance is infinite due to its self-causing and unlimited 
essence, Spinoza writes that “confused” knowledge occurs when one cannot distinguish between 
substance itself (attributes) and the modifications of substance (modes) in their singular ordering 
of ideas.77 In other words, we instantly have confused, partial knowledge when we are not aware 
that our conatus as increases or decreases in our power differ from that which is conceived as 
only a modification in substance. In this proposition Spinoza starts, “Every substance is 
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necessarily infinite.” We, along with everything else, are substance, therefore, we are also 
infinite in some way. Yet, our personal, subjective affects cannot be conceived as infinite in the 
exact same logical way. So, already at the start of the Ethics we are asked to consider the nature 
of the imagination and its differences from common notions in their strength and possibilities. 
One of Spinoza's more well-known deductions appears in this part of the Ethics when he 
writes that “being finite is really, in part, a negation, and being infinite is an absolute affirmation 
of the existence of some nature...”78 As we conceive more adequately (as our conatus increases), 
we become closer to an absolute affirmation of our existence in its largest possible magnitude 
and proportion of power. Modifications of substance include every event, every effect, every 
intensity, every transition, and the myriad of infinite causal connections in all directions, but our 
singular affects include the types of ideas we are aware of in consciousness.  
In E1p8, Spinoza will include those ideas whose objects do not exist outside the intellect 
and are in need of other, clearer concepts in order to be truly understood. But substance is 
conceived through itself and does not need any other concept in order to exist. In other words, 
depending on the object of our idea (substance or singular affects), the proper logical deductions 
should follow respectively if one is thinking clearly and distinctly. Spinoza writes that this 
confusion is one of the easiest ways to have partial knowledge, when we do not keep these two 
separate categories of logical deductions clear in our direct awareness while contemplating new 
ideas and experiences. 
The deductions Spinoza draws from E1p8 will continue to play a major deductive role 
throughout the Ethics and is why I feel we should pay close attention to his emphasis on 
imaginative knowledge early in this work. The point is that we have to investigate and examine 
how we apply “first causes,” and not only what they may be for our understanding. In other 
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words, we need a method for reflecting on our ideas – included within that method must be the 
awareness of how we distinguish between substance and its modifications. This is apparent as 
early as 1p8. If we work through the Ethics from beginning to end, building deductively upon 
what we understand, learning which methods to use that lead to certain knowledge, we will not 
“fictitiously ascribe to substances the beginning which [we] see that natural things have...”79 The 
same is true for ascribing teleological ends to substance. Ascribing a beginning or end to all of 
substance as the same kind as occur to our senses or as observed in Nature is an aspect of 
imaginative knowledge. An eternal and perfect substance does not logically have a beginning or 
an end. This was already noted earlier in the chapter, but deserves to be repeated as we proceed 
further. We are not only expressions of finite modal modifications. We are also expressions of a 
perfect, infinite substance.  
As E1p8s proceeds, we learn that substance exists by necessity, which is the deductive 
consequence of all propositions and definitions up to this point (especially E1p7) and can be 
classified as a common notion, but only if we understand the proper order and method of 
discovering first causes as the way to gain adequate knowledge and distinguish it from confused 
ideas. One cannot adequately grasp the nature of human imaginative knowledge without first 
understanding the difference between thinking about the nature of substance and modal 
modifications, and some of the differences between rationality and causality. At times, Spinoza 
will equate causes with reasons, such as within 1p7 and 1p8, and particularly in 1p11 which 
reads, “But this reason, or cause, must either be contained in the nature of the thing, or be outside 
it.”80 Yet, to truly understand what Spinoza is deducing here, a difference between causal 
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processes in Nature (Nature as a unified, eternal substance) and types of human ideas as 
expressions of natural laws must be understood separately. If so, rationality and causality can 
never be reduced to identical concepts. I return to the importance of this distinction and its 
implications in Chapter Four. For now, we can keep our new order of ideas about types of 
knowledge and the nature of substance in order so far. To search for and have confirmation from 
only external causes in Nature will be part of empirical experience, and thus will include more 
inadequate than adequate knowledge.  
Working through Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology involves a proto-physics of force and 
motion. What we acquire is a set of tools which become a method for better recognizing what 
ideas we are affirming and/or denying. Considering we are looking for the least amount of 
opposition between any two or more things so to enhance the overall power and force of the 
collection of bodies (or ideas), we are looking for those actions and ideas which are affirmative 
and can be combined. The effectiveness of our ideas is directly correlated with (proportional to) 
our understanding of the laws of thought and extension, including either knowing or imagining 
the causes of those effects. Spinoza emphasizes this deduction repeatedly throughout his works, 
including later in 4p9 and p10, for example. A theory of subjectivity and conscious awareness is 
necessary for truly understanding Spinoza's ontological and epistemological systems. Therefore, 
there is a reading of Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology that includes understanding imaginative 
knowledge as an inescapable element of our affects in increasing or decreasing our conatus. 
Some ideas, both imaginative and rational, are more perfect than others.81 Furthermore, 
some imaginative ideas about the affections of our bodies can be more perfect than others, such 
as passionate joys that are understood by reason. Reasoning well is having adequate ideas (recall 
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that our mind does not have ideas, it is ideas), and this can also include having adequate ideas 
about the laws of thought both in memory and in its application. It includes being able to think 
about our deductive chains of ideas and what they affirm or deny in association with types of 
knowledge. The right method can enhance our rational capacities to access imaginative 
knowledge in powerful ways that continue to give us joy and aid reasoning further. This level of 
awareness can enhance the use of both the imagination and reason in ways that increase our 
conatus. This includes a rational influence over our dispositions, habits, and ideas that we affirm. 
This type of comprehension expresses perfection with more power, as is evident in the 
logic of substance discussed in E1p17c: “From this it follows, first, that there is no cause, either 
extrinsically or intrinsically, which prompts God to action, except the perfection of his nature.”82 
Notice the shift in the logic of causality here between an ontological reality and the ways in 
which a finite mind can access such truths with their own laws of logic depending on which 
series of ideas are strongest in the mind in proportion. Our essence has the capacity to increase 
its power. In the Appendix to part 1 of the Ethics, we also read, “For the perfection of things is to 
be judged solely from their nature and power; things are not more or less perfect because they 
please or offend men's senses, or because they are of use to, or incompatible with, human 
nature.”83 This particular aspect of Spinoza's ontological system can be demonstrated to be 
intimately connected to the levels of power in our thinking as reflective awareness. Recall that at 
the start of the Ethics substance is described as eternal and as perfect. All expressions of Nature 
involve varying degrees of perfection to greater or lesser degrees and we are expressions of 
Nature. Thus, perfecting our understanding is our only singular cause we can enact ideationally. 
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We are expressing substance to its most power as we are capable, which one finite, modal 
ratio of unified modifications can express. Spinoza reminds us of this continually. In E2p1 we 
read: “For the more things a thinking being can think, the more reality, or perfection, we 
conceive it to contain.”84 This applies to any thinking being, whether a finite human being or 
God conceived as a thinking thing. We can singularly and collectively think and use more 
powerful ideas and actions, arranging them in an affirmative, creative order in ways that enhance 
not only our individual power to exist, but also for those around us. The transition to greater 
perfection will, in the end, be understood as love, or the intellectual love of God (Nature). The 
emphasis is on the order and arrangement of certain knowledge, and not on how many ideas we 
can think at once in a spatial sense. As noted in E2p40, Spinoza is clear that having too many 
images in one's mind at once can be a source of great confusion, especially if some of those ideas 
have been contrary and appeared before in connection to one another inadequately (as evident in 
3p14). It is not the quantity of ideas we can have, but the quality and power of arranging our 
ideas according to certain common notions regarding the laws of a self-caused substance. 
Although memories can be highly problematic, striving to recollect certain types of ideas can 
also help us increase our power to exist. Spinoza writes in 3p13 about the importance of this 
imaginative exercise, which is one of the most cited propositions in the Ethics.85 We learn that 
we also strive to recollect only things that “exclude” the existence of other things that diminish 
our power. The use of imaginative ideas in this respect is incredibly important.  
Another early reference to the importance of imaginative knowledge occurs in 1p15.86 
This proposition specifically discusses the difference between thinking about the concept of 
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“quantity” as an imaginative idea as compared to thinking about “quantity” using reason. 
Spinoza writes that all abstract thinking is part of imaginative knowledge. It is imaginative 
knowledge because it is partially constructed and all properties of the thing being abstracted 
about are not (or cannot be) known. The concept of “quantity,” which can be thought about as 
either “one” or “many,” as a whole or as parts, is placed in direct relation to the concept of 
substance in E1p15. When reason realizes this type of identity, the realization in our awareness is 
using common notions (and not the imagination): “So if we attend to quantity as it is in the 
imagination, which we do often and more easily, it will be found to be finite, divisible, and 
composed of parts; but if we attend to it as it is in the intellect, and conceive it insofar as it is a 
substance, which happens with great difficulty, then...it will be found to be infinite, unique, and 
indivisible.”87 Substance understood through the intellect is “everywhere the same” and it is 
dynamic. Substance conceived through the imagination is separated into what it is to express 
singular modes and is an abstract concept. This opening to the rest of the Ethics is one place 
where the concept of modal distinction becomes apparent, as he claims that to think of things in 
parts is to think of them as modally distinct. To think of things as parts is to use abstractions 
because all is, in actuality, one, unified substance. To think of things modally, though, is helpful 
because it includes the understanding that substance can “be affected in different ways” even 
though it is “everywhere the same.”88 All finite ideas, for Spinoza, are modal modifications of 
substance and so can be thought of as separate entities of their own which can combine to create 
larger bodies of ideas. Yet, if so, then to adequately think about modes as distinct “things” is to 
use the imagination and reason together while reflecting on different types of knowledge (as we 
are doing right now in order to understand these deductions). To adequately conceive of our 
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personal knowledge as expressing eternal common notions is to think of substance expressing 
itself. I return to these conclusions throughout this thesis. 
 At this point, Spinoza illustrates his intention deductively through the use of an analogy 
about water and water drops. To conceive of water as containing only parts (drops) is an aspect 
of the imagination, and it is to miss that it is, in its unity and essence, one substance: “For insofar 
as it is substance, it is neither separated nor divided. Again, water, insofar as it is water, is 
generated and corrupted, but insofar as it is substance, it is neither generated nor corrupted.”89 
The distinction between types of knowledge we can have about the same thing is clear in this 
example. To conceive the concept of a first cause of all of Nature adequately is to pair ideas 
about one organic substance that is self-causing and eternal. Yet, to conceive of things as parts of 
Nature is to understand these things as in relation with other things in Nature in a direct causal 
manner. Nonetheless, imaginative knowledge is important because we do, at times, think about 
water as simply water. I am refreshed when I drink a glass of water as a singular experience. We 
can also gather a drop of water or many drops, but we cannot gather all of substance. Here is the 
crux of the situation: once we have understood the difference between these factors, we can 
encounter everything in relation to the adequate ideas about the laws of one whole, eternal, 
perfect substance, instead of as distinct parts of substance. To conceive of modes of substance as 
expressions to varying degrees of intensity of a unified whole (Nature) is to conceive both the 
laws of the attributes and modal modifications more adequately. To think with more adequate 
force, as we will read about in detail in the next two chapters, is to increase our power for action, 
additional levels of comprehensive and affirmative imaginative and rational power.   
The concepts of essence and existence play an important role in our adequately 
understanding the difference between imaginative and rational ideas in similar ways. They 
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involve our logical understanding of the difference between that which is created and that which 
is generated, including new knowledge acquired, for example. The true causes of each will 
depend on the order of ideas one is arranging. In other words, a cause cannot be truly conceived 
without its effects for Spinoza, including first causes, although they are distinctly different 
expressions with different definitions.90 We also cannot know anything with certainty without 
knowing both the causes and identifying the effects of those causes as adequately (deductively) 
as possible. In this way, as we will read about in Chapter Three, all effects “involve” their cause. 
When a system is understood as immanent, a cause cannot logically be external to its effects. If 
one substance is immanent, everything you can conceive adequately is an expression of it. 
Substance is its own efficient cause, but all of substance can be understood as immanent. This is 
its essence. Human essence is defined as desire (appetite with consciousness of this appetite), and 
we increase our power to exist through understanding how the laws of motion, force, and power 
occur. But, there are other ways in which our power to act is neither increased nor diminished.91 
Spinoza wants us to understand that if we consider things using the concept of “creation,” then 
we are relying on abstract, imaginative knowledge, but if conceived as expressions of an 
immanent and eternal substance (which is its own efficient cause), then we are conceiving 
adequate ideas. 
Book Two of the Ethics proceeds with the consequences (effects) of the above deductive 
common notions. The distinction drawn between parts and the whole continues to play a role in 
our descriptions about how ideas and bodies interact with one another, both internal and external 
to us. This practical way of understanding Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology will alter as we 
comprehend more about the whole of Nature. The end of 2p13 goes into detail about how we 
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maintain our nature in its whole, in its homeostasis and conatus, while continually shifting 
motions internal and external to us are interacting and influencing one another by 
communicating their ratios of speed and rest. This is another place where I read Spinoza’s 
system as a proto-physics of force. He demonstrates how “a composite individual can be affected 
in many ways,” and yet “still preserve its nature.”92 This claim applies to both individuals (human 
beings for example) and all of Nature, but in different, determinate ways. Understanding such 
deductive conclusions about substance and its modal modifications is crucial for further 
adequately comprehending that we are able to order our ideas as that which are conceived through 
something else (as all modes are by necessity). There are other times when we are to order our 
ideas based on the common notion of substance as self-caused and self-causing, and, therefore, is 
the cause of all that is expressed by it as universally true and “prior in nature to its affections.”93 
Spinoza focuses on how to better produce adequate chains of ideas, a topic I explore in depth in 
the next two chapters. What is important for this chapter is realizing, as Spinoza writes, “And if 
we proceed in this way to infinity, we shall easily conceive that the whole of nature is one 
individual, whose parts, that is, all bodies, vary in infinite ways, without any change to the whole 
individual.”94  
We continue to deductively learn at this point in the Ethics that the more ideas a thinking 
thing can think (compare, contrast, and powerfully combine), the more perfection (reality) and 
power one expresses: “The human mind is capable of perceiving a great many things, and is the 
more capable, the more its body can be disposed in a great many ways.”95 In this recognition (by 
the laws of thought), along with what we have learned in 2p1, more will be produced, or rather, 
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more ways of expression will be accessible to us. As each effect involves its cause, nonetheless, 
our understanding of causality is not a linear one at this point. A linear concept of causality 
would require temporality (time) as something other than what it is for Spinoza, which is a 
concept of duration. Duration is a part of our imaginative knowledge because it involves being 
directly related to the nature of modal modifications and not attributes in their laws. I return to 
these distinctions in the next two chapters. To perceive one’s duration is to use the imagination, 
but to conceive of the laws of thought as that which do not require finite temporality in order to 
be true is an aspect of adequate thinking and an expression of that law. 
Imaginative ideas, therefore, can be conceived as modes of expression if adequately 
understood according to the right series of ideas about substance, its attributes which we have 
access to (as the affections of substance), and its modal modifications. They are not entirely 
reducible to representations, although there are elements that can be described as representational 
within the imagination. The power of our affects is wholly dependent not only on our developed 
adequate understanding, but also on our ability to imagine the cause of the effect (of the idea) 
present in our awareness even when reason knows it is being imagined. This is a type of 
“intellectual affection,” as Y. Yovel has explained in some of his writings.96 Images are pictures, 
representations of something else expressed in their own way, but imaginative knowledge is 
defined as a way of knowing something, and not as merely an image. We can learn how to create 
certain types of effects for any given cause if we can adequately identify the real cause of a given 
event as God (or Nature, Substance), and also understand it as a modal modification when 
identifying ourselves as internally determined on a singular level. Beth Lord writes: 
The power of an affect also varies depending on whether we imagine its cause to be 
present, future or past...and on whether we imagine it to be necessary, contingent or 
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possible... The intensity of the affects is tied to the intensity of the images connected to 
them: as things are more present to mind, we are more strongly affected by them; and as 
their presence fades, the affects fade too.97 
 
The power of joy and understanding we are rationally capable depends on having both adequate 
chains of ideas about laws of Nature on a singular level (recognizable by both the imagination 
and reason together) and common notions about universal truths (which apply to all of Nature). 
This also includes imagining God (substance or nature) as the continual cause of all things in 
their necessity through eternity, even though an actual image of such a thing is not possible. Joy 
includes the affect of an awareness that our mind and body have increased in its natural power to 
thrive, move, and think. 
 Some of our adequately understanding the laws of thought will lead, by necessity, to 
stronger, affirmatively powerful imaginings which increase our power to exist. Although 
imaginative knowledge is partial and of a distinctly singular nature, it’s laws are universal. In 
E1p16 we read: 
…the intellect infers from a given definition of any thing a number of properties that 
really do follow necessarily from it (that is, from the very essence of the thing); and that 
it infers more properties the more the definition of the thing expresses reality, that is, the 
more reality the essence of the defined thing involves... From this it follows that God is 
the efficient cause of all things which can fall under an infinite intellect.98 
 
Spinoza repeatedly places the concepts of essence, existence, reality, definition, modal 
modifications as expressions, and the infinite intellect together. One of the reasons he does this is 
because his dynamic epistemology includes that knowledge is felt as part of our affects. The 
more reality we understand, the more reality we express. The more reality we express, the more 
power, joy, and motion we feel, have access to, and can generate in relations to others and all of 
Nature. Beth Lord writes, “True knowledge as such has no power to overcome these affects; only 
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insofar as that true knowledge is felt as an essential desire that is more powerful than other 
affects will it be able to overcome them (P14).”99 Imaginative ideas can be rationally understood, 
applied, and, therefore, felt with increasing power and joy. We feel knowledge, we are affected 
by it (in conscious awareness and bodily).  
In E1p28 and later in 2p13 and 2p16, we read again that each singular thing is determined 
to motion or rest by another singular thing. In our increased understanding of the three kinds of 
knowledge, we are singular subjects, equipped with individual, creative power in thought and 
action. When Spinoza speaks of affects and dispositions, who is he referring to if not human 
individuals? When he speaks about consciousness, he is discussing all animate things in their 
degrees of varying expression, but we too are included in these varying degrees of expression in 
our own determinate ways. Pebbles may be animated in this system, rocks can be said to have a 
type of consciousness to some degree, that is, they are in relation and subject to their 
environment and laws of Nature. Yet, they cannot be said to have thought in the same way we do 
because we express human thinking according to the attribute of thought in our own determinate 
ways. Therefore, such a system cannot be reduced to a pantheist definition only. That order of 
our personal ideas is never fixed, but it does monitor its homeostasis and is influenced by the 
proportion of idea types occurring. Piet Steenbakkers concludes: 
The mind will try to imagine things which increase the body's power to act, and it will try 
to avoid imagining things which diminish that power... The only way to control an 
imagination is by directing it by means of other, stronger imaginations... That we are able 
to do anything at all against the affects is an asset we owe to the imagination, more 
particularly to the ability to combine imagination and reason. 
 
The term used in the above reference of “directing” intimately involves the use of our rational 
understanding about the laws of thought. The ordering is not the type of causality that includes a 
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one-to-one correspondence because imaginative ideas only produce other imaginative ideas. This 
level of understanding is a type of rational force. The result (effect) of that force is the re-
arranging of imaginative knowledge where possible. It is not the re-arranging of all imaginative 
knowledge (which would be impossible), but the rational awareness and conscious reflection on 
certain types of ideas and associations placed together in ways which are already understood to 
increase the power of both thought and action.  
 Missing from the dominant secondary scholarship are references to this type of rational 
force, and how it works in conjunction with ideas of the imagination, especially in its effects as 
increasing other capacities to think and to act with more force and joy. The conclusion is that 
Spinoza scholarship cannot ignore an in-depth analysis of imaginative knowledge and its power 
to strengthen reason. Not only can certain kinds of imaginative ideas aid reason, but they can 
strengthen it. It is essential to demonstrate both the importance of the ordering of ideas and how 
understanding these processes are pragmatic and beneficial. These new conditions automatically 
lead to new possibilities of actions and combinations of action among a set or group of collective 
ideas that carry more force. We can control, therefore, some of our imaginative knowledge to our 
joyous benefit. Imaginative ideas are certainly not insignificant. Therefore, a theory of human 
(singular) consciousness is also a necessary part of adequately understanding Spinoza’s system.  
 It becomes important to be able to compare opposite types of ideas because of this 
awareness. This is accomplished by consciously noting not only our method of understanding, 
but also which effects we are focusing on when re-arranging our ideas. The mechanics of 
perspective become more important at this point. It is crucial that we learn how to recognize 
what we are consciously aware of, particularly when we are experiencing a powerful external 
cause. When we cause our own ideas, that is, when we conceive of ourselves as expressions of 
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substance, and, therefore, as expressing an adequate cause, we effect our own actions and 
perspective about our experiences; but we can only arrange or re-arrange our ideas if we are 
consciously aware in reflection how various types of ideas are constructed and interact as laws 
of Nature. It is not that the ideas are different, but only that they are in relation to each other in 
ways which vary by their degree of force and type. The key is to reflect on the true cause(s) of 
our increase or decrease in power. We cannot know all of the causes occurring in Nature that 
affect us, but we can know the adequate (proximate) cause of our immediate ideas in our 
reflective awareness and in relation to our affections (as affects). Spinoza notes, “So desire can 
be defined as Appetite together with consciousness of the appetite.”100 Thus, desire, or conatus, 
is appetite, but appetite needs the consciousness of our affections as affects – the consciousness 
of our striving in body and mind together. The rational reconstruction and use of imaginative 
knowledge in productive ways is part of our overall increase in rational understanding. In her 
recent work, Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization, Hasana Sharp writes, “Power 
(potentia) should be understood as the capacity, vitality, or 'force of existing' that belongs to 
ideas as much as to bodies.”101 As we will read in the next two chapters, this definition of power 
allows for a principle of conservation in Spinoza’s theory of human consciousness.102   
Spinoza makes the above reference to the ways we can increase our power clearer in 
E3p7. As we increase our adequate understanding and motion or activity in extension, the 
power we have to be affected and affect others is enhanced. In our enhanced striving we 
recognize more of our own essence, that is, of some of the infinite ways in which substance can 
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be expressed with power. Already noted in this chapter, in 3p9s we read, “The striving by which 
each thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing.”103 As 
we will read in Chapter Five of this thesis, the recognition and understanding of the essence of 
singular things is the most powerful and joyous (intellectually enjoyable) kind of knowledge we 
can achieve.  
What is even more intriguing is that Spinoza relates the conclusion of the above 
propositions to several others throughout the Ethics, including much later in E5p9, which he also 
uses as support for 2p11 and 3p7. In all of these propositions, the message is clear. The more 
adequate ideas we can have at once about the myriad of things that contribute to an event, 
including its true first cause as substance with its fixed and eternal laws, the less we will be 
affected in a “harmful” manner by any one event. This level of comprehension is not possible 
without imaginative knowledge. E5p9 reads, “Next, because the mind's essence, that is, power 
(by 3p7) consists only in thought (by 2p11), the mind is less acted on by an affect which 
determines it to consider many things together than by an equally great affect which keeps the 
mind engaged solely in considering one or a few objects.”104  
The type of conceptual focus required to order one's idea types when thinking through 
the connections between concepts and their varying power involves an increase in the body's 
power to act in direct proportion with the power of thinking, habit, and reflection if thinking 
adequately. To be aware of an idea in reflection, despite its truth or falsity in content, is, 
nonetheless, real for the person experiencing it. Hasana Sharp writes, “The force of an idea is 
experienced affectively, by the whole individual, such that Spinoza ultimately assimilates 
judgment to affect. Affect is, therefore, not opposed to reason. Instead, reason names an active 
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affect, an action (EVp3).”105 This experience includes having reflective ideas about other ideas 
that we are learning or experiencing. In the TTP, Spinoza writes, “So when something in Nature 
appears to us as ridiculous, absurd or evil, this is due to the fact that our knowledge is only 
partial, that we are largely ignorant of the order and coherence of the whole of Nature and want 
all things to be arranged to suit our reason.”106  
This is an important insight that Spinoza was already ready for us to consider rationally 
at the end of Book One of the Ethics. He asks us to consider our reliance on imaginative 
knowledge when we believe that things in Nature were made for us. He observes: 
The other notions are also nothing but modes of imagining, by which the 
imagination is variously affected; and yet the ignorant consider them the chief 
attributes of things, because as we have already said, they believe all things have 
been made for their sake, and call a thing good or evil, sound or rotten and corrupt, 
as they are affected by it... All of these things show sufficiently that each one has 
judged things according to the disposition of his brain; or rather, has accepted 
affections of the imagination as things... For although human bodies agree in many 
things, they still differ in very many. And for that reason what seems good to one, 
seems bad to another; what seems ordered to one, seems confused to another; what 
seems pleasing to one, seems displeasing to another, and so on. ...men judge things 
according to the disposition of their brain, and imagine, rather than understand 
them... We see, therefore, that all the notions by which ordinary people are 
accustomed to explain Nature are only modes of imagining, and do not indicate the 
nature of anything, only the constitution of the imagination.107 
 
Because gaining knowledge, including learning about how reflexive knowledge enhances itself, 
involves a radical conception of the singularity of conscious awareness, Steenbakkers writes, 
“Subjectivity plays an important role in Spinoza's theory of the passions, too, viz. in the 
insistence on the imaginatio...”108 Steenbakkers believes there is the concept of a human 
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“subject” to be found in Spinoza's system. What we singularly strive to accomplish is not only 
more rational thinking. It is also “'a new form...of appropriation' of one's imaginary life, a new 
grasp of the peculiar force of ideas, the way that we live and have our being in 'the attribute' of 
thought.”109 Recall that it is ok to imagine something that does not exist as long as we know we 
are only imagining such a thing. This is not an error in reasoning if one is aware that they are 
imagining. Therefore, in reference to the longer citation above, we imagine that there is order in 
Nature and there are many good reasons why we need to imagine an ordered world, but reason 
understands such singular uses of imaginative knowledge. It is not, in other words, an error that 
decreases our power to exist if reason is aware of such imaginings as singular however false. It 
is in this way also that one can access their imagination with rational force to create something 
artistic, novel, etc. 
Spinoza writes that we often prefer our imaginative ideas because they are easier to 
maintain an awareness of, such as any given sense experience we decide to focus on which we 
are having. Our senses as ordered ideas are partially constructed and this allows us to remember 
only those aspects of our sense encounters that directly caused us some pleasure or pain. Yet, the 
order of our ideas is the order of things as we know them. As there is no true order in Nature, it 
is still apparent that we can learn to order our ideas according to those ideas which are rational, 
joyous, affirmative, powerful, and contribute to our and others' power to exist because of how the 
laws of Nature operate with necessity. We automatically increase our desire for more 
understanding and affirmative, efficient, and creative action that benefits all of Nature.  
When we become inclined to desire more true understanding of things, however complex, 
we shift the types of pleasures we can experience (and the intensity of those pleasures), including 
the intellectual love of Nature. Thus, we can alter the intensity of both our order of ideas and 
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subsequently of our affects, if not regularly then at least more consistently in order to “learn the 
true way of life and acquire a virtuous disposition.”110 This takes transformations from one using 
their power to merely survive based on their appetites to using their power to enhance reason and 
combine with others who are disposed to use reasoning more regularly. Affects can be conceived 
as actions if the affects are ideas that can cause other ideas with more rational force. As 
Genevieve Lloyd writes, “Spinoza's account of imagination...takes very seriously that level at 
which all knowledge starts – that immediate awareness of what is happening to one's body. And 
it's only on the basis of that that we get to the point of becoming rational. The level of 
imagination is never transcended in Spinoza. It's always there as the base of knowledge, even 
when knowledge becomes adequate.”111  
Some scholars, such as Theo Verbeek, have recently written about how the mind can 
perceive itself thinking. In order to recognize when one is relying on the common notions of 
rationality without too easily transitioning to ideas of the first kind, one's mind must perceive 
itself in reflection.112 Therefore, ideas of the imagination cannot be merely reduced to 
descriptions as “perceptions” alone. Adequate ideas are immediately true in Spinoza's system, 
that is, they are self-evidently known when comprehended. When we reflect on which kind of 
knowledge we are relying on, we can understand which combination of types of knowledge work 
with the most affirmative and powerful effects. This is a form of operational knowledge, which 
is discussed in more depth in Chapter Five on intuitive knowledge. 
We learn in E2p7 not only that “the order and connection of ideas is the order and 
connection of things,” but that there are modes of thinking which must be conceived through 
                                                 
110 Spinoza, TTP, 16: 174. 
111 James, “The Power of Spinoza: Feminist Conjunctions,” 53. 
112 Theo Verbeek, “Imagination and Reason in Spinoza,” in Psychology and Philosophy: Inquiries into the soul from 
late scholasticism to contemporary thought, ed. S. Heinamaa, M. Reuter (Netherlands: Springer, 2008), 89-90. 
 94 
other modes of thinking.113 This is one way reason can understand how to better recognize what 
type of ideas are being relied on, how they are processed or associated, and how they are then 
categorized. Although what a body can do is as important for Spinoza as what a mind can do, it 
is again interesting to remind ourselves that “so long as things are considered as modes of 
thinking, we must explain the order of the whole of Nature, or the connection of causes, through 
the attribute of thought alone.”114 Again, we see that this identification is important for truly 
applying a method to thought construction, which guarantees an increase in our power to think 
and act. To think about ideas or actions as only modes would be to try and conceive of the whole 
of Nature (which is impossible), but to adequately understand our affects helps us distinguish 
between types of knowledge we are relying on and what each type can tell us about the laws of 
thought and extension. In other words, although thinking only about our modes of thought is 
problematic in some ways, to understand more about our affects will, in turn, strengthen our 
capacity to better recognize which type of knowledge we are relying on and how these ideas are 
increasing or decreasing our conatus modally. Although the human mind may be understood as 
“part of the infinite intellect,” to think of things in parts can be problematic, as noted above. This 
includes thinking of every aspect of thought and extension in modal terms if modes are 
conceived as singular ways of expressing substance as conceived through something else 
(namely, the attributes), and not as expressions of substance directly. This is similar to the 
problem of thinking about expressions of Nature in the form of duration.115 
On Method and What a Body Can Do  
 I will spend the remaining pages of this chapter explaining exactly how my 
interpretation is accurate by closely examining several more specific propositions of Spinoza’s 
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Ethics. The brief extension of this chapter is necessary due to the lack of scholarship on the 
importance of imaginative knowledge in Spinoza’s system. For example, as we move from 
E2p9 through 2p19, especially 2p12 (which the scholarship does tend to focus on), Spinoza asks 
us to suspend judgment about some of the conclusions being drawn deductively until we 
understand more about how the new propositions can be added to all of Book One. It is not the 
kind of knowledge that will become immediately apparent to us, but will take the force of further 
deductive proofs.  
When we are learning we use memory, our senses, and language (all imaginative 
knowledge). As Spinoza writes, we will not be capable of understanding adequate (“distinct”) 
knowledge unless we first understand “adequately the nature of our body.”116 We are asked to 
focus on a combination of our knowledge about the affections of our body, or, in other words, 
we are asked to focus on our affects. E2p11 states, “The first thing which constitutes the actual 
being of a human Mind is nothing but the idea of a singular thing which actually exists.”117 As 
the mind is its ideas, the ordering of ideas will involve the intellect, but the ordering that occurs 
as imaginative knowledge will also include the ordering of sensations, at least those we are 
aware of. I delayed emphasizing this aspect of Book Two until now because of the importance 
on method by Spinoza and how one cannot grasp what it is to order their sensations (affections) 
until they first understand the ways in which the laws of the attribute of thought operate. The 
rational ordering of our affects is possible the more we can reflect on the types of ideas we are 
having and their relations to each other. In effect, we can enhance the power of our personal 
affects. 
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 To understand ourselves and the laws of thought and extension is to understand Nature as 
best we can, but this is a complex deductive move because, as Spinoza also writes, there is no 
true order in Nature: “Since order does not exist outside the imagination, there is no such thing 
as order in the universe.”118 Thus, if “the order and connection of ideas is the order and 
connection of things,” and if true order does not exist outside the imagination and what adequate 
thinking knows about the laws of thought, ideas of the first kind of knowledge, however partial, 
are absolutely necessary for truly comprehending all of Spinoza’s ontology and epistemology. 
 Better understanding the structure of imaginative knowledge not only strengthens the 
capacity to reason well, but it includes adequate knowledge about more natural phenomena.119 
As mentioned briefly and will be explored in more depth in the next chapter, recall that it is not 
enough to adequately understand the rule of proportion. It has to be applied well and with force. 
When one applies such a rule with both imaginative and rational force is when we are truly 
engaged in using what we know about such a law. This applies specifically to imaginative 
knowledge because Spinoza asks us to imagine those things that increase our power even when 
they are not present. As our affects are a combination of both thought and extension, what we are 
trying to understand and apply with more force includes increasing our ratios of motion and rest 
to our benefit, but also for others. In Chapter 7 of the TTP Spinoza writes, “Now in examining 
natural phenomena we first of all try to discover those features that are the most universal and 
common to the whole of Nature, to wit, motion-and-rest...”120 In other words, what we discover 
are laws of physics (and no one man can change those).  
There are passages like this throughout the TTP and they are consistent with what is 
deduced in Book Two of the Ethics. If we are consciously reflecting on our affects then we can 
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take other ideas about the structures of thought as the object of our reflections. In doing so, 
because thought and extension run parallel to each other, to increase the power of thought 
through understanding how our ideas operate is to increase the power of actions possible. These 
levels of increase in the proto-physics of force add to our capacities for conscious reflection. 
Beth Lord writes, “Self-consciousness increases with our bodily capabilities.”121 The result is an 
element of proto-physics or chains of actions of force and motion within each respective attribute 
that increases power for both, or what a body can do. The precise way to understand our 
increase in power is by more easily recognizing with efficiency exactly what series of ideas we 
are relying on, the cause of those ideas, the strength of imaginative ideas as compared to the ratio 
of adequate conceptions, and what, in total, our resulting affects are. This is also the way affects 
can transition to a more affirmative experience. 
E2p13 is one of the longest propositions in all the Ethics, covering 5 pages for its 
demonstration and explanation. I concentrate on it here because we learn that the human body 
exists “as we sense it.” It is important to recognize that our power to exist increases when we are 
aware of the true cause of the object of our ideas, which can include ourselves as an adequate 
cause. A simple way to state this is that we experience the bodily and intellectual joys which 
accompany thinking well and acting with more energy and vivacity for living as both a singular 
and social being. As E2A4 notes, we feel that our bodies are or can be affected in multiple 
ways.122 Although they are related, to think about bodies is to think about modes of motion and 
rest, speed and slowness, and not about substance. In other words, we enact imaginative 
portioning when we focus on only bodies and not some of the common notions about the larger, 
organic whole of which we are subject. Modes (even when understood as ideas) cannot be 
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adequately understood on their own, such as that which is merely a deterministic modification of 
substance, but must involve the concept of the attribute of which they are a part (and all the other 
dimensions of attributes being logically true that this involves). This particular aspect of 
Spinoza's argument is important. The argument demonstrates that the affections of bodies can be 
understood as ratios of motion and rest that can be ordered by understanding the laws of 
proportion. By contrast, when we comprehend the first cause of Nature as a whole (substance as 
self-caused in its essence of existing), we are to think of the definition of substance understood 
through the attribute of thought alone and proceed accordingly. In other words, to achieve the 
latter we are to adequately comprehend the laws of thought as an expression of one substance, 
but to adequately understand ideas as modal expressions of substance is to include our singular 
ways of imagining what can increase our power to exist with more force (according to what we 
have access to personally). Again, in 2p49 we read: 
In the mind there is no volition, or affirmation and negation, except that which the idea 
involves insofar as it is an idea... So a false idea, insofar as it is false, does not involve 
certainty. When we say that a man rests in false ideas, and does not doubt them, we do 
not, on that account, say that he is certain, but only that he does not doubt, or that he 
rests in false ideas because there are no causes to bring it about that his imagination 
wavers... For by certainty we understand something positive... I begin, therefore, by 
warning my readers, first, to distinguish accurately between an idea, or concept, of the 
mind, and the images of things which we imagine. And then it is necessary to distinguish 
between ideas and the words by which we signify things. ...an idea, insofar as it is an 
idea, involves an affirmation or negation... [We] will then understand clearly that an idea 
(since it is a mode of thinking) consists neither in the image of anything, nor in words. 
For the essence of words and of images is constituted only by corporeal motions, which 
do not at all involve the concept of thought. ...we perceive that one idea has more reality, 
or perfection, than another...123 
 
Certainty is always an absolute affirmation. The above quotation is used only to demonstrate 
that when we are relying on a series of false ideas without doubting such ideas, we are 
relying on ideas that are in no way adequate knowledge. Nonetheless, such ideas can become 
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so strong as to overpower reason. The point is that images are not concepts that we can rely 
on like we do with concepts as common notions with certainty. For example, we cannot 
imagine eternal substance as an image, but we can understand such a concept in a rational 
deduction. In Letter 17 of his correspondence Spinoza also describes images as “effects” of 
imaginative knowledge.124 To adequately understand effects is something entirely different, 
at times, from what it is to adequately conceive of causes. Imaginative knowledge can add to 
our greater perfection when reason better recognizes these distinctions and the laws of 
thought and uses the imagination to its benefit. 
Laws of Nature are today classified as forces and, thus, as properties of physics. As an 
expression of substance in our own unique combination, what we express is the whole of Nature 
by being subject to its laws, though we do this according to our own varying degrees of ideational 
and bodily power. The emphasis on the motion and rest between and within bodies is crucial. The 
way to increase our power in action is to understand how that power of action can be increased 
as a law of Nature. This understanding can produce more adequate ideas, which, in turn, 
simultaneously produces more powerful actions. As Spinoza notes, a body in motion stays in 
motion unless it is determined by another body to rest or to slow in its own motion. This is 
demonstrated in E2p13 L3c and occurs in history well before Issac Newton ever stated the same 
formula.125 But, as an external type of description of what occurs between two or more bodies 
that causally come into contact with one another, it is not a description of material substances. It 
is not a description about matter. Consider what is written earlier in 2p13 on what is true about a 
human body as it is applied to ideas: “For of each thing there is necessarily an idea in God, of 
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which God is the cause in the same way as he is of the idea of the human body. And so, whatever 
we have said of the idea of the human body must also be said of the idea of anything.”126  
When we speak about proportion and laws of Nature, it is not the “quantity” of ideas that 
is important, but the power of our thinking and how our adequate understanding can enhance our 
capability for powerfully rational and creative thought patterns. In addition, as explained in 
E2p16, what we perceive includes many external bodies and their motions simultaneously with 
our own ideas and motions of speed and rest.127 In the next two propositions of Book Two, in a 
lucid moment of what is now considered early neuroscience, Spinoza deduces that when a mind 
and body (in their more fluid aspects) have been influenced by other bodies, the mind will retain 
this impression in its memory.128 When the body acts in the same way as it once did (when it was 
affected by something that left such an impression), the mind will have an idea of the thing that 
affected it as present to it. It is not “present” in the sense that the actual thing that affected us is 
truly present before us. It is present in the sense that the mind drew an association of the thing as 
it affected us in the form of an idea as an affect. It is the affect that leaves an impression. 
This type of regular occurrence is what Spinoza calls an “image” in E2p17s and p18s, 
one that is retained in the mind.129 The reason I did not mention this sooner is that Spinoza wants 
us to work through the logical deductions of the Ethics up to this point before we actually try to 
understand what a finite, human image in the mind might actually be. The more the mind thinks 
clearly about laws of Nature that are universal and thus outside of concepts of time, the more it 
will have stronger affects which are based in rationality and can overcome other weaker affects, 
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which are based on past memories, future fantasies, and present dispositions (all a part of 
imaginative knowledge).  
E2p40 is considered the most famous proposition about the three types of knowledge 
described in Spinoza’s system. I reference it in more depth in the last pages of this chapter 
because the deductions prior to this proposition are important for truly understanding the import 
of Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology (or he would have written about them sooner). In 2p40, we 
learn about the three kinds of knowledge we can have, but also about more specifics in how we 
error in thought. We can make errors in reasoning if we are: 1) not aware of the laws of thought; 
2) not aware of the true causes of the object of our ideas; 3) overcome by stronger passive 
notions or sense experiencing without realizing that we are overcome, all of which continually 
reduces our power to thrive.  
This problem is demonstrated more forcefully in 2p17s: “...the affections of the human 
body whose ideas present external bodies as present to us, we shall call images of things, though 
they do not reproduce the [external] figures of things. And when the mind regards bodies in this 
way, we shall say that it imagines.”130 Note that our images “do not reproduce” what we sense, 
that is, they do not represent what we sense exactly, but are combined with singular, personal 
memories and other ideas. This would mean that every person’s images of things must be 
different to some extent in how they are experienced on a singular level. What is striking is in 
what follows next. As our personal imaginings and remembered images do not “reproduce the 
[external] figures of things,” it is clear that imaginative knowledge cannot be said to lack 
anything. Further, recall that to understand something as a lack is to understand it negatively, but 
to understand something as partial is to have at least some real knowledge. 
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Some of these images tell us how we are affected by external things and how we then 
combine what affects us with past memories and language (meaning). It is within our power to 
imagine those things that we know will increase our conatus. This is the point of learning how to 
use a forceful method when reflecting on idea types. The activity of the imagination involves 
memory directly. As Steenbakkers writes, “In order to remember something, we must be able to 
imagine it, to think of it as present to us even if it does not exist any longer. The link we thus 
establish between ideas is not determined by the things themselves, but reflects the way our body 
has been affected by earlier experiences.”131 In addition, notice that to imagine something which 
one knows is not present any longer while understanding the laws of thought is to use reason to 
help strengthen more helpful imaginative knowledge by proportion and patterning. It is to 
knowingly have a false impression that is, nonetheless, creating and contributing to real affects 
for a singular body and mind. 
The implications of this set of propositions in Book Two of the Ethics are great.  The 
links we establish between types of ideas can be re-arranged to better pattern what we know to 
be true about the laws of thought and extension. As a result, as an effect of such increased use 
of certain kinds of imaginative knowledge, reason can enhance our understanding of the 
capacity of our mind and body, increasing the power and creativity of both kinds of 
knowledge. We can combine both ideas of the imagination and of reason with more force, but 
what we desire by understanding the laws of thought is to increase our adequate chains of 
common notions. This is clear when Spinoza writes next that “the mind does not err from the 
fact that it imagines, but only insofar as it is considered to lack an idea which excludes the 
existence of those things which it imagines to be present to it. For if the mind, while it 
imagined nonexistent things as present to it, at the same time knew that those did not exist, it 
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would, of course, attribute this power of imagining to a virtue of its nature, not a vice...”132 Our 
power to use imaginative ideas well can become a virtue! Steenbakkers writes, “The 
imagination is a power (and hence a virtue) in itself, since it is an expression of God's 
[Nature's] power.”133 If we cannot better recognize which type of knowledge we are more 
heavily relying on we are stuck within what Spinoza calls a vice. To pattern our reflective 
thoughts on the real causes of our ideas, which are the laws of thought and how to manipulate 
them to our benefit, is to increase our capacity for thinking and acting with more power. 
The effects of this level of understanding includes that the imagination itself can 
override ideas which decrease our power to exist by imagining those things which we know 
will increase our power to exist. Even though we are imagining fictions, reason recognizes the 
patterning of ideas that the imagination is capable of as a force that can enhance its own 
capacities. Steenbakkers concludes:  
...all the imaginations the mind is subject to are not at odds with the truth, nor are they 
dispelled by the appearance of the truth. The ethical perspective here is that 
imaginations that make us suffer cannot be cured simply by confronting the real state of 
affairs: they require something that excludes their presence in the mind. This may well 
be another [stronger] imagination.134 
 
Knowing the truth is not enough to override powerful imaginative ideas, although it is a great 
start. What we can do is put our rational knowledge of the processes of the first kind of 
knowledge into action, creating stronger, more affirmative imaginings which benefit us. In 
understanding how imaginative knowledge is formed and influences us, we can better order and 
arrange the ideas our mind reflects on, produces, and associates. This is not an act of free will 
because all of thought and extension operates according to fixed and necessary laws. The key is 
understanding how to manipulate those laws to our benefit and, therefore, the benefit of all of 
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Nature. In 2p18s we read, “From this we clearly [i.e. adequately] understand what memory is. 
For it is nothing other than a certain connection of ideas involving the nature of things which are 
outside the human body – a connection which is in the mind according to the order and 
connection of affections of the human body.”135 Steenbakkers concludes, “The originality 
resides not in the link as such [between imagination and memory], but in [Spinoza's] view of the 
imagination as a concatenation of ideas reflecting an identical concatenation of corporeal 
affections.”136 
In E2p21 Spinoza concludes that the mind and the body “are one and the same 
individual, which is conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of 
extension. So the idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing, which is 
conceived under one and the same attribute, namely, thought.”137 Brain processes are an 
expression of the attribute of extension. The combination of thought and extension come 
together in our affects. It is important for us to keep these series of adequate ideas about 
thought and extension readily apparent to our memory. The form of an idea in its associations 
with other ideas that have caused it is significant when understanding the idea as a mode or 
modification of substance. But when the mind is conceived as an idea that God is having as a 
thinking thing, the way we think about our ideas alters. This alteration includes how we 
conceive of imaginative ideas and their power as well.  
By the time we deductively reach E2p22, a proposition that includes more detail about 
the nature of affects, we also realize that theories of representation about Spinoza’s 
epistemology will not suffice. I take up the exact reasons why in Chapter Four. One reason, 
though, is because the adequate understanding of the causes of our ideas and the nature of our 
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attributes as expressions of substance places together both ontology and epistemology for 
Spinoza in a way that cannot be separated. Yet, this system can still include a theory of human 
consciousness as well. Our series of adequate ideas that include God (substance) as the cause 
deductively, proximally or otherwise, cannot be explained or reduced to categories about 
bodily affections alone. Theories of representation which claim Spinoza’s epistemology is 
about having ideas that are representations of bodily affections will, therefore, not be accurate 
enough. Spinoza is clear about why this is the case from 2p22 onward. In 2p23 we learn that 
the mind's ideas “involve” the nature of the body, but due to the identity of substance, the 
affections of the body agree with the nature of the mind as one and the same thing: “So 
knowledge of these ideas will necessarily involve knowledge of the mind. But (by P22) 
knowledge of these ideas is in the human mind itself. Therefore, the human mind, to that extent 
only, knows itself...”138 In other words, anything which is adequately understood as the same 
thing cannot include a theory of representation between two things. 
The use of deductive reasoning allows us to increase the force of our adequate thinking, 
including about the laws of thought. Spinoza clarifies this in 2p25 through 2p29 next, as well 
as in 2p40. As noted above, the method and informed order of our reflections becomes very 
important, particularly because the ideas we have of our affections do not “involve adequate 
knowledge of the human body itself.”139 I discuss this aspect of adequate knowledge in 
Chapter Three next, but what we are learning is that we cannot have complete adequate 
knowledge of our body because that kind of more scientific knowledge would include being 
aware of all the actual physical processes and operations internal to us. Again, we can only be 
aware of our affects. This may seem confusing at first, which is why we need to track the order 
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of what we have understood thus far in its deductive force. Simply stated, an epistemic agent 
does not have complete knowledge about every one of the multitude of interactions occurring 
in the body that are in conjunction with all other parts which constitute one singular organism. 
How we order our affects will include what we have already adequately understood about the 
causes of our ideas, the laws of thought, and the power of expression of both thought and 
extension together as one unified force. This is a combination of continually shifting affections 
of which I have ideas that I can re-arrange or re-order to create more affirmatively powerful, 
useful, and joyous affects. Yet, such understanding can be used to manipulate singular, 
imaginative ideas in ways that can create stronger imaginings that aid reason further. As Pierre 
Macherey also writes, the “privation of knowledge” is not something negative, “to the 
contrary…it cannot be constituted except in relation to knowledge, for which it is a 'mode.' The 
inadequate idea is an incomplete idea, to the extent that we cannot grasp it except by mutilating 
it. In itself, in God, it is adequate, but by understanding it in a partial manner, we are prevented 
from perceiving the necessity within it...”140 This is also what makes it distinctly one’s own, the 
singularity of its particular partiality. 
 E2p40 is considered one of the most important propositions about Spinoza’s version of 
epistemology, as noted above, and we have been building to it deductively using a specific type 
of deductive method.141 I would like to conclude by examining a few other propositions that 
lead to 2p40. The focus of the propositions leading to E2p40, including E2p36, often discuss 
the nature of confusion. Our daily lives are continuously affected by imaginative knowledge, 
thus confused and fragmented ideas are a regular part of the ontology of the everyday. If we 
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only take into consideration our own ideas without understanding the laws of thought and 
extension (as adequate knowledge which can be applied to all minds), we will remain 
confused. It is to our benefit to combine ideas with others who are also thinking rationally. We 
must both understand what it is to be an expression of a self-causing substance and what it is 
for our ideas to be affected by other ideas in a singular way. The more we surround ourselves 
with others who understand this, the stronger we are as a group (of ideas, of actions, etc.). It is 
of the most importance that we learn how to recognize the difference between being affected 
by external causes or becoming the adequate cause of our own series of ideas and, therefore, 
affects. This is a heightened level of conscious awareness that is capable of rationally reflecting 
back on the types of knowledge one is relying on and the causes of that knowledge. This is not 
an act of free will. It is the necessary result of understanding how the laws of thought work. In 
other words, the newly strengthened capacity to reflect on what types of knowledge we are 
relying on more heavily and why is an act of adequate, rational knowing and the power of the 
second kind of knowledge. E2p29s makes this clearer: 
I say expressly that the mind has, not an adequate, but only a confused knowledge, of 
itself, of its own body, and of external bodies, so long as it perceives things from the 
common order of Nature, that is, so long as it is determined externally, from fortuitous 
encounters with things, to regard this or that, and not so long as it is determined 
internally, from the fact that it regards a number of things at once, to understand their 
agreements, differences, and oppositions. For so often as it is disposed internally, in this 
or another way, then it regards things clearly and distinctly...142 
 
 What becomes interesting is tracking exactly where Spinoza references imaginative 
knowledge for the rest of the Ethics. By the time we get to 2p40s2 defining the three types of 
knowledge specifically, Spinoza focuses on what deductive force (as a real force in Nature) can 
do for increasing the power of rational thinking up to that point. Citing Euclid again (although 
this time in a positive manner), Spinoza’s emphasis is on what can be understood about “the 
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common property of proportionals.”143 We can be aware of what the law or rule of proportion 
is, but we can also be capable of applying it immediately to our various series of ideas and 
different types of knowledge. Naturally, it is helpful if we can to do this easily so to more 
efficiently regulate the proportion and magnitude of idea types we are directly aware of and 
relying on.  
Coupled with 2p43, we learn about a more nuanced difference between a method of 
reason that is immediate and one which only mimicks reason. If we employ “the proper order 
of philosophizing,” we cannot doubt a true idea when we have one, but we need to know what 
the proper order of causes are first:  
And so he who has an adequate idea, or (by p34) who knows a thing truly, must at the 
same time have an adequate idea, or true knowledge, of his own knowledge... For no 
one who has a true idea is unaware that it is a true idea other than knowing a thing 
perfectly, or in the best way. And of course no one can doubt this unless he thinks that 
an idea is something mute, like a picture on a tablet, and not a mode of thinking, 
namely, the very [act of] understanding.144 
  
Ideas are not mute, they are not pictures, they are modes of thinking, actions of understanding. 
This is the specific emphasis of Chapters Three and Four next.  
It is not that an idea must agree with its object, but that we understand how ideas can be 
conceived as modes of thinking which are intrinsically determined according to the type of 
knowledge they are. This level of recognition (conscious reflection) has nothing to do with free 
will. As Book Two moves into Book Three of the Ethics, from the nature of the mind to the 
nature of the affects, what we are focusing on is not the body as much as on the associations we 
draw between series of ideas, and in ways in which we realize that we are not freely 
associating ideas either. This is not possible unless a singular individual is aware that they are 
consciously reflecting on the order and type of ideas they are having (i.e. of their own power of 
                                                 
143 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p40s2: 57. 
144 Ibid. 2p43, 2p43s: 58, emphasis added. 
 109 
understanding). As noted above, the ability to be able to suspend judgment until more 
knowledge is gained is important. Spinoza writes, “For when we say that someone suspends 
judgment, we are saying nothing but that he sees that he does not perceive the thing adequately. 
Suspension of judgment, therefore, is really a perception, not [an act] of free will.”145 Rational 
adequate knowledge includes knowing when to suspend judgment even though one might be 
experiencing strong imaginative ideas and images which leave impressions. 
The recognition of such importance is adequate knowledge about the attribute of 
thought which creates an affect of joy and understanding. The suspension is an affirmative 
action for the mind while recognizing that it is relying on the imagination, something otherwise 
considered to be passive and inadequate. Spinoza writes, “The affects...considered in 
themselves, follow with the same necessity and force of Nature as the other singular things. 
And therefore they acknowledge certain causes, through which they are understood, and have 
certain properties, as worthy of our knowledge as the properties of any other thing, by the mere 
contemplation of which we are pleased.”146 
I spent a good deal of time discussing Book Two of the Ethics in this chapter because 
of its importance for adequately understanding Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology. I end with an 
emphasis on Book Three because of how often Spinoza references the opening eleven 
propositions of Book Two in order to support his next deductive moves in Book Three. As we 
will read in the next chapters, understanding Book Five and intuitive knowledge is also not 
possible without pairing it with Book Two specifically.  
E3p2s, for example, draws on the connection between ideas (their associations or 
connections), as well as the order in which we understand anything in Nature. What we learn 
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next is that the ontological collapses within the epistemological. God is conceived as the 
adequate cause of the effects of God as a thinking thing (under the attribute of thought). We 
can then understand ourselves as a proximate cause in this respect, but also as an adequate 
cause if we understand the laws of thought and extension (which together create singular 
affects) and how to order our ideas with more force. The discussion turns to what it is to 
conceive of oneself as an adequate cause because we can then understand how adequate 
thinking can produce more and more powerful effects (ideas as actions which also become 
effects). As a result, an adequate idea can be understood as both a cause and as an effect 
depending on in what order of ideas about the causes of the knowledge one is consciously 
reflecting on.    
 The result (effect), to which I have been building in this chapter, of this level of 
understanding is striking. Our affects can be conceived as actions if the affections of our bodies 
are understood as the effects of our understanding being conceived (and thus operating) as an 
adequate cause of its own ideas. This is not a causal effect between mind and body as there is a 
causal barrier between attributes (each one is still of the same substance). In order to fully 
grasp the power of this conclusion and action of understanding we will have to go into more 
depth about the structure of common notions and the affects in the next two chapters. What is 
important to start to understand is that rationality needs certain elements of imaginative 
knowledge in order to strengthen itself and cause more intellectual joy, and that this process is 
intimately related to the power of our affects and overall conatus. In this way, Book Three is 
directly connected to Book Five of the Ethics and not only Books One and Two. The 
intellectual love of God (or Nature) causes us to strive to exist with more power and with an 
enhanced capacity to use both reason and the imagination with a stronger combined force. This 
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is why I continually emphasize that Spinoza’s epistemology is a type of proto-physics of force 
and motion. This level of awareness involves the “art of thinking” as it is more rationally 
construed: 
All of these things, indeed, show clearly that both the decision of the mind and the 
appetite and the determination of the body by nature exist together – or rather are one 
and the same thing, which we call a decision when it is considered under, and explained 
through, the attribute of thought, and which we call a determination when it is 
considered under the attribute of extension and deduced from the laws of motion and 
rest.147 
 
Piet Steenbakkers concludes that the power of the imagination in its affirmative 
capacities is directly proportional to an increase in our understanding; the more we understand 
about our affects, affections, and the power of the three types of knowledge, the more we use 
them to produce more understanding, joy, motivation, love, and pleasure as powerfully 
combined affects. Our power to act depends on our body's complexity, yet what this is remains 
nothing other than “reason's capacity of knowledge and action;” and, as it increases, so too 
does “the power of the imagination.”148 The conclusion is that understanding the laws of 
thought will automatically produce a series of effects that include a more active use of both 
imaginative and rational knowledge together. This includes our understanding the attribute of 
extension as well.149 
When the force of rationality increases in its ability to understand the true causes of any 
one encounter, the body's complexity increases because the options available are clearer and 
more diverse. We comprehend ourselves as an adequate cause. By E3p53, Spinoza begins to 
directly and regularly identify ideas of the imagination with our power to act. He writes, “When 
the mind considers itself and its power of acting, it rejoices, and does so the more, the more 
                                                 
147 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p2s: 73. 
148 Steenbakkers, “Spinoza and the Imagination,” 187. 
149 Recall 3p2 in the Ethics here. Spinoza directly references E2p7 as support for this conclusion: “The order and 
connection of ideas is the order and connection of things.”   
 112 
distinctly it imagines itself and its power of acting.”150 Ideas of the first kind (our partial, 
inadequate ideas) can be the very source of our joy when we imagine our power of acting and 
what it would take to increase our power of acting.  
As affects “always operate through the medium of the imagination,” then, as noted in 
E3p37, the desire that results from our joys or from our love will be greater in proportion to 
how strong the affect is.151 Affects are not special kinds of ideas. Affects are felt affections of 
the body and ideas of the mind in awareness that cause impressions or move us in certain 
directions. True joy increases our power of acting. Joy, as an element of a powerful affect, is 
directly related to ideas of the imagination. What brings us joy can result from learning how 
joy is created, and the variety of types of true joys that exist and increase our power to exist. 
Imagining what brings us joy must involve a transition to a reliance on ideas of reason if we 
are to understand the true causes of our joy and of Nature. These transitions between idea 
types can only be recognized by a singular mind in conscious reflection, including with the 
awareness and knowledge of what the three different types of knowledge that we can have are. 
They are also what can motivate us, give us energy, and, therefore, can be conceived as a type 
of physical and ideational force.   
 According to E3p37, when we experience great joy, we desire to preserve it. Virtue, as 
we will read about next, is also identified with both reason and power (as identical) in 
Spinoza’s system. This level of understanding is applied knowledge about how to use ideas of 
the first kind of knowledge with more affirmative and effective force. “An affect will be 
stronger if we imagine its cause to be present than if we imagine it to be absent...an affect will 
                                                 
150 Spinoza, Ethics, 3p53: 98, emphasis added. See also E3p54. 
151 Ibid. 3p37: 89. 
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be more intense if we imagine its object to be possible rather than contingent.”152 The use of 
imaginative knowledge for strengthening a positive affect is, therefore, critical. 
Each of us has a personal lens through which we filter everything. The importance of 
imaginative knowledge as Spinoza defines it adds to our learning about the richness and 
variety of human experience, even while understanding that we are driven by laws of Nature. 
Spinoza's ontological formulations may not allow for a complete theory of subjectivity or 
consciousness that would satisfy everyone in philosophy, psychology, and science, but his 
epistemological foundations do allow for what it is to be a singular individual with reflective 
awareness and a unique perspective. The fact that we need other ideas and other bodies in order 
to both survive and to thrive does not eliminate the reality of singular conscious experience in 
Spinoza’s system. How else can one understand or imagine themselves as the adequate cause 
of their ideas and actions? How else can one rationally suspend judgment while knowingly 
relying on better imaginative ideas until more adequate knowledge is acquired?  
 As we read in E3p5, we learn that it is impossible for two things that are equally 
powerful yet contrary to each other to co-exist.153 Similar to the laws of physics, if one thing is 
more powerful than another it will be able to overpower it. The same is true for types of ideas, as 
well as the proportion and magnitude of ideas in association with the affects they are a part of. If 
they were equally contrary, they would destroy or cancel each other out. In the same way, one 
affect must be more powerful than another for it to take over in force. Spinoza writes, “If two 
contrary actions are aroused in the same subject, a change will have to occur, either in both of 
them, or in only one, until they cease to be contrary.”154 This is also in line with what was 
                                                 
152 Steenbakers, “Spinoza and the Imagination,” 192. 
153 Spinoza, Ethics, 3p5:  
154 Ibid. 5 Ax 1: 162. 
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noted earlier that two things in relation with each other will look for the “least possible 
resistance.” 
 The question remains: How exactly are mental events efficacious without causally 
interacting with, nor being able to be reduced to, their biological or physical counterparts in 
explanation? Put bluntly, does Spinoza's epistemology account for how one's ideas transition 
exactly, through reflective awareness but without free will, from a passive state into an active 
one? As Theo Verbeek writes, “...the author of the Ethics cannot but see the notion of truth and 
reason as part of a psychological and genetic theory of mind.”155 But I wonder if we are asking 
the wrong question? That is, if imaginative ideas only produce other imaginative ideas, then 
asking what the underlying mechanics of the transition between types of knowledge are is an 
impossible and illogical question. When Spinoza speaks of transition, as we will read in the 
next chapters, he speaks about transformations from lesser to greater perfection. When this 
occurs, if it is significant, our old “self” dies and a new combination and expression of ideas 
and motion occurs. 
 One of the only ways to enhance our affects and increase our power of thought and 
action is to understand how the laws of thought and extension operate (so to be capable of 
better identifying the true causes of our ideas). When we conceive of ourselves as the adequate 
cause of our transitions to greater power, we experience great joy and understanding about 
laws of Nature and ourselves as more powerful expressions of those laws. This is what it 
means to become free from bondage for Spinoza. In an interview with Susan James, Moira 
Gatens concludes, “And if you take the view, as I do here, that for Spinoza subjectivity is 
always a becoming, and the identity of an individual is always a process which is in turn very 
                                                 
155 Verbeek, “Imagination and Reason in Spinoza,” 95. 
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much affected by the context in which the individual becomes, then that sort of base-line 
political theory...allows a possibility for the development of reason and freedom.”156  
We are determinate modes of existence, but I do not believe we can categorize this 
determination as a determinate mode of “objective” substance in any sense, which will be 
explained in more detail in Chapter Three. Ideas of the imagination are not opposite those of 
reason and intuition; they are just different from them in kind, and need to be understood using 
their own relations to logic that differ from the way we understand the logic of ideas of reason. 
As Pierre Macherey writes, “To represent reality through the imagination and to know it 
adequately are two entirely different things. And yet, even in an imaginary representation...there 
must be something adequate, something true.”157 Moira Gatens and Genevive Lloyd conclude: 
Imagination thus has for Spinoza a powerful ontological dimension – a direct and strong 
contact with bodily reality. On the other hand, Spinoza's version of the imagination 
involves an equally strong emphasis on the reality of the mental... The figments of the 
imagination are just as real – just as appropriate as objects of systematic investigation – 
as the modifications of matter.158 
 
This is a political and social consideration, and not only an epistemological or ontological one, 
because to increase our power to exist is to increase the power to exist of others: “The idea of 
any thing that increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our body's power of acting, increases or 
diminishes, aids or restrains, our mind's power of thinking.”159 This applies to all human beings. 
Our environment cannot limit the ways in which we imagine ourselves as free, nor can it 
limit the ways in which we try to understand any given situation as an effect of a law of Nature, 
nor the creative ways in which we find to live and tolerate any given circumstance through 
acquiring more adequate knowledge of natural phenomena. These are deeply existential 
                                                 
156 Susan James, “The Power of Spinoza: Feminist Conjunctions,” 49. 
157 Macherey, Hegel or Spinoza, 68. 
158 James, “The Power of Spinoza: Feminist Conjunctions,” 12. 
159 Spinoza, Ethics, 3p11: 76. 
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insights. In this way, we are transformed.160 Spinoza certainly understood how to tolerate the 
limited and punishing circumstances during his lifetime in various creative, intelligent, and 
joyous ways. Next, I explore the mechanics of the second kind of knowledge we can have, 
rational common notions, in Chapter Three, and how this level of knowledge cannot be reduced 
to an epistemological theory of representation in Chapter Four. What we will learn is that 
Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology is about the understanding and development of human affects.
                                                 
160 Simon Duffy notes in a 2009 essay on Spinoza scholarship referenced in the next chapter that the French 
collection of essays edited by C. Lazzeri Spinoza: puissance et impuissance de la raison (Paris 1999) is an excellent 
resource for understanding “how the intensity of passions is implicated in the function and power of reason in 
Spinoza.” 
 117 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE POWER OF STRIVING FOR CONTINUOUS UNDERSTANDING 
 
 “What distinguishes imaginary representation from true knowledge? It is the point of 
view from which this knowledge originates, and with it our mode of knowledge.”  
-Pierre Macherey 
 
“Learning to think provides necessary if not sufficient conditions for being genuinely 
virtuous; for learning to be a person. Learning to be a person is intimately bound to the idea of 
self-reflection, moral agency and responsibility. The test of a decent moralist…as of a decent 
scientist, is that she recognizes that her knowledge is incomplete, her theories tentative, and yet 
does not despair.” 
-Gillian Howie 
 
 
The Force of Adequate Understanding as a Law of Nature 
 There is nothing static about Spinoza’s philosophy. To think and act with force, creative 
efficiency, and continuous understanding while using both imaginative and rational ideas is, for 
Spinoza, immanently dynamic. To adequately understand how to use our ideas and actions 
with increased rational force is to experience the infinite enjoyment of existence. As Stuart 
Hampshire writes in the introduction to Ed Curley’s translation of the Ethics, Spinoza 
“consistently argued that everyone should try to create the conditions for security, peace of 
mind and for the active enjoyment of one’s own powers, physical and mental… In a person as 
a thinking subject, the levels of complexity are levels of reflexiveness, of thoughts about 
thoughts…”1 The more one can think, according to Spinoza, the more one can do. Yet, if we 
are not able to clearly identify which types of knowledge we are using, that is, which 
disposition we are taking up and why, our acts of reasoning can fall into error quite easily. As 
                                                 
1 Spinoza, Ethics, trans. Ed Curley (London: Penguin Books, 1996), xiii, xiv. 
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Spinoza notes, “the path taught by reason is a very difficult one…”2 The mechanics of 
reasoning well, while using methods of reflection which guarantee we have not fallen into 
error, is the focus of this chapter. In this process of combined affects, our capacity to thrive is 
enhanced. 
 In this chapter, I first establish the nature of adequate ideas in Spinoza’s dynamic 
epistemology and the structure of the second kind of knowledge. Secondly, I demonstrate how 
the knowledge of reasoning (common notions) is strengthened by human reflection and certain 
kinds of singular, imaginative ideas. The mechanics of such force require that we include and 
define the nature of singular, human consciousness. Lastly, I demonstrate how understanding 
the second kind of knowledge automatically enhances our rational reflective capacities for a 
more creative and affirmative use of imaginative knowledge. In conjunction with the effects of 
stronger rational capacities, our resulting actions of thought lead to the limitless enjoyment of 
human expression in its increased capacities. As an effect of conceiving oneself as adequately 
causing one’s own knowledge to express more rational and affirmatively imaginative force, we 
experience increases in our conatus and, simultaneously, add to the power of all of Nature. 
That is, by understanding how to adequately conceive of oneself as the adequate cause of one’s 
power, the more one can maneuver and transform that power for still greater effects and 
enjoyment which benefit all of Nature. As noted in E3p7, the essence of a human being is its 
conatus, which is the tendency towards both self-preservation and increases in power.3 It is 
important to begin to understand the nature of human striving as our essence or conatus. For 
example, it involves “indefinite time” and is not related to what we typically understand as 
“finite time,” the latter of which is durational for Spinoza – therefore always an aspect of 
                                                 
2 Spinoza, TP, trans. Sam Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2002), 1: 682. 
3 Spinoza, Ethics, 3p7: 75. Spinoza writes, “The striving by which each thing strives to preserve in its being is 
nothing but the actual essence of the thing.” 
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contingency by definition. As we will learn in this chapter, adequate reasoning does not 
recognize contingency, only necessity. Conatus is the source of both our singular passions and 
our rational actions and understanding, as is evident in E5p4s.4 Conatus is also a singular 
desire for self-preservation. This is stated clearly in 3p6: “Each thing, as far as it can by its own 
power, strives to persevere in its being.”5 
In developing our rational capacities through understanding the laws of thought by 
working through Spinoza’s Ethics, which is a deliberate element of the text, we learn that our 
methods of reflection on what we learn are a direct expression of the disposition we take as we 
use ideas of the imagination and of reason. In this way, working through Spinoza’s dynamic 
system, a way in which one learns how to strengthen one’s individual capacity to think with 
more force while combining types of knowledge, is beneficial both individually and 
collectively. Spinoza is not trying to get us to see order and harmony in Nature. We can only 
perceive natural phenomena through human experiences and we can only conceive natural 
phenomena through human ideas and their force of expression. He demonstrates how the laws 
of thought and extension operate according to the cause and effects of force and motion. This is 
Spinoza’s epistemological and ontological proto-physics of force. The order of coherence that 
we perceive in Nature is due, in part, to our imagination. In the TP, we read, “This is not 
surprising, for Nature’s bounds are set not by the laws of human reason whose aim is only 
man’s true interest and preservation, but by infinite other laws which have regard to the eternal 
order of the whole of Nature, of which man is but a tiny part.”6 In other words, Spinoza’s 
                                                 
4 Spinoza, Ethics, 5p4s: 164. Spinoza writes, “We must, therefore, take special care to know each affect clearly and 
distinctly (as far as this is possible), so that in this way the mind may be determined from an affect to thinking those 
things which it perceives clearly and distinctly, and with which it is fully satisfied, and so that the affect itself may 
be separated from the thought of an external cause and joined to true thoughts.” I will return to this in Chapter Four. 
5 Ibid 3p6: 75. In addition, 3p8 demonstrates, with 3p6, that an affirmative concept of destruction is not possible 
when conceiving Nature and its conatus adequately. 
6 Spinoza, TP, 2: 685. 
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system is not a continuation of the physics of either Aristotle or Descartes. Dan Garber writes, 
“According to Aristotelian physics, each kind of thing has its own substantial form, and it was 
through this that the basic property of things were to be explained. And so fire rises and stones 
fall because of their forms…”7 This is not the case for Spinoza. Conatus is not a form. 
 Recall from the introduction of this thesis that Spinoza is not talking solely about 
physical matter and its modifications when he defines “substance,” but infinite other types of 
expressions or attributes. This is another reason why it is important to track not only what type 
of knowledge we are focusing on but also which series of adequate ideas we are relating to one 
other. As we have already read, this is because Spinoza will specify what it is for substance to 
express itself as an attribute as compared to what it is to be a modal modification of substance 
in our singular expressions. As substance is eternal, we cannot, for example, conceive of it as 
being destroyed. That is an impossible thought for Spinoza. As early as 1661, Spinoza writes 
that if any part of matter is destroyed, so too would all of the attribute of extension, for his 
monism is without distinct parts or objectively real space and time.8 A monist system that is 
eternally unifying infinite attributes with infinite expressions includes the logical deduction 
that each attribute (eygenschappen) “must be conceived through itself.”9 Otherwise, there 
would be no way to conceive of distinct expressions of different kinds.   
 Although all of Spinoza’s substance is animate, his philosophical system cannot be 
reduced to one of panpsychism. As we read in E2p13c, all of substance strives toward 
preservation in existence with increasing and decreasing powers of expression.10 Although 
each attribute’s expressions are conceived through itself, the modifications of each attribute 
                                                 
7 Daniel Garber, “Descartes and Occasionalism,” 12. See also Steve Nadler’s edited volume Causality in Early 
Modern Philosophy for more on the non-teleology of Spinoza’s system and related. 
8 Spinoza, Letter 4, 767.  
9 Spinoza, Ethics, 1p7-p11: 4-7. 
10 Ibid. 2p13c: 40. 
 121 
can be conceived as eternal by understanding how attributes are eternal (as modes are 
conceived through something else, namely, always their respective attribute). As we know, we 
only have access to the attributes of thought and extension. These attributes do not influence 
each other causally in any manner. Each effect created by a force, action, motion, or expression 
of an attribute is caused by a connected expression from the same attribute.11 As adequate 
knowledge includes true ideas about the properties of things, in our conscious awareness we 
learn how to focus and reflect on the object of our ideas and what type of knowledge we are 
relying upon heavily. In the KV, Spinoza writes, “For we have said that the object is the cause 
of what is affirmed or denied thereof, be it true or false: falsity arising thus, namely, because, 
when we happen to know something or a part of an object, we imagine that the object 
(although we know very little of it) nevertheless affirms or denies that of itself as a whole…”12 
The two attributes we express are identical in their power simultaneously with each 
other, although Spinoza draws an important distinction between thought and extension in 
E4p35c2.13 In this proposition we learn that the two attributes share many descriptive 
commonalities but they are not to be conceived as identical. The only identity they share is that 
they are both expressions of one, organically unified and eternal substance. An example one 
can use to understand the difference is the adequate idea that we are both finite as modal 
modifications of the attributes of thought and extension, and we will perish in our human ratio 
of motion and rest at some point. This ending of our human conscious finiteness, nonetheless, 
is also an expression of eternal substance; when we die we simply change or transition into 
another ratio of motion and rest which does not include the expressions of a singular, human 
                                                 
11 Spinoza, Ethics, 1D6, 1p10, 1p16, 2p1, 2p2. These are some of the deductions Spinoza uses to draw the 
conclusions noted above. E1p16 is especially important. 
12 Spinoza, KV, 2:83 (footnote 16). 
13 Spinoza, Ethics, 4p35c2: 132-133. 
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consciousness and our current homeostatic form of a singular body. The adequate 
understanding of this difference is the attribute of thought expressing eternal common notions 
about laws of Nature with more force. Those ideas about the affections of our bodies include 
both what it is to have and express a finite body and what it is to be a modal modification of 
eternal substance. We can hold both ideas as adequate in our understanding simultaneously, 
and we experience this understanding as part of our affects. The bodily experience (affection) 
as the equivalent of this series of adequate ideas involves an increase in our capacities for 
actions and bodily expressions that are more powerful and joyous (pleasurable). In addition, as 
we will read about shortly, adequate ideas about other ideas are not always in need of perfect 
agreement with any actual physical object in order to be true (as understood). This is why, as 
we will see in Chapter Four, theories of cognitive representation cannot adequately address 
every aspect of Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology. The object of one idea can be another idea. 
As Gilles Deleuze writes, “In Spinoza the term ‘adequate’ never signifies the correspondence 
of an idea and the object it represents or indicates, but the internal conformity of the idea with 
something it expresses [i.e. namely, substance].”14 
 Because each attribute can be expressed in infinite ways, Spinoza deduces how 
adequate knowledge can eliminate problematic concepts of both geometric space and linear 
time. He does this by including our experience of human duration, something that is always an 
expression of imaginative (singular) knowledge. The concept of something thought about as a 
“part” can be replaced, at times, with the concept of the motion of composite bodies, as argued 
in 2p13L7s where we learn that each collection of bodily compositions and variation occurs in 
                                                 
14 Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, ed. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1992), 133. 
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a multiplicity of ways “without any change to the whole individual.”15 A new “individual” or 
composite body can be understood as expressing itself with new ratios of motion and rest 
which continue to alter and are in relation to every other element of what that body (and mind) 
are in contact with or being influenced by. These compositions or expressions are continually 
shifting variations (increases and decreases) in power and force. Spinoza replaces the concepts 
of physical space and time with logical deductions about infinity. By the concept of “eternity,” 
Spinoza intends not only that which is infinite, but the concept of “existence itself.”16 The 
necessary and sufficient condition (adequate knowledge) that supports the infinite as real and 
as that which we can express as a real element of Nature, includes, by necessity, that all of 
substance is always in existence. I return to this important deduction throughout the rest of the 
thesis, but for now we need to examine the nature of proximate causes in this system.  
 To demonstrate what kind of order and connection in Nature we are capable of 
describing with accuracy, while also expressing and describing modes as modes (wyzen), 
requires an understanding of proximate causes. In relation to the definition of substance, 
proximate causes in Spinoza’s system include adequate ideas about how cause and effect 
operate from the perspective of infinite attributes with infinite effects. Substance is self-caused 
and, as Spinoza writes in Chapters One and Two of the KV, that which is nothing cannot be 
said to have any attributes, but that which is one eternal whole can be deduced to have all 
                                                 
15 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p13L7s: 43. What we learn at this point in the Ethics is that there are various things which can 
speed up or slow down the communication of motion between aggregates of interactions and relations of any one 
body, composition of bodies, or substance as one whole. 
16 Ibid. 1D8: 2. Spinoza writes, “By eternity I understand existence itself, insofar as it is conceived to follow 
necessarily from the definition alone of the eternal thing. For such existence, like the essence of a thing, is conceived 
as an eternal truth, and on that account cannot be explained by duration or time…” 
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attributes possible. A self-caused and self-causing substance “must have all attributes…so that 
which is Something has attributes because it is Something.”17 
 That which exists is defined as that which exists eternally because the definition of 
existence can never include that the thing being defined does not or cannot exist, nor that it has 
attributes which can cease to exist. This deduction states, therefore, that the attributes of 
substance must exist by necessity and can never not exist. Therefore, Spinoza’s system can 
have a dual sense of causality. Efficient and material causation (beginnende oorzaak) can only 
be conceived in relation to the concept of modes, as noted in 1p28; this is true even when we 
understand that God (substance, Nature) is the immanent cause (inblyvende oorzaak) of all of 
Nature’s effects.18 Yet, Spinoza is clear in other places that we should not prefer to take up the 
disposition of conceiving things in this way. If substance and its attributes are immanent and 
inseparable conceptually, and if modes are expressions of substance whose essence is 
immanently in and conceived through the attributes, then we can conceive of things as modal 
modifications of substance or we can conceive of things as substance and its effects (as self-
caused). Each identification of the actions of substance carries different series of adequately 
understood relations and definitions. It is the alteration in our disposition and resulting force of 
action that matters. Finite ideas are modes, but an adequate idea about what modes are can also 
be taken as an object of thought, and this changes how we conceive of both substance and 
modes. The nature and relationship of substance and its effects is that, as its own cause, it must 
be understood as involved in its effects. This concept of immanence is not the typical (linear) 
conception of causality (for one, substance has infinite attributes which are all creating effects 
eternally), but it does involve such a concept when considering the logic of a human mind in its 
                                                 
17 Spinoza, KV, 2: 40 (footnote 6). In footnote 8 we read, “…for the nature of a thing can require nothing while it 
does not exist.” 
18 Spinoza, Ethics, 1p28: 19-20, among other places. 
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adequate chain of other adequate ideas, for example. To reason well is not to cause something 
by necessity as much as to cause is not to reason. When ideas of imaginative knowledge affect 
other ideas of imaginative knowledge, the notion of causality is altered, and it is not the same 
as what occurs when adequate ideas cause other adequate ideas. If it were the same effect, then 
imaginative ideas would not be so potentially dangerous in decreasing conatus. Yet, all ideas 
can also be understood as acts of some kind. Pierre Macherey writes, “Ideas, all ideas, are acts, 
that is, they always affirm something in themselves, according to a modality that returns to 
their cause…”19 Even the suspension of judgment is an action of knowledge. The action of 
understanding, as an expression of adequate knowledge when we suspend judgment, means we 
are aware we are not perceiving or conceiving something as completely as we can. We are 
aware that we have partial knowledge (as an experience) of the thing we are trying to 
understand. The object of our ideas at this point is not the thing we are trying to understand, 
but the awareness of our process of adequate understanding in action.20 
Adequate ideas always increase our conatus. When we reflect on and recognize that we 
are not yet fully understanding, we also recognize that we affirm our capacity to reason well. 
Spinoza affirms this process in Letter 21 when he writes, “…if only you pay attention to your 
nature, you experience the ability to suspend judgment.”21 The effects of our ideas as effects, 
related to their cause as other ideas, can be understood both as singular expressions of adequate 
knowledge and as substance itself expressing more power in its eternal truth of how the 
attribute of thought operates according to its necessary laws. Imaginative ideas cannot be 
conceived in this way. They are singular in nature, even if they are still an aspect of the modal 
expression of substance in its power as ways. What is at stake is the object of our ideas and the 
                                                 
19 Macherey, Hegel or Spinoza, 63. 
20 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p49s IIIB (ii), IIIB (iii): 66-67. 
21 Spinoza, Letter 21, 826. 
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disposition we take up. To think as a conscious human being with the capacity to reflect on 
what is being thought about is more than only reasoning. Therefore, our expression of 
substance understood as substance must differ from our singular powers of reasoning in their 
varieties of expressiveness. The relation between substance and mode is an organic whole. 
Modes are simply the ways in which substance can be and are expressed, including as 
combinations between ideas. Taking up a rational disposition in reflected awareness is what we 
know will allow us to generate new knowledge and more diverse experiences. 
 What we are learning about in Spinoza’s Ethics (adequate reasoning with deductive 
conclusions) are the necessary effects of such causes (both material and efficient). From the 
beginning of the Ethics, we learn that the knowledge of effects depends on the knowledge of 
causes. Therefore, you will not adequately understand the power of your understanding (as 
effects of other ideas) unless you rationally comprehend how that understanding was caused by 
other adequate ideas (both your own and derived from external sources).22 The ocean is 
continually animated, it has motion, power, and force. All its elements are connected 
organically in extension, yet we cannot say that the ocean has reflective ideas and actions in the 
same way that humans do. The definition of cause and effect, in other words, will vary 
depending on what kind of cause one is trying to understand. As Stephen Connelly writes, 
substance, for Spinoza, may be analogous to an infinite ocean and its waves, where we are a 
moving metronome on a moving ship on a moving ocean; but in some real sense the motion of 
the ocean’s waves will be built into our own otherwise particular motion and understanding of 
motion.23 They are separate motions, but they are inseparable. How can something be both a 
                                                 
22 Spinoza, Ethics, 1A4: 2.  
23 See http://criticallegalthinking.com/2013/06/14/power-potentia-notes-on-the-thought-of-spinoza. Connolly also 
published a 2011 article on Aristotle’s influence on Spinoza which can be found in the Utrecht Law Review. 
Aristotle’s works (as they were preserved and passed down) had a minimal influence on Spinoza.  
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part of one whole substance yet separate in its own determinate way? This is the problem 
Spinoza’s Ethics solves. As Pierre Macherey summarizes: 
 In axiom 5 of book I of the Ethics, Spinoza affirms the agreement [conventia] of the 
 true idea with its object. This proposition, which is not a definition, does not express  
 the intrinsic character of the true idea: it does not constitute an idea starting from its  
 cause but characterizes it only a posteriori through one of its properties as is confirmed 
 by definition 4 in book II, which distinguishes the extrinsic and intrinsic qualities of a  
 true idea. The notion of conventia, which relates the idea to an object that is outside it,  
 evidently designates an extrinsic quality. By contrast, the causal definition of the true 
 idea determines it through its adequatio; it is this concept, which is essential for  
 Spinoza and which marks its rupture with the traditional conception of knowledge. In 
 effect, by adequatio we must think of exactly the opposite of that which reveals itself 
 as conventia. Adequatio is the intrinsic determination of the true idea, that is, that which 
 produces its truth in the idea… The essential function of the category of adequatio is to 
 break with the conception of knowledge as representation that continues to dominate 
 Cartesianism… The adequatio is thus the key to truth, because it expresses this intrinsic 
 relationship of the idea to itself.24 
 
 The encounter with ideas (our own and from others) produce real effects. As every 
effect involves its cause, this aspect of Spinoza’s system does not say that effects can be 
reduced to their cause in definition or explanation. As our ideas cannot be reduced to our 
bodily affections and sensations, they can, nonetheless, be understood as real entities which we 
encounter and which have degrees of force and intensity. The affects of which we are aware 
are a combination of both attributes. E1p25c defines a “body” as a real “singular” thing, a 
particular expression of substance in its own determinate way. A body is not, in other words, 
only defined as a singular human (physical) body. A body can be the combination of many 
bodies into one force, for example, such as the State. To understand Spinoza’s proto-physics of 
the force of bodies together, we can refer to Letter 58: 
A stone receives from the impulsion of an external cause a fixed quantity of motion 
whereby it will continue necessarily to move when the impulsion of the external cause 
has ceased. The stone’s continuance in motion is constrained, not because it is 
necessary, but because it must be defined by the impulsion received from an external 
cause. What here applies to the stone must be understood of every individual thing, 
                                                 
24 Macherey, Hegel or Spinoza, 60, 63. See also Letter 60 in Spinoza’s correspondence to Tschirnhaus. 
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however complex its structure and varied its functions. For every single thing is 
necessarily determined by an external cause to exist and to act in a fixed and 
determinate way.25 
 
 Whatever follows or is caused by an attribute of substance is always necessarily 
infinite. In this way, as this chapter will demonstrate, our expressions of the force of adequate 
understanding are also eternal. In E1p18 through 1p21, we read, “God is the immanent, not the 
transitive, cause of all things,” and that all of God’s (Nature’s) attributes are eternal because 
“God’s existence and his essence are one and the same.”26 Therefore, anything that follows 
from the absolute nature of God’s attributes is also infinite. Although our essence conceived as 
an expression of substance (God, Nature) is eternal, our individual expressions of conatus can 
also be conceived as modal modifications of substance (modes), and, therefore, vary in their 
intensities and force of expression according to continually shifting ratios of motion and rest in 
extension. My force of expression of my conatus is different from my neighbor’s expression of 
their conatus or of any singular thing in its own determinate expression of its conatus. As noted 
in 1p25c and 1p28, modes “are nothing but the affections of God’s attributes.”27 
 Laws of Nature are forces that produce effects and relations of increasing or decreasing 
power, transformations, re-configurations, and new arrangements.28  Yet, because we are a 
continuous expression of extension, identifying a beginning or ending point of any one series of 
actions is logically impossible. The language of “beginning” and “ending” is, therefore, often a 
part of imaginative (singular) knowledge. Thus, to adequately conceive the causality of effects 
that are involved in their causes will not include explanations from a static point A to a static 
                                                 
25 Spinoza, Letter 58, 909, emphasis added. 
26 Spinoza, Ethics, 16-17. 
27 Ibid. 19. Along with E1p1 we understand that substance as self-causing is always the cause of its own effects. 
1p21 is also about our expression of what is affirmatively infinite.  
28 Later in the chapter I will reference Nancy Cartwright’s insights on the laws of physics that do not address all 
phenomenological experiences of human existence. She writes, “We have detailed expertise for testing the claim of 
physics about what happens in concrete situations. When we look to the real implications of our fundamental laws, 
they do not meet these ordinary standards.” 
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point B. The nature of the ways in which we can adequately understand causality, for Spinoza, 
will logically alter depending on if we are describing the expressions of attributes or the effects 
and expressions of modes. Affections of substance cannot be located ‘in time.’ 
 Certain aspects of the essence of modes are composed of parts because imaginative 
knowledge is an aspect of what it is to be a modal modification of substance. Our conceiving of 
anything as a “part,” as we read in Chapter Two, is always an expression of imaginative 
knowledge. In addition, not all modes are finite, some are infinite and immediate, for example. 
Yet, any finite expression, if described as an aspect of what it is to be finite, can be logically 
conceived as a mode. Among the three types of modes (finite, immediate and infinite, and 
mediate and infinite), their combination in expression as a human mind and body. They are an 
expression of both imaginative knowledge (in its singularity) and of the adequate knowledge (as 
common notions which are eternal and necessarily true). In Letter 12, Spinoza writes, “The 
affections of Substance I call Modes. The definition of Modes, insofar as it is not itself a 
definition of Substance, cannot involve existence… From this it further follows that when we 
have regard only to the essence of Modes and not to the order of Nature as a whole, we cannot 
deduce from their present existence that they will or will not exist in the future or that they did 
or did not exist in the past.”29 Thus, it is not a logical contradiction to talk about the essence of 
modes in duration (finite human bodies die, for example) or to explain the same action of modal 
modification understood more adequately as an expression of an eternal law of Nature.  
 Therefore, our ideas can be understood as expressions of the power of our conatus and 
not as in existence or not in existence (that is, as having beginning and ending points). This is 
also why, as we will read later in this chapter and in Chapter Four, understanding the nature of 
the power of our affects becomes crucial to adequately comprehending Spinoza’s dynamic 
                                                 
29 Spinoza, Letter 12, 788. We can also reference E1p21 for more support on the infinite and the finite again. 
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epistemology. The letter noted above was written in 1663, but ten years later, in the unfinished 
TP, Spinoza reaffirms the same conclusion. He writes: 
Therefore, just as the coming into existence of natural things cannot be concluded from 
their definition, so neither can their perseverance in existing, for their essence in the 
form of ideas is the same after they have begun to exist as it was before they existed… 
The same power that they need in order to begin to exist, they also need in order to 
continue to exist. Hence it follows that the power of natural things by which they exist, 
and consequently by which they act, can be no other than the eternal power of God… 
By the right of Nature, then, I understand the laws or rules of Nature in accordance with 
which all things come to be; that is, the very power of Nature…30 
 
In this way, I conceive of my ideas and actions as both adequately caused by the proto-physics 
of force and motion on a singular level, and as caused by the laws of Nature. It depends on 
which disposition of series of ideas I assume as my conscious mind. The existence of natural 
things or phenomena cannot be deduced from their definition (explanation) alone, but have to 
be understood according to their relation to the “eternal power of God” and the laws of Nature 
of the two attributes we express. Perhaps more importantly, whatever power was in the essence 
of a thing when it started to exist (as noted in several passages above about the physics of force 
within and between real things) will be required as a bare minimum in order for it to continue 
to exist. Yet, that level of power can increase in both force and expression when combined with 
other things which enhance our power to exist, such as adequately understanding how the laws 
of the attributes operate, and the enjoyment of our singular existence in its variety of 
expressive possibilities. As we will read about in Chapter Five, the third kind of knowledge we 
are capable of, intuitive understanding and expression, involves the adequate comprehension 
and application of all three types of knowledge and the essence of singular things. 
 It will be helpful to refresh our memory and consider what is said above in relation to 
Chapter One about the nature of definition, using support from Spinoza’s Letter 9 addressed to 
                                                 
30 Spinoza, TP, 2: 683. Note that our essence as conatus can be understood as “the form of an idea.”  
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Simon de Vries. In this letter, Spinoza writes about two types of definition. He informs de 
Vries that the latter’s difficulties in understanding the nature of definition are due to his 
“failure to distinguish between two types of definition. There is the definition that serves to 
explicate a thing whose essence is in question and the subject of doubt, and there is the 
definition which is put forward simply for examination. The former, since it has a determinate 
object, must be a true definition, while this need not be so in the latter case.”31 A definition put 
forward for evaluation does not make what is evaluated eternally true; however, the structures 
of reasoning used and required in order to evaluate its truth or falsity are an eternal expression 
of the attribute of adequate ideas. If the definition is not true as a common notion, then we can 
include some of our ideas about it as part of imaginary knowledge but not necessarily an error 
in reasoning. This is why it is important to have the rational capacity to reflect on what kinds of 
ideas we are considering, as well as their objects, and then suspend further judgment as needed.  
 Letter 9 also includes references to why Spinoza equates the definition of “substance” 
and that of “attribute” when logic requires it as an aspect of series of adequate ideas. The 
definition of substance and of modes, on the other hand, are very different kinds of definitions. 
Learning how to recognize in conscious reflection which types of knowledge we are relying on 
and why, as well as what effects in the form of ideas they produce with more force, becomes 
crucial in understanding more about the expression of substance (Nature, God) as compared to 
the expressions of modal modifications of substance with lesser degrees of force and 
animation. Modes are never (adequately) conceived as contrary to substance or they would 
destroy each other, as Spinoza notes in E3p5 and 3p6; they are modifications (affections) of 
substance.32 All singular things are modes, and every affection of substance is also a modal 
                                                 
31 Spinoza, Letter 9, 781. 
32 Spinoza, Ethics, 3p5, p6: 75. 
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modification. Every real thing is always opposed to that “which can take its existence 
away…”33 This deduction is forcefully consistent. In 3p7 we learn that our striving for 
continued existence, therefore, must involve the concept of indefinite time. 
What we learn is not only the distinction between natura naturans and natura naturata, 
but that we also perceive “nothing more clearly” than the intellect and its processes (as  
conscious awareness), especially when we are reflecting on the laws of thought. Spinoza writes 
that because the intellect is conceived as an expression of an attribute of substance, it must, 
therefore, also include what it is for that attribute to have infinite modifications in expression 
of itself as itself. He writes, “By intellect (as is known through itself) we understand not 
absolute thought, but only a certain mode of thinking, which mode differs from the others, such 
as desire, love, and the like, and so (by D5) must be conceived through absolute thought, that is 
(by P15 and D6), it must be so conceived through an attribute of God, which expresses the 
eternal and infinite essence of thought…”34 We learn that we can adequately understand not 
God or Substance or all of Nature itself but a certain modal modification of the expression of 
the attribute of thought in its laws by necessity. The laws of expression are the same for all 
who express the attribute of thought, but their specific determinate expressions are infinite – 
and in that realization we understand still more about the laws of thought. As such, we express 
the eternal nature of the attribute of thought in its essence. 
 As we can “understand nothing that does not lead to more perfect knowledge of the 
intellection,” continued understanding, conscious reflection, and an enhancement in the power 
of thought and action are intimately connected.35 Adequate knowing will always use concepts 
(common notions) which are derived from reasoning, and, as we read in the last chapter, this 
                                                 
33 Spinoza, Ethics, 3p5, p6: 75. 
34 Ibid. 1p31: 21, emphasis added. This position is key to understanding Spinoza’s system. 
35 Ibid. 1p31: 21. 
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can include understanding how certain imaginative ideas can aid reasoning and understanding. 
For Spinoza, “what is contained objectively in the intellect must necessarily be in Nature;” 
therefore, our true ideas are as much an expression of God (Nature) as everything else. In 
accordance with E1ax5, Pierre Macherey writes, “The true idea is not adequate to its object 
because it corresponds to it; one must say, quite the contrary, that it corresponds to it because it 
is adequate, that is to say determined in itself, in a necessary fashion.”36 This coheres with 
Spinoza’s explanation of the first kind of definition above. We understand that more chains of 
common notions are produced as the effect of an increase in adequate knowledge and the laws 
of thought as cause. In short, the more our mind and body learn how to move in different ways 
with more power, that is, to have more diverse encounters with increased understanding and 
efficient and joyous experiences, the more we are able to produce different kinds of effects and 
new combinations of ideas which are powerfully rational and effective. 
 Letters 6 and 12 add support to Spinoza’s conclusion that true ideas are real things 
expressed by Nature and that which the attribute of thought expresses in its essence. In Letter 
6, in a section on fluidity, Spinoza writes, “In my view, notions which derive from popular 
usage, or which explicate Nature not as it is in itself but as it is related to human senses, should 
certainly not be regarded as concepts of the highest generality, nor should they be mixed (not 
to say confused) with notions that are pure and which explicate Nature as it is in itself. Of the 
latter kind are motion, rest, and their laws…”37 Ratios of motion and rest are the ways in which 
the attribute of extension expresses itself, but our adequate understanding of this are the natural 
expressions of true ideas and the essence of the laws of thought. The same sentiment is 
                                                 
36 Macherey, Hegel or Spinoza, 66. He continues, “The active character of knowledge does not depend on the 
initiative of a free subject; rather, it is the idea itself that is active, insofar as it expresses in a singular fashion the 
infinite causality of substance.” 
37 Spinoza, Letter 6: 773. The use of the term “pure” in this letter is problematic, but was acceptable for Spinoza. 
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expressed elsewhere, such as in E1p15s and Letter 12 on the infinite. We learn that we can 
experience things around us by way of the imagination (through sense data, a feeling of 
duration and, therefore, of that which is contingent) or we can conceive of such things as 
expressions of one organic substance. If the latter, then we deduce that such expressions are of 
one substance with everything else, infinite as expressions of laws of Nature, and indivisible.38  
 Spinoza’s work emphasizes what it is to increase our ratios of motion in ways where 
more aspects of our human, singular extension combines in active, powerful ways. Learning 
what a body can do using adequate knowledge simultaneously combines with feelings of 
pleasure, joy, and energy in extension. The individual that I am currently will end in its ratios 
of motion and rest upon my finite death, for example, but the adequate ideas that I am 
expressing (and their power to effect ideas in other minds) will continue in new expressions 
after my death. It is in this way that adequate ideas can also be understood as eternal in 
essence. The ratios of my motion and rest will also alter to combine with other expressions of 
extension (such as the deterioration of my physical body and its combination with the earth to 
create dust and dirt as new forms of an energy resource) and combine to become new ratios. 
 Spinoza’s system is not devoid of its own method of measurement. Efraim Shmueli 
writes, “Spinoza’s system was understood, or rather, misunderstood as an anticoncept, not 
determinative of any real objects.”39 His system is as much about true ideas with content as real 
expressions of Nature that are infinite in essence as it is about singular experiences as a real 
expression of Nature as well. Both are required for such a system, which is why Spinoza had to 
                                                 
38 Spinoza, Letter 12: 787-791 and Ethics 1p15s: 10-13. Spinoza writes in Letter 12A that 1p15 should be referred to 
when trying to understand “all modes of thinking.” I referred to this particular proposition as crucial regularly. 
39 Efraim Shmueli, “Hegel’s Interpretation of Spinoza’s Concept of Substance,” 180. Shmueli’s work is interested in 
demonstrating how the philosopher Hegel misunderstood Spinoza’s system as void of content. He writes, “Hegel’s 
concern with Spinoza’s concepts was thoroughly influenced by his struggle for the justification or validation of his 
own method…” The point is only that many Spinoza scholars feel Hegel read Spinoza incorrectly. 
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break his deductions down to include both eternal attributes with their laws and modal 
modifications and their three types or kinds of expression. In such a system, the “logic of each 
concept presupposes relation to other things…Claims to unity for either part or whole are 
spurious. Or at least it is attained by absorption into some more adequate unit.”40 In my 
singular expression of ratios of motion and rest I am transformed continually, while also 
maintaining a homeostatic balance towards self-preservation, perseverance, and, if reflecting 
on and using adequate knowledge, expressing thought and extension with increased force. All 
things express extension in its laws of motion and rest. In this way, my pen can be described as 
an expression of God or Nature as much as a rolling motorcycle, recipe, lake, rotting animal, 
laughter, a prayer, notes on a musical scale, metaphor, or a piece of metal.   
 To put it another way, Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology cannot be reduced to a human 
system of neurons and material substance or inert matter. His proto-physics of force in thought 
and extension can be better understood as expressions of real things and not mere mental 
constructs. As Spinoza writes in Letter 27, the understanding of his system “must be based on 
metaphysics and physics.”41 As Hsana Sharp concludes, “Thought, which is not equivalent to 
the symbolic, is its own peculiar reality rather than a reflection other than itself.”42 To think of 
such a system as that which uses representations (as I will discuss in Chapter Four on Michael 
Della Rocca’s interpretation) is to reduce it to symbols, reflections, and images or 
correspondences. My ideas do not correspond to reality in the form of only representations. 
They are reality in the determinate expression of the force of the laws of the attribute of 
thought. The ideas of the attribute of thought, in other words, do not represent the actions of 
the attribute of extension because attributes are “one and the same thing” in Spinoza’s 
                                                 
40 William Sacksteder, “Simple Wholes and Complex Parts,” 398.  
41 Spinoza, Letter 27: 839. 
42 Sharp, “The Force of Ideas,” 738. 
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understanding of substance. Something that is one and the same thing cannot be said to have 
some parts that represent other parts of itself. All expressions are immanent expressions of 
itself as itself in their own ways.43 A good example is that if a word appears on a shirt in a 
foreign language that both has a literal meaning in that language which does not fully represent 
the term proudly shown on the tee-shirt, and the English translation also does not fully account 
for the term used in definition either, the word (language) on the shirt is not a representation of 
the real meaning in its totality. For Spinoza, it depends on how the term is used and repeated, 
what context it is applied to, and, therefore, the term in definition is something different from 
the term on the shirt and the way it is used on the shirt. One meaning does not represent the 
other meaning, even if the “image” of the term in both instances is identical in some way. 
The Expression and Definition of Attributes and Modes as Substance 
 The problem of how to understand and define the attributes of Spinoza’s substance is a 
highly controversial area of debate within the scholarship. As A. Wolf writes, “The only 
difference between the Attributes and Substance is that our intellect can be an act of abstraction 
thinking of one of the Attributes apart from the rest, whereas in reality all Attributes are 
inseparably together.”44 How to adequately conceive of substance and the attributes, therefore, 
requires more explanation and demonstration. E1p11 reads, “God, or a substance consisting of 
infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists.”45 
In 1974, Ed Curley wrote on this interpretive problem in response to the extensive 
treatment of Spinoza’s system by Martial Gueroult. I believe some of Curley’s conclusions 
summarize the interpretation of such an ontological problem as noted above nicely. He writes: 
                                                 
43 See E1p4 where Spinoza identifies substance with the attributes and 1p19 where he writes how the attributes are 
eternal expressions of substance, as well as 2p21s. Letters 2, 4, and 9 also support this position.  
44 A. Wolf, “Spinoza’s Conception of the Attributes of Substance,” 2. 
45 Spinoza, Ethics, 1p11: 7.  
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Gueroult's own interpretation conceives Spinoza's substance as a complex whole whose 
essence is constituted by an infinity of really distinct elements, the attributes, each of 
which satisfies in its own right the definition of substance. So substance is identical with 
the totality of its attributes, and each attribute both exists in itself and is conceived 
through itself. This is very similar to a position I have argued for myself... As Gueroult 
points out, a good many objections to Spinozism can be shown to rest on a 
misunderstanding if this interpretation is accepted... But once we conceive the idea of an 
ens realissimum, of a being whose nature it is to consist of infinitely many attributes and 
whose existence follows from that nature, then we are obliged to conceive of the 
attributes as constituents of one being and not as a mere collection of substances. God's 
existence does not result from the necessary existence of each of the elements which 
constitute his nature. It is rather their existence together which results from his necessary 
existence...46 
 
The evidence to support Curley’s reading is ample in Spinoza’s work, particularly in E1p29s 
that is cited by both Curley and Gueroult. I also find more support for the reality of the 
attributes (where each expresses itself infinitely and uniquely) in 1p10 and 1p11. To 
understand how to solve some of the problems that arise from such a construction, Spinoza 
writes in 1665 that some solutions “cannot be grasped without first understanding the necessity 
of things.”47 We have already worked through 1p8s2 and 1p9 that demonstrate that attributes 
are not modifications of substance, as that would involve their concept employing another 
concept in order to be true. As we have already read, attributes are conceived through 
themselves. In 1p9, Spinoza simply writes that the more reality “or being” a thing has, the 
more attributes it will have by necessity.48 It is at this point where Spinoza includes a 
discussion about signs and the ways in which we try to recognize Nature as one substance, that 
is, as all connected by necessity and not as numerically one thing. As noted above, the concept 
of number is not logically required for conceiving substance as having infinite attributes that 
express themselves in infinite ways. He writes that we will search in vain if we are looking for 
signs in Nature for proof of the diversity of substances. He also notes within this proposition 
                                                 
46 Curley, “Recent Work on the 17th Century Continental Philosophy,” 240. 
47 Spinoza, Ethics, 1p10, p11: 6-9 and Letter 27: 839. 
48 Ibid. 1p9: 4. E1p10 shows why, therefore, each attribute must be conceived through itself. 
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that “it is evident that although two attributes may be conceived to be really distinct…we still 
cannot infer from that that they constitute two beings, or two different susbstances.”49 The 
deduction that attributes are real but are not separate substances, therefore, is a conceptual 
distinction between what it is to conceive real things through themselves and to do so logically 
in a certain determinate way. In other words, Spinoza is not concluding what we might find in 
Aristotle about substance and its attributes, nor can we compare the two systems as similar on 
the nature of singular expressions of each attribute either.  
 The above emphasis on how to logically conceive of distinct things that are real 
expressions of Nature as one whole is also found in Chapter Four of the TTP. For something to 
be really distinct is for it to be conceived through itself without the need for another true 
concept in order for it to be true. As early as 1661 and 1663, Spinoza writes about how to 
understand what this entails in Letter 2 and Letter 9. What matters in our conceptual 
distinctions is what each definition being relied on is in relation to by necessity. Noting the 
definition he already ascribed to Substance, Spinoza writes, “I understand the same by 
attribute, except that attribute is so called in respect to the intellect… This definition, I repeat, 
explains clearly what I mean by substance and attribute…”50 
In other words, substance and attribute can be conceived as the same thing because both 
can be conceived through themselves. But their concept must be used differently when required 
in order for our singular minds to adequately comprehend what it is for something which is 
self-caused and self-causing with infinite expressions to encompass the totality of Nature (for 
example, one singular thought of such a thing is not possible so our conceptions must shift in 
order to understand what Nature is defined as). Spinoza writes, “For it is of the nature of a 
                                                 
49 Spinoza, Ethics, 1p10s: 6. 
50 Spinoza, Letter 9: 782. 
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substance that each of its attributes is conceived through itself, since all the attributes it has 
have always been in it together…each expresses the reality, or being of substance.”51 Consider 
what appears in a footnote of the KV as well: “The [attributes] following are called Propria, 
because they are only Adjectives, which cannot be understood without their Substantives. That 
is to say, without them God would indeed be no God, but still it is not that they constitute God; 
for they reveal nothing of the character of a Substance, through which God exists.”52 And still 
further, if we turn to Chapter Four of the TTP we read, “To put it another way, since the 
knowledge of an effect through its cause is nothing other than the knowledge of a property of 
that cause, the greater our knowledge of natural phenomena, the more perfect is our knowledge 
of God’s essence, which is the cause of all things.”53 Clearly, an attribute can be understood as 
a property of substance, but only in the sense of what it is to conceive of Nature as self-caused 
and self-causing, and how, therefore, the effects or expressions of Nature always involve their 
cause (and its essence as the essence of Nature). The essence of God, Nature, or Substance 
(however you name it) is that it is eternal with infinite attributes expressed in infinite ways. In 
other words, a human mind must understand the attributes of thought and extension as 
expressions of natural phenomena and laws of Nature conceived through themselves! 
Otherwise, substance and its attributes can also be understood as the same thing and there 
would be no way to logically understand how our singular expressions can be truly distinct and 
yet of one and the same thing. The above references demonstrate how and why Spinoza 
equates God with Nature or Substance, or that, as Letter 9 continues, “one and the same thing 
can be signified by two names.”54 Yet, attributes are not properties of substance. In Letter 10, 
                                                 
51 Spinoza, Ethics, 1p10s: 6. 
52 Spinoza, KV, 3: 50, footnote 13. 
53 Spinoza, TTP, 4: 428, emphasis added. 
54 Spinoza, Letter 9: 782. 
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Spinoza writes to Simon de Vries, “So since the existence of attributes does not differ from 
their essence [as conceived through itself directly], we shall not be able to apprehend it by any 
experience…”55 In other words, some other causal notion is required to explain how singular 
things do express substance as substance, or what we know of as modes. 
 The mind does not have ideas, as already noted. The mind is ideas. Thus, we cannot say 
that we “experience” reason as something distinct from our thoughts about it. To think using 
the second kind of knowledge is to reason. Our strength of reasoning will always be in relation 
to increases and decreases in expressions and proportions of our essence. Anthony Paul Smith 
writes, “Spinoza allows us to see that reason is not an absolute; it is placed within a wider 
relationship, and it is often strongly directed by the affect it relates to at any given time.”56 As 
we also learn in Letter 6, philosophical investigations must examine individual differences and 
similarities between real, distinct things of Nature, which also applies to Spinoza’s system as a 
logical explanation of everyone as one substance. But this system is dialectically material, at 
least in the sense that it does not end in a type of empiricism that endlessly attempts to evaluate 
and hold up particulars alone (an impossible task when speaking about all of Nature). I will 
return to the reasons why later in the thesis. 
 As a result, we need another concept in order to explain the many different and 
determinate ways the attributes of thought and extension can be expressed by individuals who 
also differ in their degrees of power of expression. My choice of terms to describe what it is I 
am understanding rationally involves my singular imaginative knowledge, but the power 
expressed is determined by the necessity of the ways in which laws of Nature work. Modes, as 
modifications (affections) of substance, are conceived through something else, that is, through 
                                                 
55 Spinoza, Letter 10: 783. 
56 Anthony Paul Smith, “The Ethical Relation of Bodies: Thinking with Spinoza Towards an Affective Ecology,” in 
Spinoza Beyond Philosophy, ed. Beth Lord (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012): 58. 
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and involving the necessary concept of their respective attributes which is defined in E1D5.57 
In 3p6, we read, “For singular things are modes by which God’s attributes are expressed in a 
certain and determinate way (by 1P25C), that is (by 1P34), things that express, in a certain and 
determinate way, God’s power, by which God is and acts.”58 This type of necessity is not any 
different from the freedom of spirit Spinoza speaks of, which we experience when we reflect 
on what it is to be a modal expression of eternal substance and increase our power of 
expression: “For freedom…does not remove the necessity of action, but imposes it.”59  
 As noted earlier and will be addressed at length in this chapter and the next, affects are 
key to understanding Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology and proto-physics of force adequately. 
They are not special kinds of ideas. They are expressions of substance that are not void of 
content because they include both affections and ideas paired together into one experience. 
What we reflect on will depend on which affect we are experiencing. As Dan Selcer writes, 
affects are:  
a transition to a greater or lesser state of perfection, which means a modulation of the 
power of a singular thing to act and to exist. Affect is thus an expression of power…a 
unification (across attributes) of corporeal affections with the ideas of those affections 
to which they ontologically correspond under the identity of the order of ideas with the 
order of things… Affect is thus a concept describing the regular distribution, 
arrangement, or configuration of a dynamic system.60 
 
In conscious reflection we are configured by our affects and our understanding in its power 
depending on which type of knowledge is proportionally relied on more heavily. The order of 
things we encounter is understood according to the order of ideas we are paying attention to or 
using. Spinoza writes, “I think I have demonstrated with sufficient clarity and certainty that the 
                                                 
57 Spinoza, Ethics, 1D5: 1. 
58 Ibid. 3p6: 75. 
59 Spinoza, TP, 686. 
60 Dan Selcer, Philosophy and the Book… 190. 
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intellect, even though infinite, belongs to Natura naturata, not to Natura naturans.”61 Our 
affects are important for us to learn how to understand and reflect upon because they 
“constitute sites of transition.” As that which are connected to all three types of knowledge we 
are capable of, they are “particularly dynamic ways in which nature is expressed…”62 
Transitions, for Spinoza, are like limits. Transitions between ideas can be understood as 
immediately proportional to the type of ideas that have more power, which is referenced in 
Letter 12. These limits and their overcoming and recognition are transformations in power and 
joy where passionate joys and joyous passions are also possible. Beth Lord writes: 
When we have an adequate idea we know that we know it, and the mind necessarily 
considers its own power of thinking, leading to joy (P53). Furthermore, those desires 
through which we strive to persevere in our being do not come from experience or 
imagination, but from our very essence. As we are more active, our essence flourishes 
and those essential desires are intensified. The joy and desire that are related to our 
activity are different from the joy and desire that arise from our passivity.63 
 
This interpretation of Spinoza is supported by his references in Letter 23. There, Spinoza 
writes that although a mouse and an angel are both dependent on God’s laws in the same way, 
one can hardly be said to be like the other, just as we cannot say that sorrow is similar to joy in 
any way.64 Sorrow, as a passion, relies on ideas of the imagination and, therefore, decreases our 
conatus. On the other hand, passionate joys are rationally understood ideas as part of an affect 
which is only partially involved in imaginative knowledge as experience, and are, therefore, 
ideas about other ideas, such as how we can separate sorrow from joy as elements of our 
affects in continuous understanding.  
                                                 
61 Spinoza, Letter 9: 782. See also E1p29s for more support. 
62 Peg Rawes, “Spinoza’s architectural passages: drawing out geometric comportments,” Spinoza Research 
Network, Spinoza and Texts, June 2010. Rawes writes, “…the sequence of their transition are their duration is 
always different…the movement between them is itself a kind of geometric reasoning, expressed in the dynamic 
nature of our emotional lives.” 
63 Beth Lord, Spinoza’s Ethics, 101. Letter 21 also confirms this.  
64 Spinoza, Letter 23: 833. 
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 Spinoza believes that adequate knowledge includes knowledge about true causes and 
their effects. Recognizing, understanding, experiencing, or knowing in any way all the causes 
of Nature is an absolute impossibility. Therefore, what we learn we can understand truly is how 
we express laws of Nature in thought and extension with varying degrees of animation and 
force. As C. De Deugd writes, any aspect of that which is contingent, or of what we experience 
as contingent, is a part of imaginative knowledge: “Reason does not recognize contingency.”65  
 This gives depth of meaning to a crucial aspect of all of Spinoza’s system that is causa 
immanens, or in the Dutch inblijvende oorzaak, a cause that remains in its effects. If the cause 
remains an element of its effects, then one cannot categorize all causes and effects as wholly 
distinct from each other. Yet, there is a limit to what sense experience can add to reasoning. 
This is why – in Letter 10 to Simone de Vries on empirical experience – Spinoza writes, “To 
this I reply that we need experience only in the case of those things that cannot be deduced 
from the definition of a thing, as, for instance, the existence of modes… We do not need 
experience in the case of those things whose existence is not distinguished from their essence 
and therefore deduced from their definition…for experience does not teach us the essence of 
things.”66 This passage is telling because Spinoza reminds us when we can conceptually 
collapse essence, existence, and definition, as well as when experience and the idea of the 
modal expression of substance become distinct. It also relates to what we read in E3D1 on 
adequate causes (because it is a cause we rely on to clearly and distinctly perceive an effect). 
 To summarize thus far, adequate knowledge is that of common notions understood as 
the second kind of knowledge (adequate ideas). It is the kind of knowledge that is in relation to 
our affects and their transitions, including being aware that we will reason with increasing and 
                                                 
65 C. De Deugd, The Significance of Spinoza’s First Kind of Knowledge, 29. 
66 Spinoza, Letter 10: 783, emphasis added.  
 144 
decreasing levels of power depending on how much accurate information we have and what we 
are taking as the objects of our ideas under the influence of any given affect. Adequate 
understanding also includes our awareness of what the three types of ideas we can have are and 
the processes of knowledge construction that relate to degrees of ideational power. Spinoza 
provides a proof that such knowledge is humanly possible as early as the opening definitions of 
E1, particularly 1p3: “If things have nothing in common with one another, one of them cannot 
be the cause of the other.”67 Only things that have something in common can cause something 
to occur as an effect within or in relation to another thing.  
Finite ideas cause other finite ideas, but only within their own idea type. Regarding 
adequate knowledge, Steenbakkers writes, “The characteristic feature of this kind of 
knowledge is the application of general patterns to individual cases, thus yielding adequate 
insight (as opposed to knowledge from causal experience).”68 Notice that this reading accords 
with what was just said above about definition and experience and what can be derived from 
experience. The object of common notions are “whatever is common to all things,” which is 
not the same as discussing the essence of singular things in their unique determinate 
transformations and transitions. In other words, the power used to transform may have the 
same mechanics for all bodies, but the actual transition will be unique to each singular thing.69  
The material effects of the attributes of thought and extension involve ideas, force, 
motion, power, expression, continuous transition, speed, and shifting intensities, among other 
things. They are defined as both the recognition of patterns and knowledge of particular things. 
They are also expressions of substance in the form of modal modifications to varying degrees 
of animation.  
                                                 
67 Spinoza, Ethics, 1p3: 3. 
68 Piet Steenbakkers, Spinoza’s Ethica: from manuscript to print, 163. 
69 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p37: 54. 
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Imaginative knowledge cannot be classified as either “good” or “bad,” because Spinoza 
feels such classifications are specific to human circumstance and context. Imaginative 
knowledge is only beneficial if, combined with reasoning, it enhances our capacities for 
thought and action, creativity and joy. The rational reconstruction, understanding, and use of 
partial (imaginative) knowledge only makes reason more complete and enjoyable (if the laws 
of thought are rationally understood). This furthers our capacities to think with more adequate 
force. As Spinoza writes in 2p13, the object of our ideas is always the affections of our bodies. 
Our knowledge, though, runs the risk of being “a completely confused knowledge of our 
bodies.”70 We can only transform our ideas by strengthening reasoning capacities with the 
ideas we compare and associate with each other, and by recognizing patterns of thought that 
increase or decrease our power to exist. This process entails that one’s singular memory plays a 
key role in our recognition of rational patterns of thought, and that memory is logically 
categorized as imaginative knowledge. We can also add to our transformation in knowledge by 
understanding how finite (human) bodies are all the same in that we share various common 
properties that the laws of Nature produce. The infamous epistemology passage in the Ethics 
2p40s reads: 
With this I have explained the cause of those notions which are called common, and 
which are the foundations of our reasoning. But some axioms, or notions, result from 
other causes… Those notions are Universal, like Man, Horse, Dog, and the like, have 
arisen from similar cases, namely, because so many images (e.g. of men) are formed at 
one time in the human body that they surpass the power of imagining… For the body 
has been affected most [forcefully] by [what is common], since each singular thing has 
affected it [by this property]. And [the mind] expresses this by the word man, and 
predicates it of infinity many singulars. For as we have said, it cannot image a 
determinate number of singulars. But it should be noted that these notions are not 
formed by all in the same way, but vary from one to another, in accordance with what 
the body has more often been affected by, and what the mind imagines or recollects 
                                                 
70 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p13: 40. 
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more easily… And similarly concerning the others – each will form universal images of 
things according to the disposition of their body…71 
 
Note that Spinoza mentions both singular associations and one’s experience of infinity in the 
same passage. The term “man” automatically indicates an infinite amount of possible men and 
expressions made by human beings. Imagining a determinate number of singulars is not 
possible. For Spinoza, the alternative is that we have to rationally assume an infinite expression 
of actual and possible singulars as a result, and infinite in all ways and all directions. If he is 
wrong, what is the alternative? In my reading, 2p40s clearly demonstrates that a theory of 
human consciousness and subjectivity is crucial to reading Spinoza correctly.  
 What we learn is that reflective knowledge can continue to attempt to rationally 
transform new knowledge adequately if one can understand the ways in which the three types 
of knowledge operate: “The commonality of these singular embodied ideas further enables us 
to understand the perfection of God through their resolution of the step-by-step agreement 
between mind and body, and their expression of an embodied kind of human ‘perfection’ or 
unity.” This level of subjectivity, although singularly experienced, becomes adequately 
understood as identical with the order of causes in Nature as we know them.72 In other words, 
in order for our human minds to increase their capacities for rational thinking, we will have to 
develop the ability to recognize and shift between various registers of different types of 
knowledge. Therefore, to become a forcefully rational thinker, using conscious reflection to 
pay attention is a method of thought required by necessity, including strong reflections on what 
type of imaginative knowledge one is also using (memory, sensation, language, etc.).  
 In my reading, we cannot do away with a concept of human subjectivity and singularity 
even if there are difficulties in reading Spinoza in this way, as Ursula Renz and Harold Skulsky 
                                                 
71 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p40s: 56. 
72 Ibid. 3p2s: 71. We act in-so-far-as we are relying heavily on adequate common notions as a disposition of power. 
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have pointed out, for example. Skulsky notes 2p13s as support for his position that what is true 
for human minds and bodies is also true for “other individuals” and that “all of these, in 
varying degrees, are endowed with minds.”73 E2p12 and its relation to 2p19 cause some to use 
these propositions as sweeping interpretive conclusions that Spinoza can only have one 
“subject” and that this subject is God. I find that one of the major problems with such readings 
is that Spinoza is clear that we (human beings) have individual rights in the TTP. How can 
anything that is not a real singular human being have individual rights? According to Spinoza, 
using reason well is also an individual experience of virtue. In the TTP, we learn that we have 
the right to personal freedom of thought and safety. These aspects of being an individual are 
not possible for a human being without personal reflective consciousness.  
 To further illustrate this point, in the TTP we read, “What greater misfortune can be 
imagined for a state than that honorable men should be exiled as miscreants because their 
opinions are at variance with authority and they cannot disguise the fact? What can be more 
calamitous than that men should be regarded as enemies and put to death, not for any crime or 
misdeed, but for being of independent mind?”74 Note what is stated years later in the TP which 
is similar, “Furthermore, it follows that every man is subject to another’s right for as long as he 
is in the other’s power, and he is in control of his own right to the extent that he can repel all 
                                                 
73 Harold Skulsky, Staring Into the Void… 29. To be fair, Skulsky’s writing is refreshing. It asks many important 
questions and rigorously works to try and understand Spinoza on his own terms. However, I feel there is too much 
reliance on contemporary terminology and influence being applied to a work over three hundred years old that used 
some terms in different ways than as we would understand them today. He acknowledges, for example, that an 
“idea” in Spinoza is something more than “some physical representations or ‘image’ – say a brain state – but God’s 
immediate act of conceiving.” This is true, but he extends this otherwise correct interpretation too far, stating that 
“the ‘things’ of common sense are actually just ‘modes’…” And modes, for Skulsky, are really “nothing.” As we 
have already read, when considering modes Spinoza asks us to include, by necessity, the modes of imaginative 
knowledge. Imaginative knowledge is a singular (human) experience. Skulsky also leaves out the term conatus 
almost entirely from his interpretation. Finally, there is a problem with the fact that Skulsky calls God a person, for 
this is an anthropomorphic conception of Spinoza’s notion of God and such conceptions are not permitted (Skulsky 
writes, “At the very least, he [Spinoza] needs to show that his supreme being qualifies as the supreme person…”). 
74 Spinoza, TTP, 20:570. 
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force.”75 These deductions require human subjectivity in order to be fully understood. For 
example, in order to repel the force of another we have to be capable of consciously reflecting 
on one’s singular circumstances, options, and rational dispositions. Because understanding all 
of Nature is impossible, attempting to understand oneself within the various contexts and 
environments one is involved in is more realistic. Yet, we are to keep in mind something 
Spinoza warns us about as early as the KV, namely that “truth,” “essence,” and “existence” 
“never depends on me: for, as was shown with reference to the second kind of ideas, they are 
what they are independent of me…”76  
 Emphasized in the above passages is not only singularity but the nature of human 
certainty and deductive logic – that such a thing can exist in an objective way. Common 
notions are common for all regardless of who/what is thinking them; some are human centered 
and some are common to all of Nature (such as the laws of extension). The object of a common 
property is not necessarily what the content is as much as the adequate notion that is about laws 
of thought operating which act according to the same laws of Nature for all, even God. The 
laws are the same even when the content varies. Just because the content varies does not also 
entail that Spinoza’s system is one empty of content. As he writes in 3p12 and p13, individual 
minds strive to seek those things that increase their unique power to exist.77 Consider it this 
way: any theory that deduces that I do not have my own power of thought will decrease my 
power to exist singularly. Therefore, I must, as a human mind, have the capacity to reflect on a 
singular level and be aware of such things as particularly human and involve human power 
through consciousness. I also must remain aware of my interactions with other finite bodies as 
distinct, as that which can add to or take away from my power. My collective contribution 
                                                 
75 Spinoza, TP, 2: 685. 
76 Spinoza, KV, 1:1, footnote 3: 39. 
77 Spinoza, Ethics, 3p12, p13: 77-78. 
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allows me to remain aware of my individuality and increases (or decreases) in personal power, 
including that aspect of my adequate ideas which expresses common notions that are infinite 
and apply to all of Nature. This adds to our joy, by necessity, and Spinoza makes this point 
specifically as early as E1p21. To feel our experiences (ideas and actions) as affects that 
involve the infinite by logical necessity is to understand that we are thinking and acting with 
more power; and such an expression is immensely joyous.78 
 The above deductions are similar to what Peg Rawes calls “the production of 
subjectivity” through philosophically understood “architectural passages” of increasing 
capacities to use reason well.79 This requires a theory of human consciousness in my reading. 
My essence, as my own desire and tendency towards self-preservation, has ratios of motion and 
rest that interact both with my internal actions as well as with external encounters. Yet, these 
ratios are unique to my personal equilibrium and homeostasis. As we read in E2p13s, a finite 
body can learn how to transform itself according to the laws of the attributes so that “its mind 
is more capable of understanding distinctly.”80 Spinoza is not talking about God’s mind, at 
least not directly, nor your neighbor’s mind or your pet’s mind. He is talking about a human 
being’s singular mind and thought processes that are controlled by laws of Nature. Spinoza is 
also talking about the human mind that is reading and learning his system. It is not a pebble 
learning its surrounding environment and internal structures in the same way as we have access 
to after-all. It is a singular human person. The ideas we have, as human beings, about the ways 
in which things agree, the patterns of motion they assume, and the laws of Nature they abide 
are all adequate ideas when understood rationally. This reading is supported further by such 
                                                 
78 Spinoza, Ethics, 1p21: 16-17. This is also why Spinoza writes next in 1p28s that God can be conceived as both an 
immediate and a proximate cause. 
79 Rawes, “Spinoza’s Architectural Passages…” 67-69. 
80 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p13s: 40. 
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propositions in the Ethics as 2p38, in conjunction with 2p11c and 2p40s2.81 The interactions 
with my environment that play a role in my reflective awareness are continually shifting 
spontaneously. This also involves the rational understanding that ratios of motion and rest 
cannot be thought of in a linear manner but only as continuously shifting and layered or 
multiple. That spontaneity (like the thought that the sun is close to one’s body because the 
feeling of warmth increases, although, in fact, the sun is far away from one’s body) is part of 
imaginative (singular) experience and knowledge. The key is to not allow imaginative ideas to 
become the larger portion of one’s awareness. The only way to do this, for Spinoza, is to 
strengthen reasoning. The content of such exercises is not only about other bodies but one’s 
own. The content of such experiences is about my own increases and decreases in the power of 
my conatus in relation to what I encounter personally. Imagine a human body that has never 
experienced being pushed further in reasoning capacities past imaginative experiences (relying 
on sense data alone, for example). Such an individual would never be capable of recognizing 
common notions even if they were experiencing them. Nonetheless, their expressions are still 
an aspect of the reality of Nature. In this way, at least in part, God’s attribute of thought is 
expressed in all ways. The emphasis is on singular bodily experiences and our affects in a 
deliberate manner.  
Spinoza’s Theory of Consciousness 
 There is a legitimate debate about what a theory of consciousness can be in Spinoza. It 
is the position of my thesis that such a theory is possible, and, if so, it is not one that ends in 
mind-matter dualism, egoist ethics, or rigid determinism. Spinoza’s theory of consciousness is 
transformative, dynamic, and cannot be reduced to any theory of representation, as we will 
read about in Chapter Four. My ideas and actions have real effects and are all expressions of 
                                                 
81 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p11c, p38, p40s2: 39, 54, 57.  
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the power of Nature. Spinoza makes this clear in Letter 21 where he writes, “When you say 
that by making men so dependent on God I reduce them to the level of elements, plants, and 
stones, this is enough to show that you have completely misunderstood my views and are 
confusing the field of intellect with that of the imagination.”82  
 Some background on current theories of consciousness will be helpful before discussing 
Spinoza’s Seventeenth Century version. Leading biologist and neuroscientist, Christof Koch, 
writes, “Without consciousness there is nothing… But there’s the rub. How the brain converts 
bioelectrical activity into subjective states, how photons reflected off water are magically 
transformed into the percept of an iridescent aquamarine mountain tarn is a puzzle. The nature 
of the relationship between the nervous system and consciousness remains elusive…”83 
 The nature of consciousness is, indeed, a “hard problem,” replete with intricate 
theoretical and practical difficulties about the nature of subjectivity and how it differs from the 
electrical synapses which continually flow by the trillions between our two hemispheres and 
spinal cord.84 David Chalmers writes, “…no explanation given in wholly physical terms can 
ever account for the emergence of conscious experience.”85 This modern explanation supports 
Spinoza’s epistemology. Singular, phenomenal conscious experience is a real experience that 
we are more acutely aware of when reflecting on the types of ideas that are our mind. On 
Spinoza’s use of the term “consciousness,” Early Modern philosopher, Udo Thiel, writes, “In 
any case, although ‘conscientia’ is clearly a relating to one’s own mental states, it remains 
                                                 
82 Spinoza, Letter 21: 825. 
83 Christof Koch, Consciousness… 25. In a recent TED talk given to CERN physicists, philosopher John Searle 
stated that consciousness is real, is not reducible back to physical brain matter, that is, it does not arise from brain 
states but co-exists with body, brain, and the environment as one organic whole. 
84 The phrase “hard problem” was coined by philosopher David Chalmers and, as Koch also notes, in the 1980s and 
into the 1990s “writing about consciousness was taken as a sign of cognitive decline.” If it’s true that what we are 
most concerned with is explaining the first person account of consciousness specifically, then Spinoza can help. 
85 David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, 93.  
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unclear what kind of relation to one’s own mental states, emotional or otherwise, conscientia is 
meant to be in Spinoza.”86 I aim to make Spinoza’s meaning more clear in this chapter. 
 In 2008, Spinoza scholar and biographer, Steven Nadler, in his essay “Spinoza and 
Consciousness,” not only writes that there is a problem with those interpretations which reduce 
Spinoza’s system to a theory of cognitive representations, but also that there is a theory of 
consciousness to be found in Spinoza’s system.87 Nadler makes an important comment within 
the opening pages of his essay: “What is particularly interesting is how few contributions to the 
question of consciousness in Spinoza there really are.”88 Nadler opens his essay stating, 
“Spinoza does indeed have an explanation of consciousness, a rather sophisticated one that 
depicts consciousness, like all elements of the mind for Spinoza, as deeply grounded in certain 
functional aspects of the body.”89 Nadler combines the meaning of human consciousness with 
what it is to be aware that one is conscious in a similar way as I have noted above. As Spinoza 
defines the mind as ideas, Nadler’s reading is logical. In his reading, Nadler includes the 
capacity to reflect on one’s conscious states, but draws the line at what are typically called 
“intentional states” in the literature: “Merely having an intentional state is not ipso facto to 
have a conscious state.”90 The distinction being drawn is between merely being conscious and 
reflecting on one’s conscious states and dispositions, but the debate is far from over. 
 Nadler outlines the two schools of thought regarding a theory of consciousness in 
Spinoza’s works. There are those who believe there is absolutely no such theory possible in 
Spinoza’s Ethics (Bennett, Della Rocca, Matson, Miller, etc.) and those who believe that such a 
                                                 
86 Thiel, 65. 
87 Steven Nadler, “Spinoza and Consciousness,” Mind 117 (2008). Nadler explains that he understands the notion of 
human consciousness as “a being who has conscious states.” He states that he is following the same line of thought 
of philosophers such as Thomas Nagel, Tyler Burge, and Ned Block regarding “phenomenal consciousness.” 
88 Ibid. 580. 
89 Ibid. 575. 
90 Ibid. 581. 
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theory is possible, but that it is seriously flawed or limited (Curley, Matheron, M. Wilson, etc.). 
In one footnote in his Beyond the Geometric Method, Ed Curley, while discussing the KV, 
notes, “…Spinoza recognized what ought to be obvious enough from experience: that different 
people possess self-consciousness (which I presume includes conscious awareness of the state 
of one’s body) in varying degrees, and that no human has full self-consciousness.”91 Some 
scholars, such as Caroline Williams, eliminate any possibility of a theory of consciousness in 
Spinoza, writing, “…there is no subject of the affect, because affect drives the subject towards 
identity and performance.”92 If this is true, I would ask, do we ever get to identity? I wonder 
how there can be a singular drive towards identity without a subject of that identity who is 
aware that they are a singular subject? 
 I agree with Nadler that there is a viable theory of human subjectivity and 
consciousness to be found in Spinoza. It is also important to recognize what Genevive Lloyd 
states, namely that, for Spinoza, ideas about the modifications of our body depend both on 
ourselves and on external bodies that we encounter.93 We need other singular subjects, but that 
is not all of what it is, for Spinoza, to be a “body” either. The method we learn for better 
recognizing our own increases and decreases in power is a distinctly singular experience (even 
though the laws used are the same for all of Nature). Although the laws of Nature work the 
same for everyone, the experience of the effects produced by those laws as modifications of 
modifications of substance vary on a singular level. Why else would Spinoza emphasize so 
heavily in the TTP and TP the freedom of thought we are all afforded as a natural right? We 
individually have the unique capacity to order and arrange the three types of knowledge in 
                                                 
91 Ed Curley, Beyond the Geometric Method, 157: footnote 34. 
92 Caroline Williams, “‘Subjectivity Without a Subject:’ Thinking Beyond the Subject with/through Spinoza,” in 
Spinoza Beyond Philosophy, ed. Beth Lord, 21. 
93 Genevive Lloyd, Spinoza and the Ethics, 56. 
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unique ways to increase our conatus. How else would a theory of imaginative knowledge be 
possible if not that we have distinct memories and singular sense experiences that are our own? 
 One’s ideas are in continual interaction with other ideas and other bodies external to us. 
Spinoza makes this point clear in E2p21s, p22, and p23, among many other places.94 More 
support can also be found in Letter 19. There, Spinoza explains that those who partake in 
continuous rational understanding are expressing the intellectual love of God (or what he calls 
the third kind of knowledge, intuition) and are “conscious.” Those described as “wicked” are 
those who do not actively express increasing perfection in this way and are, therefore, merely 
moving about human existence “unconsciously.”95 The necessity of Nature in motion with 
continuous interactions is emphasized throughout E4, especially in the Appendix: “Again, 
because, among singular things, we know nothing more excellent than a man who is guided by 
reason, we can show best how much our skill and understanding are worth by educating men 
so that at last they live according to the command of their own reason.”96 If Spinoza did not 
want us to consider the subjectivity of singular human minds he would not use such terms and 
phrases as “of their own reason” as he does in the above passage. 
 Philosopher John Searle has defined consciousness as what we experience in our 
waking hours.97 Yet, I would argue that we are consciously aware when we are asleep, and not 
only in our waking hours. Any parent who hears their children in danger in the middle of the 
night while otherwise sound asleep understands that there is always a level of conscious 
awareness of one’s external environment at work. The physicist and part time philosopher, 
                                                 
94 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p21s, p22, p23: 48-49. 
95 Spinoza, Letter 19: 810. One can also refer to E3p9, where the term “conscious” is used in this very important 
proposition about conatus and singular endeavoring. The Latin term is “conscia” and it is used in conjunction with 
what “conatus” involves. The Dutch term used by Spinoza is “bewust” which is a reference to human thinking. 
96 Spinoza, Ethics, 4 App IX: 156. 
97 John Searle, The Mystery of Consciousness, 48. 
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Adam Frank, in conjunction with the work of Alva Noe writes, “The truth of the matter is we 
are just at the beginning of our understanding of consciousness and of the Mind.”98 This is a 
striking statement, and I believe very possibly an accurate one after decades of contemporary 
debate on the nature of consciousness. 
 Conscious reflection is clearly required if we are to control our passions, which are also 
singularly experienced. This involves what was referenced previously in Chapter One about the 
method of combining analysis with synthesis in reflection. In the Appendix to E4, Spinoza 
continues: 
But human power is very limited and infinitely surpassed by the power of external 
causes. So we do not have absolute power to adapt things outside us to our use. 
Nevertheless, we shall bear calmly those things which happen to us contrary to what the 
principle of our advantage demands, if we are conscious that we have done our duty, 
that the power we have could not have extended itself to the point where we could have 
avoided those things, and that we are part of the whole of nature, whose order we 
follow.99 
 
It is not simply that we learn how to build to using the most efficient method. Our increase in 
conatus helps us live in more rationally powerful ways. As the passage above states, there will 
be times when we consciously reflect on external circumstances and the power of Nature so that 
we rationally understand that there are events occurring which are not to our singular benefit. 
That is, we adequately comprehend how to calmly tolerate external events that are more 
powerful than we are or can be. It is adequate thinking if we are “conscious that we have done 
our duty” to the best of our current capacity. Our essence is conatus, but the essence of reason, 
according to E4p26, is the mind “insofar as it understands clearly and distinctly (see the 
definition of this in IIP40S2). Therefore (by IIP40) whatever we strive for from reason is 
                                                 
98 Adam Frank’s comments and article on consciousness can be found at: 
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nothing but understanding.”100 This is similar to, but differs from Stoic philosophy because 
Spinoza’s theory of affects, as directly tied to his dynamic epistemology, cannot be reduced to 
only our emotions. The Stoic version of the passions are about emotions and our understanding 
of reasoning verses the passions. Spinoza is clearly talking about singular human minds in the 
above reference. For example, as Peg Rawes writes, “Geometric thinking in the Ethics is 
therefore aligned with life, and the reader’s journey towards fulfillment or joy reflects this 
process as they make the step-by-step movement through the text’s different elements…”101  
 Absolute affirmations through conscious reflection are done by reasoning with more 
conceptual force and understanding. Spinoza writes that the less indifferent we are when 
affirming or negating something, the more forcefully rational we are thinking, by necessity. The 
laws of the attribute of thought require that ideas of reason cause other ideas of reason only. 
This is also why Spinoza concludes, as noted above, that reason does not recognize 
contingency. This process of thought is also when we are most free: “I call him free who is led 
by reason alone.”102 The processes of analysis, synthesis, and geometric thinking use reason in a 
way that builds in strength, and bring about the effects such reflections cause. We can only 
understand these processes of a singular human mind by putting forth a theory of human 
consciousness. As noted above, because the recognition of contingency is an element of 
imaginative knowledge, when reason understands contingent events with more force, it is doing 
nothing else but using reasoning about the laws of thought and extension with more clarity.  
 Furthermore, adequately understanding the proto-physics of ideational force and the 
shifting ratios of motion and rest in extension involves reflecting on our affects in adequate 
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ways. Such regular habits lead to what Spinoza calls “a virtuous disposition.”103 We can employ 
such tools consistently as we strengthen our “habitual readiness.”104 As A. G. Duttmann writes 
in the anthology Spinoza Now, “Each time the rule that determines the relationship between rest 
and motion is altered, the disposition of bodily parts is transformed.”105 Therefore, the process 
of consciously reflecting on our affects must include both the capacity to recognize what kind of 
knowledge we are relying on more heavily and what is reasonable to expect our bodies to do in 
any given context or environment. While this chapter, and particularly this section, are focused 
on the second kind of knowledge, it becomes increasingly clear that we cannot think about what 
reasoning is (and the role it plays as a type of force which can enhance our conatus) without 
also taking into serious consideration both the attribute of extension and the combination of 
extension with our ideas to create affects. In addition, to rationally reflect on the proto-physics 
of the force between our ideas includes understanding some fundamental laws of physics. As 
Curley notes, at the very least, “the attribute of extension is that fixed and eternal thing to which 
the most fundamental laws of physics correspond…”106 It is not enough to understand motion, 
for example, since motion involves the concept of another thing (namely extension) in order to 
be understood, something Spinoza is clear about in E4. But thought and extension are attributes 
which are conceived through themselves: one as increasing and decreasing levels of force and 
the other as shifting ratios of motion and rest. In Letter 2, his first letter to Henry Oldenburg, 
Spinoza writes, “…by attribute I mean every thing that is conceived in itself and through itself, 
so that its conception does not involve the conception of any other thing.”107 If thought and 
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extension were not distinct attributes of the same substance, as Paul Wienpahl notes, we would 
never be capable of having thoughts about bodies, and especially about the diverse and varied 
experiences of our own body.108 
 We have adequate knowledge when we determine our ideas internally and not according 
to any order we perceive externally in Nature according to Spinoza. This is because we cannot 
know all of the causes of Nature and so to see either order or confusion externally is to rely on 
imaginative knowledge more heavily than reasoning: 
I say expressly that the mind has, not an adequate, but only a confused knowledge, of 
itself, of its own body, and of external bodies, so long as it perceives things from the 
common order of Nature, that is, so long as it is determined externally…and not so long 
as it is determined internally, from the fact that it regards a number of things at once, to 
understand their agreements, differences, and oppositions. For so often as it is disposed 
internally…then it regards things clearly and distinctly…109 
 
This is also more support for not interpreting Spinoza’s conception of extension (ratios of 
motion and rest) as something linear. The ordering of one’s ideas is, in this way, distinctly 
singular. Conscious, reflective awareness is required for the ordering of singular ideas. By 
increasing understanding, we increase our capacities for thinking well. Spinoza writes, “But 
skill and alertness are required for this. For men vary – there being few who live according to 
the rule of reason…”110 By singular, Spinoza intends both individuals and collective bodies of 
individuals, “By singular things I understand things that are finite and have a determinate 
existence. And if a number of individuals so concur in one action that together they are all the 
cause of one effect, I consider them all, to that extent, as one singular thing.”111 
Continuous understanding of the laws of thought and extension which create our 
combined affects become automatically stronger as we understand more. Beth Lord writes, 
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“We are more rational as we understand things better, and more imaginative as we are more 
affected by our experiences. At no point can we ever be wholly rational (for then we would feel 
nothing) or wholly imaginative (for then we would know nothing truly).”112 One way to 
understand the deductions made so far are to understand that the laws of thought are separate 
from the laws of extension. Nonetheless, within the laws of thought there are three types of 
knowledge with their own properties. Each type can only produce another idea of its own kind. 
To say that the laws of thought are all we need in order to comprehend Spinoza’s dynamic 
epistemology is an over-generalization. The experiences of our senses are completely different 
from the use and experience of the capacity to reason. You cannot stop your senses from 
flowing (unless you commit suicide, which is an instance of the imagination overpowering 
reason).113 
 There are a diversity of ways to better order our affects in accordance with reason. As 
we read in E4p63c, passionate joys can be rational and not excessive.114 It is much easier to 
order our affects to benefit ourselves and others if we adequately understand how we are 
expressions of forces (laws) of Nature. These intellectual affections are tremendously joyous in 
both their ordering and, most importantly, that is, in their effects. In other words, the more we 
understand how to apply the laws of proportion to our own lives (ideas and actions), the more 
readily and easily we can recognize where such laws can be applied or increased in magnitude. 
It is not enough just to know how something works; one must put it into action in order to truly 
increase the magnitude of effects from such knowledge. As Spinoza writes in 2p13L7, any 
given body is composed of many parts communicating their motion and rest to each other 
                                                 
112 Beth Lord, Spinoza Beyond Philosophy, 3. Therefore, affectivity, as Lord discusses, is not only bodily. Language, 
for example, is wholly an aspect of imaginative knowledge, but this is precisely why we can be affected by it in so 
many ways. 
113 Recall that, as we read in E2p43s, having a true idea is to know something “to the utmost degree.” 
114 Spinoza, Ethics, 4p63c: 150. 
 160 
continuously.115 What matters to a human being whom is able to consciously recognize certain 
effects and transitions is the speed and power of what is possible in such transitions.  
 Therefore, we cannot eliminate the concept of human, reflective consciousness in 
Spinoza’s Ethics. In his monism, “…nature as such resists any total capture by human 
thought.”116 Nature and its laws lack nothing nonetheless. So, we have to ask what it is about 
human thought that is both expressive of all of Nature in acting out the laws of thought and 
extension and, simultaneously, cannot capture all of Nature? To have any lack would imply 
there was something we were working towards, which is a form of teleology. For Spinoza, 
such systems are not possible. He writes, “What is called a final cause is nothing but a human 
appetite insofar as it is considered as a principle, or primary cause, of some thing.”117 We have 
to remind ourselves at this point (which involves imaginative knowledge as memory in 
conjunction with adequate reasoning) of an important metaphysical component that is 
understood as immanent. Spinoza writes, “For if God acts for the sake of an end, he necessarily 
wants something which he lacks. And though the theologians and metaphysicians distinguish 
between an end of need and an end of assimilation, they nevertheless confess that God did all 
things for his own sake, not for the sake of the things to be created.”118 The reference by these 
theologians/metaphysicians to a future tense is important, as to refer to the future is to say that 
God’s modal expressions are not yet fully God, which is absurd. The Latin term perfectus is 
translated by Piet Steenbakkers as that which is already complete and fulfilled. The term 
potential is also used by Steenbakkers in a way that denotes an identity between virtue and 
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power (strength) where human conceptions of values as inherent in Nature are not logically 
possible.119  
As we will read in the following chapters, the intellectual love of God (and Nature) 
includes enhancing one’s reasoning and power to act, but it also includes loving well. In the 
TP, we read that individual virtue is identical with the strength of one’s rational capacities, 
which Spinoza also calls “freedom of spirit.”120 In E4p22c, we read, “The striving to preserve 
oneself is the first and only foundation of virtue.”121 These ideas are consistent across 
Spinoza’s works. In Letter 32, he also writes, “But I would first ask you to note that I do not 
attribute to Nature beauty, ugliness, order or confusion. It is only with respect to our 
imagination that things can be said to be beautiful, ugly, well-ordered or confused.”122    
 Letter 32 can be used to compare with E2p7 (“the order and connection of ideas is the 
order and connection of things”) because 2p7 can only be applied to human ideas in my 
reading. As Pierre Macherey writes, “‘order’ here designates something completely different 
from a relationship of presence between propositions… For Spinoza, the ideas of method and 
order cease to be formally determined by a criteria of priority; rather, they express the real 
movement of thought…”123 Spinoza’s notion of the power of the intellect and its rational 
process “has nothing to do with the obligatory unfolding of an order, because it no longer has 
any goal to complete.124 Again, as noted repeatedly throughout this chapter, this is another 
reason why one cannot critique Spinoza’s concept of extension as ratios of motion and rest by 
relying on linear concepts. When talking about extension, we can only refer to concepts of 
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continuous transformation, power, layers, and multiple ratios combining in ways that create a 
unified force with shifting degrees of increases in power. The natural processes of reasoning 
well include using clear and distinct chains of adequate ideas, but they also include learning 
more efficient methods of analysis and synthesis in the production of new knowledge.  
 In Spinoza’s system, knowledge proceeds “…neither from things to ideas nor from 
ideas to things, but it goes from idea to idea, that is to say it links acts of thought between 
them, according to a necessary causal order that is the same as the one in which things are 
linked in reality.”125 Ideas link acts of thought. Acts of thought are always one of two elements 
of our combined affects (along with our bodily affections as ratios of motion and rest). Affects 
are what we are aware of as an expression of our consciousness and physical sensations. The 
point is that all of substance is expressed modally in distinct and infinite ways, but is at the 
same time expressed by mechanical operations of the same natural laws. This necessity does 
not, therefore, mean that our modal expressions are reduced to representations of reality. They 
are reality. Real expressions of natural laws are not representations of Nature, as we will read 
about more specifically in Chapter Four. So, for example, contingencies exist in Nature, but 
they are an expression of singular, imaginative knowledge. It is also evident from Chapter Two 
of the TP that there are certain desires which can only arise from ideas of reason as an effect 
the laws of thought and motion together can produce (as affects). In other words, although 
there is no cross attributal causality between thought and extension, in an affect the attributes 
combine separate forces into an organic, singular expression of power. Affects, as modes, can 
be adequately understood as both a cause and an effect of Nature depending on what other 
conceptual chains they are placed among. E1p36 reads, “Nothing exists from whose nature 
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some effect does not follow. Whatever exists expresses the nature, or essence, of God in a 
certain and determinate way the power of God, which is the cause of all things…”126 
In E1p11, Spinoza challenges you to conceive “if you can” that God does not exist and, 
therefore, the essence of God does “not involve existence.”127 The principle of sufficient reason 
(PSR) is inserted here with force, but this principle will also take on several different variations 
throughout the Ethics. Everything in this system must have a cause for its existence or for its 
inability to exist. Those causes cannot contain an inherent contradiction: “But this reason, or 
cause, must either be contained in the nature of the thing, or be outside it.”128 As early as the 
KV, we read, “…for the nature of a thing can require nothing while it does not exist.”129 In 
1p11, Spinoza writes that the reason why substance exists is due to its nature of inherent self-
preservation. Its nature also includes the whole of all its attributes. That which has within the 
drive towards self-preservation always has a quality of existence as part of, yet different from, 
its essence. So, in a way, even though human beings as singular, finite things die, we continue 
to exist as new expressions of substance in other ways (new ratios) upon their death. Substance 
(God, Nature) is eternal regardless of its unique finite expressions, and the definition of 
“existence” must include that anything which is ever in existence includes a certain set of 
factors deductively, namely, that it is evident through itself that a thing which is in existence 
includes primary characteristics of absolute affirmation. Spinoza writes, “These things are 
evident through themselves; from them it follows that a thing necessarily exists if there is no 
reason or cause which prevents it from existing.”130 How we construct order in Nature will be 
based on the effect of what ideas we are having and what types of knowledge we are relying 
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on. The implication of these deductions is that “cause” (as we understand the concept) does not 
exist in Nature outside of thought, and yet, the common notion we have about causality is an 
expression (truth) of Nature as well. A horse or tree will have different determinate ways of 
interacting with the environment. And although everything strives to persist in its existence, 
how it persists is unique to each type of thing doing the persisting, including types of ideas. 
This is not an anthropomorphic conception of Nature if we adequately recognize and reflect on 
the infinite modal ways Nature expresses itself through its attributes. 
 There are two final considerations related to E1p11 that are important to understand. As 
noted, to exist is power, therefore, the more existence a thing has, the more power it has (as a 
cause and as an effect). In this way, power is a feedback loop. It must be within the thing to 
begin with, a part of its nature, as we cannot draw our power from external causes but must 
become self-caused in our own determinate ways. This is what Spinoza refers to as an adequate 
cause, one whose effects are clearly and distinctly perceived.131 In 4p26, we read, “What we 
strive for from reason is nothing but understanding…this striving for understanding (by P22C) 
is the first and only foundation of virtue…”132 The cause of the thing and its power must be 
itself: “…whatever perfection substance has is not owed to any external cause. So its existence 
must follow from its nature alone; hence its existence is nothing but its essence.”133 In this way, 
nature, as well as our singular expressions of substance, has an essence that involves existence. 
Every effect involves its cause. Something that is in existence is always conceived as 
affirmative. 
 The singularity of individual expressions of substance with their own ratios of motion 
and rest and ideational force involve many common notions conceived through and with the 
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attributes. The ambiguity of daily human experiences can be organized by relying on rational 
conceptions of the necessity of natural laws, as well as rational evaluations within conscious 
reflection as common notions. Yet, as we learn in 2p32 and 2p36, the same rules of necessity 
apply to inadequate ideas as to adequate notions (as all ideas are in God).134  
 Recall that an idea is “a concept of the mind which the mind forms because it is a 
thinking thing,” and adequate ideas considered in themselves have “all the properties, or 
intrinsic denominations of a true idea.”135 These definitions are referenced repeatedly, but 
another important distinction includes what is written in 2p40s2 where we learn the distinctions 
between the three types of knowledge. Leading up to this point Spinoza writes in 2p38 that 
whatever is common to all things and equally in the part as in the whole “can be conceived 
adequately.” The corollary reads, “From this it follows that there are certain ideas, or 
[universal] notions, common to all men. For (by L2) all bodies agree in certain things, which 
(by P38) must be perceived adequately, or clearly and distinctly, by all.”136  
 By the time we reach E2p40 and the definitions for kinds of knowledge, we have 
already learned how to consider what human bodies are, share, and can do or have in common. 
We read, “Whatever ideas follow in the mind from ideas which are adequate in the mind are 
also adequate.”137 This result, as an effect produced by something that is identical (and yet its 
cause), occurs by necessity. The same thing, as cause, can cause its own kind in effect. It is the 
force intrinsic to an affirmation of necessity and it causes its own existence as a law of its 
nature. Therefore, learning how adequate ideas are formed and manipulated with more force 
only guarantees that one will be capable of conceiving expressions of Nature with more force 
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of comprehension and joy. This is also how it is possible to rationally defer judgment and, yet, 
such a delay is not something negative but is something affirmative. The delay in judgment is 
still a use of reasoning. At this point in the Ethics we learn that common notions are the 
“foundations of our reasoning” and that they result from being caused by other adequate notions 
about the common properties between things. 
Included within these deductions, starting back as early as 1p11, reason is included as a 
way to build understanding of what causes are. Therefore, reflecting on our ideas and actions as 
only representations of Nature (or as only modal modifications of substance) will become 
logically problematic. Modes, for example, can both exist and not exist. Modes are not 
determined in-themselves, but rely on other concepts to be understood. Adequate ideas, on the 
other hand, must be understood as something different, that is, they are conceived through 
themselves and are, therefore, absolute affirmations of existence. We are concerned here with 
shifting our thought patterns towards that which we have already learned applies to substance 
itself as necessary, and not only the modal expressions of substance. When we do this, we can 
produce not only more adequate notions, but more forceful adequate chains of ideas; and we 
combine them with other variations of imaginative ideas to create stronger, more affirmative, 
and joyful affects. Contingencies and doubt or limitation are not possible as conceptions within 
such realizations. In this way, and because we are consciously reflective expressions of Nature, 
2p40 can be combined with 3p53, 3p55, 4D6, and 5p6 to allow stronger deductions of rational 
force, as well as their logical conceptual results or further effects.  
Our habitual readiness to use reason well includes understanding the necessity of laws 
of Nature. All of our experiences can be understood according to only select affects: joy 
(affirmations), sadness (denials, contingencies, or partial information), or as temporarily neutral 
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(also affirmations of adequate understanding even if not joyous). The adequate knowledge we 
have about affirmation is itself a force that propels rationality by necessity.138 Steve Nadler 
writes, “Since we cannot control the objects that we tend to value and allow to influence our 
well-being, we ought instead to try to control our evaluations themselves and thereby minimize 
the sway that external objects and the passions have over us. We can never eliminate the passive 
affects entirely; nor would that even be desirable in this life.”139 Singular, conscious self-
reflection is needed for daily evaluations and generative transformations or productions of 
knowledge being experienced. Passions are singular too, although some are also shared. We 
may both be terribly upset about a tornado that has torn our shared neighborhood and homes 
apart, but perhaps your structure stands enough to affect you less economically and emotionally 
than my completely destroyed home and foundation which I cannot afford to rebuild. Our 
passions will be both shared and, yet, singularly experienced. The difference is important, but 
the shared common notion is that Nature is larger in force than either of us individually or 
combined. In that understanding we are one. Macherey writes, “…the power of the intellect 
is…an affirmation of self…”140 
 In addition, the human experience of space and time is directly proportional to ideas of 
the imagination and of reason, depending on what aspect of that experience is being reflected 
on. Nonetheless, rational truths are clear and distinct common notions and common notions are 
always affirmative. Our experience of space and time, as durational (finite), is part of 
imaginative knowledge. Interestingly enough, the effects of thinking clearly and distinctly 
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increase the power of our understanding “not from our ‘being convinced by reasons, but from 
our feeling and enjoying the thing itself [singular essence]…’”141  
The deduction made in the above proposition, that we are not necessarily always 
convinced by reason, places a whole new meaning on the use of the PSR by Spinoza in the 
Ethics.142 Understanding the law of how something works is not enough. Such an act would 
include being able to be convinced by reason(s) alone. We have to put that law into action, 
which, as an effect, will increase its force further and be something we feel in addition to 
understand. In this way, it is not the reasons which convince us (which also means that it is not 
the PSR alone which is at work), but our actions and their results, whose effects we enjoy 
because we are aware of the transitions in power and how to enhance our laws of thought and 
action. This is also how new ideas or combinations of ideas are born. It is also a disposition of 
virtue (and is not only about habits). More is required. Understanding well includes singular 
habits as an increase in our interactions with others, with new experiences, with more forceful 
concentration or creativity, and so forth. If the powers of imaginative and rational knowledge 
were the same for everyone, there would be nothing new to discover, invent, or experience as 
the generations pass by. Substance has infinite attributes that express themselves in infinite 
ways, combinations, and continuous arrangements, compositions, and decompositions... 
 Efficiency and Force in Our Magnitude of Understanding  
In Chapter Three of the TTP, virtue as a rational disposition can be conceived as a habit 
of thought and action that is meant to help “subjugate the passions.” In E4p24, we read, “But  
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we act only insofar as we understand (by IIIP3).”143 Being capable of acquiring a disposition of 
strength and virtue through developing conscious rational habits, as well as understanding the 
causes of things, and to live in a state of security with opportunities for good health and 
freedom of thought and speech are the things Spinoza prioritizes which “depend on human 
power alone,” that is, “on laws of human nature.”144 Spinoza calls these natural laws “gifts.”  
We can draw a connection between these deductions and E5p39s. Spinoza writes that 
we can be “conscious” of external causes or we can be conscious of one’s mind in its series of 
ideas and their idea types which are a part of our affects.145 To shift one’s conscious reflections 
between the two options will require learning how the rules of thought operate through 
demonstrations or applications of common notions, observation, habit, and retention. 
Reasoning well in a way that allows for an affirmative suspension of judgment is distinctly a 
human experience. All parts of Nature may strive for continued existence, but pebbles do not 
experience consciousness like a human being. In 4p33, we read, “The nature, or essence, of the 
affects cannot be explained through one’s essence, or nature, alone (by IIID1 and D2), but 
must be defined by the power, that is (by IIIP7), by the nature of external causes compared 
with our own. That is why there are as many species of each affect as there are species of 
objects by which we are affected…”146 Because human thought cannot escape its own 
participation in and experience of its affects, we cannot only conclude that there are truths 
outside of how human thought deduces or understands them. This is Macherey’s point. 
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 In the KV and the Ethics, we learn that a finite human can be said to be perfect both in 
its duration and in its relation to what is an immanent cause of ideas.147 This is because it is an 
expression of an eternal God (substance) with the attribute of thought. Another way to 
understand that all of substance and my personal finite, modal expressions are both the same 
thing to different degrees (or how we are modalized in existence and also eternal expressions) 
is to conceive of simple wholes and complex, determinate parts that do not have set material 
limits. Motion and force cannot, in themselves, be understood as something with limits. Things 
in motion stay in motion until they come up against another force that enhances, hinders, or 
stops that motion. This is a law of Nature that Spinoza was working on in the Ethics and in his 
correspondence with scientists and friends. As we read in Letter 32, for example, relying on a 
fictional story about a worm living within the blood of some body (unaware that it is a small 
part of something much larger), Spinoza draws an analogy and asks us to use both our reason 
and our imagination to consider both the worm and the larger body it is within co-exist in 
separate, determinate ways within one larger whole together:  
On the question of whole and parts, I consider things as parts of a whole to the extent 
that their natures adapt themselves to one another so that they are in the closest possible 
agreement [with the ‘least possible opposition between them’]. Insofar as parts of things 
are different from one another, to that extent each one forms in our mind a separate idea 
and is therefore considered as a whole in itself, and not as a part.148 
 
The ideas within this letter are the key to understanding all of Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology 
and determinist ontology. We get a glimpse of such deductions even earlier in Letter 12 on the 
infinite where Spinoza also writes what I consider another key passage for adequately 
understanding his system: 
It is to the existence of Modes alone that we can apply the term Duration; the 
corresponding term for the existence of Substance is Eternity, that is, the infinite 
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enjoyment of existence or – pardon the Latin – of being (essendi). What I have said 
makes it quite clear that when we have regard only to the essence of Modes and not to 
Nature’s order, as is most often the case, we can arbitrarily delimit the existence and 
duration of Modes without thereby impairing to any extent our conception of them; and 
we can conceive this duration as greater or less, and divisible into parts. But Eternity 
and Substance, being conceivable only as infinite, cannot be thus treated without 
annulling our conception of them. So it is nonsense, bordering on madness, to hold that 
extended Substance is composed of parts or bodies really distinct from one another.149 
 
 Therefore, as our attributes can be understood as the infinite enjoyment and power of 
existence, it is not that I conceived of myself as separate from another human body or as parts; 
it is that I adequately understand what it is to be a specific kind of determinate expression of 
something that is eternal. When we die, for example, our finite expressions of substance as 
human simply transform into another type of expression of ratios of motion and rest. Spinoza 
goes so far as to explain that even major transformations in personality due to a growth in 
rational capacities for comprehension and an increase in the use of common notions are little 
deaths. As adequate thinking about such things will always be affirmations, Spinoza deduces, 
“…human understanding is immortal, because it is a product which God has produced in 
himself.”150 If we place the deductions of Letters 12 and 32 with E2p38, we start to gain a more 
lucid perspective and understanding of Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology. As one cannot place 
a rational limit on the enjoyment of existence, 2p38 states, “Those things which are common to 
all, and which are equally in the part and in the whole, can only be conceived adequately.”151 
The understanding of parts and wholes, in other words, when logical, will always be adequate 
                                                 
149 Spinoza, Letter 12: 788. What is striking about this letter is its relation to E1p15, a proposition which was crucial 
for as part of a correct interpretation of imaginative knowledge in Chapter Two of this thesis. Recall that in this 
proposition we learn that terms and ideas such as “measure,” “time,” and “number” are “modes of imagining.” 
Because adequately understanding what modes are can only be an aspect of the second kind of knowledge, the 
definition of modes must contain the concepts of substance (including the concept of Eternity) and attribute as they 
are always conceived through something else. Yet, the actual expression of modes can include a relation to 
imaginative knowledge and experience on a singular (finite) level as well. There is a difference between “mental 
constructs” and “real things,” and how to adequately describe such relations and differences is something rational. 
Can this last conceptual deduction also apply equally to the different ways to think about the combination of ideas?  
150 Spinoza, KV, 2:19:87. 
151 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p38: 54. 
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knowledge that produces more adequate knowledge. Just as contingency cannot be understood 
by reason and is always an aspect of imaginative knowledge, so, too, the understanding of parts 
and wholes can only, for Spinoza, be understood by reason if being recognized in its logical 
implications and impossibilities. William Stakstedder concludes: 
The way of being correlates thus with the way the subject is considered… Neither part 
nor whole is a viable notion by itself…calling anything either part or whole is possible 
only when it is juxtaposed with something other than itself… Rather, anything is called 
a part in view of a common nature shared with others. It is called a whole in view of its 
opposition to some other thing.152 
 
 Substance is an immanent cause, even if both concepts have to be understood through a 
finite lens. Furthermore, “Motion alone does not exist, but only motion and rest together; and 
this is in the whole, and must be in it, because there is no part in extension.”153 The above 
deductions should make this earlier claim on motion and rest in the KV clearer. He continues, 
“Now when we consider extension alone, then we become aware of nothing else in it except 
Motion and Rest, from which we then discover all the effects that result therefrom.”154 
 With the deductions of part and whole in mind, we can return to a discussion of conatus 
and especially the proto-physics of force of human conatus. Spinoza writes, “But since the 
universal power of Nature as a whole is nothing but the power of all individual things taken 
together, it follows that each individual thing has the sovereign right to do all that it can do; i.e. 
the right of the individual is co-extensive with its determinate power.”155 From this passage in 
the TTP, it is clear that Spinoza believes in both singular individual things and the natural rights 
of singular things as equal to their essence as determinate expressions of power. It is important 
for me to establish this point repeatedly so to better structure a theory of human consciousness, 
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153 Spinoza, KV, 2:19:87. 
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and how such conscious reflection is co-extensive with the intellectual love of God (or Nature) 
and the joy of existence of one’s conatus. To have an idea about the object of one’s idea is to 
focus reflectively on the object of the idea, which involves using imaginative knowledge and 
reasoning to process that object, but it also involves adequately understanding shifting registers 
of motion and rest and ideational power or ways of knowing and being. 
 My determinate power as my conatus will depend on what type of knowledge I focus 
on as the object of my ideas as well. To reflect on types of knowledge is to use ideas to reflect 
on other ideas. In the KV, Spinoza writes, “…Desire depends on the idea of its objects…”156 To 
define and understand human power as the power of Nature is to emphasize dynamic and 
versatile human singularity in its reasoning capacities specifically, particularly the capacity to 
understand the same object from multiple perspectives. Hsana Sharp writes, “…self-
determination emerges from our receptive powers to be affected and to coordinate multiple 
diverse agencies.”157 As I will demonstrate next, adequate understanding involves consciously 
reflecting on the three types of knowledge we are capable of. Once we grasp this level of what 
reasoning is capable of, we can process what it is for ideas to have varying forces. 
Conscious Reflection as a Proto-Physics of Force and Motion 
 Spinoza reflected on his system in terms both ecological and ethological. If we are not 
only moved and convinced by reasons, but are also moved by feelings, then all three forms of 
knowledge should be considered as an organic, unified process (as we read in E2ax2). This is 
particularly so because some of Spinoza’s ideas fall within today’s generally accepted 
definitions of ecology: “The scientific study of the inter-relationships among organisms and 
between organisms, and between them and all aspects, living and non-living, of their 
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environment.”158 Ethology is the study of human patterns of behavior and disposition, as well 
as the study of human personalities and their natural habitat with an emphasis on both 
empirical experiences and the rational and imaginative use of ideas and reflection. Spinoza’s 
system can be used for both.159 
 Spinoza focuses specifically on what strict deductive logic can show us about different 
types of causality within our experience in extension and thought. The connection of thought, 
motion and rest, and ontology includes, as noted earlier in passages such as E1p28, that 
efficient and material causation (beginnende oorzaak) can only be adequately understood in 
relation to ideas about modes. This deduction can accompany the understanding that God (or 
Nature) is the immanent cause (inblyvende oorzaak) of all things. Therefore, we are to consider 
multiple levels of causality at once. This fact brings up a challenge for relying on one 
definition or use of the PSR when reading Spinoza because the nature of causality must be in 
relation to both substance as one organic whole and the expressions of modifications of 
substance as modes. Modes are not, in other words, conceptual fictions but are real 
modifications of substance with their own causal rules and properties. There is not one set of 
rules for understanding all types of causes and all effects.  
 Adequate knowledge includes true beliefs which are logical and about the properties of 
things, including about thought and types of ideas. The attributes of thought and extension are 
real things (res), and the true beliefs of thought, for Spinoza, include “…that conviction 
whereby it is clearly seen that it cannot be otherwise.”160 Reason does not recognize 
contingency because clear and distinct ideas are completely true by necessity and could not 
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idea throughout his later works. 
 175 
have been otherwise. The way reasoning recognizes that contingencies are a part of one’s 
imagination is only by understanding the laws of thought and how each type of knowledge is 
separate, each creating ideas of its own kind. Necessary relations in reason cannot, logically, be 
contingent. Learning this is what enhances conscious reflection on those contingencies as 
partial knowledge. The experience of contingencies is a part of the imagination, but the 
adequate reflection is an action of reason. 
 Substance is the self-perpetuating single cause of all its effects. Spinoza clearly felt that 
he had a philosophical system that is one organic whole with infinite ways of expressing itself 
as self-caused and eternal. We can only understand substance and our expressions of it as the 
laws of Nature of thought and extension. These deductions bring with them more clarity about 
E2p7 (“the order and connection of ideas is the order and connection of things”). The type of 
knowledge you are aware of and, consequently, the affects you experience will be how you 
interpret the world or environment. In addition, as Ed Curley writes, for Spinoza persons are 
“an indissoluble unity which can be considered from two points of view, and with two distinct 
vocabularies and two distinct kinds of causation.”161 
 All expressions of Nature have some degree of determinate power, but for purposes of 
this chapter I am drawing our attention to human thought and reflective consciousness as 
potentia mentis. The rational striving for an enhanced capacity for adequate knowledge and 
expression leads our rational dispositions to become more automatic and forcefully habitual. 
When we adequately understand how the laws of Nature of thought and extension work, we are 
able to better recognize how to increase their force and expression (i.e. we comprehend 
increasingly difficult topics with more speed and clarity and we extend our diverse motions 
with more options and joy or pleasure). Rational conceptual blending increases our conatus. 
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These increases are highly correlated with the infinite possible experiences and the joy of 
existing. As Simon Calder writes, “For Spinoza, it is only through experiencing – and therein 
enjoying – the activity of thinking that beings become capable of reforming their 
‘imaginings.’”162 This is why it is important to understand the difference between knowing a 
truth and applying it well, with more effective force, or with more creativity so a multitude can 
experience the joy of such encounters and not only oneself.  
 Understanding the physics of force that is produced between and within our ideas will 
equip us with a capacity to live in a particular way: “The mind as far as it can, strives to 
imagine those things that increase or aid the body’s power of acting.”163 As we learn early in 
the Ethics, increasing our capacity to compare and contrast many ideas at once only 
strengthens one’s use of rationality, as well as one’s ability to respond to encounters within the 
environment more productively. This capacity for enhanced rational discrimination adds to our 
power of being able to recognize and reflect on the kind of affect we are experiencing and how 
to alter it. In Teaching Philosophy, Richard Shusterman writes, “Contrast makes feelings easier 
to discriminate…For such reasons, the use of language [imaginative knowledge] to guide and 
sharpen somaesthetic introspection…is crucial even to those disciplines of body consciousness 
that regard the range and meaning of our feelings as going well beyond the limits of 
language… The key is not to rank them in order of importance, but to coordinate them 
better.”164 In summary, the way to fully understand Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology and proto-
physics of force is to focus one’s singular conscious reflective capacities on singular affects, 
and to focus on them in a way that powerfully emphasizes to oneself what is felt, what kind of 
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knowledge is being relied upon more heavily, how many other ideas can be compared and 
contrasted during an experience, and how all of this can lend itself to an increase in the 
rational strength of habitual readiness and affirmative dispositions. Quite simply, Spinoza’s 
philosophy can become personally transformative. 
  The increased capacity to use reason well is what Stuart Hampshire calls 
“configurations of thought.”165 According to Spinoza, conatus is a natural right for each 
singular thing.166 It is not that we have free will and can go against natural laws. Instead, when 
natural laws are in operation, and they always are, there are different ways the laws of thought 
and extension are expressed. If sense experience and the imagination are over-active, our 
power will still be increased but not to our greatest benefit. If, on the other hand, rational 
disposition and rationally created affects are more proportionally powerful (we can never stop 
sensing so imaginative ideas are always present), then our power is increased both to our 
greatest joy and benefit but also for the benefit of others and all of Nature. In the TP, Spinoza 
writes, “But the fact is that men are mainly guided by appetite devoid of reason; yet even so 
they do not violate Nature’s order but necessarily conform to it.”167  
 Putting our increased capacities for reasoning well and more creatively into action is 
what increases our joy: “For more power comes to us from the understanding of proportion 
itself, than from the understanding of the rule of proportion.”168 To apply what we learn is a 
type of operational knowledge, which we will read more about in Chapter Five when I address 
                                                 
165 Hampshire uses this phrase in the introduction to Ed Curley’s translation of Spinoza’s Ethics. 
166 Spinoza, TTP, 16: 527. I am reminded of Thomas Kuhn’s striking critique in The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions of Aristotle and how little he knew about the mechanics of motion. Aristotle certainly understood a 
tremendous amount about what might be involved in rationally contemplating motion, as evident in the Physics, but 
Kuhn’s assessment is that contemporary science and the development of the discipline of physics over time has 
shown that Aristotle’s analysis is only partially accurate. 
167 Spinoza, TP, 2: 688. 
168 Spinoza, KV, 2:22:93. 
 178 
the third and final kind of knowledge found in Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology. Motion, in 
other words, involves more than just the properties of change and spatial direction, much more. 
 In 2011, Ursula Renz wrote that Spinoza is “not taking the cognitive ability which is 
usually only attributed to the human mind as an absolute privilege of human beings…”169 I 
partially disagree with this interpretation because human minds cannot know anything else 
except what they are consciously aware of as individuals in their expression of ideas. But a 
complete theory of human conscious reflection would not be possible if she is correct. It is a 
specific human experience to be capable of cognizing well while referencing one’s singular 
affects and personal imaginings. Simply stated, we do not know what it is like to be anything 
else other than human. But just as important, it is a way for a singular human being to control 
and evaluate one’s individual passions and reactions. This is the point in what was referenced 
above when Spinoza deduces that not all use reasoning well, but their conatus can still be 
active and powerful. Recall that the attributes of thought and extension can be expressed 
infinitely in infinite ways. 
 To be able to control and understand one’s singular passions is specific to being human. 
All things may have a certain degree of “awareness” of their conatus, but what that awareness 
is for human beings is distinctly different from any other expression. Beth Lord writes, “True 
knowledge as such has no power to overcome [our] affects; only insofar as that true knowledge 
is felt as an essential desire that is more powerful that other affects will it be able to overcome 
them…”170 For example, reflection on essence as expression and on ourselves as efficient 
adequate causes is the formal essence of the mind. Furthermore, in both Book Four of the 
Ethics and Chapter Two of the TP, Spinoza is clear that the conscious rational reflections of 
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individuals are required for true civil order among many competing human interests within one 
state or nation. We cannot live as we please or always allow only our personal judgments to 
sway us. There are circumstances where we can and should, by reason, defer our personal 
evaluations, preferences, or desires to benefit of the greater civil order. This is clear in E4p37s2 
where Spinoza writes, “If men lived according to the guidance of reason, everyone would 
possess this right of his (by P35C1) without any injury to anyone else… Again, in the state of 
nature there is no one who by common consent is Master of anything, nor is there anything in 
Nature which can be said to be this man’s and not that man’s. Instead, all things belong to 
all.”171 Later, in the TP, we read: 
Thus it follows that it is quite inconceivable that each citizen be permitted by ordinance 
of the commonwealth to live just as he pleases, and consequently the natural right of 
every man to be his own judge necessarily ceases in a civil order. I say expressly, ‘by 
ordinance of the commonwealth,’ for every man’s natural right (if we consider the 
matter correctly) does not cease in a civil order; for in a state of Nature and in a civil 
order alike man acts from the laws of his own nature and has regard for his own 
advantage. In both these conditions, I repeat, man is led by fear or hope to do or refrain 
from doing this or that. The main difference between the two conditions is this, that in 
the civil order all men fear the same things, and all have the same ground of security, 
the same way of life. But this does not deprive the individual of his faculty of 
judgement, for he who has resolves to obey all the commands of the commonwealth, 
whether through fear of its power or love of tranquility, is surely providing for his own 
security and his own advantage in his own way.172 
 
The conclusion is that we are both singular, individual human beings with personal reflective 
consciousness and social beings who also need to defer some of our personal interests and 
desires in order to maintain a (rationally) stronger civil order. The passage from the TP 
supports some of Hasana Sharp’s interpretation as well. Sharp concludes that, for Spinoza, 
“The modal nature of human existence…entails that humans cannot be considered in isolation 
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from one another…I think only if we think.”173 In E4p70 we read, “Everyone judges according 
to his own temperament what is good (see IIIP39).”174 
 Spinoza’s proto-physics of force and power (energy coupled with understanding and 
application) requires further explanation. Spinoza was interested in and experimenting with 
principles in physics, such as force, natural laws, momentum, flow and dynamics. He even 
went as far as to dig up his back yard in order to construct an underground water system with 
piping which would add fresh running water to his place of residence. As well, and as we read 
in Chapter One, physics was becoming an official discipline worthy of its own kind of research 
and experimentation in Holland during Spinoza’s young life. The first university physics 
laboratory at an academic institution was born at Leiden University. But, more importantly, in 
Spinoza’s system and letters we find many references to velocity, force, momentum, friction, 
motion, space-time, energy, and so forth. We get many glimpses of such concerns and how 
they, conceptually and physically, relate to Nature as expressions of natural laws, but one 
striking example occurs in a letter from 1665. In a response sent to Spinoza, van Blyenbergh 
writes, “Consequently, it must also infallibly follow that in relation to God I include as much 
perfection (differing only in degree) in my actions when I have a desire for pleasure as when I 
have no such desire… For at that time there pertains to my essence only as much as is 
expressed in action, for, on your view, I can do neither more nor less than what results from the 
degree of essence I have in fact actually received.”175 Spinoza clears up the misunderstanding 
of his system, ending the friendship, by simply stating that many confuse concepts when we 
attribute to God desires that are similar to human desires. We cannot rationally ascribe human 
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characteristics to God (or all of Nature), but we can talk about human expressions of God as 
involving the infinite or as part of a force that is eternal. 
 A key question when examining Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology, proto-physics of 
force, and theory of human consciousness, is about principles of conservation. For physicists 
and neuroscientists who study the functions of brain matter and the separate, yet related, 
experience of human consciousness, what is most puzzling is “the absence of any conservation 
laws: synapses, action potentials, neurons, attention, memory, and consciousness are not 
conserved in any meaningful sense.”176 Therefore, we have to look for support for conservation 
in order to more fully develop Spinoza’s theory of human consciousness in my reading. One 
place to look for such a concept and effect or expression of the attribute of thought might be 
found in the affirmations and use of common notions. Not only is it the case that memories can 
be thought of as a type of conservation, but our expressions of thought and extension are 
derived from the same eternal necessity as everything else in Nature. Therefore, if you find 
conservation somewhere else in Nature, you may also be able to find it as a part of human 
consciousness, especially if the interpretations of Spinoza (particularly E2p7) by scholars such 
as Pierre Macherey are correct. Macherey writes, “The movement of thought [in Spinoza] 
proceeds from the same necessity as all reality.”177  
 The main concept to consider is how ideas themselves can have power, force, and act 
like bodies. As ideas have their own striving to persist, as everything else, this striving cannot 
be described as motion.178 As already noted, motion is a concept and ability assigned to only 
the attribute of extension, but the equivalent action found in thought with every motion of 
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extension is a type of knowledge with increasing or decreasing force. In addition, motion can 
only exist as understood along with rest as a combination of ratio(s). Beth Lord writes, “If we 
align our finite existence as far as we can with the true order and connection of ideas and 
activities that is our essence, we will be more rational, more active, and more free.”179 Conatus 
is defined as appetite coupled with degrees of power and tendencies towards self-preservation, 
and human conatus is expressed in its own determinate ways specific to being human. This is 
also part of the logic why we cannot ascribe human characteristics to all of Nature; that is what 
makes human characteristics specific to human beings. Spinoza would not be able to use such 
logic if there was not something wholly unique about human expressions and reflective 
consciousness.  
 Therefore, we can develop a theory of human consciousness. In Chapter Three of the 
TTP, we read, “He who counts himself more blessed because he alone enjoys well-being not 
shared by others [humans]…knows not what is true happiness and blessedness… A man’s true 
happiness and blessedness consists solely in wisdom and knowledge of truth…”180 Pebbles, 
bats, and oceans cannot experience and feel knowledge of truth in the same way human beings 
can reflect on the force and motion of singular consciousness and action.181 Our conscious 
awareness is made up of all three types of knowledge, however rare intuition is, but especially 
it is composed of a continuously shifting interaction between imaginative and rational ideas. As 
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Stuart Hampshire notes, Spinoza “could not accept a simple-minded materialist conception of 
personality, having once recognized at first hand and in his own person the power of reflection 
and of active self-consciousness…”182 We might also consider what neurophilosopher, Antonio 
Damasio, concludes about Spinoza’s early philosophy of human consciousness: 
The notion of ‘ideas of ideas’ is important on many counts…it opens a way for creating 
an idea of self. I have suggested that the most basic kind of self is an idea, a second-
order idea… Because it is based on two first-order ideas – one being the idea of the 
object that we are perceiving; the other, the idea of our body as it is modified by the 
perception of the object. The second-order idea of self is the idea of the relationship 
between the two other ideas – object perceived and body modified by perception.183 
 
Yet, and of note, Damasio’s later work deduces that Spinoza’s Ethics is not enough to account 
for all of human consciousness as we know it today. In Self Comes to Mind, he concludes: 
Consciousness is not merely about images in the mind. It is, in the very least, about an 
organization of mind contents centered on the organism that produces and motivates 
these contents. But consciousness…is more than a mind organized under the influence 
of a living, acting organism. It is also a mind capable of knowing that such a living, 
acting organism exists. …the decisive step in the making of consciousness is not the 
making of images and creating the basics of mind. The decisive step is making the 
images ours, making them belong to their rightful owners, the singular, perfectly bound 
organisms in which they emerge.184 
 
But if my reading is correct, then Damasio’s early and later conclusions can both apply to a 
theory of human consciousness in Spinoza. His system of adequate knowledge does not 
recognize contingencies, therefore, what it does recognize, when reflecting on its own kinds of 
knowledge, ideas, and conscious experience of Nature as expressions of the laws of Nature 
(causes and effects with infinite ways of expressing those effects), is true knowledge about 
what it is to be human. To understand in such ways is to enhance our personal capacities to 
thrive and persevere. Such understanding is always an affirmation. In E1p33s, we read, “A 
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thing is called necessary either by reason of its essence or by reason of its cause.”185 To 
recognize and reflect on the adequate knowledge of essence, both one’s own and Nature’s, is to 
have true ideas, that is, to know with certainty and by necessity that it is my combination of 
ideas that are doing the affirming.   
 Another way to support such a reading includes some of the elements in the TTP where 
Spinoza differentiates between being a “slave” and being a “subject,” something he would not 
have been able to write about unless he felt human beings were unique in their capacities for 
reflective and singular consciousness. He writes, “A slave is one who has to obey his master’s 
commands which look only to the interest of him who commands…a subject is one who, by 
command of the sovereign power, acts for the common good, and therefore for his own good 
also.”186 This exact sentiment, written both before and again during the construction of the 
Ethics, is also found later in the TP. In other words, the practice and concept of a sovereign 
state are not possible without the existence of individual human subjects with the capacity for 
rational reflection, deferment of some personal interests so to live in a state of peace with many 
others, and the power to thrive and feel joy in existence as human and as an expression of 
Nature. Spinoza continues, “It must therefore be granted that the individual reserves to himself 
a considerable part of his right, which therefore depends on nobody’s decision but his own.”187 
Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology and proto-physics of force is an optimistic philosophy: 
“…awareness is also an apprehension, it is therefore also a mode of understanding…”188 
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 My process of transformation will be different from yours. This makes our expressions 
uniquely human in their own determinate ways. And yes, it is, in part, due to the contingencies 
picked up by me as an individual. This does not cause any problems for Spinoza’s 
epistemology. Anthony Paul Smith writes that the human question in Spinoza is not merely a 
new ideology of non-subjectivity; it goes beyond human collectivity as well. The human 
question in Spinoza is a radically singular one, and it also, as Antonio Negri holds, consists in a 
“fabric of hard relations.”189 Reflective consciousness is how we understand our appetites. 
Lord writes, “There is no difference between appetite and desire, except that desire involves 
consciousness of our appetite.”190  
 Spinoza draws specific differences between human emotions and feelings in many of 
his works. Reasoning well plays a vital role in regulating our passions. As we read in E4p63c, 
rational joys are not a problem when we are passionate about something as long as they are not 
excessive.191 Our habits and dispositions help form our embodied knowledge. Damasio 
summarizes, “More emotion gives rise to more feeling, and the cycle continues until distraction 
or reason put an end to it…”192 Using reason well turns out to be a state of awareness which 
includes a disposition of focused attention and the increased use of common notions instead of 
sense experience and imaginative knowledge. We can find evidence for this in E2p28 where 
Spinoza writes that to consider only our affects will result in confused knowledge, therefore, 
we must pay attention to both our affects and increased understanding about laws of Nature 
(causes and effects) in general.193 Because all of Nature is one organic substance, we can say 
that pebbles have conatus and are, in some determinate way, aware of their environment if 
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consciousness is understood as only convenio and with degrees of animation. But our human 
situation becomes more nuanced for us because we are passionate and have many desires. 
Because of this, the idea of shifting perspectives in Nature is important to consider. 
 Although we are discussing epistemology, the actions of thought and extension run 
parallel to each other so there is a need to understand conatus as it involves extension if we are 
discussing a proto-physics of force and motion. Our levels of animation involve energy and 
momentum in more rational directions where our actions will be the most beneficial for all of 
Nature (because increased benefit is closer to perfection). Enhanced powers of reflection 
include being more aware of how we are feeling and how our bodies are affected by others, or 
how we can affect others with more force. Recall that the use of rational power “leads to 
natural inclination” of the body and mind towards those things which will further add to our 
understanding. This is why Spinoza suggests we eat new foods, try new experiences, travel, 
and join with others in friendship as well: “But a free man strives to join with other men to him 
in friendship (by P37).”194  
 Because the attributes work together to create one combined affect of power, it is 
difficult to discuss why one might concentrate on thought and understanding. Yet, as Piet 
Steenbakkers writes, “Spinoza’s favorite expression throughout the Ethics seems to be 
‘potentia Mentis…’”195 The “power of the mind” and the “natural light of reason” are regular 
expressions used by Spinoza. Reducing all of Nature to extension is impossible, especially 
when we have access to our singular experiences of sense date and imagination in thought. 
Because of this, thought holds a special ontological status and it involves power relations 
between ideas that cause force in capacities for imaginative and rational comprehension and 
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application. As demonstrated in Chapter Two, when rationality is able to readily reflect on 
what proportion and kind of imaginative idea(s) the mind is using (sensations, memories, 
language etc.), it can, with more force, access those specific imaginative ideas which will 
benefit the overall increase in one’s conatus. Although common notions involve those “things 
which are common to all, and which are equally in the part as in the whole,” and which can 
“only be conceived adequately,” these deductions involve laws of Nature of which we are all 
subject: how we express those laws occurs in our own determinate ways singularly.196 
Foundations of reasoning are not the same as their infinite possible expressions. 
 When certain determinate chains of ideas are caused, it is not that they are created out 
of nothing. Another idea type of the same kind, by using the structures of the laws of the 
operation and function of thought, was produced as an effect of the previous idea. True ideas 
used by reason and intuition have the most power, but we can apply the structures of thought to 
our imaginative ideas and impressions as well. This is what occurs when we rationally reflect 
on our sense experiences, for example. That reflection is composed of clear and distinct ideas 
about our experiences to greater and lesser degrees of knowledge and force. That is why we are 
able to defer judgment, as noted above. It is more useful for us to discover, through reflective 
capacities, what other ideas we are associating with our experiences and not only what the 
object of our idea is. If we can do this we are closer to the real cause of our ideas (which are 
always other ideas).197 This is a version of the PSR, but with a very specific use that cannot 
apply to other attributes. This version and use differentiates itself from the definition of 
essence. As we will read in Chapter Four, if this is true, and I believe it is, then the essence of 
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substance cannot be reduced to a definition of linear causality. It is also why rationally creative 
common notions can be used so powerfully, which is evidenced in E2p40s2 III. The force of 
our sets of adequate ideas is directly correlated with our knowledge of “the properties of 
things.”198 The more knowledge of singular essences, for example, the more creatively 
powerful we can use our common notions to create stronger affects in ourselves and in others. 
For example, the more life experiences one has the more they may be able to use their 
imaginative knowledge coupled with reasoning to create a novel that affects others with greater 
intensity, such as in aesthetics and the uses of metaphor to produce knowledge for example. 
 In a footnote in the essay “Donagan’s Spinoza,” Ed Curley writes that there is little 
difference between geometry and physics. The geometric method Spinoza’s relies on produces 
a strengthening of rational capacities when we study the Ethics. It is a way of enacting 
operational knowledge. This method, as an activity of synthesis already noted in Chapter One, 
is a force which produces more common notions and more of an ability to affect others in 
affirmative ways. We are affected affirmatively because our existence is enhanced. Such 
experiences add to our enjoyment of existence as an effect. As Peg Rawes writes, “Rather than 
operating merely as an idealistic mathematical procedure, geometry is associated with modes 
of expression that range from the irreducible power of God as ‘substance’ or ‘nature’ to 
everyday human powers of expression, such as imagination and emotions, and the 
conatus…”199  
 Existing, thus, becomes a kind of action that can involve novelty. To have increased 
adequate knowledge is not the enjoyment of continuous understanding only, but it is also, by 
necessity, to enjoy persevering in existence itself (and the existence of the expressions of 
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substance are infinite). Spinoza writes, “And so he who has an adequate idea, or (by P34) who 
knows a thing truly, must at the same time have an adequate idea, or true knowledge, of his 
own knowledge… For no one who has a true idea is unaware that a true idea involves the 
highest certainty. For to have a true idea means nothing other than knowing a thing perfectly, 
or in the best way.” 200  
 It will be helpful if we, lastly, consider some interpretative nuances regarding the 
definition of essence and the nature of a true idea. E1A6 states that “a true idea must agree with 
its object.”201 This is the translation given by Ed Curley. A different translation is provided by 
Sam Shirley as a “true idea must agree with that of which it is the idea (ideatum).”202 These 
two interpretations can be read very differently. Shirley’s translation seems more in line with 
what it is to have an adequate idea of the essence of the object of that idea. When Spinoza 
writes that intuitive knowing, the third kind of knowledge we can have, is adequate knowledge 
and application of continuous understanding about the essence of singular things, it would 
seem his deductions are more in line with Shirley’s interpretation than Curley’s more 
correspondence theory of truth interpretation. Carl Gebhardt’s Latin version reads, “Idea vera 
debet cum fuo ideato convenire.”  
 At first glance, these two leading interpretations appear to be very similar or nearly the 
same, but consider the distinctions about the formal and objective essence of an idea which 
Spinoza elaborates on in the TEI. There, Spinoza draws a specific difference between the actual 
“objective essence” of an idea and “formal essence.” He plainly states, “A true idea (for we do 
have a true idea) is something different from its object (ideatum). A circle is one thing, the idea 
of a circle another… And since it is something different from its object, it will also be 
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something intelligible through itself.”203 A true idea can be about actual physical objects, but 
true ideas can also be about other ideas, entire events, an attribute of Nature, or imaginary 
objects or actions that, nonetheless, produce real effects. But agreement between ideas and 
objects do not entail that they are identical. For example, an idea about an affection of one’s 
body is not identical with the affection itself. The two events occur simultaneous to each other 
and are the effects of the laws of separate attributes. A true idea, for example, is “something 
intelligible through itself.” In addition, true ideas which take – as their object – other true ideas 
(such as we are doing in this analysis) will also be conceived through themselves, that is, they 
will be or can be defined as the attribute of thought (or substance) in action. Henry Allison 
writes: 
[The mind] does not passively perceive but actively conceives its objects. Indeed, an 
idea for Spinoza turns out to be the very act of conception or understanding, this 
identification [that the mind is its ideas] really amounts to the claim that the mind is 
identical with its acts, that its essence, as a finite mode, like that of God, is its 
activity…204 
 
 The level of activity in thought is not reducible to conceiving thought as only a corporeal 
activity, although it does include it within its actions and effects. Any theory of representation 
used to explain Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology, therefore, will not be adequate enough. 
Spinoza makes this clear as early as Letter 4 when he writes to Oldenburg, “But you say, 
perhaps Thought is a corporeal activity. Let it be so, although I do not concede it…”205 
 Spinoza is concerned with the “formal essence” of the idea, and the ability for the mind 
to grasp itself in its formal essence (ideas about ideas or singularity), but which can also be 
about the objective essence of an object (as one’s body or something external to us). When we 
have an idea about an object that idea is understood in its objective reality. When we have 
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reflective awareness about the types of ideas we are relying, and are able to better recognize 
when we are using adequate knowledge well, the mind is able to reflect on itself in action and 
as action (as an adequate cause). Objects and actions are two different things. This level of 
reflection carries with it, by necessity, the awareness and grasping of the formal reality of the 
idea as adequate knowledge. The result is understanding one’s own thought as an activity. It is 
an intellectual affection that is also felt, but that effect is experienced differently by each 
singular thing affected by it through individual, singular experiences of consciousness. 
 What we add to our knowledge and experience is the awareness of the powerful effects 
of adequate thinking. Hampshire writes, “Therefore, as our psychological and physiological 
knowledge of human actions and reactions increases, the range of human actions of which we 
can reasonably say ‘an alternative action was possible,’ or ‘he could have acted otherwise,’ 
necessarily diminishes.” In E2p21s we learn more about our having ideas about other ideas: 
“So the idea of the mind and the mind itself are one and the same thing, which is conceived 
under one and the same attribute, namely, thought… For the idea of the mind, that is, the idea 
of the idea, is nothing but the form of the idea insofar as this is considered as a mode of 
thinking without relation to the object.”206 Therefore, the object of one’s mind is not only one’s 
body and its affections, but can also be understood as other ideas (as the mind does not have 
ideas, it is ideas). The reason our range of possible actions may diminish, as noted above, is 
because we use reason to know, as Spinoza says, what is in our best interest, what is not, and 
what we can and cannot understand further. You may feel a strong intensity to punch someone 
in the face for spreading false and destructive rumors about you which contributed to the end of 
your career, and be fairly justified in feeling that way passionately, but reason limits your 
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possible choice of actions in the moment if you somehow find a way to reflect on the laws of 
Nature and what is beneficial to you and those around you. 
 When we consciously reflect on our ideas as an activity, the content we are concerned 
with are the other ideas that knowledge derived from, is in relation to, and what kind of 
knowledge will be produced as an effect. This is what it is to grasp ideas in their formal reality 
for Spinoza. In 2p43, we read, “He who has a true idea at the same time knows that he has a 
true idea, and cannot doubt the truth of the thing.” He continues, “And so he who has an 
adequate idea, or (by P34) who knows a thing truly, must at the same time have an adequate 
idea, or true knowledge, of his own knowledge. That is (as is manifest through itself), he must 
at the same time be certain…”207 The most important deduction to grasp is this: ideas in their 
objective essence can be understood as some form of representation, but, and here is the point, 
ideas grasped in their formal reality are neither representations nor representational. They are 
certainty itself, or true ideas (common notions) expressed as “a certain species of eternity.” 
Like mathematics, those expressions are eternal truths, but unlike being reducible to measure 
and number, such eternal expressions can be rearranged as needed infinitely as an element of a 
perfect, indefinite, affirmatively eternal system. The knowledge in our reflective awareness is 
forcefully clear and distinct in its formal reality. As we read in 2p44c2, “Add to this that the 
foundations of reason are notions (by P38) which explain those things which are common to 
all, and which (by P37) do not explain the essence of any singular thing. On that account, they 
must be conceived without any relation to time, but under a certain species of eternity…”208 
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 The changes we experience in our increases and decreases in conatus involve our 
changes in momentum.209 The objective essence of a true idea is “a mental action.” This action 
is another true idea, that of the formal essence of whatever is being thought about.210 When we 
learn, as noted above, that “A circle is one thing, the idea of a circle another,” the same 
deduction can be applied to 2p7 as well. That is, we could say that the body is one thing, but 
the idea of the body (the mind) is something else. Spinoza not only references a circle and its 
properties as different from the idea of a circle that includes those properties in its formal 
essence, which “can be the object of another objective essence…,” but he then gives an 
important example: 
For example, Peter is something real. Now the true idea of Peter is the objective essence 
of Peter and is in itself something real, something entirely different from Peter. So since 
the idea of Peter is something real, having its own individual essence, it will also be 
something intelligible, that is, the object of another idea which has in itself objectively 
everything that the idea of Peter has formally.211 
 
The object of the idea is about the idea of Peter. The idea has an objective essence and is real 
in the same way as the adequate idea of Peter (the first idea) maintains formally (formal 
essence). In summary, a mode of thinking is not a representation of formal essences, but a true 
act of understanding of what it is to have an idea as a mental action. It is a real activity of 
recognizing the true ideas we are having by using other ideas to reflect on the initial objects of 
thought. These other ideas connected to the rational ones we are having deductively assert 
themselves as clear and distinct (have force to produce other adequate common notions), that 
is, as true ideas about the objects (and processes) of thought.  
 Spinoza ends E2 by writing that, “…the affirmation which the idea of a circles involves 
differs from that which the idea of a triangle involves as much as the idea of a circle differs 
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from the idea of the triangle… For there is nothing positive in ideas which constitutes the form 
of falsity (see P35, P35S, and P47S).”212 Each affirmative idea is, therefore, an actual action, 
an event with power, and not a passion or passive representation. If all ideas of each kind of 
knowledge are caused by former ideas of the same kind, then in a certain determinate way the 
new ideas are the object of other ideas to which they are connected or associated by force. This 
is also how causes involve their effects and how we can logically talk about direct causal laws 
and proximate causal laws or adequate causes.  
 Since ideas as causes are responsible for and a part of our affects, to reflect on the 
necessity of the laws of thought and extension, instead of singular modal experiences as 
uniquely personal, is to experience the intellectual love of God (or Nature). It is also to have 
operationally true ideas about the laws of proportion as natural phenomena in ways in which 
we can put them to use with more force and motion (like God or Nature also do). What is most 
important is the way in which we become aware of what ideas we are relying on and why or 
what caused them, as well as the differences between the essence of an idea, the essence of an 
object, the essence of our affects as conatus (both ideas and affections combined), and the 
essence of Nature. All of these are different actions of knowing with different effects. Spinoza 
writes, “Hence it is evident that certainty is nothing else than the objective essence itself; that is 
to say the way in which we become aware of the formal essence is certainty itself.”213 
Objective essence is coupled with the way we understand the ideas we have having, which 
requires, by necessity, a consciously reflective human subject in my reading, as well as the 
object of those ideas. We can shift from that which appears representational to that which is 
adequately understood in its formal essence, the latter of which cannot be representational. 
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 In other words, what matters is our method of thinking or what Dan Selcer calls ways of 
knowing. The laws of thought are there to be used and are regularly accessed, but developing 
rationality directly involves understanding what ways and methods we use to understand the 
essence of singular things. This process is an aspect of the understanding of what adequate 
knowledge is and how it can be strengthened. Each kind of idea can have its own essence. 
Spinoza writes, “And in turn the idea of the idea of Peter again as its own essence, which can 
also be the object of another idea, and so on without end.”214 If all ideas had the same kind of 
essence then their power would be invariable and originality in thought, for example, would 
have no lasting impact or make no joyous impression. We know this is not the case. Some 
ideas are just better than others, often because of their acutely rational import and direct 
applications. Ideas, therefore, have force, a proto-physics of force in the ways in which they are 
used and expressed, that is, in how they are coupled with other ideas to create a more powerful 
and effective body of expression. Our true ideas are expressions of necessary certainty 
common to all bodies but put into action singularly with varying degrees of force of expression 
because attributes can express themselves in infinite ways sub specie aeternatatis. Thus, in 
Letter 37 in 1666, Spinoza writes: 
...one clear and distinct perception, or several taken together, can be absolutely the cause 
of another clear and distinct perception. Indeed, all the clear and distinct perceptions that 
we form can arise only from other clear and distinct perceptions which are in us... Hence 
it follows that the clear and distinct perceptions that we form depend only on our nature 
and its definite and fixed laws, that is, on our power itself alone... From this it is quite 
clear what a true method must be and in which it should especially consist, namely, 
solely in the knowledge of pure intellect and its nature and laws... To understand these 
things, at least as far as the method requires, there is no need to get to know the nature of 
mind through its first cause...215 
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 I believe the last line of this letter involves the earlier logical argument Spinoza makes in 
the Ethics that knowing causes is crucial for advancing knowledge, but one cannot know the 
“first” cause of any given idea or motion because of the multitude of continuous influences, both 
in ideas (as each idea is always caused by others prior to it) and extension (internally and 
externally to one’s body). If we return to Ed Curley’s translation of a “true idea” as one which 
agrees with its object, it is interesting to take into consideration not E2p7, but the definition of an 
“idea” and an “adequate idea” given by Spinoza at the start of Book 2 of the Ethics. An idea is “a 
concept of the mind which the mind forms because it is a thinking thing.”216 The notion of 
“concept” in this definition is meant to include the content of that idea, but a concept that has 
force and its content are meant to be understood differently when required. This is the point of 
the last few pages of this chapter. Spinoza then writes that an adequate idea is to be considered in 
itself “without relation to an object,” and that it “has all the properties, or intrinsic denominations 
of a true idea.”217 Therefore, an adequate idea is a concept or common notion that has content 
that may vary depending on what other concepts are needed to combine with it in order to be 
rationally understood. Attributes need no other concepts to be true, but modes are conceived 
through something else, for example. In these very important definitions, Spinoza is quick to 
point out the “action of the mind” in the form of an idea, similar to what was discussed above 
from his earlier work in the TIE. Actions of the mind are what Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology 
is concerned with. In order for ideas to be comprehended as actions, singular human minds 
capable of rational reflection about the methods of understanding are required. 
 This deduction deserves repeating because of its implications and unique contribution to 
the history of Western philosophy in the Seventeenth Century. A true idea is true regardless of a 
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finite mind conceiving it, but once conceived, the act of conceiving is an action of a particular 
mind, which is an expression of something infinite (substance) and not about only that which is 
finite. Consider how Euclidean geometry has defined “common notions” as “axioms concerning 
magnitudes in general, e.g. ‘things equal to the same thing are equal to each other.’”218 The 
magnitude of a common notion for Spinoza is that it expresses one eternal substance. 
Nonetheless, a direct comparison between magnitude and proportion as the same kind of thing is 
not possible in Spinoza’s Ethics. I can express, for example, a proportion (not portion, Spinoza’s 
choice of terms is proportion) of God’s or Nature’s entire magnitude, but I could never possibly, 
as a finite human being, express all of that magnitude. They are different concepts and actions, 
with different kinds of effects, and they need to be evaluated separately. Spinoza comments on 
this exact distinction in the CM and how it is imaginative knowledge to consider things in terms 
of duration, number, and measure (as in magnitude).219 Yet, the above definition about axioms 
concerning magnitudes overlaps with something Spinoza also writes about in Letter 12, the 
infamous letter on the infinite: “things which agree with a third thing agree with one another.”220 
I will return to this characteristic. 
 If the previous deductions in Chapter Two of this thesis are correct, then there are times 
when we can have adequate knowledge about some of our imaginative ideas in ways that reason 
can use to its benefit. To develop better habits of adequate thinking (habitual readiness) is to 
understand what methods of thought and distinction between types of essence (and ways) work 
more powerfully. It must, therefore, be the case that there is a form of objective essence of 
inadequate ideas that is different from the objective essence of adequate ideas. I believe this is 
another way to understand what Spinoza intends at the start of E3 about the intrinsic and 
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extrinsic determinations of ideas noted above. If so, and I believe we can draw these distinctions 
if we are careful in our methods of thought, then any theory of representation, such as that of 
Michael Della Rocca’s which we will review in the next chapter, will not be a completely viable 
interpretation of Spinoza. Because of this, as Dan Selcer concludes: 
If there is a register in which we may distinguish between 'idea-types,' then, the Cartesian 
assertion of the identity of all ideas with respect to formal reality is overcome. One way 
to advance this thesis would be to introduce an ontologically or causally differentiated 
typology of sensations and intellectual affections that could serve as a comprehensive 
catalog of our various ways of knowing... Another would be to frame a differentiated 
epistemological hierarchy that would distinguish between levels of ideational power, 
conceptual efficacy, or kinds of knowledge. Such a hierarchy could, for example, 
differentiate adequate and inadequate ideas, or again, sensible linguistic knowledge, 
common notions regarding shared qualities or predicates, and intuition of singular 
essences. These last possibilities, of course, are precisely the ones that Spinoza proposed 
in his Ethics...221 
 
Bodily encounters, actions, and combinations of powerful aggregates of ideas working together, 
produce increases and decreases in motion; ideas generate and express the effects of other ideas 
as expressions of real things in Nature. Ideas, in other words, have power, create effects, cause 
impressions, affect us with joy, and strengthen our rational capacities. Using our adequate 
knowledge well includes reflecting on what methods of thought and action we are relying on and 
why. These deductions go beyond what Descartes thought was possible, which is why Spinoza 
makes a real contribution to the history of philosophy. 
 As I will demonstrate in Chapter Four, Spinoza’s proto-physics of ideational force leads 
to a detailed discussion about the nature of affects and transitions (transformations) between 
registers of singular and collective power. A debate in the scholarship involves what kinds of 
transitions occur between passions and actions or between passive ideas and active ones. We 
cannot be expected to behave completely rationally on a continuous basis for Spinoza, primarily 
because Nature and external causes always have the potential to affect us with more force. We 
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are also passionate creatures. We write poetically, love passionately, and strive towards dreams 
which appear, at first, impossible to attain. We also write poetically about bad or negative things 
that affect readers with sadness, yet the writing is rationally well done in structure, form, 
creativity etc. There are, in other words, good or joyous passions. As I’ve already stated, the sad 
passions reduce our conatus. Spinoza notes as much in the KV when he writes, “We must, 
however, note here as an excellent thing about the passions, that we see and find that all the 
passions that are good are of such a kind and nature that we cannot be or exist without them, and 
that they belong, as it were, to our essence; such is the case with Love, Desire, and all that 
pertains to love.”222 These are not representations of Nature, they are expressions of Nature, that 
is, they are Nature itself. As we learn, we become more aware of our ideational levels of power 
and striving, as well as how this increased awareness involves the intellectual love of God (or 
Nature). Stuart Hampshire summarizes, “The individual person’s consciousness of his own needs 
and strivings (appetitus) is reflected in his consciousness as desire (cupiditas). But his desire, 
which is associated with his pursuits of particular ends, is no more than the reflection in idea of 
his total state, which itself is determined by a variety of external and internal causes…”223 
  As we have learned, and as Pierre Macherey explains in his reading of Spinoza’s 
dynamic epistemology, there is not reality and then representations of reality. The finite and the 
infinite are expressed in infinite ways by singular things, individually and in combination with or 
relation to each other. He writes:  
With Spinoza…the conatus that constitutes a singular essence unites it without 
intermediary to infinite substance that expresses itself within it, in a determination that is 
at the same time finite and infinite, and cannot therefore be restrained by the conditions 
of a possible knowledge…there are not two orders of reality, one substantial and infinite 
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and the other modal and finite, but one single and same reality continuous and indivisible, 
determined by one unique law of causality…224 
 
The degree of adequacy we express will depend on the degree(s) of comprehensiveness and 
method we achieve habitually on an individuated and partially non-representational level. 
Reading Spinoza through a theory of representation, as Michael Della Rocca does, is an 
inaccurate way of understanding his otherwise dynamic epistemology. I will explain why such a 
reading ignores foundational concepts found in Spinoza’s epistemology in Chapter Four.225
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CHAPTER FOUR 
NON-REPRESENTATION IN SPINOZA: 
HOW THE IMAGINATION AND REASON COMBINE TO CREATE GREATER AFFECTS 
 
“Immanence is the very vertigo of philosophy, and is inseparable from the concept of 
expression…” -Gilles Deleuze 
 
 
Immanence and Monism As Structure and Method 
 In this chapter I argue against a dominant strain of interpretation of Spinoza’s Ethics, 
particularly found in North America, namely a reading of Spinoza’s epistemology where ideas 
are understood as representations about actions in extension. Michael Della Rocca is the main 
proponent of this interpretation.1 His representational parallelism is based on a theory that he 
calls the “mind-relativity-of-content” thesis. As our mind does not have ideas but is ideas, in my 
reading, any theory of epistemological representation applied to Spinoza’s monism ignores the 
very real involvement of affects in such a system. It also ignores how the mind and body are 
combined in ways where their motions and forces remain distinctly separate modally. 
This chapter operates on two levels. First, the first two short sections will further the 
conclusions of Chapter Two and Chapter Three by continuing to advocate for a theory of 
affective awareness and human consciousness that is non-representational in Spinoza’s dynamic 
epistemology. Second, it will describe and argue against some of the main elements of Della 
Rocca’s interpretation of Spinoza’s epistemology. As Spinoza notes repeatedly and as I have 
argued for in this thesis, the adequate understanding of Nature (or God) is nothing other than the 
increased understanding of natural phenomena. Our awareness of our ideas in their essence is an 
                                                 
1 See, for example, the recent annual seminar of The Society for Early Modern Philosophy at Yale (SEMPY) where 
Early Modern scholar Dan Garber debated Michael Della Rocca on Spinoza’s Ethics: www.yale.edu/sempy/. In this 
talk, Della Rocca states that he is resolved in being identified as reading Spinoza as an idealist thinker. 
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expression of natural phenomena. In other words, adequate ideas are not representations of the 
actions of the attribute of extension but are real entities of their own singular kind with their own 
variety of dynamic expressions.  
As posed in Chapter Three, what is the nature of transformation of intellectual (human) 
force and power in extension when the method of increasing conatus becomes the object of our 
ideas and desires (and thus the main part of our awareness)? The inquiry involves understanding 
both the transitions between our passions and actions, and human consciousness taking itself as a 
direct expression of natural phenomena (with increasing levels of intensity). We need not, for 
example, overcome all passions as this would be impossible, especially given external causes 
that could affect us in unexpected ways. Spinoza writes, “We must, however, note here as an 
excellent thing about the passions, that we see and find that all the passions that are good are of 
such a kind and nature that we cannot be or exist without them, and that they belong, as it were, 
to our essence; such is the case with Love, Desire, and all that pertains to love.”2 Human desire, 
as and combined with common notions and actions, create powerful affects. Where there is 
power there is force. Singular experiences of love and desire are highly individuated. Once we 
understand such adequate expressions, love is neither a joyous passion nor a passionate joy.3 It is 
adequate understanding put to use to create more powerful affects. Thus, the ontological and 
epistemological are intertwined in a way theories of representation cannot fully address. As 
Stuart Hampshire writes, “The individual person’s consciousness of his own needs and strivings 
(appetitus) is reflected in his consciousness as desire (cupiditas). But his desire, which is 
associated with his pursuits of particular ends, is no more than the reflection in ideas of his total 
                                                 
2 Spinoza, KV, 2:14:78. 
3 As noted in another chapter, for an excellent summary of this debate see “The Joyful Passions in Spinoza’s Theory 
of Relations” by Simon Duffy in Spinoza Now (2011). 
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state, which itself is determined by a variety of external and internal causes…”4 The key is to 
determine oneself through internal causes, to become an adequate cause, through a more 
powerful understanding. The pursuits of particular ends noted by Hampshire are non-
teleological. In finite death we simply become a new ratio of motion and rest, for example. 
 It is the level of conscious reflective power and ideational efficacy that is most intriguing 
and effective in Spinoza’s epistemology. The effect of adequately conceiving ourselves as self-
caused includes the feeling of being a power of Nature that is a natural expression of our being 
human. Our ideas do not “represent” what is happening in our body. Our ideas are what is 
happening in and to our bodies, just expressed in their own determinate ways: 
The reason I speak here of actual intellect is not because I concede that there is any 
potential intellect, but because, wishing to avoid confusion, I wanted to speak only of 
what we perceive as clearly as possible, that is, of the intellect itself. We perceive nothing 
more clearly than that. For we can understand nothing that does not lead to more perfect 
knowledge of the intellect.5 
 
As we learn about idea types, and when we include the distinction between the objective and 
formal essence of common notions, our body will experience more power and joy. As Dan 
Selcer notes, Descartes already focused on ideas which take method and other ideas as their 
object, but Spinoza seems to take this fact of the intellect and its capacities to a more nuanced 
and logical outcome (made possible by the premises of all 5 books of the Ethics and other 
works). Selcer writes, “…in Descartes’ early work we can already see methodological reflexivity 
begin to take its definitive rationalist form: an immanent self-constitution of method that results 
when method takes itself as its own object… Philosophical method, on this model, emerges 
precisely out of its repetition with itself; it arises from the methodological investigation of the 
                                                 
4 Hampshire, Spinoza and Spinozism, 119. 
5 Spinoza, Ethics, 1p31s: 21. 
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nature, status, and form of rule-governed thinking.”6 The nature of reflecting on the proportional 
power of the intellect is one way of experiencing a transformation in thought and extension 
(through affects) because of the laws of thought and taking method itself as our object of 
thought. 
This organic relationship between idea-types or ways of thinking and accompanying 
actions of the body with other bodies in increasing and decreasing degrees of power not only 
maintains itself in a homeostatic state of varying degrees of force and transformation, but it also 
exists without any intermediary. Without an intermediary, theories of representation will not be 
adequate enough to address such a dynamic epistemological system. That is, our power, as an 
expression of Nature, is the combination of the expressions of a singular essence and of infinite 
substance by definition (with each also being defined separately when needed). The ontological 
and epistemological distinctions occur for human reflection understood either as substance and 
its attributes or as modal modifications of substance in infinite ways. Pierre  Macherey writes: 
With Spinoza…the conatus that constitutes a singular essence unites it without 
intermediary to infinite substance that expresses itself within it, in a determination that is 
at the same time finite and infinite, and cannot therefore be restrained by the conditions 
of a possible knowledge…there are not two orders of reality, one substantial and infinite 
and the other modal and finite, but one single and same reality continuous and indivisible, 
determined by one unique law of causality…7 
 
Thinking adequately about substance, while transitioning between types of knowledge is not that 
which is fulfilled by some absolute notion. There is always an infinity of relations and 
continuous combinations of expressions involving the attributes of substance, but we can only be 
aware of those of our singular expressions of thought and extension through our affects. Spinoza 
writes: 
                                                 
6 Dan Selcer, Philosophy and the Book..., 63. 
7 Macherey, Hegel or Spinoza, 200, 201. 
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If, therefore, we wish to investigate the first of all things, there has to be some foundation 
which may direct our thoughts there. Next, since method is reflexive knowledge itself, the 
foundation which is to give direction to our thoughts can be nothing other than 
knowledge of what constitutes the specific reality of truth, and knowledge of the intellect, 
its properties and powers. For when this is acquired, we shall have a foundation from 
which we shall deduce our thoughts, and a path by which the intellect, according to its 
capacity, may attain knowledge of eternal things, taking into account, of course, the 
powers of the intellect.8 
 
Knowledge of how one’s mind develops its power of thinking adequately with more force only 
adds to that force (with joy). But, for Spinoza, such knowledge about the nature of method and 
thought must occur before adequate knowledge of eternal things is possible. 
 Our experience of duration is a good example of the above. For us to recognize that our 
duration is an experience of imaginative knowledge takes many strong common notions about 
the logic of an eternal substance that we express. Human sentiments on linear temporality and 
spatial dimensions in the physical world are part of our imagination (mostly as and for sensations 
and bodily comportment and survival), for not only can we not imagine all spaces and 
relationships, but also, according to Spinoza’s logic, that which is eternal with infinite attributes 
(which have infinite expressions) cannot be fully expressed by one singular thing in thought or 
extension. Concepts about measurement can be common notions, but acts of measurement by 
singular things are something else (they are limited expressions etc.). This deduction allows 
knowledge to be something more than that which is instrumental or representational. Spinoza is 
aware that it is a human body and mind that is his reader as well. It’s human subjects with 
reflective consciousness building on their operational knowledge and methods of forceful and 
joyous, beneficial expressions who are learning his system.9 As Macherey writes: 
…the intellect had to first work with the ideas that it had, serving as they did as authentic 
knowledges, in order to make them produce all the effects they were capable of, 
                                                 
8 Spinoza, TEI, 105: 28, emphasis added. 
9 As Spinoza writes in Letter 12, he desires to enter into friendships with other individuals who are interested in 
pursuing rational thoughts and actions. Together, they will be stronger. This is the aim and goal of the Ethics. 
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gradually refining their own activity… There is no introduction to understanding, no 
correct method to know; because it is only in its effective practice that thought can be 
considered, as a real activity of a mind that puts to work and submits to proof, its own 
power…which it forms in its practice.10 
 
 In a letter to Schuller, Spinoza defines his consciousness as that which is composed of 
“reason and experience,” a letter where he talks about writing as an act of rational and 
imaginative thought as well as bodily extension all working together, asking that his reader listen 
to “the consciousness of man himself…”11 By better understanding the laws of thought and idea-
types, and what the extent of our power and expression are as extension, we can better and more 
quickly recognize errors in reasoning. Such recognition is one of the most difficult problems to 
solve in philosophy, for when someone feels he or she is certain about something, clear headed, 
with strong arguments and what they feel is logical evidence, it’s virtually impossible to change 
their mind. In other words, their beliefs (however partially rational) are so strong that they cannot 
easily identify their own errors in method or conclusion. This level of force would be a detriment 
to Nature if it were of the imaginary, illusory kind and of passionate behaviors daily in a 
proportionally large manner. Beth Lord writes, “Error then, is an inherent aspect of being a finite 
mode who is necessarily implicated in the world.”12 We are prone to error when our imaginative 
ideas are proportionally stronger than our rational common notions. The important point to 
recognize is that errors in reasoning occur on the singular level. Errors are an element of 
imaginative knowledge and each of us experiences our imaginative expressions differently. 
Ursula Renz writes, “However, in response to the repeated objection that he [Spinoza] allows 
individual subjects to disappear, Spinoza has much more to offer than is commonly supposed. 
                                                 
10 Macherey, Hegel or Spinoza, 49, 50, emphasis added. 
11 Spinoza, Letter 58, 910. 
12 Lord, Spinoza’s Ethics, 75. 
 207 
So, the next time an old schoolmate tells us in glowing terms about beautiful mountain hikes, and 
this fills us with pain, we can rest assured that their experience was a different one from ours.”13 
 In our daily encounters we have opposing affects and individuated experiences. 
According to Spinoza, we “develop rational knowledge through experience and imagination.”14 
As we become more reflectively aware of idea-types and the varying powers of expression they 
have in conjunction with each other, our personal habitual readiness for using reason well is 
enhanced. The knowledge of this process, of our ability to enhance our knowledge of natural 
phenomena as self-caused expressions of substance, gives us increasingly enjoyable pleasure, 
peace of mind, new ideas, and possibilities for action. It enhances our striving in existence. 
 Personal identity significantly involves singular conscious awareness. Spinoza believes 
that we transform into new individuals when our ratios of motion and rest alter our bodies in 
significant ways. Macherey writes, “The order of ideas is thus that of their actual production; this 
order is necessary, not by virtue of a rule-bound obligation, which could only be satisfied in a 
contingent manner, but by reason of the intrinsic causality of the true idea, which determines the 
idea in the course of producing the totality of effects, that is, all the ideas that depend on it.”15 
Yet, the intrinsic nature of true ideas will also depend on my own conscious awareness of them 
in order to use them to further enhance my conatus. The “degree of adequacy” we express will 
depend on the “degree of comprehensiveness” we achieve, as Spinoza writes, “…for the 
perfection of things is to be judged solely from their nature and power; things are not more or 
less perfect because they please or offend men’s senses, or because they are of use to, or 
                                                 
13 Renz, 118. 
14 Lord, Spinoza’s Ethics, 81. 
15 Macherey, Hegel or Spinoza, 45. According to Macherey, Spinoza overturns both the classical definition of 
‘method’ and of ‘order.’ Stuart Hampshire’s early work also supports this reading in Freedom of the Individual. 
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incompatible with human nature.”16 The degree of comprehensiveness we express will depend 
on our capacity to better recognize errors in reasoning and how to defer judgment if needed. 
 Some of what we judge to be good is based on our desires. Our desire includes that “the 
highest satisfaction of the mind stems from the right principle of living,” where we act “from the 
necessity of nature.”17 Yet, we cannot account for the totality of human thought nor would it 
make sense for Spinoza’s system to say we have or can. This is a place where Spinoza differs 
from many previous Western philosophers and scientists before him. Individual knowledge is 
fragmentary, with gaps, fissures, external influences, overflows, intensities of varying degrees, 
habits of thought according to the preface of E4. It is also open ended. Reason understands that 
certain ideas can be used to the benefit itself and Nature. Spinoza writes clearly in Letter 37, 
“Hence it follows that the clear and distinct perceptions that we form depend only on our nature 
and its definite and fixed laws, that is, on our power itself alone; and not on chance, that is, on 
causes which, although acting likewise by definite and fixed laws, are yet unknown to us and 
foreign to our nature and power.”18 Using the example of how reason can overpower one’s 
passions or false beliefs, but that this action is one of adequate understanding about thought and 
extension and not an act of free will, Stuart Hampshire supports Spinoza’s conclusions when he 
writes: 
I may look for methods and techniques of ridding myself of thoughts which are painful or 
harmful, and which are not beliefs genuinely held by me… Even if some unpleasant 
affect still recurred when darkness fell [the example being used is about fear of the dark], 
it would not be fear, if the thought of danger was not present [along with the fear]. The 
method, or technique, that I employed to rid myself of the thought that I was in danger 
would not amount to changing my mind about the existence of danger; for to say that I 
had changed my mind about the existence of danger would imply that I was now ready to 
deny that which I had formerly been prepared to affirm. I had not decided that a 
proposition, which I had previously believed to be true, was false… Rather I had used 
                                                 
16 Spinoza, Ethics, 1App: 30-31. 
17 Ibid. 5p10s: 167. 
18 Spinoza, Letter 37: 861. 
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some means, or method, or technique, to bring about a change in the sequence of ideas 
occurring in the natural course of events to my mind, just as I might have used some 
means to prevent or remove an impulse to behave a certain way, which I find occurs in 
the natural course of events… I used my knowledge of the cause…to produce a change in 
the natural course of events. He who employs some method or technique to get rid of an 
idea, which he knows or believes to be false or groundless, acts upon himself, and brings 
about an effect in his own mind…19 
 
 We are not the whole of Nature, but we do express its eternal truths in our own 
determinate, dynamic ways. The thoughts we have are our state of mind or the disposition we 
take, and this state of mind is directly parallel with the affections of one's body. As we've read 
and can be noted in 4p37s2, one can only counter one emotion by another which is stronger, and 
rational states of mind always accompany stronger emotions and dispositions. In Letter 30, 
Spinoza writes:  
For I do not think it right to laugh at nature, and far less to grieve over it, reflecting that 
men, like all else, are only a part of nature, and that I do not know how each part of 
nature harmonises with the whole, and how it coheres with other parts. And I realise that 
it is merely through such lack of understanding that certain features of nature - which I 
thus perceived only partly and in a fragmentary way, and which are not in keeping with 
our philosophical attitude of mind - once seemed to me vain, disordered, and absurd. But 
now I let everyone go his own way.20  
 
As I've already discussed, Spinoza tried to eliminate the concept of “part” when we are 
understanding the laws of Nature as substance, which are expressed in their eternity, necessity, 
and indivisibility. Extension, as an attribute, is indivisible, and yet, in thought an idea can be 
singular in nature in the way described above. That is, we can have individual ideas. God, or 
Nature is “simple,” that is, “not composed of parts,” as it is “that which is not composite or 
composed of parts that are different in nature, or of other parts which agree in nature.”21 Our 
ideas are not conceived as individual parts. They are adequately conceived as events and effects. 
 
                                                 
19 Stuart Hampshire, Freedom of the Individual, 99-100. 
20 Spinoza, Letter 30: 844. 
21 Spinoza, Letters 35, 36: 856, 858. See also E2p13s, a proposition, as we’ll see, which Della Rocca misinterprets. 
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Conatus and Affect as A Force of Physics in Thought and Motion in Extension 
 
Our desire to keep moving, to endeavor in our existence with power, is a way of affirming 
our existence, and it is an “impulse” which is “innate in all men,” yet of “no great force and can 
easily be checked by the recurrence to mind of some other thing which is frequently in our 
thoughts.”22 This recurrence of thoughts creates a proportion of force all its own. What we will 
learn is that it is not that Spinoza prioritizes the mental over the physical, but that we cannot truly 
endure with more and more joy, power, and understanding unless we also reflect regularly on the 
nature of our affects and the processes by which they can be transformed.23 To do so is built into 
the nature of our conatus as a capacity to be strengthened. 
 Conatus consists in ratios of acceleration and deceleration in intensities composed of 
many different motions of the paths of various interactions forming an organic whole. But human 
conatus, and its resulting actions and series of ideas alter consistently, as does our strength of 
understanding. With more force, our understanding can increase in its capacities of 
comprehension. This force, as a ratio and proportion, composes our affects. Once the powers of 
comprehension take hold and we are aware of more adequate ideas that is our mind, other forms 
of comprehension and use of such knowledge can occur more easily and efficiently.24 We need 
good methods for such regular continuous understanding and conscious reflective capacities.  
The concept of an efficient cause is crucial to adequately understand here. The efficient 
cause, for Spinoza, is what always does the moving of any determinate expression of Nature 
(which is everything at all times). Expressions of Nature are simply laws of Nature, and laws of 
                                                 
22 Spinoza, Letter 58: 909. This is why Harold Skulsky writes that 4p15-17 and 4p54s is evidence that Spinoza felt 
rational impulses are rare and must be developed. I believe 5p20 in its entirety supports these claims as well. 
23 For a very recent work which partially supports a theory of human conscious awareness as it directly relates to the  
 affects in Spinoza, and of which partially supports my reading in the last chapter, see Eugene Marshall's The 
Spiritual Automaton: Spinoza's Science of the Mind. 
24 This is also why E2 and E5, in relation to certain aspects of E4 regarding the affects, must be understood together.  
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thought and extension operate according to causes and effects. In Letter 60 from 1675, two years 
before Spinoza’s death, he writes, “...I assert absolutely that from certain properties of a thing 
(whatever be the given idea) some things can be discovered more easily and others with greater 
difficulty – though they all concern the nature of that thing.”25 This conclusion (method) can be 
paired with what he states in the same letter when he also writes that the only way we can know 
the properties of anything at all is if “the idea or definition of the thing should express its 
efficient cause...”26 But is this also a strict use of only one form of the PSR? Are there a 
multitude of ways the PSR can express its own definition as it relates to the definition of an 
efficient cause? Spinoza is clear in E1p8s2 I-V that his version of the PSR is flexible.27 
 Attributes, as constituting the essence of substance, must be conceived through 
themselves conceptually. How will the PSR account for something being both conceived through 
itself and also the cause of its own separate effects? Thought cannot affect extension causally and 
does not need to be conceived through it in any way. The attribute of thought, nonetheless, is also 
understood as natural phenomena. Spinoza writes, “...if the Being is Thought, it cannot be 
conceived as determined in Thought, but only as undetermined, and if Being is Extension it 
cannot be conceived as determined in Extension, but only as undetermined.”28 Therefore, we can 
conclude that, understood in a certain way, the efficient cause operating as the force and speed of 
thought is undetermined substance, yet the three kinds of knowledge I can have and singularly 
reflect on can be understood as the efficient causes of themselves in the modal distinctions 
between different effects produced depending on which kind of knowledge is being used as our 
awareness. I use the term “kind” of knowledge, but you can just as easily say “way” or ways too. 
                                                 
25 Spinoza, Letter 60: 913. 
26 Ibid. Letter 60: 913. 
27 Spinoza, Ethics, 1p8s2I-V: 5-6. 
28 Spinoza, Letter 36: 858. This is similar to the idea that that which is infinitely extended cannot include within its 
definition the concept of part nor the concept of divisibility, but this is certainly not a novel deduction.   
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 In the anthology Spinoza Now, Antonio Negri concludes Spinoza’s concept of conatus is 
the combination of continued learning within the experiences of an individual human and an 
expression of Nature. Interestingly enough, Spinoza scholar Wiep van Bunge has a conclusion 
similar to Negri’s.29 For both scholars, Spinoza's system is, in the end, about intellectual love, 
even if in Negri’s interpretation he ends emphasizing the collective more than personal identity. 
In my reading, our singular existence can be transformed and continually regenerated by others 
as well as by our own rationally powerful combination of ideas. It is a combination of both, but 
our adequate knowledge is understood as determined internally as adequate causes and their 
effects. There are dual causes interacting simultaneously and multiple types of causes in relation 
perpetually. Does not Spinoza place together the concepts of personal identity and memory in, 
for example, E4p39s?30 My memories are different from someone else’s memories and that is 
partly what makes us singular expressions of our own variations in degrees of power and 
intensity. Although conscious awareness may be inherently inadequate or partial due to the 
imagination’s fragmentary nature, this does not entail that a concept of the coherent “subject” 
cannot exist in Spinoza’s system.  
If we didn’t strive to persist in our existence, we would die. The more the body is capable 
of having certain images, the more the conscious mind is simultaneously aware of such images.31 
                                                 
29 Van Bunge concludes in his 2012 collection of essays already noted in this chapter that Spinoza's foundational 
theme throughout the Ethics and the TTP can be summed up as a moral (almost Christian) ethic and intellectual 
virtue to “love thy neighbor.” Although I have found this theme to be very strong in the TTP, I disagree that it is the 
underlying foundation of the Ethics. See also Spinoza Now, edited by Dimitris Vardoulakis (2011). 
30 E4p39s reads, in part, “...I understand the body to die when its parts are so disposed that they acquire a different 
proportion of motion and rest to one another...even though the circulation of the blood is maintained...the human 
body can nevertheless be changed into another nature entirely from its own.” Further, we act according to what 
benefits us, but not only this. Spinoza writes earlier in 4p37s2 that we act towards our benefit “according to his own 
temperament.” Tenacity is what benefits us, but when we recognize what benefits others, it is nobility. One can also 
point back to 2p10s2 and 2p37 for more support. How can we eliminate the concept of reflective, singular affect and 
experience while maintaining all of what is written in these and similar propositions? 
31 Spinoza, Letter 58: 910: “I think that he must likewise have experienced that the mind is not at all times equally 
fitted to thinking of the same object, but that just as the body is more fitted to have the image of this or that object 
aroused in it, so the mind is more apt to regard this or that object.” 
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The more I am able to imagine something, the more what I am imagining it continuously present 
to my mind. What is present to my mind composes my state of mind and bodily disposition. This 
is why Spinoza refers to our use of both images and memories of maxims alongside common 
notions about the properties of the things we are considering, such as found in E5p10s.32 This is 
also why, as we'll read next in more detail, the dominant interpretation of Michael Della Rocca 
will not work as the way to understand Spinoza. As one example, Della Rocca argues, 
“...Spinoza speaks only of ideas and not of physical images as representational.”33 But in the 
above proposition just noted (and several others), Spinoza does speak about physical images in 
singular minds as representational, and it is perhaps the only time we can use the concept of 
“representation” in Spinoza at all.34 All three types of ideas can exist separately at one time in a 
singular mind in order to create transformative affects, something I believe is supported by 
E4p37-39 as well as by 2p13 lem7, where we examine the way we understand the interactions of 
the ever-shifting expressions of one substance.35 How will a theory of representation account for 
this combined, affective phenomena and its continuous transformations completely?  
 Because the mind is ideas, understanding the formation of ideas we are reflecting on is 
extremely critical because it is equivalent to better understanding one's own mind and its power. 
I would even say that this endeavor precedes any other discussion about how “logic” and Being 
are defined. If one does not understand one’s own mind and how combining common notions can 
strengthen rational processes or if one is not consciously aware about what a singular mind can 
and cannot do, then the rest of our inquiries about knowledge, logic, and Being become 
                                                 
32 Spinoza, Ethics, 5p10s: 166-167. 
33 Della Rocca, Representation, 60. 
34 As we will read, one can contrast the concept/theory of representation with the transitions of corporeal becomings, 
eliminating the former in support of the latter, such as we find in the work of Clair Colebrook, for example, in her 
article “From Radical Representations to Corporeal Becomings…” (Hypatia 2000). 
35 Spinoza, Ethics, 5p10s: 167. The proposition states that we have the power to arrange the modifications of our 
body according to an intellectual order the less we are affected by emotions contrary to our nature. 
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impossible.36 This is Spinoza's theory of human psychology. Such an endeavor precedes such 
questions as inquiring into the meaning of Being because, if you cannot better recognize when 
you are relying on imaginative ideas and why, how will you know when they are in need of a 
suspension of judgment in order to gather more information? Spinoza allows for doubt when 
needed, but not contradictions in deductive logic about the properties of things.37 
 The difficulty of the Ethics is not due as much to its impenetrability as it is to the amount 
of dedication and conscious deductions it takes to get to the logical effects and consequences of 
each book in a way in which our knowledge is actively affected in new and rationally powerful 
ways. This awareness includes the capacity to consciously use one's increase in the power of 
rational thought and action by learning such a system. This is also why the references to the work 
of Daniel Selcer at the start of this chapter are important. At the least, the attempt involves 
reflective awareness on several levels. It particularly involves the ability to recognize more easily 
if we are relying on a series of imaginative ideas or on rationally understood ideas as certain 
knowledge. Each attribute must be conceived through itself. It is also about how each attribute is 
“determined in its own way.” One cannot be defined as representing the other in any way. 
 Again, keep in mind that what moves us (or not) are affects, which can be passive or 
actively joined together with “the common properties of things” in order to act with more force 
or power. For now, it is enough to understand that the intensity of affects is what transforms us. 
The intensity of affects is never static, nor can it be explained with concepts that are static. 
Concepts can be logical and yet dynamic depending on other ideas they are in relation to. Affects 
                                                 
36 This is more complex a problem than many give credit to. One example includes the many individuals who seem 
to be capable of things most other minds are not capable of, such as, for example, super memory and being capable 
of recalling every major detail of one's life on each individual day for years on end. Such rare abilities demonstrate 
that we have barely scratched the surface of what the human mind is and can do. We still do not have agreement on 
the nature and definition of consciousness across disciplines. 
37 See evidence for this, for example, in Letter 56: “I say that a probable proof must be such that, although open to 
doubt, it cannot be contradicted; for that which can be contradicted is akin, not to truth, but to falsehood.” 
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can arise as or because of images in the mind or they can arise as and in conjunction with 
adequate ideas. Recall that Spinoza writes, “An affect which is a passion ceases to be a passion 
as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it.”38 And as Gilles Deleuze notes about Spinoza’s 
system, “…a feeling of which we are the adequate cause is an action.”39 As well, this is how 
joyous passions can be better understood as adequate ideas about ideas of the imagination 
(which include our sense experiences). Spinoza writes that our various affects “can be 
compounded with one another in so many ways, and that so many variations can arise from this 
composition that they cannot be defined by any number.”40 Again, imaginative and adequate 
ideas can work together in ways that strengthen reason and its uses. 
Book Five of the Ethics is a very important element of Spinoza's dynamic epistemology 
in this respect. There are many references to affects, especially in relation to the ordo et connexio 
of things. The images of our mind make us aware of the affections, but affects can shift from 
passions to effective actions that benefit oneself and the whole. As E5p4 notes, we can have 
common notions about our affections and how they are formed. New series of adequate ideas 
about the images of one's mind are more active and powerful. Spinoza writes in the opening of 
E5, “Therefore, because the power of the mind is defined only by the understanding...we shall 
determine, by the mind's knowledge alone, the remedies for the [passive] affects.”41 Knowledge 
of, and transition to, greater affects involves understanding things as necessary, and reducing our 
reliance on knowledge of causes external to us, as supported by 5p4s and 5p6.42 We read, “We 
must, therefore, take special care to know each affect clearly and distinctly (as far as this is 
possible), so that in this way the mind may be determined from an affect to thinking those things 
                                                 
38 Spinoza, Ethics, 5p3: 163. 
39 Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, ed. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1992), 221. 
40 Spinoza, Ethics, 3p59s: 103. 
41 Ibid. 5 preface: 162, emphasis added. 
42 Ibid. 5p4s, 5p6: 164-165. 
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which it perceives clearly and distinctly...so that the affect itself may be separated from the 
thought of an external cause joined to true thoughts.”43  
Michael Della Rocca labels affects simply “special kinds of ideas.” Yet, affects are 
something real according to Spinoza, and they include the affections of the body as part of their 
expression. He writes, “But an affect arising from reason is necessarily related to the common 
properties of things (see the Def. of reason in IIP40s2), which we always regard as present (for 
there can be nothing which excludes their present existence) and which we always imagine in the 
same way (by IIP38).”44 Note the very important reference to the definition of reason in this 
proposition with the most important epistemological proposition E2p40. When we understand 
the necessity of not only the laws of thought and extension, but the expression of those laws as 
Nature's eternal existence (and thus as always present), we have more power over our affects as a 
result of this increased knowledge. This type of affect does not alter in its necessity, and is 
always more powerful than those things which do change.45 This formula of the affects will be 
one way to counter certain theories of representation directly.46 
 Recall also that “an affect toward a thing we imagine as necessary is more intense...than 
one toward a thing we imagine as possible or contingent, or not necessary.”47 Because “insofar 
as we imagine a thing to be necessary, we affirm its existence.”48 Affirmation of existence is 
what conatus is about, that is, to persist and strive in existing with tenacity and nobility. Our 
actions can, in this way, be said to issue that which is necessary in conjunction with what we 
                                                 
43 Spinoza, Ethics, 5p4s: 164. 
44  Ibid. 5p7: 165. 
45 This is one way Spinoza can escape the need to have an absolute definition of time or space, which is also how to 
logically distinguished himself from systems like Aristotle's Physics. 
46 In certain ways, this whole reading supports some of the work of Hasana Sharp on the nature of affects in 
Spinoza. She writes that affects must be read as singular, qualitative changes, equally corporeal and mental, 
involving the intensity of what it is for one to have the power to persevere. 
47 Spinoza, Ethics, 4p11: 122. 
48 Ibid. 4p11: 122. 
 217 
might call internal causes or our perception and conception as God, Nature, or substance, even if 
it is the only perspective we have access to. This is why Spinoza needs the concepts of duration 
and proximate cause, but it is also why the concepts and understanding of variations in power 
and affects (as signs of effects) must accompany the concepts of substance, mode, and 
existence.49  
Many, if not most, philosophers have engaged in on-going debates about the nature of 
causal laws and causality in Nature, as well as our capacity to use the PSR. As Charles Hartshorn 
notes, many, such as Charles Peirce, Henri Bergson, Boutroux, Dewey, Montague, Whitehead, 
Popper and other well-known thinkers in physics have concluded “that the genuine causal laws 
are all approximate or statistical, not deterministic in the classical sense.”50 Yet, determinism and 
laws of Nature as fixed cause and effect processes are what concern Spinoza. As he writes in 
4p37s1, if we relate all of what we both desire and what we do “of which we are the cause” 
according only to an idea of God, we are remaining within the confines of what he critiques as 
“religion.” On the other hand, if we desire and act according to an adequate use and 
understanding (guidance) of reason and its various uses it is called nobility, virtue, and 
“morality.” The use of ideas in these ways requires personal “tenacity” and perseverance (as our 
environmental circumstances are always shifting and unpredictable).51 Spinoza writes, “The 
rational principle of seeking our own advantage teaches us to establish a bond with men...”52 
 In the TdIE we read about the method involved in the process of reflecting on one’s ideas: 
Our aim, then, is to have clear and distinct ideas, that is, such as originate from pure mind 
and not from fortuitous motions of the body. Next, so that all ideas may be subsumed 
                                                 
49 This is a reference to the work of Gilles Deleuze on Spinoza again. 
50 Hartshorne, “Creativity and the Deductive Logic of Causality,” 62. Conceptually we begin to understand how 
“‘the many become one and are increased by one’” as Whitehead writes and is noted by Hartshorne.  
51 Spinoza, Ethics, 4p37s2: 134. If we need others, which we do according to Spinoza, then we too must be one of 
their other(s); that is, there are individuals and we can differentiate from each other. This same proposition reads, 
“Now, the good which everyone who lives according to the dictate of reason...wants for himself is understanding.” 
52 Spinoza, Ethics, 4p37s1: 135. We also read here that it is religion if we relate all of our ideas to a God. 
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under one, we shall endeavor to connect and arrange them in such a manner that our 
mind, as far as possible, may reproduce in thought the reality of Nature, both as to the 
whole and as to its parts. As to the first point, our ultimate aim, as we have already said, 
requires that a thing be conceived either through its essence alone or through its 
proximate cause. That is, if the thing is in itself, or, as is commonly said, self-caused, then 
it will have to be understood solely through its essence; if the thing is not in itself and 
needs a cause for its existence, then it must be understood through its proximate cause. 
For in fact knowledge of the effect is nothing other than to acquire a more perfect 
knowledge of the cause.53 
 
Clearly the above passage cannot be about only ideas which represent bodily actions, and to have 
in thought the “whole” of Nature is an impossibility. This is another reason why I started this 
thesis with the nature of definitions for Spinoza.  
Throughout the TTP Spinoza writes that we do not have true ideas or understanding of 
the second kind of knowledge unless we investigate scientific principles of the causes of natural 
phenomena: “For whatever we clearly and distinctly understand must become known to us either 
through itself or through some other thing that is clearly and distinctly understood through 
itself.”54 We can understand that substance (God, or Nature) is self-caused, and we can 
understand adequately that our true ideas are modal expressions of reality determined in their 
own ways. Modal expressions of Nature are understood clearly and distinctly through something 
else. This would result in understanding that the concept of the essence of substance, for 
example, is, in fact, an adequate idea that we can have, but must be understood as determined in 
its expressions by each attribute being considered in relation to its essence.55 Hasanna Sharp 
writes, “The true ideas of finite modes should not be understood on a correspondence model of 
truth... True ideas are not measured by something outside the attribute of thought.”56 True ideas, 
as experienced by a singular mind, have no need to be understood through something other than 
                                                 
53 Spinoza, TIE, 91: 257, emphasis added. 
54 Spinoza, TTP, 6: 447 
55 This is also supported by Letter 50. 
56 Sharp, 72. As noted in E2p7, the reasons for our true ideas must be located within what a rational human mind can 
experience, therefore, in the ordering of our ideas and ways of knowing. 
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itself and its expression. What this also demonstrates is that modes, as modifications of substance 
understood through something else, can themselves be that which become clearly and distinctly 
understood, even though they are, by definition, modifications of substance. Modes can be 
understood as that which are clearly and distinctly perceived, as long as they are done so in a 
way that includes the definition of the attribute of which they are a part. To include something in 
its definition is to say that the thing is immanent to it. Modes are immanent to that which is self-
expressed. As Deleuze writes, “The path of salvation [for Spinoza] is the path of expression 
itself: to become expressive – that is, to become active; to express God’s essence, to be oneself 
as idea through which the essence of God explicates itself, to have affections that are explained 
by our own essence and express God’s essence.”57 
 As we've read in previous chapters, definitions and their order and arrangement are 
crucial for understanding Spinoza's system. Specifically, affirmative definitions are those that 
generate particulars to be contemplated and used. Part of my task in this project has been to 
familiarize the reader with “the conditions of a good definition,” as Spinoza puts it. The 
extensive possibilities of building on and working with certain axioms (deductively) are infinite, 
but these possibilities can interfere with contemplating “one particular thing rather than 
another.”58 We cannot contemplate it all. So, we must have a method to discern what we can 
know and express in order to improve our understanding. To start with more general yet 
deductively connected definitions and then progress to particulars enhances the capacity to 
reason with more force. Not only will we understand more about the thing in question, but the 
process itself becomes more fluid and efficient by understanding how this process works (or 
                                                 
57 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy, 320. Also, adequate ideas about god/causality must coincide with adequate 
ideas about necessity and perfection, and never with only human nature. What kind of theory of human 
consciousness will now be required if this is the case? 
58 Spinoza, TIE, 257. 
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method). The risk is that this also applies to imaginative ideas that are combined in various 
associations without using rational ideas to discern why we are relying on them in the first place. 
Reason works with what the mind is often imagining. Spinoza writes, “For a definition to be 
regarded as complete, it must explain the inmost essence of the thing, and must take care not to 
substitute for this any of its properties.”59 So, as we can see, definitions can be open ended at 
times until we have enough information and logical certainty to make them more complete. This 
is argued in the preface of Book 4 of the Ethics. 
 To explain the inmost essence of something is to adequately comprehend its properties, 
but it is not only this, as we noted in the last chapter when discussing the law of proportion. It is 
not enough just to know this law exists, nor can one understand every possible expression of 
such a law. If the existence of a singular thing is an action by definition, then to read or know 
about something is not enough to keep it in existence even though, by knowing it adequately, one 
is affirming existence itself. Not because they are not actions too, but only because there are 
other ways of expressing such knowledge which can become more powerful. Those new ways 
can be re-arranged and applied creatively by singular minds and bodies, for example. We must 
accomplish the thing as an action of the mind, especially by imagining certain ideas as present 
even when they are not. This is the challenge. To rationally reflect on what it does include as a 
true idea is to understand its properties, of course, but if the affirmative definition of a thing 
includes its own action, then acting is what we must focus on in order to continue existing with 
the most power when adequately comprehending.60  
This is another reason why a theory of representation will not work to understand 
                                                 
59 Spinoza, TIE, paragraph 95: 257, emphasis added. 
60 I believe this kind of reading supports the work of Justin Clemens in his article “Spinoza's Ass,” Spinoza Now 
 (2011). The rational suspension of judgment is possible for Spinoza, but only with the understanding that this 
suspension is part of what we are adequately conceiving and rationally reflecting upon, and not only what we are 
perceiving. See the TEI paragraphs 27 and 28 for more support. 
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Spinoza's system. To “represent” a bodily affection in the form of an idea is not necessarily to 
truly comprehend all of what that idea involves, is, or could combine with other ideas to become. 
This will be a problem for the dominate North American interpretation of Spinoza by Michael 
For example, Della Rocca writes, “For Spinoza…by having a particular representational 
character, an idea is certain. [Spinoza’s] point is that that idea is certain by virtue of its 
representational features alone.”61 Yet, there can be a true idea in the form of an imagination, but 
not necessarily an adequate idea, for example.62 In other words, the object of every idea does not 
always have to be reduced to an affection of the body by definition. The object of our adequate 
ideas can be other adequate ideas that include the former idea and actions in conjunction with 
each other (as greater affects) in order to increase both one's motion and power, especially when 
one is reflecting solely on the methods used to understand. The object and action become the 
application of method in creating affirmative affects, and not only in knowing. 
By the end of the TEI, Spinoza is more concerned with our properly conceiving the 
nature and method to achieve affirmative, reflexive knowledge as an act of its own (as a force 
that will influence other ideas and enhance our power to exist). As we think adequately, we act in 
multiple ways with more power, due to the parallelism of the two attributes. The intellect is to 
“reproduce the interconnections of Nature” when conceiving singular essences or particular 
things, not merely represent them.63 To “reproduce” Nature because one is Nature is not to 
represent it, just as difference is not negation for Spinoza.64 It is an expression of Nature's order 
                                                 
61 Della Rocca, Spinoza, 132. This reading is directly correlated with the objective essence of an idea for the author. 
62 See E2Def4 and Letter 60 for more support here. “Between a true idea and an adequate idea I recognise no  
difference but this, that the word 'true' has regard only to the agreement of the idea with its object (ideatum), 
whereas the word 'adequate' has regard to the nature of the idea itself.” This is a crucial distinction for understanding 
Spinoza’s dynamic proto-physics of ideational force adequately. 
63 Spinoza, TIE, paragraph 95: 258. 
64 Spinoza, Ethics, 4p32s: 130: “For things which agree only in a negation, or in what they do not have, really agree 
in nothing.” There are infinite things that do not agree with each other. Therefore, the concept of what we do not 
have or agree with, such as is found in the concept of negation, cannot work logically as a part of Spinoza’s system. 
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in its own determinate way conceived as a modal modification of substance (a finite mode). 
In part, this is thinking with more power of force (reflexive knowledge), adequacy, and 
application. To think adequately is to think rationally. To think rationally is to think affirmatively 
and productively, but also while reflecting on one's affects more habitually. To think 
affirmatively produces more powerful chains of rational ideas and patterns of thought that affect 
us. The use of reason in increasing our understanding always produces something with more 
force or power if it is in conjunction with understanding the necessity of the laws of Nature of 
thought and extension. It is always something that is affirmative and includes an automatic and 
simultaneous increase in our ratio of motion and rest. Negation is something that does not 
increase our individual conatus for Spinoza. What we express is Nature in every way, but with 
more or lesser degrees of power. Therefore, you can understand how ideas are produced, 
although that is not enough; you need to actually put that understanding into greater use, or, by 
definition, you are not truly understanding the adequate notion you believe you are. 
 What is contrary to something contained within a definition is not capable of truly being 
a part of that definition for Spinoza because definitions are affirmative if we are conceiving them 
adequately. A definition that is otherwise always affirmative and generative cannot include any 
real negation. This is one use of the principle of non-contradiction Spinoza relies on. We 
increasingly comprehend that the more we understand about how these laws work, the more 
easily and creatively they can be put into action. To have adequate knowledge of particulars one 
must continually access reasoning capacities in ways that include consciously reflecting on laws 
of Nature. This means reflection not only on the content of particulars, but also on the actual 
adequate function in action and what it can produce. When consciously reflecting on what we are 
taking as the object of our ideas (for example, God, laws of Nature, or some external body or 
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event), we are accessing adequate ideas about the properties of things. We can be deceived in 
thinking we understand such laws if, for example, we simply sit in one place contemplating them 
and nothing more. The contemplation is an act of conscious reflection, but it is not an action of 
understanding applied to its fullest force and capacity. Each attribute “will be something that 
expresses God's nature in some way...”65 The determinateness of Nature is immanent. The 
attribute of thought does not express God (Nature) as a representation of extension. This 
deduction is another way to understand how God is the efficient cause of all things, as 
demonstrated in E1p16c2 for example. But for us, knowledge of God is the same as knowledge 
of natural phenomena. Spinoza also refers to God's (Nature's) existence, by definition, as a force 
that we will read more about in the last chapter next.66 The order and connection of things 
express the order and connection of the laws of Nature. How can God be conceived as the 
efficient cause of all things if those things are also conceived as laws of Nature in our series of 
adequate ideas? Because to think adequately with more force is to apply what one understands. 
To understand involves being continuously capable of reflecting on our affects in ways in which 
we can transform them through the application of adequate knowledge. As Eugene Marshall 
writes, “For animals such as human beings have a complexity and sophistication that allows for a 
peculiar type of affect, one that pans and pancreases likely lack, namely, the ability for one affect 
to take another affect as its object. In other words, the affectivity account explains how people 
can be self-aware in a way that pans and pancreases likely cannot be.”67 The deductions made so 
far will be given more support in the last section of this chapter next. 
The more adequate ideas a singular mind has, the more it is enhancing its own strength in 
understanding through understanding the functions of the laws of the attribute of thought, and the 
                                                 
65 Spinoza, Letter 36: 859. 
66 Ibid. Letter 36: 859. 
67 Marshall, The Spiritual Automaton, 131. 
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more power and force those ideas will reproduce. Hasana Sharp writes, “My mind serves as the 
adequate cause when it acts, that is, when the idea it produces follows more from its power and 
the ideas included in it than from external sources.”68 
 Motion is understood by thought as only applicable to the attribute of extension. Our 
awareness of this naturally increases our action and power in thought. In this context, for 
something to be in motion involves that which can be understood as a ratio in extension 
(between our levels of homeostasis and striving indefinitely). As that ratio increases or 
decreases in intensity, we can evaluate the power of what it is we are thinking and doing. That is, 
if increased, we have more power to adequately evaluate the magnitude and kind of an effects we 
experience and produce. To speak of qualitative effects is also to understand the causes and 
effects of our affects, especially on a singular level. In other words, to slow down in intensity is 
not a negation nor is it a decrease in some form of quantitative motion that can be directly 
measured; it is simply to be acting with less overall (combined) affective force in thought and 
action as a total ratio. Therefore, it involves the result of having less forceful effects. It is a 
degree of power along a continuum of animation that has less force than it could have had. To 
increase that force is to have an adequate understanding of the laws of Nature that are at work in 
the construction or pattern of ideas one is associating while evaluating one’s affects. To increase 
this force is an action. Thus, negation cannot be a cause, only an effect or expression of partial or 
fragmented knowledge and less force of power (as noted in 4p22s). The essence of God, or 
Nature, is to exist. Our essence (conatus) is also to strive to exist, but we are “in part a negation” 
because of our finiteness. A true negation of the definition of essence is a conceptual 
impossibility for Spinoza. That which is eternally self-caused and self-causing cannot negate 
itself in its own existence: “But this reason, or cause [of necessary existence], must either be 
                                                 
68 Sharp, Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization, 72. 
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contained in the nature of the thing, or be outside it.”69 For Spinoza, the cause and definition of 
substance is the fact that it exists: “Therefore, there is no cause, or reason, either in God or 
outside God which takes its existence away.”70 We can think adequately about God as the 
immanent cause of all things because we can think logically, and, for Spinoza, to think logically 
about a God (or continuously self-causing agent such as Nature) includes that it would be 
illogical to conceive of anything else outside of it and its nature.  
 At one point in the TEI, Spinoza writes that ideas are embedded in and depend on their 
context in the same way that the object of an idea is embedded within reality as a real thing (as 
expressions of the laws of thought).71 This distinction is critical. Although the real concept of 
what an idea is and can do is discussed in the KV, not to mention what a body is, both concepts 
were not fully developed in this work. The distinction mentioned is helpful nonetheless. On one 
hand, we can compare the objective essence and formal essence of ideas themselves, as was 
covered in the previous chapter. On the other hand, we can also keep the two topics separate and 
apply one (objective essence understood as mental action) to Natura Naturans (all of nature 
naturing in the active sense) and the other (the object of the idea which is not an action, but only 
the thing in question) as Natura Naturata (nature natured simply by being an expression). 
Although we can distinguish between these two different concepts logically, we can understand 
that all of nature is always both, and we can only truly comprehend Natura Naturata (our 
expressions of substance). Jeffrey Bernstein, in his essay “The Ethics of Spinoza's Physics,” 
describes it best when referencing Letter 6: 
At first glance, Spinoza seems to be making a sharp distinction between topics such as 
'movement and rest' (which express nature in-itself) and topics such as 'fluidity and 
solidity' (which only express our conventional ways of viewing nature). However, 
                                                 
69 Spinoza, Ethics, 1p11: 7. 
70 Ibid. 1p11: 7-8. 
71 Spinoza, TIE, 41: 242. We can also refer back to paragraph 25 for more support. 
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Spinoza does not (and, in fact, cannot) suggest that there is an ontological distinction 
between the former and latter kind of topic. This means that perception of nature ‘in 
itself’ is only modally distinct from our imaginations about nature. What Spinoza desires, 
therefore, is that we understand the involvement of movement/rest in fluidity/solidity. 
Simply put, we need to investigate the causes (Spinoza calls it the 'necessity') of 
movement/rest with respect to fluidity/solidity... And since there can be only one 
substance (E1p14cor1) from which modes cannot be distinct, it follows that 
substance/nature...is its modal expressions.72 
 
We can also reference a footnote on this topic by Sam Shirley in his translation of Letter 40 when 
he writes that, for Spinoza, like Descartes, the “objective reality of a representation cannot be 
explained by an infinite series of causes, although just such a series does explain its formal 
reality.”73 Just as when we understand that something is a part of Nature and, therefore, within 
the context of what is influenced by it, the same can be said of ideas. Not only are those ideas 
one is contemplating the result of the ideas that have come before them in kind in a causal series, 
but they also have the power and force as mental actions to create new ideas not observed or 
understood before through a variety of associations. This next statement by Spinoza about 
method from the TEI is telling in this respect: 
Again, method must necessarily be discourse about reasoning or intellection. That is, 
method is not reasoning itself which leads to the understanding of the causes of things, 
and far less is it the understanding of the causes of things. It is the understanding of what 
is a true idea, distinguishing it from other kinds of perception and examining its nature... 
so that we may thereby come to know our power of understanding and may so train the 
mind that it will understand according to that standard all that needs to be understood, 
laying down definite rules as aids, and also ensuring that the mind does not waste its 
energy.74 
 
 Spinoza believes the mind's ideas are a kind of energy as force, a power that combines 
with our affections to create diverse affects. It is the affects that move us and not just ideas or 
external bodies. In fact, as we’ve seen, certain affects can even overpower all of our other 
                                                 
72 Bernstein, “The Ethics of Spinoza's Physics,” p. 8. Bernstein also suggests that one can find a consistency 
between Spinoza's earlier work in the KV with the later Ethics regarding the nature of ratios of motion and rest and 
the affects. 
73 Spinoza, Letter 40: 865, footnote 144.   
74 Spinoza, TIE, 241, emphasis added. 
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desires.75 This is how Spinoza uses and translates the Latin term vis as well, as an expression of 
force. This force is not defined as motion, for motion and rest are what the body does in 
extension. It is a force or tendency in the ways in which we apply our ideas and experience our 
affects. Recall, the object of the idea as a mental action is its formal essence, but the idea itself 
(if adequate and certain) has its own objective essence, and we must attend to that aspect of what 
it is to think dynamically in order to discover the true causes of the object of our ideas. A theory 
of representation needs to address this distinction in this way.  
The goal is to compare ideas as actions of force and degrees of power. This aspect of 
Spinoza's epistemological physics hinges on the direct, non-representational parallelism between 
the attributes.76 When we discover the adequate cause of something, our power to act is 
increased. As Dan Selcer writes, “Spinozan textual materialism involves reconfiguring matter 
itself as power and the notions of 'idea' and 'body' in terms of movement and its capacity to 
produce effects.”77 This type of dynamic materialism conceives matter as “productive power,” 
while bodies can be understood as “complex patterns of movement as well as equally complex 
and constantly mutating articulations of a power or force to act and to exist.”78 The ideas we 
have now are about force or power that are a part of an adequate series of ideas that we are 
certain of after we learn how ideas can have increasing force (i.e. how the laws of Nature work). 
This sense of after is not a temporal one because of the definition of common notions as 
infinitely affirming the existence of substance. The force of an adequate idea includes its 
deductive certainty, and its capacity to also be an action that produces more clear and distinct 
                                                 
75 Spinoza, Ethics, 4p44s: 139. 
76 Spinoza, Letter 59: 911. Two years before his untimely death, Spinoza was asked for his “General Treatise on 
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77 Selcer, Philosophy and the Book, 175. 
78 Ibid. 176. 
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ideas. The more one understands what it is for ideas to be mental actions, the more one’s 
understanding is enhanced as a productive effect. Again, this is about acquiring a powerful 
method for the application of operational ideas. Spinoza writes: 
So a good method will be one which shows how the mind is to be directed according to 
the standard of a given true idea. Again, since the relation between two ideas is the same 
as the relation between the formal essences of those ideas, it follows that the reflexive 
knowledge of the idea of the most perfect Being will be more excellent than the reflexive 
knowledge of other ideas. That is, the most perfect method will be one which shows how 
the mind should be directed according to the standard of a given idea of the most perfect 
Being. From this one can readily understand how the mind, as it understands more 
things, at the same time acquires other tools which facilitate its further understanding.79 
 
To better understand means acquiring new tools for understanding. Notice the connection 
Spinoza draws between our ideas, the idea of the most perfect Being, and the most perfect 
method. “God, or Nature” can be the efficient and immanent cause of all things. This passage 
also brings up the intimate relation between Spinoza's epistemology and his ontology, a topic I 
address in more depth in Chapter Five next. Spinoza places emphasis on our need to pay 
attention to both, and his discussion of what definitions are, can do, and how they relate to the 
concept of a cause and existence involve both.80 For more support we can refer to Letters 34 and 
35. There we learn about the nature of definition as they relate to what God is, for example. 
Recall that definitions of each singular thing “includes nothing other than the simple nature of 
the thing defined,” which entails that absolutely no definition “involves or expresses a plurality, 
or a fixed number of individuals, since it involves and expresses only the nature of the thing as it 
is in itself.”81 
 God, or Nature, by “its own sufficiency or force” is the immanent and efficient cause for 
                                                 
79 Spinoza, TIE, paragraphs 38 & 39: 242. 
80 Spinoza, Letter 34: 854. 
81 Spinoza, Letter 34: 854. The footnote of this letter cites E1p8s2 which emphasizes the flexibility of the PSR. In 
Letter 35 Spinoza continues, “To come now to the point at issue, I assert that there can only be one Being whose 
Existence pertains to its own nature, namely, that Being which possesses in itself all perfections, and which I shall 
call God.” 
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all its expressions, for all its perfection, by necessity of its existence. For continued support we 
can briefly note Letter 58, already referenced in Chapter Three. There, Spinoza is discussing 
God's necessity, human free will as an illusion, laws of Nature, and the physics of force and 
power that are involved: 
A stone receives from the impulsion of an external cause a fixed quantity of motion 
whereby it will necessarily continue to move when the impulsion of the external cause 
has ceased. The stone's continuance in motion is constrained, not because it is necessary, 
but because it must be defined by the impulsion received from the external cause. What 
here applies to the stone must be understood of every individual thing, however complex 
its structure and various functions. For every single thing is necessarily determined by an 
external cause to exist and to act in a fixed and determinate way.82 
 
Therefore, the more a mind is capable of adequate knowing, including about processes of the 
imagination, the more perfectly it understands. Or rather, it expresses Nature's perfection more 
forcefully. But this is not merely an exercise in recognizing what we know or think we know. It 
is an exercise in increasing our power to know, that is, of our proportion of perspective, our 
power to affirm or deny (compare, contrast, and combine) concepts between types of ideas and 
their logical limits.83 It includes our power of discerning between continuously changing ideas so 
to increase our power of comprehension. Increasing our conatus strengthens our adequate 
patterns of knowing leading to an increase in our rational actions. Not only is it the case that “the 
more the mind understands of Nature, the better it understands itself,” but it is also an encounter 
which increases and decreases the power of our mind as an experience that coincides with the 
actions of our body and bodily joy. In other words, we have more joyous and powerful affects. 
Therefore, understanding Nature and natural phenomena includes understanding human 
perceiving and conceiving as they relate to dispositions and perspective. That is, the more the 
                                                 
82 Spinoza, Letter 58: 909. 
83 This insight is dedicated to anyone who has ever thought they had the absolutely correct perspective about an 
experience, only to discover with enough time, a softened ego, and genuine investigation into either the thing itself 
or the nature of how we obtain real knowledge, that they were wrong in their original (seemingly certain) 
deductions. This is the meaning of true courage for Spinoza. 
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mind “understands the order of Nature, the more easily it can restrain itself from useless 
pursuits.”84 Again, we witness a reference to mental energy, to a conservation of energy so not to 
waste it on useless pursuits. 
 It is not as much a matter of understanding the order and connection of the causes of all 
ideas, which is an impossibility, as it is about understanding and recognizing the power between 
different types of ideas and how that power increases when we affirm our existence as natural 
phenomena. The only way one can follow a train of thought in order to enhance one’s own power 
is by consciously reflecting on personal, subjective types of ideas in their relations and 
productive effects and in accordance with one’s ratios of motion and rest in extension. 
 Spinoza is interested in how we draw inferences from the ideas that both agree with their 
object and are adequately understood to the degree that one can discern between types of 
knowledge with more power. How we draw inferences is similar to the above example of a stone 
and its impulsion. He is strictly interested in how we draw inferences from ideas (composing the 
strength of the mind itself) understood as mental actions and not only as conceptual causation. If 
there were not a relation to another idea of which the ideas in question were not associated, what 
Spinoza calls interrelated with, then “we could make no inference regarding it.”85 That is, 
because the mind is ideas, we would not be aware of our own mind if we were not continuously 
drawing various kinds of inferences. This is the same deduction made in Letter 32 and it is 
telling. All of Nature is interrelated and thus, all ideas are also interrelated. With new adequate 
ideas, the method and tools of reflexive thought also increases in force and affirmation or 
inclination. Things that are interrelated in Nature will be capable of being understood, and the 
objective essence of our ideas will also have this order. What is important to pay attention to in 
                                                 
84 Spinoza, TIE, paragraph 40: 242. 
85 Ibid. paragraph 41: 242. 
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this letter is the comment about tools acquired “for further progress.” We need to be capable of 
recognizing not only the adequate ideas we are having, but how they can be used as tools! That 
is, “the order and connection of ideas is the order and connection of things.” As Spinoza writes, 
our affect of joy is related both to the mind and to the body simultaneously as one and the same 
thing expressed in two different determinate ways.86 
 When building on a more powerful method of conscious reflection we need the power of 
accurate recollection, an aspect of imaginative knowledge. Therefore, recall that in E3p11 we 
learned, “Whatever increases or diminishes, assists or checks the power of the activity of our 
body, the idea of said thing increases or diminishes, assists or checks the power of thought of our 
mind.”87 This is the nature of an affect and our appetites, as noted in E3p9s earlier. We are 
conscious of our striving, but reflection is about connections between ideas and consciousness of 
our striving (and not only about what words we know and use): “When this striving is related 
only to the mind, it is called will; but when it is related to the mind and body together, it is called 
appetite. This appetite, therefore, is nothing but the very essence of man, from whose nature 
there necessarily follow those things that promote his preservation.”88 Book 3 is the exact place 
in the Ethics where Spinoza defines desire as appetite together with the consciousness of the 
appetite, which creates an affect. If conatus, as desire, is an affect, then we are forced to pay 
much more attention to the nature of our affects and the relations of adequate chains of ideas 
that we are conscious of.  
 Of course, we cannot be aware of all the ideas we are actually associating at all times. 
Yet, we can strengthen the method we use to recognize the various types of ideas which bring us 
more joy, power, and conservation of energy. This method will simultaneously influence one's 
                                                 
86 Spinoza, Ethics, 3p11: 77. 
87 Ibid. 3p11: 76. 
88 Ibid. 3p11, 76. 
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thought processes with the same variation of either more or less power. In this way, conscious 
reflection becomes a type of physics of force. 
 Before moving to the last section about how a theory of representation cannot work to 
apply to Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology, we have to add to our understanding about the nature 
of what an “idea” is, such as found in E2P49s2 for example. In this very telling proposition and 
its demonstration, Spinoza makes clear that the “concept of extension” is not involved in the 
definition of what an idea is. This also coheres with 2p6d and elements of Letter 34.89 As we will 
read next, this is going to be a problem for Della Rocca’s interpretation. We can have an 
adequate idea about how the laws of extension work, but the object of that idea in its formal 
essence is another adequate idea about rational (logical) understanding. Even if all ideas are also 
categorized as modes, as it seems they are in 1p31, there are modes of thought that are 
determined in a certain way and modes of extension that are determined in their own ways, not to 
mention the three distinct categories of modes we learned about in the last chapter. Being aware 
of the objective essence of our ideas includes knowing what kind of knowledge one is relying on 
when thinking and how it can be used in efficient ways, which transform our affects to include 
more reflection on the formal essence of our conatus! 
 What an idea involves at its core is an affirmation or negation. Words are neither 
affirmations nor negations as well. That is how we can clearly understand how an idea in a finite 
mind can also be understood as eternal. All affirmative ideas logically connected are clear and 
distinct. This claim is a logical deduction related to Spinoza's initial definitions at the start of the 
Ethics. We are born with the ability to reason, but those ideas we can understand and use in a 
reflectively certain way are not immediately apparent until we synthesize them with more 
powerful knowledge. The logical argument is that adequate ideas are eternal affirmations of the 
                                                 
89 This will become important later in this chapter when examining the work of Michael Della Rocca. 
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properties of things (common notions), and eternal affirmations are always in existence as true.90 
Spinoza writes that those who view images or words as ideas “do not see that an idea, insofar as 
it is an idea, involves an affirmation or negation.”91 An image or word is not, in itself, either an 
affirmation or negation, but all ideas are. This is why those who claim that Spinoza's idea of 
“cause,” is identical to both what it is “to conceive” and what it is “to explain” something, 
cannot be logically possible. To conceive adequately is not necessarily to be capable of 
explaining what one knows, although the latter is, naturally, helpful, constructive, and potentially 
productive. Recall that words and images are part of imaginative knowledge. They are not 
classified as either affirmations or negations because imaginative ideas are always only partial 
knowledge, which is why we can use the same word in so many diverse ways of varying 
intensities depending on the context. As we read in E3p56, truth does not reside in our 
explanations, but in our adequate understanding and application. Explanations can be and are 
applications of knowledge, but Spinoza is interested in more than just our explaining things. In 
addition, also found in Letter 56, we learn that we can have clear, adequate ideas of something 
which, nevertheless, we can never imagine clearly - that is, we don’t form a clear mental image 
of in its entirety (such as all of Nature).92 Spinoza concludes this sentiment in Letter 37 years 
earlier. We cannot have a series (or many series) of causally connected adequate notions about all 
of Nature, but we can understand why this is so logically, that is, clearly and distinctly. This is a 
great example of the difference between expressing a common notion that, nonetheless, uses 
certain aspects of imaginative knowledge to do so (we need to be alive in order to be thinking), 
which is an idea that has no equivalent in the form of images. 
                                                 
90 This is also one reason why we can see some overlap with Nietzsche's philosophy, for example, and the eternal 
return. There are other overlaps as well, but I believe their systems differ more than they are alike. 
91 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p49s2: 64. 
92 Spinoza, Letter 56: 905. 
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Recall from the last chapter that Spinoza writes that words acquire their meaning from 
their use. The “nature of thought” does not involve the concept of extension. What thought is (as 
an attribute) must be in relation to types of knowledge, types of ideas, and what it is for God to 
be the immanent and efficient cause of all attributes (in relation to the concept that God is a 
thinking thing). An idea understood to exist as a mode of brain activity, for example, “consists 
neither in the image of anything, nor in words,” as corporeal motions do not involve “the concept 
of thought.”93 Recall, as Letter 50 makes clearer, that to think of the concept “one” must include 
only the affirmative concept of existence. To speak of human essence, therefore, is to speak of 
determinate modal expressions or modifications of modifications of substance that are 
affirmative. My conatus on an individual, imaginative level, for example, must include the 
concept of mode, but when I understand substance as one, only that substance's existence and 
expression as Nature is logically important. This is yet another reason why we might characterize 
Spinoza as a type of existentialist thinker. This level of understanding has more power to assist 
me in reaching a more homeostatic state and continue to thrive. Spinoza writes, “In the common 
round of life we have to follow what is probable, but in speculative thought we have to follow 
what is true.”94 This conclusion demonstrates yet again that probability (often conceived as 
imaginative knowledge) and reason (common notions) work together to increase our conatus.  
It seems Spinoza makes a distinction between thought in conjunction with a process and 
motion of the body as corporeal extension and “the concept of thought” that reasoning is both 
doing and is trying to understand (in action, in conceiving). The brain’s movements (as corporeal 
motions) are not the concept or content of thought, yet our affects include ideas we are having 
about the affections of our bodies. Attributal parallelism does not also include a strict identity 
                                                 
93 Spinoza, Letter 56: 905. This is going to be a real problem for Della Rocca’s reading. 
94 Ibid. Letter 56: 904. 
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between the attributes, even if, in the end, thought and extension are “one and the same thing.” 
Our adequate “concept of thought” involves only other ideas and the laws of the attribute of 
thought. Since we strive to exist by necessity, ideas that involve affirmation increase our conatus. 
Therefore, ideas about negation must be related only to other ideas about essence, as the concept 
of one organic whole involves only the adequate definition of affirmative existence in expression 
(modally).  
 When Spinoza discusses reflexive knowledge he is not only talking about ideas of ideas. 
He is also speaking about the activity of comprehending clear and distinct, true ideas that are 
intrinsically determined and doing so regularly as an efficient method. Intellectual activity 
involves a different kind of transformative force. There is activity when we think, and we have to 
find ways to accurately account for the development of novel combinations of ideas that have 
more impact and leave a larger trace or imprint of Nature. Activity, therefore, becomes an 
expression, and that expression, in turn, becomes more (or less) activity with more (or less) 
power and force depending on what other ideas are used in associations and reflective awareness. 
Part of this expression is what we affirm or deny about the ideas and affects we are reflecting on 
at any given time, and what we decide to keep in mind.95 As Spinoza writes and was referenced 
earlier in the thesis, “For an idea itself is nothing but a certain awareness.”96 Conscious 
awareness of (and reflexive knowledge on) what types of ideas one is relying on, in addition to 
their actual content, is crucial to Spinoza's epistemology in the TEI, TTP, Ethics, and the 
unfinished TP. In all of these works (and his correspondences) it can be demonstrated that, in 
order to think well, one must attain an adequate method for becoming increasingly (reflectively) 
                                                 
95 I would like to thank Kevin Daily for teaching me more about the importance of this dynamic. We do not have 
true free will according to Spinoza. What we have is the ability to connect ideas of one kind or another in ways in 
which knowledge can be expressed. For my part, I believe in both singular consciousness and free will. 
96 Spinoza, TIE, paragraph 77: 253. 
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aware of both the content and cause of their ideas, and also of how to categorize what type of 
idea they are relying on the most (imaginative, rational, or rationally intuitive) in order to affirm 
or deny that idea in its meaning and function with other ideas. Further, Spinoza writes that “the 
more intelligible a thing is, the more easily it is retained.” Retention is a part of imaginative 
knowledge. Therefore, as intelligibility increases in efficiency, rationality is used to strengthen 
those aspects of imaginative knowledge that benefit our capacity to reason with more force. 
Certain knowledge lasts longer and is easier to recall because it is stronger and present to us. It 
can be accessed readily or with habitual readiness. 
 
A Theory of Affects and the Non-Representational Way to Read Spinoza 
 
 Here's where things get intriguing! Memory and recollection are something wholly 
different for Spinoza. They are not identical processes. Memory is expressed as imaginative 
knowledge, and is “the sensation of impressions in the brain together with the thought of the 
determinate duration of the sensation.”97 Memory, in other words, is a combination of bodily 
sensations coupled with ideas about our duration and pleasure or pain, very similarly to an affect. 
Personal memory involves singular affect, and awareness of affects requires conscious reflection 
of both imaginative and rational ideas. Recollection, on the other hand, retains the memory of the 
original sensations on the brain that left impressions, but disregards the idea of a determinate 
duration because recollections involve only conscious awareness of ideas within the attribute of 
thought as common notions. Therefore, we can say that in Spinoza's earlier writings he made 
explicit the importance of recollection over mere memory, especially if one is remaining 
consciously aware of what it is to have adequate and intuitive ideas. The more we think 
adequately about true singular essences, the easier one recalls certain kinds of ideas (as 
                                                 
97 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p18: 46-47. 
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memories along with their involved affects). Spinoza writes, “...the more singular a thing is, the 
more easily it is retained.”98 We more readily retain both memories and recollections of the 
essence of a singular thing. It is clear, at least in the TEI, that once understood, we should 
concentrate on becoming increasingly aware of how to construct more adequate ideas, and how 
to recollect them as singularities more regularly. 
Recall what we understood in Chapter Two about weaker and stronger imaginings: when 
reason understands its own processes, it can combine its power with certain kinds of ideas of the 
imagination to create stronger impressions in order to strengthen itself. It is similar to the idea 
that when we understand the laws of Nature and then act rationally in order to benefit others, we 
are also aware of how much this benefits ourselves, as well. This is one reason why virtue can be 
included in the definition of reason. It is also why the mind works towards a principle of 
conservation in its methods and efficient use of various kinds of ideas as power and force. 
 Yet, this type of awareness and mental activity are not only about recollecting if one also 
has desires and daily needs. It is more about retention in the intellect due to a learned impression. 
The force of retention in consciousness increases significantly as the ideas that we are 
reflectively aware of become more intelligible. The more something is understood adequately, 
the more easily it becomes a part of our habits; that is, it becomes ready knowledge, in a similar 
way as conceptions of force in mathematical deductions or the physics of bodies when combined 
in one activity cooperatively. Spinoza writes, “When on reflection a person perceives the 
inadequacy, the emotion is immediately changed.”99 This level of awareness and the processes 
involved are Spinoza's proto-physics of force. As Eugene Marshall writes, “…if we become 
consciously aware of the fact that the mind is a causal mechanism governed by the laws of 
                                                 
98 Spinoza, TIE, paragraph 83: 255. 
99 Spinoza, Ethics, introduction: xi, emphasis added. 
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Nature, and if we actually understand this idea adequately, then it must be the case that this 
adequate knowledge has become an affect, increasing our power or moving us to act.”100 
 If reflection is needed to increase one's power, then debates about whether Spinoza is 
discussing human consciousness as direct awareness are diminished. Our concentration on our 
conscious awareness is absolutely necessary in order to increase our joy and power in thought 
and action. Hampshire continues, “Through systematic knowledge of the workings of the mind, 
matching systematic knowledge of physics, we can gain control of our sentiments and follow a 
consistent path towards tranquility and happiness.”101 This is also supported by what Spinoza 
writes in and after E2p13, as well as what Sam Shirley refers to as offering “a basic outline of 
Spinoza's physics.”102 
 How many multiple, internally determined states we can assume and compare, that is, 
how many sets of ideas we can rationally contrast and arrange, determines how one can increase 
their force of conatus and of motion simultaneously. By Book 5 of the Ethics, Spinoza writes that 
we should “...develop into a body that is capable of a great many activities and is related to a 
mind that is highly conscious of itself, of God, and of things, and in such a way that everything 
relating to its memory or imagination should be of scarcely any importance in comparison with 
its intellect...”103 Intellectual affects dominate the mind and are not “special kinds of ideas,” but 
are the very increase in our force of existing and joy. They are real, true ideas which express 
reality. True ideas must include an aspect of adequate understanding about how one's body is 
affected, but that does not imply that they are defined as representations of actions in extension.  
                                                 
100 Marshall, The Spiritual Automaton, 206. 
101 Spinoza, Ethics, introduction: xi. 
102 Spinoza, Letter 59: 911, footnote 213. I believe it is also supported by such authors as Anthony Uhlmann, where 
in his article titled “Spinoza, Ratiocination, and Art,” he writes that we feel meaning: “Ideas are not [strictly] 
identified with words or images; rather the idea is the very process of understanding... Might this mean we do not 
come to think or learn to think; that rather, insofar as we understand, we are already in thought? (265)” 
103 Spinoza, Ethics, 5p39: 178, emphasis added. 
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I have already mentioned above the problem of any reading of Spinoza which wholly 
collapses the idea of “cause” with the idea of “explanation” into one and the same thing. This 
collapsing of both processes/meanings into one is not a new problem in philosophy, but when 
Spinoza refers to “the order of Nature,” he is always intending Natura Naturata or substance 
modally expressed through thought and extension. Recall that in the very first definition of Book 
2 of the Ethics we learn that a “body” is one type of expression of substance, as a mode, and 
extension is another type of expression, as an attribute. As is so famously debated, in 2p7 we 
then read that “a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing, but 
expressed in two ways.”104 If a body, as a mode of expression, is not reducible to the definition 
of extension as an attribute, then we might want to read 2p7 as more about affects than about 
either modes or attributes. As we read in 2p5, modes can be understood as the effects of their 
respective attributes only. The meaning of the determinate expressions of the attributes as the 
same substance is different. 
 Michael Della Rocca, in his influential reading of Spinoza’s Ethics, draws together what 
he feels is the necessary and essential relation between three details: an ideational modal 
expression, God as cause, and the concepts of essence and existence. He does this through his 
reading of the principle of sufficient reason that allows for our ideas to be explained as 
representations of expressions of extension. He calls his thesis “mind-relativity of content.” For 
him, “each idea 'represents' [an] extended counterpart,” yet we need look no further than certain 
propositions in the Ethics regarding the affects in order to demonstrate how his interpretation, 
although fruitful in some respects, is inaccurate. For example, when Spinoza asks us to 
“imagine” a maxim that pertains to a rational good, but of which we must pair with an image of 
something that represents that maxim specific to us, one's understanding cannot be explained as 
                                                 
104 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p1D1, 2p7s: 31, 35 
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representing only the extended counterpart of each of these idea chains or combined affects. I 
will explain why next. 
 As already noted, we cannot imagine eternity, but we can reason about it conceptually, 
trying to understand its logical limits. “Finite” modes are not, in themselves classified as eternal, 
but they express, and are in relation to eternal attributes conceived through themselves. For 
Spinoza, words are always an element of imaginative knowledge so we must look past mere 
explanation to that of understanding and the feeling of meaning, as well as how meaning can 
create greater affects. Primarily, we have to consider what it is for the type of idea we are having 
to be either active or passive. In many respects, certain bodies of ideas in relation to each other 
have greater or lesser degrees of expression and power. As organically active, they lend 
themselves to our being an adequate cause of chains of ideas which are already true facts about 
the properties or essences of singular things. All judgments are ideas, as is made clear in 2p49, 
but there are elements left unclear.105 Do we express essence when thinking adequately or is this 
only possible when we have an adequate idea about essence? It seems both are possible, but the 
former is logically something very different than the later. For example, if individuals cannot 
adequately recognize errors in reasoning then they may also not know that their ideas are not 
adequate enough. So how do we strengthen reasoning? William Earle expresses this distinction 
well: 
The [ontological] argument states in some fashion that the existence of God or substance 
follows from his essence alone; to attempt then to give further grounds for the existence 
of God than those asserted by the argument would be to destroy that argument. The 
argument must stand or fall by itself... Briefly the argument states that there is an essence 
whose existence follows necessarily from that essence. That is all. It does not say: I have 
an idea of such an essence, and therefore God must exist as cause. Nor does it say: there 
are certain finite things, hence there must be a necessary being as cause. These are both 
variants of the cosmological argument, and although used by Spinoza, were considered 
by him to be a posteriori and of inferior certitude. ...an essence is not an idea, or a 
                                                 
105 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p49: 63. 
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psychological state of some sort. Spinoza distinguishes between the idea and the 
ideatum... The essence of house or of circle, therefore, neither is nor involves the notion 
of thought... The conclusion of all this is simply that essences are not ideas, although 
sometimes ideas are ideas of essences, the essences do not require that particular act of 
thought for their definition, and hence are structurally independent. ...An independent 
essence will be one which is conceived through itself and which is in itself... The 
discernment, therefore, of an essence which is thought through itself will be at the same 
time the discernment of that which exists through itself; defining the essence is precisely 
this act of discernment. ...Existence follows only from certain essences, those namely 
which express infinity, independence, and substance.106 
 
When we have adequate ideas proportionally more powerful than imaginative ones, we are 
expressing an independent substance that is infinite in those strivings. In other words, we are 
neither expressing representations of the attribute of extension when thinking adequately, nor 
expressing representations of God as cause. In thinking adequately we are expressing directly 
God’s (or Nature’s) power. It should be noted that even as the above description is helpful, 
Spinoza does away with the ontological status of ideas about ideas in E2p21s.107 This better 
clarifies how to read Spinoza accurately, should the mind affirm its existence according to 
greater or lesser degrees of power. This is also why a theory of human consciousness is required 
for accurately interpreting Spinoza’s epistemology as we read in Chapter Three. 
 We can rearrange not only our ideas, but also our affects using adequate common notions. 
To be an adequate cause in this way is not to be a proximate cause, as Spinoza writes in E4p2-4. 
Della Rocca argues that the expressions of the mind and body are absolutely identical, with the 
exception that all ideas of a finite, human mind must be called representational. It would be 
illogical to say that our ideas represent our mind, as they are our mind. It is not as problematic to 
say that they represent some parallel expression of our bodies, perhaps. In later works, Della 
                                                 
106 William Earle, “The Ontological Argument in Spinoza,” 549-551, 553. Etienne Balibar supports this kind of 
reading. For Balibar, every act is also a cause, which is the meaning of causa sui for him. The more we have 
adequate ideas, the stronger our desire to learn becomes, the more our existence is enhanced.  
107 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p21s: 48. “For the idea of the mind, that is, the idea of the idea, is nothing but the form of the  
idea insofar as this is considered as a mode of thinking without relation to the object.” 
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Rocca writes, “The most fundamental question in the philosophy of mind, for Spinoza, is this: 
What is it for a thought or idea to represent, to be about, a particular object? This is the crucial 
question because...all features of a mental state just are, or derive wholly from, its 
representational features. In this way, representation -and not, as Descartes would have it, 
consciousness- is the essence of the mental.”108 Yet, our ideas are our conscious awareness of our 
shifting affects so I have a problem with the way Della Rocca approaches Spinoza’s system. 
Readings from representation of this kind want to replace the idea of reflective 
consciousness with that of ideational representations of bodily actions, though I do not believe 
this type of replacement is possible for Spinoza. Della Rocca writes, “My interpretation takes 
Spinoza's claims at face value, as involving a representation relation between an idea on the one 
hand and its extended counterpart and the cause of that counterpart on the other hand, and as 
involving no duality of senses of representation.”109 He continues, “Again, I take Spinoza's talk 
of perceiving something...as talk about what the relevant ideas represent.”110 Yet, I would like to 
ask if ideas about other ideas are included in the above description? As already noted, in 
E4p37s2 we learn that there are times when we cannot fully restrain our emotions, but a greater 
affect can overpower more passive emotions. It is not clear how Della Rocca's interpretation 
might account for ideas about ideas that create transformative affects unless they are conceived 
as objects of their own. Some of our adequate ideas, for example, are about eternity, which is 
nothing other than another adequate idea that is taken as the object of the first idea. The object of 
that particular idea could be said to be what it is for an idea to be eternal. This is a key point for 
                                                 
108 Della Rocca, Spinoza, 89-90. In contrast, Hasana Sharp writes, “...Hegel is concerned above all with relationships 
of representation, while Spinoza examines relationships of composition [as well as decomposition, transformation,  
aggregation] among human and nonhuman forces (121).” 
109 Della Rocca, Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza, 46. To be fair, about a quarter of the way 
into this book Della Rocca writes, “I should note that my aim here is not to give a complete account of Spinoza's 
theory of adequate and inadequate ideas (53).” 
110 Ibid, 48. 
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Spinoza as early as E1p8, among other places, where he writes that confused knowledge occurs 
if one does not track the use of concepts distinguishing between the nature of substance's 
modifications (being a singular mode) and what it is to be an attribute conceived through itself. 
 Some parts of our bodies can communicate their motion to other bodies while the 
integrity of our whole body continues to operate according to its own ratios of motion and rest.111 
Affects are crucial to this process. Recall that to think of anything as an organic whole is to 
consider its thriving as a continuation of existence in an affirmative manner only, that is, as 
existing.112 One might ask, is representation a complete conceptual affirmation according to 
Spinoza’s logic and definition of existence? Can a representation of something else be a 
complete affirmation? No. But do we experience representation? Yes. 
The transformations we experience continually contribute to our overall conatus. There 
are times when we can think about certain kinds of ideas we are having and their content, and yet 
there are many other kinds of ideas relied on simultaneously that are not in our direct reflective 
focus – ideas that strengthen or weaken the types of knowledge being used by our awareness. As 
demonstrated in E2p9, the adequate idea of a singular thing is defined by its relation to other 
singular things or ideas, not only to one's affections. It is a definition that includes the necessary 
relations to many other singular things continuously, as well as continuous interactions with the 
organic whole that is substance.113 This organic interaction as substance is taken to a new level of 
description when considering what it is for something to have infinite attributes expressed in 
infinite ways, as clarified by Spinoza in Letter 66. There he writes, “I say that although each 
thing is expressed in infinite modes in the infinite intellect of God, the infinite ideas in which it is 
expressed cannot constitute one and the same mind of a particular thing, but an infinity of 
                                                 
111 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p24: 49. See the infamous Letter 32 for more support. 
112 Spinoza, Letter 32: 849: “Thus the blood would always have to be regarded as a whole, not a part.” 
113 See here Letter 50 where Spinoza confirms this. Letter 50 will be taken up at the beginning of the next chapter. 
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minds” (as he also makes clear in 1p10 and 2p7s).114 Notice that this is the problem of infinities 
later to be taken up in the field of mathematics and which I address, at least in part, in this thesis. 
 Della Rocca's brand of interpretation fits very nicely within current strands of 
physicalism and theory of mind movements that reduce all conscious experiences from or back 
to their “origins” in brain states.115 Della Rocca summarizes his interpretive conclusions about 
mind-body identity in Spinoza in the following way: 
Since all extensional properties must, for Spinoza, be neutral, I will investigate what 
kinds of properties Spinoza would regard as neutral. By eliciting these neutral properties, 
it will become evident that, for Spinoza, mind and body share all their neutral properties. 
From this fact, it follows that mind and body share all their extensional properties and are 
thus identical... The parallelism provides the basis for concluding that mind and body are 
identical.116 
 
This quasi-materialist approach also ignores some viable atomist strains of arguments in Spinoza 
scholarship, as well as theories of consciousness and affectivity. Della Rocca calls his reading of 
Spinoza representational parallelism, although also stating there is no duality between attributes 
noted above, which he states is “absolutely crucial” to his overall interpretation and that 
addresses current problems in the mind-body debate in philosophy.117 I partially agree with him 
when he states, “Spinoza's arguments represent a significant advance in our understanding of the 
traditional and still raging mind-body problem.”118 The difference is that brain states in his 
reading are conceived as wholly physical, giving rise to causal thoughts, whereas ideas are to be 
                                                 
114 Spinoza, Letter 66, trans. Shirley,  921.There is a lot of controversy with this letter in response to Letter 65. 
115 There is a lot of material on this debate over the past century. For one such current and lucid exposition in the 
debate, see the recorded dialogue on video at Northwestern University (2013) between Owen Flanagan and Evan 
Thompson. 
116 Della Rocca, Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza, 133. 
117 Della Rocca writes, “Further, and more important, certain current debates in the philosophy of mind show 
Spinoza's views to be as philosophically relevant as ever... One important aspect of current debate is whether or not 
the mental can be reduced to the physical. Reductionists claim that mental properties are necessarily coextensive 
with certain physical properties. The connections between the properties would hold by virtue of laws of nature... If 
such laws held, mental events could in principle be explained simply in terms of the occurrence of the physical 
properties of events and objects... A similar dynamic is at work in the raging debate over the nature of 
representation.” Yet, each attribute for Spinoza requires its own determinate type of causal explanation. One cannot 
represent the other. 
118 Della Rocca, Spinoza, 57. 
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understood pertaining to the attribute of thought as representations of these brain states and 
bodily affections. Della Rocca also interprets modes, against alternative readings by Ed Curley, 
Piet Steenbakkers, Gilles Deleuze, and many other Spinoza scholars, as “states of substance.”119 
Although some elements of his interpretation work, Della Rocca does not adequately address the 
very important metaphysical aspects of Spinoza's dynamic epistemology, nor do his initial 
assumptions cohere with more accurate readings of Spinoza's works already in circulation by 
prominent Early Modern scholars on the nature and importance of the affects. If you recall from 
earlier chapters, for an effect to “involve” its cause is for modes (modal modifications) to be a 
necessary logical consequence of that which has infinite attributes expressed in infinite ways. 
Modes are Spinoza’s answer to the infinity problem and affects provide the evidence. The 
problem of contingency does not fall into the problem of an infinite regress, a common critique 
of philosophers who work on the infinity problem. As reason does not recognize contingency for 
Spinoza, only necessity, an adequate and sufficient explanation for the contingency problem and 
infinity does not exist as a problem for Spinoza’s system in the typical ways often addressed by 
Western philosophers. 
The only neutral property mind and body share is that they are both expressions of 
                                                 
119 Della Rocca, Spinoza, 62. Della Rocca goes on to write that it is easy to understand how all modes are also 
“features or states of God.” Whereas they might be conceived as expressions of substance, I do not believe one can 
say modes are “features” of God. There are three types of modes, and finite modes cannot be described as features of 
a God as God is eternal, as Spinoza himself writes in footnote 7 to Chapter 1 of the KV. There, Spinoza notes, 
“Certainly not from God, for he has nothing imperfect or finite, etc.” Therefore, classifying finite modes as 
properties of God might run into logical problems of explanation. For Della Rocca, Ed Curley's interpretation on 
modes is particularly problematic. He writes, “For him [Curley], modes are merely causally dependent on God, they 
do not inhere in God, they are not states of God. And, while Spinoza does say that modes are in God, by this, for 
Curley, there are two different kinds of dependence: inherence and what might be called mere causation or 
dependence that is not inherence. The states of a thing would be conceived through the thing on which they depend, 
and Curley-esque modes as mere effects would be conceived through substance. The question I want to press here is 
this: in virtue of what are inherence and mere causation different kinds of conceptual dependence? What makes 
them distinct? ...One can see such a distinction as a violation of Spinoza's naturalism which is, as we saw, the thesis 
that everything in nature plays by the same rules (65, my emphasis).” But here I would ask Della Rocca to then 
address what is written by Iiro Kajanto in his essay “Spinoza's Latinity,” when he writes that the term “involvere” 
can be loosely translated as “to entail,” but “In Aquinas...the word still had its original meaning 'to envelop,' while in 
Spinoza it is a logical term, 'to have as a necessary consequence...' (Spinoza to the Letter, 50).” 
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substance with respective laws of Nature. It is clear that Della Rocca’s ultimate aim is to 
demonstrate the identity of the mind and the body in Spinoza, but we might ask how one’s 
personal affects, as part of both the essence of my singularly formed ideas and my extension 
together, are in any way neutral? Is any affect, which always involves ideas as either affirmations 
or negations, neutral? Della Rocca relies heavily on the much debated proposition E2p7 for 
support of his reading, particularly for his claim that our ideas are solely about their objects and 
nothing more. But which object and how many motions of the object in question? In other words, 
if understanding involves adequate knowledge about the operations of the things we encounter, 
one might wonder how far such knowledge can extend at any given moment. 
 But more problematically, perhaps, is not only that the mind and body can be understood 
as “one and the same thing” in certain deductive contexts, as Spinoza demonstrates, but that 
Della Rocca seems to include all possible (numerical) causes and effects in his mind-body 
parallelism across all contexts.120 As he understands it, each idea we have represents something 
else and, therefore, cannot be considered in-itself as a direct expression of substance, for it is 
only a representation of extension and ends in identity. To apply a concept of causality that only 
refers to the external world as part of its foundational structure will not be able to properly 
account for the dynamic status and force of ideational power as the essence of a singular thing.121 
 Della Rocca continues, “The thesis of parallelism simply states that there is a structural 
similarity between two separate explanatory or causal chains.”122 There may be an element of 
structural similarity in that the laws of thought parallel the laws of extension in corresponding 
actions or degrees of power. But what does this have to do with types of explanations when 
                                                 
120 Della Rocca, Spinoza, 18. 
121 This is Dan Selcer’s point when he concludes that Spinoza’s “dynamic epistemology” can be read as registers in 
ideational power, including a theory of singular affects (as required) in his work Philosophy and the Book. 
122 Della Rocca, Spinoza, 18. 
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Spinoza is clear that words are always an aspect of singular, partial knowledge? Della Rocca’s 
reading equates issues of linear (possibly temporal) causality with issues of semantics and 
identity. He also relies on 2p7 in a way in which there is “not stated or referred to in 2p7d any 
requirement that the idea of a cause itself causes the idea of the effect of that cause.”123 But this 
is exactly the opposite of Spinoza's point in Letter 66, as well as Letter 64, as it is often noted 
that our understanding of cause aids in our strengthening both reason and creativity.124 This 
means that the force of understanding, as an affect, is something different from the definition of a 
cause. Della Rocca’s reading also contradicts E1ax4, where Spinoza insists that knowledge of an 
effect involves knowledge of its cause.125  
In addition, an important relation to pay attention to here is found 1p33s, which may offer 
an alternate way to evaluate concepts about causality. There we read, “A thing is called necessary 
either by reason of its essence or by reason of its cause.”126 Therefore, one can interpret the 
necessity of the relation between cause and effect as adequate knowledge being an element of the 
essence of the laws of thought as an attribute, and not that the idea of an effect depends on the 
idea of a cause only. Spinoza does not “need to satisfy” this requirement as Della Rocca believes 
is necessary.127 As another example, E1p33s includes two allowable, separate ways to explain 
something, by its essence (my conatus) or by its cause (God as first cause for example), but each 
                                                 
123 Della Rocca, Spinoza, 22. 
124 In Charles Hartshorne’s “Creativity and the Deductive Logic of Causality” we read that “Entailment without 
equivalence is always a matter of dropping, in conclusion, some part of the logical strength, the information, 
contained in the premises. The one-way view of causal necessity is the limiting and most concrete case of this, with 
the description of the later situation, the outcome or effect, being the logically stronger premise and the antecedent 
situation or cause the logically weaker conclusion. Becoming is enrichment of reality, adding definiteness but not 
subtracting any (64).” We also read, “The cause-with-the-effect must be superior to the cause alone. Also, if causes 
do not annihilate themselves, effects with causes are the only effects there are…” 
125 Della Rocca does mention this issue again on page 22, but his concern is strictly whether this coheres with his 
version of representative parallelism only. But what would he do with E5p7? I will return to this proposition later. 
126 Spinoza, Ethics, 1p33: 22, emphasis added. 
127 Della Rocca, Representation, 23. Della Rocca writes that all of his claims in chapters 2 through 5 in this work 
depend on how he interprets only E1ax4! I believe he misinterprets 1ax4 so I did not proceed much further on this 
problem in all of his chapters. 
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one carries its own series of adequate ideas that either refer back to substance and its attributes or 
refer to the modifications of substance (my singular modal expressions). 
 Let's return to an even more fundamental distinction drawn by Della Rocca’s version of 
representation in Spinoza. His reading depends wholly on what he interprets as Spinoza's 
definition of a human mind. Recall that for Della Rocca, an “idea” in Spinoza is representative of 
the object it corresponds to (i.e., our body’s affections in extension): “A further important feature 
of parallelism is the fact that an idea represents the item with which it is parallel.”128 This is not 
entirely true for Spinoza, something I have noted both in the previous chapter and on the nature 
of affects in this chapter. Della Rocca admits that there can be both an identity between thought 
and extension and a parallelism in a certain sense, but that parallelism must be conceived in a 
way in which thought and extension have actions which are a one-to-one correspondence which 
renders the shared property neutral. Isn’t that another way to describe identity? Further, such a 
reading misses the crucial importance of Spinoza’s theory of an affect. An affect is, by definition, 
not related to definitions of parallelism. 
 As well, where does Della Rocca’s one-to-one version of (numerical) representation stop? 
I think this is why the lesson of Letter 50 continues to be so important. There, we learn that we 
can think about the same thing in two different ways. That is, the example used includes that 
there are either two numerically separate coins in our hand (a nickel and a dime) or there is 
simply money in our hand. Adequate ideas about objects in one’s hand can be either of two 
separate and different things or of the one thing that they both are. They can be conceived as 
                                                 
128 Della Rocca, Representation, 19. In the footnote to this statement is also written, “The representational nature of 
parallelism is also evident from the fact that, as we will see, in order to demonstrate 2p7, Spinoza uses 1ax4, an 
axiom that involves the notion of 'knowledge.'” Della Rocca seems to feel Spinoza is using traditional forms of the 
concept of representation as employed (and thus influenced) by Descartes, making reference to Descartes' Third 
Meditation and Second Replies. But Spinoza challenges or extends Descartes’ argument by altering the definition of 
immanence. 
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wholly different or as the same thing equally. In a way, the first type of idea, that we have two 
coins, is a part of imaginative knowledge, but the second kind of idea is much more adequately 
conceived. Also, recall that, for Spinoza, extension is indefinite by definition. It is indivisible, yet 
the attribute of thought does not carry the same logical type of necessity of indivisibility in the 
same way.129 Just as continuous motion(s) in its expression of ratios of motion and rest is what 
extension is, continuous alterations between the power of imaginative knowledge and of rational 
understanding is what a human mind is defined as. The key is to focus our attention on our 
affective knowledge, which becomes easier to do when experiencing joy because our power of 
thought is enhanced. 
 To be fair, in an early work Della Rocca writes, “In a similar way we can arrive at a series 
of ideas of ideas of ideas (and so on). What that relation between these various series of ideas is 
intended to be is also something I will not explore here.”130 Nonetheless, this specific avoidance 
is one key problem with his entire interpretation. The avoidance makes his deductions about 
parallelism even more problematic as well when he writes, “This may seem to be a misleading 
way to use the term, since parallelism seems to imply a duality of parallel things. But, as I will 
argue, the duality in Spinoza's parallelism is not one between distinct things but between distinct 
descriptions or ways of conceiving things.”131 Again, conceiving something adequately and 
describing it are not identical for Spinoza. Della Rocca conflates conceiving and description. 
                                                 
129 One of the problems in Spinoza scholarship is how something indefinite can then be said to also have a tendency? 
But for something to be in existence means, by necessity, that it strives to continue to exist for Spinoza. 
130 Della Rocca, Representation, 19. The issue of ideas about ideas cannot be ignored and is critical to adequately 
understanding Spinoza's dynamic epistemology. As Steve Nadler has also shown more recently in a 2012 article 
titled “Spinoza's Monism and the Reality of the Finite,” this element of Spinoza's system is crucial to interpret 
correctly from the outset. Nadler is concerned more specifically with what it is for a finite singular idea to 
adequately comprehend that which is infinite, for example, and how the two work together logically. 
131 Ibid., 19. As Della Rocca writes, his interpretation has its basis in a semantic distinction 
and not an ontological one. Yet, his conclusions reduce ideas themselves to mere representations of the attribute of 
extension, thereby making the attribute of extension more important ontologically than the attribute of thought if his 
reading is correct. 
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Although he insists that this is where he'll end up, he continually relies on the concept of 
causality and his version of the PSR in such a way that needs the two attributes to be both 
distinct in their description and one and the same thing by definition. At times, this is also where 
Spinoza takes us, it is not the logical route Della Rocca takes to reach his deductions. How does 
Della Rocca understand Spinoza’s meaning of being “conceived through something else”? He 
separates what it is to be a “mental individual” with what it is for an individual to be a composite 
of ideas expressing substance in its affirmation through reflective understanding and the 
experience of affects, ultimately eliminating the latter.132 But we cannot eliminate the latter. In 
addition, Spinoza has a unique version of what it is to be an “individual.” 
 As we've already seen, this kind of interpretation does not compare well with the lucidly 
written yet divergent readings of Spinoza, such as those of Warren Montag and C. Casarino more 
recently.133 In his later work titled Spinoza, when Della Rocca relies heavily on E2p49 to make 
his argument, we also witness an overlap with current theories of representation that find their 
place in many analytic circles in North America. Some of what is stated in this work contradicts, 
in part, what is concluded in his earlier work on representation in Spinoza. For example, Della 
Rocca writes, “2p49 is thus not only a crystallization of Spinoza's philosophy of mind and 
metaphysics, but it is also a crystallization of his multifaceted anti-Cartesianism.”134 As noted 
earlier, 2p49 states, “In the Mind, there is no volition, or affirmation and negation, except that 
                                                 
132 Della Rocca, Representation, 25. Earlier Della Rocca also writes that he does allow for possible asymmetry 
between the attributes and points to E2p13s for support, but does not take up this problem fully. The mind's degree 
of reality expressed is wholly determined by what series of adequate common notions about the thing in question 
one is clearly and distinctly having. Therefore, if one is thinking clearly about the attribute of extension, it is enough 
to logically deduce that at that moment both the attributes of thought and of extension are expressing, as one whole, 
the same degree of reality as one organic whole. If there is any real logical asymmetry, it is only, in my reading and 
according to 2p13s, because the first idea of the mind “is the body.” The first idea in our mind is not the mind itself, 
but that we have a body, that body has a brain, and that we are aware of our ideas. 
133 The entire anthology Spinoza Now could effectively be used as a way to advance alternative legitimate 
interpretations of Spinoza that are rigorous and directly challenge Della Rocca's influential interpretation. 
134 Della Rocca, Spinoza, 200. 
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which the idea involves insofar as it is an idea.”135 This proposition cannot be understood 
independent of other related propositions and definitions, and it is a very long, important, and 
complex proposition (of which many disputes have occurred). To be “about” an object is not 
necessarily to represent it in its totality or identity, as we can certainly think about an eternal, 
self-causing substance logically and yet, as Spinoza writes, we cannot fully grasp it in our mind 
(or we would become that thing in identity). For an idea to correspond to an object does not 
necessarily mean that the idea contains all of what that object is. That the first idea of my mind is 
of my body does not include, for example, that I am aware of absolutely all of what is occurring 
in my body.136 
When we know (and are aware) that we have knowledge of an object, this knowledge 
does not include confirmation of complete knowledge of the entire object. One might ask what 
part of the object(s) in question are being represented in the idea if Della Rocca’s reading is 
correct? Direct conscious awareness of our adequate ideas, and of their laws of construction and 
power, their method of revelation and action, is absolutely paramount to Spinoza's dynamic 
epistemology and our understanding of our epistemic autonomy.137Also, knowledge is infinite, 
but knowledge about the function of our finite bodies is not necessarily infinite (by definition of 
what it is to be a finite expression of substance at least). As Beth Lord correctly notes, 
“Whenever we gain true knowledge about the world, we gain more true knowledge of God. Only 
once we understand that basic relation can we begin to truly understand the nature of the body, 
the nature of experience and the knowledge available to us.”138 So to know Nature is to know 
                                                 
135 For more support of the discrepancies, one can refer to Della Rocca, “The Power of an Idea: Spinoza's Critique of 
Pure Will,” Nous, 37:2, (2003), 200-231. 
136 This is why Piet Steenbakkers has noted that infinity is not inside modes, but rather is conceived as that which 
can be found in the causal chains which create and are in relation to modal expressions of substance. 
137 This phrase is used by Charlie Huenemann's “Epistemic autonomy in Spinoza,” Interpreting Spinoza (2008). 
138 Beth Lord, Spinoza's Ethics, 48. 
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God and to know God and Nature is also to know the mind and body expressed in determinate 
ways at once (as affects). Gilles Deleuze writes, “In return, the finite is clearly limited and 
determined: limited in its nature by something else of the same nature; determined in its 
existence in such and such a place or at such and such a moment.” He continues, “The existing 
finite mode is limited in its essence and determined in its existence.”139  
For more support of a non-representational reading of Spinoza, we can turn to E2p11c 
where Spinoza is not discussing issues of representation, but human awareness and the immanent 
ontology of substance: “From this it follows that the human mind is a part of the infinite intellect 
of God. Therefore, when we say that the human mind perceives this or that, we are saying 
nothing but that God...insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind, has this or that 
idea...”140 Della Rocca takes up this issue and proposition specifically in his interpretation, but 
his reading includes that “...the human mind is just a certain (complex) idea that...is an idea God 
has. Thus, when Spinoza says that in this situation God 'also has the idea of another thing 
together with the human mind,' his point is that in this situation God has the idea that is the 
human mind, and that God also has another idea distinct from, and presumably not part of, the 
human mind.”141 Yet, anything that is expressed by our mind is a modal modification of 
substance, which has to be conceived and understood through the attribute of thought as both 
attribute and mode. 
 In my reading, we are passively perceiving and actively conceiving and continuously 
expressing substance all at once, but each of these activities can be described differently and 
need to be described differently because of their different logical series of deductions. My 
adequate idea of God conceived as a thinking thing is identical to adequately understanding the 
                                                 
139 Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988), 95. 
140 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p11c: 39. 
141 Della Rocca, Representation, 54. Della Rocca also relies on 2p24-25 on p.38 for more support. 
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laws of the attribute of thought, but that understanding, although wholly my own singular 
expression, is also a common notion. Common notions are the common properties of things of 
which an infinity of minds can adequately comprehend. In other words, against Della Rocca I 
would argue that we cannot apply one strict sense of causal linearity and semantic distinction to 
Spinoza’s God if the attribute of thought can be expressed in infinite ways. 
 Yes, the first idea the mind is aware of is that it exists as something real (a body with a 
brain), but this is, at least in part, still an element of singular imaginative knowledge (because it 
involves a human perception and sensation). Therefore, as Spinoza writes in Letter 64 to G. H. 
Schuller, to understand God as a cause of anything that involves the attribute of extension, and 
then to conceive of the mind as the idea of the body, is also to understand God as the cause “only 
insofar as he is considered under the attribute of extension.”142 In other words, to understand the 
cause of ideas we must go further and adequately conceive what it is for a singular mind to 
become an adequate cause of its own knowledge (mind), as well as what it is to have ideas about 
other ideas that have God as their cause among the separate attributes. Substance is not neutral, 
it’s active and it expresses itself in an infinity of ways. Spinoza gives evidence for these 
deductions in Letter 64, E2p13, as well as 2p10 and 3p7 (and most importantly in a reference to 
the scholium of 2p7). This is a very important reference because Della Rocca relies on 2p7 and 
2p13 to make some of his initial claims regarding his theory of representational parallelism. The 
reason Letter 64 is so important is because Della Rocca also uses 2p13 as absolute proof of 
Spinoza's parallelism. However, Spinoza is using this proposition as a way to talk only about the 
identity between substance and its attributes, something already noted in this thesis. Della Rocca 
writes, “In this passage, Spinoza is implicitly invoking parallelism...(The context, which depends 
heavily on 2p7, makes clear that Spinoza has in mind here the relations between parallel items.)” 
                                                 
142 Spinoza, Ethics, 2D1: 31. 
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He believes 2p13s points to “some kind of asymmetry between modes of thought and modes of 
extension,” yet he cites the identity between substance and its attributes as support. Perhaps we 
need only point to 4p8 where Spinoza, in discussing the importance of the power of our affects 
and our understanding of that power, is very clear that there is a real difference between things 
being really distinct and that which is “conceptually” distinct.143 If this difference exists in his 
system, and I believe it does, then Della Rocca cannot hold that real things are identical to the 
ways that we describe them conceptually using the rules of the PSR.  
 As Pierre Macherey has also noted, there is not a hierarchical structure between substance 
and attributes. Substance is not transcendent or prior to what the attributes are, that is, the 
attributes are not devoid of content.144 Adequately conceiving the affections of substance 
logically fall after one has already adequately understood the true nature of substance as per the 
very first proposition of the Ethics. Substance is conceived, therefore, prior to its effects. 
Substance is logically prior in nature to its affections because it must be conceived as their cause, 
as already noted. Furthermore, substance exists eternally, but all finite modes do not, at least not 
in the same way as substance is understood. Macherey writes, using Letter 9 as support, “...the 
attributes are essences, hence realities. Thus they are absolutely not names in themselves, that is, 
designations of substance by an intermediary, a means by which substance would decompose 
itself abstractly into a multiplicity of perspectives or appearances.”145 Things that are really 
distinct cannot be said to be one representing the other. 
                                                 
143 Spinoza, Ethics, 4p8: 121. In other words, human semantic distinctions in what we can conceive are not identical 
to real ontological distinctions. They are ways to express what we know. 
144 Macherey, Hegel or Spinoza, 108. Letter 9 is also proof of the identity between all attributes and substance, even 
while each attribute expresses substance in its own unique way. Substance is composed of infinite attributes 
expressing themselves in infinite ways. In The New Spinoza, Macherey writes, “...the independence of the attributes, 
which are nonetheless identical in the substance of which they constitute the essences, is only comprehensible from 
the fact that substance expresses itself not in one, two, or any number of attributes, but in their infinity, which 
forbids establishing among them a term-by-term relation, whatever its form (72).” 
145 Ibid. 93. 
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 If, as Beth Lord has written, Spinoza's God is “the activity of actualising its 
being...[which] is a power of actualising its essence, of activity 'unfolding' the modes that follow 
necessarily from its essence,” then, not only does this eliminate any real problem of inherence in 
substance between being and its attributes, modes, and activities (“whatever is, is in God,”), but 
it also becomes apparent that its causal nexus would be impossible to deduce in totality for 
anyone other than an all-powerful, eternal God.146 The discussion of “parts” interacting with one 
“whole” must logically shift to a more important distinction that emphasizes the activities and 
expressions of one, unified substance for this reason. That is, the correct arrangement of common 
notions about the essence of singular things must shift to a method of interpretation about 
expressive, active relations between types of knowledge and bodily capacities, and must include a 
conscious singular thing who knows what it is to understand more about the natural phenomena 
and the laws of Nature. Inherence, causation, and conception are, thus, not identical.147 
Spinoza repeatedly emphasizes the importance of paying close attention to the ordering of 
our ideas as an activity, that is, how we attempt to organize and associate all three kinds of ideas 
(imaginative, rational, and intuitive) into patterns of thought which are increasingly more logical, 
creative, enjoyable, or, at the least, more beneficial. These patterns of thought (or method) are the 
understanding of relations and force between all three kinds of knowledge.148 Adequate ideas are 
true in-themselves; and because we become aware that they are both true and adequately 
                                                 
146 Lord, Spinoza's Ethics, 35. The quote “whatever is, is in God” is from Spinoza's Ethics 1p15. For more on the 
problem of inherence in substance, one can turn to the anthology Spinoza on Monism edited by Philip Goff (2012). 
147 Yitzhak Melamed published an article in 2012 titled “Spinoza on Inherence, Causation, and Conception” where 
he argues against Della Rocca’s interpretation specifically. His interpretation differs from the conclusions of my 
thesis, but I support the continued effort of understanding that inherence in Spinoza is not identical to causation. 
148 Although Eugene Marshall’s most recent work on Spinoza can be used to support my reading of a theory of 
human consciousness and the importance of the affects found in Spinoza’s system to some degree, this is the one 
significant place where we disagree. My reading of Spinoza places much more emphasis on the constructive and 
necessary uses of imaginative knowledge in order to reason well with more force and creativity. Certain kinds of 
imaginative ideas strengthen reasoning capacities. As well, there are too few female Spinoza scholars left out of 
Marshall’s latest book whose work is crucial to understanding Spinoza correctly today. 
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conceived by us, they do not need to include a reference to their object in every instance in order 
to be understood. That they are “adequate” is enough to posit their certainty.149 
 Macherey’s interpretation can be relied on further to counter Della Rocca’s reading. 
Briefly stated, our point of view within the intellect is what we know of substance, as referenced 
in Letter 67, and our proportion of perspective directly involves our affects and reflective 
awareness: 
Here the fact that in his definition of attributes Spinoza uses the word 'perceive' 
(percipere) must be taken seriously: the intellect perceives the attributes as constituting 
the essence of substance...regarding the idea that is a 'concept of the mind,' Spinoza 
writes that 'I say concept rather than perception, because the word perception seems to 
indicate that the mind is acted on by the object. But concept seems to express an action of 
the mind.' This indication can be turned around and applied to the definition of the 
attributes: Spinoza does not say that they are what the intellect 'conceives' of substance, 
precisely because that would imply an activity of the intellect in relation to its 'object,' on 
which it would impose a modification, for example, by giving it form... The attribute is 
what the intellect 'perceives' of substance, because, in the relation established here, there 
is on the contrary a passivity of the intellect vis-a-vis substance, which it accepts as such, 
in the essences that constitute it, that is, in its attributes.150 
 
The above passage helps counter Della Rocca's mind-relativity of content thesis. The human 
mind is not wholly different from God's mind, that is, it cannot fully be explained as something 
separate from God's mind because we use the attribute of thought to explain such things (and all 
expressions of that attribute are through itself). It is only expressive of God's attribute of thought, 
conceived as a thinking thing, in its own determinate way. That is, we both perceive and 
conceive God according to our singular expression of ideas. This is why “the order and 
connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.” 
In the end, one could say they are one and the same thing in the same way that Spinoza 
concludes that thought and extension are also “one and the same thing.” That is, the above 
passage demonstrates how there is no real representational difference between God's mind and 
                                                 
149 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p21s: 48, as one good example prior to 2p49. 
150 Macherey, Hegel or Spinoza, 73. 
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the human mind once we adequately understand what it is to perceive substance through the 
attribute of human awareness and a God with that attribute (a God as a thinking thing).151 
Nonetheless, Della Rocca concludes, “...where representation in God's mind is concerned, 
Spinoza does quite clearly insist that the correspondence relation involves representation. So it 
should not surprise us that this relation involves representation on the level of the human mind as 
well.”152 Yet, “God” is never fully external to us, not in any real sense if we are expressing 
Nature at all times in some way. There is no relation of transcendence possible other than that we 
do not have infinite attributes and substance does. That is, Nature is never wholly external to us 
because we are Nature.153 The same can be said for God and the expression of the attributes of 
thought and extension. God is never wholly external to us because, in our expressions, we are 
God. Everything is God, or Nature. 
 Recall E2p13, a proposition that Della Rocca relies on repeatedly: “This indicates that for 
Spinoza the mind is united to the body simply because the mind is a representation of the 
body.”154 Isn’t this similar to saying a conscious mind is representing its brain processes? This is 
how the mind and body are united according to Della Rocca. Yet, as we have already read, the 
mind's adequate ideas are also expressions of God's power in a non-transcendent way. This 
proposition states that the object of the idea is a mode of extension. In other words, our body as 
the object of our ideas is conceived (understood) as a modification of the attribute of extension. 
This is not news, but Spinoza states that “the nature of thought...is quite removed from the 
concept of extension.”155 In light of Della Rocca's 1991 essay on causation, the focus is on the 
                                                 
151 Della Rocca, Representation, 69-70. 
152 Ibid., 50. 
153 We can locate more support here by referring back to E5p4-6 for example. 
154 Della Rocca, Spinoza Society, Rijnsburg, Netherlands, September 2009. Another problem is that Della Rocca 
ended this talk claiming Spinoza allows teleological ideas as part of his system, citing E1 App as support. I 
completely disagreed then and I still do today as well. Chapter Three of this thesis demonstrates otherwise. 
155 Spinoza, Ethics, trans. Curley,  2p13: 39-40. Della Rocca was clear in his Spinoza Society talk in 2009 that this is 
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problem of any form of numerical identity thesis and the attributes.156 Spinoza is clear in some 
aspects of E2p13 that what thought is is not to be found in any concept about extension (due to 
his parallelism) other than the concept of substance. Della Rocca modifies his position slightly in 
a later work titled Spinoza when he writes, “For Spinoza, as we've seen, no fact about thought 
depends on any fact about extension.”157 Yet, he continues to hold throughout his main 
conclusions that the two attributes are in relation to each other according to his thesis of 
representational parallelism and the mind-relativity of content. He does so by offering that the 
mind cannot know itself without the body. So we might ask, what happens to the mind’s 
expressions of adequate ideas after the body dies? Are they lost? If so, where were they before? 
 It is helpful to return to some of what Stuart Hampshire concludes about Spinoza's theory 
of human reflective awareness. What we actually are to reflect on in adequate thinking is the 
“order of causes” between our own ideas, and not the order of causes between us and God or all 
of Nature, as both of these latter types of order and causality are impossible to adequately 
conceive.158 There are multiple types of causes and conceptions of causality we could consider. 
Recall that knowledge proceeds “...neither from things to ideas nor from ideas to things, but it 
goes from idea to idea, that is to say it links acts of thought between them, according to a 
necessary causal order that is the same as the one in which things are linked in reality.”159 If so, a 
move to add the idea of knowledge as representation is not needed. Spinoza’s emphasis here is 
on “acts of thought” which occur between ideas. This is a helpful deduction to support my 
reading of his epistemology. 
                                                                                                                                                             
one of the propositions which he feels proves his thesis, particularly 2p13s. 
156 See “Causation and Spinoza's Claim of Identity,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 1991. 
157 Della Rocca, Spinoza, 54. 
158 Hampshire, Spinoza and Spinozism, 88. Spinoza writes in the KV that we are much more affected by our own 
internal ideas then we are by anything external to us. This is also why we need to conceived ourselves as the 
adequate cause of our ideas as well. 
159 Macherey, Hegel or Spinoza, 58 
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At one point in his work Della Rocca also writes, “Finite modes of extension are simply 
particular physical objects.”160 But, are all modes of extension “objects”? Why are modes of 
thought not considered objects of their own kind in reality? Does Della Rocca need modes of 
extension to be objects in order for our ideas to be representations of “objects?” 
 Spinoza’s theory of affectivity is how I will end this chapter and continue to support my 
counter-reading. As Spinoza writes in 3p1, where we determine the causal identity of any given 
“object” or action (including our interaction as a body with other bodies) is crucial to how we 
understand our affects.161 This is important because the deductive move Spinoza draws from this 
is, not only the identity of mind and body as both the same substance expressed in different 
ways, but also, “The result is that the order, or connection, of things is one, whether Nature is 
conceived under this attribute or that; hence the order of actions and passions of our body is, by 
nature, at one with the order of actions and passions of the mind.”162 This “oneness” is what an 
organic whole can be said to express in the form of an affect. Curiously, in a small footnote to the 
above proposition, Della Rocca writes that this description of finite modes of extension includes 
all physical events. So now we have finite expressions of the modes of extension as “facts,” as 
“objects,” and as “events.” Physical objects, in my reading, are conceived very differently from 
physical events, especially of an attribute that is indivisible by nature of its expression. A law of 
Nature is an event when it is being expressed. We need reflective thought to adequately 
understand what laws of Nature are, but part of that understanding will include that they can be 
conceived as involving that which is both externally universal or objective and subjectively 
                                                 
160 Della Rocca, Representation, 6. 
161 E3p1, in relation to the epistemological claims in 2p40s, states that the mind acts when having adequate ideas 
and is acted upon when having inadequate ideas. The action of the mind is described here very clearly; it is not due 
to brain states or anything related to modes of extension. The conception or definition of what it is for a mind to 
“act” includes what it is for God to act in that God is a thing that thinks. It is highly metaphysical in its 
epistemological relation, but it is also about singular affects. Spinoza goes directly to the statement that “the mind 
and the body are one and the same thing” deductively to finish this proposition as well. 
162 Spinoza, Ethics, 3p2s: 71, emphasis added. 
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durational or singular in their expressions. In other words, there is an identity on the level of that 
which is understood both internally and externally, but there is more than this when describing 
substance’s modal modifications. As Spinoza notes in 1p25c, all “particular things” in Nature are 
to be conceived as modes (modifications of substance), and modes need other concepts in order 
to truly be understood.163 
 We continue to learn that for Della Rocca “Finite modes of extension and infinite modes 
of extension differ in the way they are caused by or conceived through the attribute of 
extension.”164 For example, infinite, immediate modes are, well, always immediate. As an action 
of extension, the expression of extension is acting in-itself, both in the physical sense and in the 
sense of being defined as ratios of motion and rest. The actual definition differs from the many 
things that can be expressed in extension. When Della Rocca writes that for Spinoza “just as 
there are no conceptual or explanatory relations between mental facts and physical facts, there 
are no causal relations between the two realms,” he misses the explanatory relations between the 
two attributes, as is demonstrated by Spinoza’s theory of the affects.165 Affects are not “special 
kinds of ideas,” nor are they “emotions,” as Samuel Shirley has called them.166 Affects are a 
collective expression of one organic whole of both our thoughts and our actions working together 
to create effects of which we can reflect on, feel, and of which increase or decrease in power, joy, 
energy, and reasoning capacities.167 
 In a 2009 Spinoza Society lecture in Rijnsburg, Della Rocca drew attention to the 
                                                 
163 Spinoza, Ethics, 1p25c: 19. 
164 Della Rocca, Representation, 6. 
165 Ibid., 12. 
166 Spinoza, Ethics, trans. Samuel Shirley. 
167 I am reminded here of a sentiment expressed by Rabindranath Tagore when he writes, “Facts occupy endless 
time and space; but the truth comprehending them all has no dimension; it is One... The facts of the gramophone 
make us aware of the laws of sound, but the music gives us personal companionship.” 
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importance of E1p11d2 and 2p13s, and later 2p11 and 1ax2 and 4.168 The references to E2 and 
1ax4 were already noted above, but in this later lecture there is a specific appeal to 1p11d2 for 
more support of his theory of representation and the use of the PSR (as conceiving and as 
explanation). Yet, if there is any proposition that distinguishes between “concept” and “cause,” 
as 1p28 does for example, then Della Rocca is going to have a problem. It is clear Della Rocca 
felt his interpretation needed more support yet at that time. I believe 1p28 is an explicit reference 
to the very real difference between that which is an adequate cause and which is an adequate 
concept. One way to understand this is to understand simply that God, as an eternal cause, is not 
to be understood as a human concept, but human minds, as finite modes of expression of 
substance, have human reflections as well. To adequately conceive chains of causes and effects is 
to separate the understanding of what it is to conceive something adequately in comparison with 
what it is to adequately conceive a chain of causes while understanding causality itself as a 
process. One is a law of Nature that structurally never changes and the other is enveloped within 
itself in a problem of both self-reference and potential infinite regress. It is a productive 
repetition. In addition, the only way we can focus reflectively on the content of our ideas that 
may interact with things external to us is through our own ideas, and as our affects (which 
involve the ideas we decide to use/focus on). Consider what Charles Hartshorne writes in an 
essay on creativity and causality to support the difference:  
The mistakes of traditional reflections upon causality have been the arbitrary assumptions 
(a) that causal conditioning is symmetrical or bi-conditioning (events equally requiring 
their antecedent conditions and their respective results) and (b) that the way to understand 
effects is to consider what it means to be a cause. By (a) either creativity is wholly 
excluded (determinism) or else no strict cumulativeness is allowed (Mead). By (b) one is 
trying to understand causal deduction by asking how its conclusions imply its premises, 
thus taking the affirmation of the logical consequent as the primary deductive procedure! 
Not causes but effects are the premises, the logically stronger terms.169 
                                                 
168 This lecture has already been noted above in footnote 146. 
169 Hartshorne, “Creativity and the Deductive Logic of Causality,” 68. 
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My thesis has shown that Hartshorne’s reading is correct and can be applied to Spinoza. What we 
are to pay attention to are the effects we can create. 
Each finite mode is caused by another finite mode in order to produce its effect. 
Therefore, depending on what you are comparing, a mode can also be either a cause or an effect. 
If so, Della Rocca’s interpretation will run into further difficulties. When discussing substance as 
self-causing, modes are always modifications or effects. He writes, “Thus, there are two causal 
chains within the realm of extension: an infinite series of finite causes and a series of infinite 
causes beginning with the attribute of extension. Each finite mode of extension occupies a point 
at which these two series intersect.”170 Although Della Rocca immediately states that he will not 
participate in the debate about the nature of attributes and modes as “properties” of substance, 
while also stating he feels they very much are to be considered as “properties,” he has already 
staked his claim in the debate with some of the assumptions he relies on and the extensive 
analysis of Spinoza’s system he offers. 
In contrast, we have already understood modes as God's infinite power to exist, that is, as 
“ways,” configurations, expressions, constellations, modifications, arrangements and/or things. 
The “destruction” of one mode means only it becomes something else, expressed in a new way. 
Our perfection includes maintaining a rational identity in the continuous events of changing 
configurations of modal expressions and affects in their power. This is the intensity of one's 
actuality in the power to exist where patterns of rational thought and action can endure with 
increasing or decreasing in force. If, in Spinoza, as Della Rocca believes throughout his work, 
“...causal relations must correspond to conceptual connections,” and if there are “two causal 
chains within the realm of extension,” does this also mean that there are two causal chains within 
                                                 
170 Della Rocca, Representation, 7, emphasis added. 
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the attribute of thought at all times in order to maintain the thesis of parallelism?  
It is not that there is an infinite series of finite causes and, in addition, a series of infinite 
causes that are categorized as something other than finite causes. For Spinoza, it is rather that 
any and every mode of expression of substance is only what it is “in a certain and determinate 
way,” which alters what this determinate way is in effect. Spinoza often asks us not to think 
about things as modes, but as direct expressions of substance in their own determinate ways. But 
even more, is not an infinite series of all finite causes already inclusive of any series of infinite 
causes in any and all attributes? In other words, any adequate concept describing an infinite 
series of all finite causes is, in a way, the same thing as describing an infinite series of causes, 
because this would include the finite within such a description (doing the explaining by a finite 
person able to speak and write for example). The infinite is just that, eternal. The only thing that 
“causes” an infinite series of causes and effects perpetually are the laws of Nature themselves. 
The effect of that which is self-caused is just an infinite series of causes and effects in all 
directions expressed in infinite ways. 
Therefore, that the problem of finite modes only partially follows from God directly 
(perhaps as proximate causes) is not a logical problem at all. It is only a problem if you believe 
that modes must inhere in God in a way that is unrelated to or different from being conceived 
through the adequate concept of laws of Nature.171 Causes are not reducible to only concepts as 
                                                 
171 Della Rocca appeals to the thought experiment of what it would be for an attribute to “produce one finite mode,” 
but such a thought experiment does not prove what our logical options or lack-there-of would be. It is problematic to 
begin with the idea that we can rationally conceive (in a complete way) such a thought experiment at all. For 
Spinoza, all modes expressed by adequate thinking cause other modes of adequate thinking continuously by 
necessity. The correlate in extension is that everything is in motion. The mind does not have ideas, it is ideas, and 
although we can say that ideas are modes, they are not only modes. Common notions are, in the end, universal 
common properties of things of which we can all become aware of and express modally. Della Rocca appeals to 
E1p28 and some letters for his conclusion that a mode can be said to come directly from God if understood only “as 
part of a package of infinitely many other finite modes.” Number cannot enter into the equation as a concept of 
rational measurement here. I would agree that there are infinitely other finite modal expressions which are human 
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Della Rocca would hold, and, therefore, are not equivalent to the best possible explanation.172 If 
causality were reducible to concept construction alone, Spinoza would be easily classifiable as an 
Idealist, Relativist, or Rationalist. 
We are aware that we cannot possibly know about all causes and types of causes in 
Nature, and, therefore, we can recognize through reflection that our affects regulate the force of 
intensity of our ideas and actions. As Hampshire summarizes:  
I come to realize that all my knowledge of causes in the common order of Nature is to 
some degree fragmented and partial, and that I concentrate irrationally on only a few 
proximate causal factors. So a balance between the active and the passive in the mind 
characterizes my empirical knowledge...which Spinoza characterizes as the level of 
imagination. The laws of thought operating at this level are both the laws of logic and the 
laws of the association of ideas, one pressing against the other...173 
 
Return now to combine this reading with what we've already learned (because adequate 
repetition produces more conceptual force): “When on reflection a person perceives the 
inadequacy, the emotion is immediately changed.”174 Della Rocca's argument that Spinoza does 
not clearly account for our singular feelings being restricted to our bodies will no longer hold.175 
Recall that he interprets E2p11 to mean that ideas in the mind are “numerically identical” to 
ideas in God's mind and that all inadequate ideas are effects of other ideas “that are not part of 
the human mind” which is perceiving them.176 Yet, the inadequate ideas that I am perceiving are 
                                                                                                                                                             
minds and their ideas, and I agree that, because all modes are causally related, Spinoza system is deterministic by 
necessity, but measuring one finite mode is an experiment of abstraction in the imagination only.  
172 This would call into question Spinoza's multiple demonstrations in E2 that state that the order of our ideas is the 
order of causes in 2p9, 2p19, and 2p30. All that we are aware of which contain the power to change our ideas are 
other ideas and the experience of powerful affects, but we cannot possibly be consciously aware of all the causes of 
those many chains of ideas. Nancy Cartwright, in referencing the work of Bas van Fraassen again, writes, “...are not 
'inferences to causes after all merely inferences to the truth of propositions describing general characteristics of...the 
things the propositions are about' (8)?” And later, “Explanatory power is no guarantee of truth, unless van Fraassen's 
challenge can be met.” But perhaps Cartwright can, in a way, be seen as an ally for Della Rocca when she also 
writes that the laws of association (Hume for example) are also “insufficient to account for the facts about effective 
strategies. Causal laws are required as well (10).” 
173 Hampshire, Spinoza and Spinozism, 9, italics added. This was quoted in chapter two, but it bears repeating here. 
174 Spinoza, Ethics, introduction: xi, italics added. 
175 Della Rocca, Representation, 27. 
176 Ibid. 54. What is most important are the “necessary and sufficient conditions for...” aspect of the equation. 
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not numerically identical to ideas in God's mind and they are not caused only by ideas external to 
us, but are a part of our changes in singular affects. Another interpretation of 2p11 and 2p11c is 
required. A law of Nature is not only a concept (although it may be conceived as such in its own 
way as part of the attribute of thought and within certain parameters of what it is to think about 
both processes of reasoning and of explaining). 
 Della Rocca makes another claim that is particularly difficult to accept, namely, that all 
affects are “simply special kinds of ideas,” already noted above.177 An “affect” is defined by 
Spinoza in E2p22 as an idea coupled with its affection. It is a singular organic experience that 
combines both thought and extension into something comprehensible and felt, such as joy and 
sorrow. For Della Rocca, an affect is only an idea. Yet, he does note that there is a place where 
Spinoza makes it explicit that affects are not only ideas (in 1p31d and 2ax3, both very important 
to Spinoza's overall system), but then relies solely on elements of Book 5 in order to support his 
final conclusion that affects are only special kinds of ideas. In a 2008 publication he writes, 
“Affects are simply ideas considered insofar as they are passive, considered insofar as they are 
caused from outside a given mind… What’s worse, insofar as we have affects we ourselves are 
unintelligible and do not exist. Affects, for Spinoza, literally strip us of our existence… This 
charge is propelled by Spinoza’s PSR.”178 The claim that we do not fully exist insofar as we 
experience passive affects is highly problematic. Is this account about the representational nature 
of the affects sufficient if Spinoza notes in many places throughout E4 and 5 that affects work as 
                                                 
177 Della Rocca, Representation, 7. He also writes, “It is worth noting that Spinozistic ideas are particular 
psychological items. They are always states of some particular mind.” I might agree with these latter statements, 
especially as they apply to a theory of subjective consciousness that is possible in Spinoza. He continues, “Spinoza 
is concerned with my thought or idea that summer is nice as opposed to your thought that summer is nice.” This is 
true, but when both you and I are adequately conceiving the same common notion and combining in our actions 
while doing so, we are a stronger body as one organic whole and are now not understood as two separate individuals 
alone. Both singular organic unity as one’s affect and a combined organic unity between two minds or two bodies 
(or more) are possible in Spinoza’s system. Just as we read in 1p15s, two versions of the same concept are possible 
depending on whether we are understanding that idea in imagination or as a common notion. 
178 Della Rocca, “Rationalism run amok…,” 51, 52.  
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something other than only ideas? They are ideas in action, activity and energy itself. In the 2008 
article, Della Rocca also writes that the reason affects are representational is because the affect in 
question depends on a particular type of “relevant idea” as “prior to the affect,” and he intends 
this conclusion as something temporally prior.179 Affects are continuously shifting between our 
types of ideas and desires and they are also highly related to the singular imagination. 
Affects involve ideas, but they are not only ideas nor only special kinds of ideas. They 
combine with affections. They can also be conceived as effects. Della Rocca writes that, because 
affects are special kinds of ideas, “all finite modes of thoughts are ideas of one kind or 
another.”180 This is accurate. There are three types. While it is certainly true that the mind is 
nothing but ideas, it is not the case that this second conclusion can be applied to (or follows 
directly from) the nature of affects. The definition of affects includes that they are about one, 
unified experience of force(s) and motion(s), that is, they are not understood as one event in only 
the body or one idea in only the mind. A theory of representation is not possible between two 
things if those two things are considered, in the end, as one unified experience of its own kind 
with its own specific definition. Ideas cannot be understood as only representations because they 
do not arise solely on account of objects in the world (at least not only). As Spinoza writes in 
2p37, “That which is common to all things and is equally in the part as in the whole, does not 
constitute the essence of any one particular thing.”181 Therefore, adequate ideas alone do not 
compose my essence, conatus does; and my conatus is a continuously shifting force of ideational 
                                                 
179 Della Rocca, “Rationalism Run Amok…,” 33. In another work Della Rocca cites E5p3 and 5p4c as support that 
affects are only special types of ideas. 
180 Della Rocca, Representation, 7. Della Rocca cites Parkinson's interpretation of Spinoza's epistemology in 
Spinoza's Theory of Knowledge as supportive of his claims here, and, therefore, to be taken as the correct 
interpretation. He also cites Letter 72 as support, but this is problematic for reasons already stated in this chapter. 
Yes, ideas can be about things, have content, refer to their objects, etc., but they can also be about other ideas. 
181 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p37: 54. 
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power and ratios of motion and rest.182  
 There is yet another problem with the theory of representation and Spinoza. Della Rocca 
relies heavily on what he considers to be Spinoza's use of the PSR, writing, “Spinoza strongly 
adheres to the Principle of Sufficient Reason...” and later, “Spinoza accepts the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason and thus, for him, every fact must be explainable.”183 This is the explainability 
thesis already noted above. Yet, for something to be a fact about Nature does not automatically 
include, by necessity, that it can be completely explainable. If this were true, there might be 
nothing left to learn once important facts about Nature are all uncovered and fully explained. In 
2009, Della Rocca states that Spinoza relies on a “two-fold” use of the PSR claiming, “The PSR 
emerges clearly in Ethics 1p11d2...And in 1ax2...” as well as 1ax4.184 This conclusion is closely 
related to what he takes to be that which is explainable, with the only other option being that a 
thing is inexplicable (which he calls the “inexplicability argument”). If it is not explainable then 
it is deemed inexplicable and forgotten? The PSR must apply to the concept of “existence,” as 
well as to all ideas of reason, which therefore, according to some, must be explainable. As Jim 
Swindal notes in his work Action and Existence, “As Herbert Schnadelbach argues, even though 
all linguistic modes of representation link up with arguments, it does not follow that on what the 
argumentation either depends or is conditioned by must itself take the form of argumentation.”185 
In addition, in his work Spinoza, Della Rocca claims Spinoza is reliant on the PSR for the 
demonstration of the wholly independent nature of attributes.186 I have already noted in this 
chapter that the process of thinking through the absolute affirmation of the logical necessity 
                                                 
182 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p37, p38: 54. 
183 Della Roca, Representation, 31, 35. See also the essay “A Rationalist Manifesto: Spinoza and the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason,” Philosophical Topics (2003). 
184 Della Rocca, unpublished paper, Spinoza Society, Rijnsburg, September 2009. E1p11d2 reads Cujuscunque rei 
assignari debet causa, seu ratio,tam cur existit, quam cur non existit. E1ax2 reads Id, quod per aliud non potest 
concipi, per se concipi debet. E1ax4 reads Effectus cognitio a cognitione causae dependet, & eandem involvit. 
185 Jim Swindal, Action and Existence: A Case For Agent Causation (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 117. 
186 Della Rocca, Spinoza, 55. 
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involves that which exists. The “reason” for the cause of substance is itself (in its eternity), but 
the reasons for the increase in my singular power of existing becomes myself as the adequate 
cause of, and result of, understanding things with more rational and imaginative force. 
 For Spinoza, though, these are not the only two options. Although these statements are 
said conclusively, the PSR is mentioned very minimally throughout Della Rocca’s earliest work. 
The PSR in Spinoza is the “mind-relativity of content” thesis which then becomes a theory of 
representation in later work.187 It is impossible for any one individual to explain every fact of 
Nature when relying on, conceptually, the processes of cause and effect to do so. But Della 
Rocca's version of the PSR clearly uses an argument which stems first from effects (as “facts” 
about objective reality, as he puts it) and then going back to their causes, instead of concentrating 
on the property of Nature, which is the infinite production of effects of rational and imaginative 
power  vis-à-vis Spinoza's dynamic epistemology. Spinoza proceeds from causes to effects after 
we have understood how the three types of ideas work together to create affects. Because of his 
method, we can alter how we think about the causes of effects after those effects have happened 
and we can imagine them as present to aid in increasing our power and joy. This contributes to 
the striving of all of Nature. We can transform our affects. Necessity does not prevent novelty 
and creative new arrangements that express reality to stronger degrees of perfection and joy. 
Spinoza writes, “To have a true idea means only to know a thing perfectly, that is, in the best 
                                                 
187 Della Rocca, as a student of Early Modern scholars Don Garrett and Dan Garber, has also been influenced in his 
interpretation of Spinoza by these thinkers as well as Jonathan Bennett, even though he will point out where he 
disagrees with Bennett. In addition, Della Rocca sets himself up as countering Ed Curley's interpretation. Thus, it 
seems Della Rocca feels his reading and application of the PSR is the correct way to read Spinoza over all other 
major interpretations. For example he writes, “While I disagree with Curley about inherence, he is,  
believe, absolutely right that the in-relation just is causation or, more generally, conception (67).” Here and 
elsewhere we can see that Della Rocca's conception of the PSR is to collapse what it is for something to inhere in 
substance, and for that something to be causal, and thus for it to be completely conceptual and explainable: “For 
Spinoza, inherence must be intelligible and it is intelligible in terms of intelligibility itself.” I do not believe that 
these three elements (inherence, causality, and conceptual understanding) are identical or wholly reducible to each 
other, but they do involve one another. 
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way…”188 
 In the 2009 lecture, Della Rocca relied on Leibniz's Principle of the Identity of 
Indiscernibles (hereafter the PII) to support his interpretation, claiming that “the non-identity of 
two things must be explained by a qualitative difference between the things. No two things can 
be exactly alike.”189 Yet, I would note that Spinoza is clear about some very fundamental 
distinctions we need to keep track of as we read the Ethics: 1) there are times when the definition 
of substance and attributes can be used in the same way, 2) there are contexts when the definition 
of substance, attribute, and mode must be distinguished from each other, 3) there are no two 
substances which are identical (so the PII already appears in a certain form, for example, in the 
opening definitions and propositions of E1), and 4) the attribute of thought and extension, 
although both substance and (in that way) identical, are to be distinguished qualitatively in “a 
certain and determinate way,” as well. The way in which Della Rocca uses the PII will not work 
from the outset. Reading E1p10s, which says, “From these things, it is evident that although the 
two attributes may be conceived to be really distinct, we still cannot infer from that that they 
constitute two beings, or two different substances,” Della Rocca interprets conceiving two 
attributes as really distinct to mean “one may be conceived without the aid of the other.” 
The point is that each attribute does not cause anything in the other and, therefore, one 
cannot be said to “represent” the other. They are qualitatively different in that they each have 
their own series of causes and effects, yet Della Rocca has said, “The mind and body are 
indiscernible so they must be identical.”190 They are not indiscernible. If the idea of the effect 
depends upon the idea of its cause, then we need to adequately be capable of identifying which 
                                                 
188 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p43s: 58. 
189 Della Rocca, unpublished paper, Spinoza Society, Rijnsburg, September 2009. 
190 Jeffrey Bernstein, in his article “The Ethics of Spinoza's Physics,” notes that E3def3 and 3p2s help show how the 
mind and body are only modally distinct. 
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cause (and type of cause) one is associating with which effect. The mind and body are not 
identical – or affects would not be possible as Spinoza defines them. Together, thought and 
extension create affects we can reflect on, but we cannot possibly reflect on every single effect 
which occurs in our bodies or in our associations between ideas which run parallel. This is also 
why the nature of reflecting on our changing affects is so important. In 1p10s we learn that there 
is a very real difference between what one can conceive and what one can then infer from what 
one conceives, thereby drawing a real distinction between that which we can understand 
adequately and that which we can possibly explain well using language.  
 We need to reconsider what it is for something to be “conceived through itself.” The very 
definition of a modification of substance in E1p8 includes that we understand what it is for 
something to be “in another,” that is, “those things whose concept is formed from the concept of 
the thing in which they are.”191 The definition of a mode includes the definition of an attribute, 
but what an attribute expresses is something different in explanation from a mode (by logical 
necessity). The mind and the body are only modally distinct. Spinoza “could not accept a simple-
minded materialist conception of personality, having once recognized at first hand and in his own 
person the power of reflection and of active self-consciousness...”192  
When Della Rocca writes, “The main problem is this: the fact that all thoughts are 
conceived through thought does not show that thought is an attribute unless it also can be shown 
that thought, in turn, is not conceived through anything else. Unless this gap is filled, one is not 
entitled to conclude that thought is an attribute...,” he has contradicted what Spinoza has already 
asked us to do in E1p8.193 It is true that definitions are composed of words, but this is particularly 
                                                 
191 Spinoza, Ethics, 1p8: 4. Again, Letter 50 is helpful, as are those places where Spinoza both equates and 
differentiates between “substance” and “attribute.” 
192 Hampshire, introduction, xxxiii, my emphasis. 
193 Spinoza, Ethics, 1p8: 4 and Della Rocca, 15. Stuart Hampshire also writes, “In a person as a thinking subject, the 
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applicable to the definition of Substance, whose nature (essence) is that it exists (and not that it 
needs a definition or explanation to exist nor that it does not exist through anything else).  
It is very important to follow what is written in E1p10 and 1p11 here. Each attribute must 
be defined and understood as being conceived through itself because it is the nature of the 
attribute to exist as itself, and because its concept, therefore, does not involve the concept of 
anything else on which it relies. Critically, in 1p11 Spinoza writes, “But this reason, or cause, 
must either be contained in the nature of the thing, or be outside it.”194 There is a reference to the 
PSR, but it is only within the opening context of proving that substance (and thus its attributes) 
must be the cause of itself. In other words, the reason for its existence is itself and its nature is to 
exist. No other concept is logically needed. But, this deduction cannot be applied as an overall 
principle for the rest of the demonstrations in the Ethics. For example, it cannot be applied to the 
definition of modes. 
 The theory of representation applies a narrow version of the PSR to Spinoza's system, a 
version which Della Rocca believes is the only way the PSR can be understood and used. In an 
article titled “PSR” as recent as 2010 in Philosophers' Imprint, he starts by saying outright:  
And even when I am relentlessly pursuing this line of thought, as I am wont to do, a part 
of me really wants to stop because I know that this pursuit can win me few friends and 
allies. And where does this line of thought lead? Straight to the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason, the PSR, that forelorn principle according to which, for each thing (object, state 
of affairs, or whatever) that exists or obtains, there is an explanation of its existence, there 
is a reason that it exists.195  
 
An interesting aspect of Della Rocca's reading of the PSR is a confession in the footnote to this 
opening statement: “Alternatively, if we focus on truths instead of things or states of affairs, we 
                                                                                                                                                             
levels of complexity are levels of reflexiveness, of thoughts about thoughts.” 
194 Spinoza, Ethics, 1p8, p9, p10:  4-7. 
195 Della Rocca, “PSR,” Philosophers' Imprint, 2010, 2. 
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might say that, for each truth, there is an explanation of its truth.”196 I feel this second statement 
of what the PSR “really” means is telling. In fact, it alters the very way in which one might read 
zesSpinoza. Recall that earlier Della Rocca admitted that our ideas create singular, psychological 
“states” of mind and that affects are only “special” kinds of ideas. There can be an explanation 
for every truth, but the truth of common notions as rational conceptions and adequate knowledge 
is not reducible to their explanations (words) in order to be true. Della Rocca emphasizes a focus 
on “truths” and “facts,” but what is and is not a “fact” can alter if, for example, more information 
is uncovered at another time. 
 It is one thing to feel the PSR is in need of a revival, which I tend to agree with for 
different reasons than what Della Rocca gives, but he is concerned that many philosophers today 
presuppose or “operate under the assumption” that the PSR is false. I feel any decent philosopher 
will examine and use the many versions of the PSR and principle of non-contradiction (Leibniz 
certainly did). Della Rocca appeals to Leibniz's example about Archimedes for support in 
particular. Archimedes, realizing that two equal weights hanging on each side of a scale are not 
necessarily at rest, must, nonetheless, reject this possibility as a rational explanation because it is 
virtually impossible to prove why the whole apparatus is actually not fully at rest. I feel this line 
of reasoning is a poor way to draw our attention to Spinoza's system. For example, it’s clear in 
E2p43s and 2p49s that when we have a true idea we simply “know a thing perfectly, or in the 
best way,” and this “best way” includes being able to suspend judgment when we are aware that 
there may be more to know about the thing in question. In this way, the “act of understanding” 
itself is a rational affirmation (an adequate idea with force), and it can be experienced as an 
affect, an intellectual affect.197 Spinoza makes this clear throughout E4, but 4p52 and 4p56 
                                                 
196 Della Rocca, “PSR,” 2. 
197 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p43s, p49s: 58, 64, 66. 
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demonstrate this well.198 Therefore, we can adequately conceive (as an act of understanding) that 
we do not have to pass judgment and, therefore, give an explanation for what we think we know 
at all times. In other words, knowing how to defer such judgments and explanations is also 
adequate knowledge. This ability to rationally defer explaining what one is learning about or 
knows is critical because it adds a third possibility to the two mentioned above by Della Rocca. 
He writes, “...the PSR is simply the rejection of inexplicability in general.”199 If this is what the 
PSR is, then it is not applicable to Spinoza’s system as his main tool. Spinoza simply writes that 
he will rationally suspend judgment (and explanation) until he can understand more, and that it is 
necessary and sufficient to do so. This deduction is also the acceptance of rational inexplicability, 
even if we also know that every effect has and involves a cause. For example, I am rationally 
aware, because of my ability to reflect on what I am thinking about and feeling or being affected 
by, that my imaginative ideas are only (ever) partial explanations, yet cannot escape them 
entirely. As we read in Chapter 2, I can access them to aid reason nonetheless, and too many 
imaginative ideas can lessen my power to think at any time should they become proportionally 
stronger in my awareness. 
 I think we can consider another kind of explanation or example to make this more clear. 
When Spinoza describes what it is to know something that is based on an interaction with other 
bodies and ideas, his example in Chapter One of the TTP is very helpful. He writes that when we 
hear (hearing being a perception/sensation) someone say “I understand,” we know that it is a 
person's mind (and not necessarily their body) that is doing the understanding. He writes that we 
use ourselves (as a singular subject with conscious reflection) as a comparison between ideas to 
draw this conclusion: “...the hearer knows what it is to understand, that he readily grasps the 
                                                 
198 Spinoza, Ethics, 4p54, p56: 143, 144. We read that perceiving our power of acting is perceiving our power of 
understanding. 
199 Della Rocca, “PSR,” 2. 
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speaker's meaning through comparison with himself.”200 Comparing ideas between ourselves and 
others is often the nature of human dialogue, but these ideas of comparison are filtered through 
many series of my own, singular ideas and their proportions. 
 Della Rocca is effectively claiming that ideas, as “representations,” arise from the brain 
states (therefore are always mediated in some way) and are less real in their singularity then their 
physical counterpart.201 If you are not yet convinced, consider his statement (which involves the 
topic the nature of consciousness) that rationalists tend to avoid the inexplicability argument 
mentioned above: “This concern to avoid inexplicability is, I would argue, the core motivation 
behind most forms of physicalism and functionalism in the philosophy of mind.”202 Yes, 
understandably at times, this is the primary concern of physicalism and philosophy of mind, but 
that does not include (by necessity) that such an avoidance entails that the PSR is true based on 
the inexplicability problem. 
Yet, this is not the same as what Della Rocca then writes at the end of his essay in 2010, 
which is, actually the real philosophical issue. He notes that many “leave untouched the central 
philosophical issue here: viz., determining whether there is a principled line between [types of] 
explicability arguments, and if so, what it is. And, again, if there is no such line, then the 
argument for the PSR that I have offered may not be able to be avoided.”203 I am offering an 
                                                 
200 Spinoza, TTP, 1. 
201 “My uncovering of these implications in Spinoza is not meant as an argument either for or against the radical-
independence view. My goal is to show how this view is employed by a master system builder such as Spinoza. To 
attempt a final evaluation of the radical independence view would require something that...I do not have, namely, a 
solution to those problems about representation and the relation between the mind and body that this work hopes to 
illuminate (17).” This is what Della Rocca calls “the numerical identity interpretation” in his earlier 1991 essay, that 
is, whether the mind and body are independent from or identical to each other. He writes, “The numerical identity 
interpretation can avoid these inconsistencies [posed by Delahunty and Bennett] if it can be shown that Spinoza 
holds a certain thesis about causation.” 
202 Della Rocca, “PSR,” 4. The author relates these views to his views on causality, and, as we know, Spinoza has 
several forms of causation that he employs in the Ethics, but more importantly, an affect, as an organic, forceful and 
moving experience, cannot be directly measured. 
203 Ibid., 10. Della Rocca does not take states of mind (which he defines affects to include as well) or objects as 
important as what he names as “truths,” even while having previously spent a great deal of time explaining his 
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epistemological line for discussion in this chapter. Unless one is to claim that there is only a first 
cause and nothing more, each effect can also be named as the cause of the next effect, and that 
next effect becomes the cause of the one after that ad infinitum. In other words, new kinds of 
explanations are needed if one decides to explain this new series of causes that are based on 
previous effects, and not only for the first cause of all effects. This is yet another reason why 
naming a cause and an effect as such requires a different conceptual model from understanding 
the process of causality itself according to the traditional sense of the PSR only.  
Gilles Deleuze might have an answer for us. As he writes in his essay “Spinoza and the 
Three 'Ethics,'” Spinoza is more interested in the logical understanding of “forms of expressions” 
(three types of knowledge in their power) than he is their actual shifting content, as the latter is 
open ended and alters according to context.204 We are continually shifting ratios of motion and 
rest with ideas of three kinds, and placed together are our awareness of our ideas and the 
sensations (though not only sensations but much of what occurs in our body is unknown to direct 
awareness). 
For Deleuze, Spinoza's system can be read in a non-representational way in which signs 
are “always an effect,” and effects are traces left on/inside/related to bodies. Strong affects leave 
those trace impressions as they alter and form the next singular affect or collective body of 
action. These effects as affections are states of duration that cannot be directly compared (as 
discrete facts, for example) because they are continuous. Space and time are, ultimately, 
elements of imaginative knowledge for Spinoza. Deleuze writes, “...each state of affection 
                                                                                                                                                             
mind-relativity thesis in his work on representation and the mind-body problem. Here he concludes, “Alternatively, 
to insist that there be an explanation of the truth of each truth is simply to insist on the PSR itself. I will not continue 
to give the alternative formulations in terms of truth.” But he does continue to discuss forms of truth later in this 
essay when he writes, “Similarly, if we focus on truths instead of things or states of affairs...” etc. 
204 Deleuze, essays critical and clinical, 138. 
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determines a passage to a 'more' or a 'less'...”205 That is, each passage as affect determines how 
much power we have, but this process is continuous and organic in either direction. That our 
ideas about our affections are “confused,” at least in part, is not a problem when considering the 
nature of the power of affects. Deleuze categorizes the three types of knowledge into affects, 
concepts, and knowledge/experience of essences. I believe I have already demonstrated where in 
the Ethics Spinoza combines the first two types of ideas and calls that combination its own kind 
of affect, an immensely enjoyable kind. Therefore, the second kind of knowledge cannot be 
categorized as only concepts. But by categorizing the three types of knowledge the way he does, 
Deleuze is better able to discuss the signs of continuous affects, and from there he concludes that 
we can be affected by both joy and sadness at the same time.206 How would a theory of 
representation account for such an affect?  
For more support, we can note that Spinoza writes that we can use reason to alter the 
combination of images and imaginative concepts we focus on when we imagine a former 
experience which was noble or courageous and couple it with an image about a maxim of what it 
is to be noble. But while doing so we are also accessing the adequate knowledge of what it is to 
re-arrange ideas of the imaginative sort. We are applying, that is, the laws of thought. This 
experience we are creating for ourselves brings a sense of real joy. In our experience of joy there 
is a passage from lesser to greater effects in this instant, but as soon as that emotion and affect 
are altered, there is no longer any sadness. Or, at the least, the sad passion is weaker than the 
adequate idea about it. I believe E4p11 and 5p4-10 are significant examples for support of this 
                                                 
205 Deleuze, essays critical and clinical… 138-139. 
206 Ibid. 140. Why? Because various types of signs “are Abstractions that fix a relative constant for variable chains 
of association.” Certain types of affects (vectorial signs) “enter into variable associations as much as do affections: 
what is growth for one part of the body can be a diminution for another part, what is servitude for one part is power 
for another...” 
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reading.207 The law at work, that is, is the law of force and strength. Adequate ideas about the 
cause of our affects (as ourselves or as externally determined) immediately alters that affect into 
something more efficient, enjoyable, and producing more adequate knowledge. Our sad passions 
can take over, but not if we are understanding what caused them and how to alter their effects. 
 What is most important to take away from Deleuze's reading in contrast to Della Rocca’s 
interpretation of the PSR is that signs “do not have objects as their direct referents.”208 Similarly 
to what Bernstein has written (which was noted above about the ethics of Spinoza's physics), 
affects are “variations of power,” they are signs of effects. Deleuze writes that Spinoza 
categorizes causality into two types of series, a type of reflection between bodies that affect each 
other (variations and combinations or decompositions of motions), and a type of absorption 
when we experience a singular affect that includes both the effects between bodies and our own 
ideas about our affections as a result. Both processes are occurring at once. Objects can be 
causes, and ideas can be causes, but effects can be their own type of cause by definition, and 
affects yet another type of cause. Deleuze’s conclusions show why and how Della Rocca's use of 
the PSR does not work in the way he applies it to Spinoza's system: 
In effect, the structure is geometrical and consists of solid lines, but they are constantly 
being formed and deformed, acting as cause. What constitutes the structure is a composite 
relation of movement and rest, of speed and slowness, which is established between the 
infinitely small parts of a transparent body...there is in each body an infinity of relations 
that are composed and decomposed... Modes are geometric but fluid structures... 
Structure is rhythm, that is, the linking of figures that compose and decompose their 
relations... But the structure moves in both directions simultaneously... If one refers to the 
cleavage in causality, signs refer to signs as effects refer to effects, following as 
associative chain that depends on the order of the simple chance encounter between 
physical bodies. But insofar as concepts refer to concepts, or causes to causes, they 
follow what must be called an automatic chain, determined by the necessary order of 
relations or proportions, and by a determinate succession of their transformation and 
deformations... But when one asks how we manage to form a concept, or how we rise 
from effects to causes, it is clear that at least certain signs must serve as a springboard for 
                                                 
207 Spinoza, Ethics, 4p11, 5p4-10: 122, 163-168. 
208 Deleuze, essays critical and clinical… 141. 
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us, and that certain affects must give us the necessary vitality... There is thus something in 
signs that at the same time prepares for and doubles the concepts... The cries of the 
language of signs are the mark of this battle of the passions, of joys and sadnesses, of 
increases and decreases of power...The Ethics is the discourse of the concept... The 
common notions refer to relations of movement and rest that constitute relative speeds; 
essences on the contrary are absolute speeds that do not compose space by projection, but 
occupy it all at once, in a single stroke... What the notions grasp are the relations between 
relative speeds. But absolute speed is the manner in which an essence surveys its affects 
and affections in eternity (speed of power)... They are not simple operations of fact, but 
an entire production in principle...209 
 
Can't we say that the above coheres with Spinoza's use of causa immanens (inblijvende oorzaak), 
that which is a cause that remains a part of (is involved in) its effects? And can’t we say that the 
result is that our adequate common notions about causality are then transformed? For Spinoza, 
every effect “involves its cause,” but what sense of “involves” (involvere) is the debate, as noted 
above. The use of the PSR for Della Rocca is applied specifically to “facts” about objective 
reality, and the PSR as he sees it (especially in his most recent essay from 2010) is always in 
relation to existence. He writes, “...the existence of each thing that exists must be explicable, just 
as the consciousness of each conscious mental state must be explicable, and so on for other 
cases... So the explicability argument concerning existence, unlike the other explicability 
arguments, is an argument for the PSR itself...”210 It is clear from this statement that Della Rocca 
feels a rational argument for the concept of “existence” is a rational argument for the PSR. But 
there are different versions of the concept of existence and, at times, of the PSR that have already 
been noted here.211 For Spinoza, existence is, utterly, a complete affirmation first. Yet, to be a 
                                                 
209 Deleuze, essays critical and clinical, 141-145, 148-149, italics added. This is the heart of the matter, and it 
makes a difference. This is also why it is so importance to understand how immanent and transitive causation. In 
the end, when reasoning with force we are the efficient cause of our affects. 
210 Della Rocca, PSR, 6-7. 
211 To this, Della Rocca might respond, “So if the non-rationalist is to draw the kind of line she needs to draw 
between acceptable and unacceptable explicability arguments, she must do so in a principled way, i.e., she must give 
us a reason for thinking the other -at least some other- explicability arguments are legitimate, but that the 
explicability argument concerning existence is not.” Yet, it is one thing to give a reason for something and an all 
together different matter to insist that for every cause in Nature there is a human explanation in the sense that they 
are identical. Causes are not reducible to human explanations in order to have truth value as real in Nature.  
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cause that remains in its effect seems closer to the use of the Latin term involvere as “to 
envelop.” The sense of cause and effect Spinoza holds is closer to Ed Curley’s reading than to 
Della Rocca's. We might turn to those like Deleuze, Macherey, and Bernstein together for more 
support. In addition, Don Hoffman, in a 2008 article titled “Conscious Realism and the Mind 
Body Problem,” writes, “Despite substantial efforts by many researchers, we still have no 
scientific theory of how brain activity can create, or be, conscious experience. This is troubling, 
since we have a large body of correlations between brain activity and consciousness, correlations 
normally assumed to entail that brain activity creates conscious experience.”212 
Against the version of necessity and the PSR Della Rocca embraces, Macherey writes, 
“On the other hand, in Spinoza's statement the principle of causality literally inverts the terms of 
the traditional principle: from the well known formula 'nothing is without a cause,' which 
proceeds in an analytical manner from effect to the cause, he substitutes 'no cause is without 
effect,' which proceeds by contrast from cause to effect, synthetically and summing up in a single 
phrase the genetic conception of knowledge...”213 This reading relates quite well to Deleuze's 
interpretation noted above. Further, Macherey links this synthetic reversal of the way to think 
about causality in Spinoza to a theory of non-representation specifically. He writes, “For 
Spinoza...adequate knowledge 'explains' its object to the extent that it affirms itself as identical to 
it, not in the transparency of a conforming representation but in the likeness of the order of an 
equally necessary reality.”214 In strengthening adequate knowledge and action, we regularly 
affirm our objects of thought as identical to substance’s causal order. 
It is through the effects of other effects that I recognize when my understanding acted as a 
                                                 
212 Hoffman, “Conscious realism and the mind body problem,” Mind and Matter 6, no. 1 (2008): 87. 
213 Macherey, Hegel or Spinoza, 56, italics added. 
214 Ibid., 56. Because finite affects are not only about thought, so to they are, therefore, not 
only about explanations either and is evident in E2p49s2 as one example. 
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cause. As substance and identical to it, I am both the cause and the effect as the adequate cause. 
Della Rocca reads Spinoza's concept of the human mind as having ideas about objects and 
things, about facts, of which the cause is in need of a rational explanation, instead of the mind as 
ideas that are signs, effects, and an organic part of the ever-shifting landscape. As is clear in 
E2D3, having an “idea” is not equivalent to speaking about brain states or physical descriptions 
as representations, but is in relation to what it is for God (or Nature) to be a thinking thing 
perceived and expressed as a human mind. And in 2p28 we learn that finite affects cannot be 
only about the attribute of thought (therefore they cannot be only about our explanations), but are 
about the composition and decomposition of relations between idea types and interactions with 
other bodies of all kinds in our environments (chairs, clouds, buildings, people, plants, animals, 
desks, church, the state, revolutions and so forth).215 As Jeffrey Bernstein writes, “In other words, 
the stability of our bodies is due to – in fact our bodies are constituted by – certain proportions of 
movement and rest (i.e. forces)... As the ratio of forces changes, the formation of these bodies 
changes... Simply put, change occurs by the composition or decomposition of fluid, determinate 
bodies; space need not enter the equation... Differently stated, Spinoza's monistic substance is 
constituted by ratios of forces. Spinoza calls such forces 'affects.'”216 Ratios of forces always in 
motion cannot possibly be reduced to representations of something else. They are Nature. 
 After we understand the logical consequence of a cause being “in” its effects, “substance” 
can be understood as an infinite series of degrees of expression and power that continually 
transform into other degrees of power and expression or ratios of motion and rest.217 This is 
                                                 
215 Spinoza, Ethics, 2D3, 2p28: 32, 51. 
216 Bernstein, “The Ethics of Spinoza's Physics,” 12-13. 
217 At the end of chapter 1 of the KV, Spinoza writes, “From all this, then, it follows clearly that we can prove both a 
priori and a posteriori that God exists. Better, indeed, a priori. For things which are proved in the latter way [a 
posteriori] must be proved through their external causes, which is a manifest imperfection in them, inasmuch as they 
cannot make themselves known through themselves, but only through external causes. God, however, who is the 
first cause of all things, and also the cause of himself [causa sui], makes himself known through himself (Shirley, 
 281 
Deleuze’s main point. Those things that are in-themselves do not involve the concept of another 
thing. Existence needs no explanation. The meaning is conceived through itself. How then do 
causes inhere in their effects if the concept of the thing, in the above sense, does not involve the 
concept of another thing when conceived through itself? In other words, the explanation of a 
definition will alter in what is required depending on whether you are understanding something 
as an expression of an attribute or as an expression of a mode. The explanation will logically 
alter depending on which common notions are placed together.  
When concepts involve the concepts of other things, such as the definition of a “mode,” 
their sense of what it is to be a cause, an effect, and “involve” alters depending on what is being 
defined. This is yet another reason why Spinoza writes in E2p49s, among a series of replies to 
possible objections to his deductions, “But…we perceive that one idea has more reality, or 
perfection, than another.”218 Some explanations are better than others, but that which is 
conceived through itself needs no explanation in order to be both true and to cause effects. 
 God's essence is eternal existence and is self-caused. Our essence, as a finite mode, is 
understood differently. I can logically understand that I exist as a real expression of Nature, and I 
am aware of this regardless of an adequate explanation of how it is possible that I exist as an 
expression of an eternal substance. In a way, there is only one explanation of substance; it exists, 
eternally. We adhere to the necessity of laws of Nature of which substance is. The rest are the 
effects of variations in degrees of intensity of thought and action by all things with each other.219 
                                                                                                                                                             
40, emphasis added).” 
218 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p49s III.A.(iii): 65. Prior to this, in a warning but also in 2p49s, Spinoza writes 
that we must first distinguish between an idea (concept) of the mind and the images of the mind, and then we must 
distinguish “between ideas and the words by which we signify things... (Curley, 64).” In fact, “in order to arrange 
one's life wisely,” Spinoza insists that we must always keep track of the differences in our mind between images, 
ideas, and words. I believe this complicates Della Rocca's interpretation. 
219 Della Rocca writes, “I suspect many of you simply will not see the force of the challenge that I am issuing to the 
non-rationalist. (I speak here from long experience, experience that prompted me to call my endeavor here 
quixotic.)” He continues that the need to respond to his reading of the PSR “in a non-question-begging way becomes 
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And where there are degrees of intensity in rational and imaginative thought, there are novel 
ways to both experience, express, and explain reality. But Della Rocca believes necessitarianism 
and the PSR, as he has defined it, are inseparably intertwined: “Precisely because 
necessitarianism is an implication of the PSR, the intuitive pressure leading to the PSR is 
intuitive pressure leading to necessitarianism. A clear-headed proponent of the PSR can be 
expected to embrace necessitarianism for precisely this reason. (Spinoza certainly did.)”220 Yet, 
Spinoza's concept of necessity is intimately related to his metaphysics and the idea of a God. The 
meta-physics of the many uses of language as signs, to produce effects, as types of explanations, 
or simply as types of knowing also seems to go beyond a strict reliance on the PSR as the best 
way to perceive and conceive reality. My ideas are not representations of reality in extension. My 
ideas are concepts, methods, and ways of knowing that create my awareness; some are images, 
some are words, some are rational common notions connected to other rational common notions 
with the force for understanding, novelty, and creativity as well. 
 At this point it would be helpful to refer back to the definition of an “idea” that can be 
found in E2p48s: “For by ideas I understand, not the images that are formed at the back of the 
eye...but concepts of thought.”221 Images and concepts are, thus, distinguished from each other. If 
the mind is understood not as having ideas but as ideas themselves, then ideas as concepts of 
thought are what the mind can be said to be defined as, but not without the dynamic 
epistemology of ideational method and “ways” of knowing. Images are only a bi-product or yet 
                                                                                                                                                             
urgent.” Yet, he also writes at the very end of his 2010 essay, “And I must admit that I am not optimistic that such a 
line can be found.” 
220 Della Rocca, PSR, 9. It seems one cannot deny the PSR or, according to Della Rocca, in doing so one has 
actually relied on it to do so. In this logical move, there is little recourse to argue against Della Rocca. He writes, 
“To appeal to the PSR's implication of necessitarianism as ruling out the PSR and as enabling us to draw a 
principled line between good and bad explicability arguments is thus question-begging.” What Della Rocca explains 
as question-begging is in question, primarily because it is not that opponents of his position “have no response at 
all,” but that the explanation given does not satisfy his specific use and reliance on the PSR.  
221 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p48s: 62. 
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another way for the attribute of thought to express itself. In this respect, if the mind and the body 
are “one and the same thing,” then the equivalent of ratios of motion and rest of extension can be 
said to be parallel in the mind as proportions of adequate ideas (and what concepts and images 
they are in relation to). Our proportions of the power of effects cannot be defined as 
representations. Recall that in 2p13 the idea of a mode can be taken as the object of an adequate 
idea, even while the expression of that adequate idea is also a mode itself.222 In other words, in 
this case the object of an idea is another idea. The attribute of thought has its own kinds of 
modes, and although they can be understood as immediate and infinite in certain determinate 
ways, mediated and infinite in other determinate ways, or just finite, taking a specific kind of 
mode as a concept and object of an adequate series of ideas realizes a different kind of 
affirmation in thought (than simply understanding that ideas are modes of the attribute of 
thought). In other words, understanding what ideas of ideas are in this system is crucial to 
unpacking it correctly. This is related to an argument Spinoza makes about judgments of the 
imagination. He notes that our prejudices (opinions) about the mind's ideas and free will, among 
other things, “...can easily be put aside by anyone who attends to the nature of thought, which 
does not at all involve the concept of extension. He will then understand clearly that an idea 
(since it is a mode of thinking) consists neither in the image of anything, nor in words.” If an 
adequate conception of knowledge does not necessarily need words in order to be understood, 
how will Della Rocca’s explainability thesis and his use of the PSR hold? Not all of our 
understood and felt concepts need to be explained or are explainable in order to be true. Some 
                                                 
222 Della Rocca notes an important interpretation problem with 2p13 on page 26. Some translate this proposition as 
“The object of the idea constituting the human mind is 'a' body...” and some as “is 'the' body...” The difference is 
large conceptually. I believe, along with other Spinoza scholars already mentioned in this chapter, that this 
proposition is to be read in relation to 2p17s where it is referenced, which reads at one part that he has already 
demonstrated that “the human body exists as we are aware of it (see P13c).” Therefore, it seems we should interpret 
the correct Latin here as “The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body,” as in one's own body and 
its affections, though this can also be adequately understood as the direct expression of substance itself as eternally 
self-causing.  
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can be applied with force and power and, therefore, demonstrate their truth directly.  
 We can understand how one idea “has more reality, or perfection, then another,” and how 
that which ideas involve can differ in their types of affirmation. To repeat, “...the affirmation 
which the idea of a circle involves differs from that which the idea of a triangle involves as much 
as the idea of the circle differs from the idea of the triangle.”223 Therefore, we may have two 
adequate ideas that differ completely in their affirmative powers. There is not a representational 
image for such expressions either. In Letter 17 we read, “The effects of the imagination arise 
from the constitution either of body or of mind.”224 It is important to remember while trying to 
understand this type of system that, as Spinoza writes, “Whether we are 'determined to act' by 
passion or by reason is a matter of where we locate the causes of our activity.”225 Locating causes 
is a mental action. We find more support in Chapter 13 of the TTP where Spinoza emphasizes 
that we are not to think of God as having motion when concentrating on the nature of extension, 
but as ratios of motion and rest, including our own ratio.226 Thus, the cause of my motion is the 
result of a law of Nature that is an expression of God, but I am only to concentrate my 
understanding of the natural phenomena of the law of Nature itself. My expressions will be 
different in intensity from yours. Substance cannot negate itself so when I die, it is simply a new 
ratio of motion and rest that my body has in relation to Nature.227 I expressed myself as Nature 
prior to death according to a level of homeostasis and bodily comportment and I will do the same 
                                                 
223 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p49s II, IIIA (iii), and IIIB (iii): 64-67, italics added. 
224 Spinoza, Letter 17: 803.  
225 Genevieve Lloyd, Spinoza and the Ethics, 85.  
226 Spinoza, TTP, 13: 513. 
227 This is another place where I think one can argue effectively against Della Rocca as he ends his article on how to 
use the PSR with the conclusion that when thinking about existence and the PSR “the contrast need not be seen as 
holding between two existing things.” How can we think clearly and distinctly about existence if the definition 
includes that it need not exist as something real? To equate (treat?) existence and the PSR as identical, as one thing, 
is more along the lines of what Hegel tried to accomplish, yet Spinoza allows for causal laws of nature to be built 
into the essence of things as early as the TIE. These laws, however, can be used and expressed in arrangements that 
are also conceived as infinite, whereas there are times the definition of what I am, as a finite mode, cannot b 
understood as causally infinite. 
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after death. The “awareness” of such a process and transition, the parallel attribute of thought in 
action, is where the current debate is located still today. 
 As Macherey holds, we are able to explain the fact that substance proceeds from cause to 
its effects (as modifications and synthesis) in generating itself. Substance's continual generation 
of itself is its effect. We cannot define Spinoza's use of the PSR as simply that “every fact must 
be explainable.” There may also just be too many facts in Nature to explain them all anyway. 
They are infinite in expression. Spinoza's use of a version of the PSR understands identity that 
proceeds in explanation from that which is self-caused (substance, God) to the nature of its 
generated effects (modifications of modifications of substance).228 In this way, I believe we can 
gather a tremendous amount of support for a non-representational counter-reading, including 
support from E3p37, p47, p49, p53-54, 4p7, p8, p9, p14, p18 (and several other related 
propositions). Perhaps Spinoza makes this most clear when he writes in the preface to E4, 
“Finally, by perfection in general I shall, as I have said, understand reality, that is, the essence of 
each thing insofar as it exists and produces an effect, having no regard for its duration.”229 The 
understanding of the essence of singular things, as we will read in Chapter Five, is intuitive 
understanding.  
 My reading of Spinoza’s theory of affects is a way to argue against Della Rocca’s theory 
                                                 
228 Mendal Sachs draws a nice summary of what we are also talking about above when he writes on physics and 
what it means to attempt measurements of that which is always in motion: “To predict the motion of a "test body," 
one must first solve for the field solutions corresponding to the entire closed system, and then take the asymptotic 
limit in which the system appears to manifest itself as a part very weakly coupled to the rest of the closed system, 
treating this part as a "test body." It is important to note, however, that no matter how closely one may approach the 
limit where there would appear to be an actual uncoupling of the test body from the rest, the actual limit cannot be 
reached, in principle. The closed system is not composed of separable parts! This is a conceptual view of the 
oneness of the universe in accordance with Spinoza's philosophy. Such an existential approach is also taken in 
Einstein's unified field theory. This is a view that asserts the elementarity of relation, not as a set of secondary 
restraints on relata, but rather as a basic order that is primary to an understanding of the real, substantive universe. It 
is an order in terms of fundamental relations, in the sense of logically necessary connections, where no manifestation 
of the universe, be it man or elementary particle, is unconnected from the rest of the single closed system. In this 
view, what appear as relata in atomistic philosophies play the secondary role of being derivative features, following 
from the underlying abstract relations that are the laws of nature.” At this point, I turn to quantum mechanics. 
229 Spinoza, Ethics, 4 preface: 116. 
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of representation. To conclude, we can examine how and why Spinoza references our 
experiences of (psychological) freedom, love, sadness, affects as effects, and passages to greater 
perfection, but he also references the use of powerful images and imaginative knowledge in 
creating more affirmative affects. We read in 3p47 that when we are sad it is often because the 
memory of what caused our sadness is still vivid: “While the image of the thing still remains, this 
determination is, indeed, restrained by the memory of those things that exclude its existence; but 
it is not taken away. And so man rejoices only insofar as this determination is restrained.”230 
Restraining a certain type of imaginative determination is a rational affirmation because our 
adequate knowledge understands which imaginative determinations need restraining and why. 
Clearly, our adequate knowledge about joy and sadness is not enough. We need to include, as a 
general affect that we experience and feel, those memories that are strong enough to overtake the 
existence of the thing we are recalling to mind. This is because such things reduce our tenacity 
and capacity to thrive. In this way, ideas of the imagination have their own type of existence 
because memories are in existence for us, they are real, but as singular memories the object they 
refer to may not be real. In fact, in restraining them there is no real way to explain what exactly 
is becoming passive and what is becoming active through a theory of representation. Therefore, 
their object is directly related to the proportions of other types of ideas we associate with them, 
such as the imaginative idea of freedom from a past danger or “evil” (which Spinoza refers to 
directly). In many places, including the previous 3p43 (which also references 3p37), we learn 
that our striving “will be greater or lesser in proportion to the affect from which it arises.”231 
Conatus is a striving, a tendency, and it is clear that the strength of that striving is in direct 
relation to our changing affects of which we are aware in conscious reflection. We read in 4p14, 
                                                 
230 Spinoza, Ethics, 3p47: 94. 
231 Ibid. 3p43, p. 93. 
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adequate knowledge of what is true is not enough, as “no affect can be restrained” by this true 
knowledge “but only insofar as it is considered as an affect.”232 So the restraining of certain 
imaginative ideas spoken about above can only occur if the ideas are understood as an organic 
whole of force and motion expressed in an affect that has degrees of power. This changes the 
strength of our desire because the affect that desire arose from (by necessity) is stronger.233 And 
recall that desire is “the very essence of man.” True knowledge cannot be used to restrain affects 
necessarily. Only stronger affects can achieve this according to Spinoza’s dynamic 
epistemological system. Conscious reflection is required for such a task. It’s where the propelling 
force of intellectual power, creativity, and joy arises. Our method is what aids us in recognizing 
what ideas we are affirming or denying and locate the cause of our affects. 
 We also learn in 3p48 and p49 that our understanding of causes can increase or diminish 
the power of the affects we are experiencing. E3p49 reads, “Given an equal cause of love, love 
toward a thing will be greater if we imagine the thing to be free than if we imagine it to be 
necessary...”234 This is telling because it means that, at times, a stronger, affirmative affect is 
experienced if we rely on an imaginative idea rather than an adequate one. Awareness of the laws 
of Nature helps generate stronger affects. 
Where things get really interesting is in what Spinoza writes next as the demonstration. 
He notes, “A thing we imagine to be free must be perceived through itself, without others (by 
ID7).” We are all affected differently by the same object (3p51). We also judge from our own 
affects what is good or bad, better or worse for us, and we can suspend this judgment, as stated 
above. Noted in 2p49, the rational suspension of judgment is a perception and an affirmation. It 
is the affirmation of a series of inadequate thoughts, but an affirmation that we are understanding 
                                                 
232 Spinoza, Ethics, 4p14: 123. 
233 Ibid. 4p15: 123. 
234 Ibid. 3p47: 95. 
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how to use such ideas, which is clearly a rationally adequate series of understanding about 
natural phenomena.235 The diversity of expressions of this kind are infinite: “it follows that men 
can vary as much in judgment as in affect” and, as already noted from the TTP, the more certain 
terms are used to describe things, the more we come to believe that we have adequately described 
the thing in question. If this is a real problem, then explanations can also become a real problem 
when they are inaccurate and yet perpetuated. Spinoza writes, “...we can deduce more affects 
than those which are usually indicated by the acceptance of words. So it is clear that the names 
of the affects are found more from the ordinary usage [of words] than from an accurate 
knowledge [of the affects.]”236 Naming something (description) is, therefore, not enough for 
understanding things. The explainability and inexplicability thesis won’t hold if understanding 
Spinoza’s system in the ways I have outlined in this chapter. As Syliane Malinowski-Charles 
writes, “it is all a matter of a question of proportion between adequate and inadequate 
knowledge...”237 Words are always, for Spinoza, a part of inadequate, partial knowledge. There 
are other ways to express what one knows, particularly by application. 
 As one last claim of support for my reading on the nature of our affects and their role in 
strengthening not only adequate knowledge, but also imaginative ideas and images which can aid 
reason, consider what Yirmiyahu Yovel writes: “Cognitive events are at the same time affective 
events.”238 Spinoza confirms this as early as the TEI where he writes that what we are to pay 
most attention to is “the way we become aware” of our changing ideas.239 The way we become 
aware of powerful knowledge is directly needed in a theory of human consciousness as a result. 
We are always to reflect on our power of action in existence, and we can do this through 
                                                 
235 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p49: 63. This is also an important point also noted by Genieve Lloyd in Spinoza and the Ethics. 
236 Ibid. 3p51: 52, 96-97. 
237 Malinowski-Charles, “The Circle of Adequate Knowledge...,” 139-164. 
238 Yovel, Desire and Affect, 53. 
239 See all of Spinoza’s TIE paragraphs 31, 35, and especially 41. 
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reflecting on and altering our dispositions and affects. As Anthony Paul Smith writes, reason 
guides our affects and our affects guide reasoning in ways that become actions, that is, “...they 
become acts through being known.”240 This places the singular experience of wonder within an 
important current debate as well, particularly because some believe Spinoza felt wonder could 
move us with great accuracy and joy if used well with other series of rational ideas. Others, such 
as Piet Steenbakkers, believes that wonder is left solely to the imagination as a passive (and thus 
less forceful) response to our environment.241  
 Other explanations are possible against a reading from a theory of mind and 
representation perspective, but in 2011 we find more support for where Della Rocca goes off 
course. Because his interpretation of Spinoza has been so influential in North America, it is 
important to gather as much alternative support as possible. In Mogens Laerke’s essay, 
“Spinoza's Cosmological Argument in the Ethics,” the author argues that Della Rocca's reading 
has gone wrong from the start. The reading won’t work because of how DR interprets 1p11D3 
and Letter 12, both already cited in this chapter in detail. Spinoza's system is directly relating to 
the continuous transformation of our affects within a singular theory of human reflective 
consciousness which we have learned about in later books of the Ethics. 
 Letter 12 is highly relevant to this conversation. Spinoza lucidly writes that we can 
understand the same thing in one of two ways, either by its definition alone or by its cause 
(which can alter depending on what kind of knowledge we are using and why). The latter is 
about the use of the PSR, but the former is something entirely different. It seems Della Rocca, in 
combining both the nature of definitions (explanation) and of causality, collapses these two 
                                                 
240 Smith, Spinoza Beyond Philosophy, 61. Paul Wienpahl, in his work Radical Spinoza, also writes, “At its very 
abrupt end BdS was using 'perceiving,' 'thinking,' and 'understanding' interchangeably...(107)” I would agree. 
241 Steenbakkers, “The Passions According to Lodewijk Meyer,” in Desire and Affect: Spinoza as Psychologist, 
Ethica III, 200. Steenbakkers writes, “In EIIIdef.aff.4exp, Spinoza ranks wonder as imagination and he does not, for 
that reason, number it among the affects.” 
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distinctions that Spinoza goes to great lengths to remind us to keep separate.242 Spinoza is clear 
both here and throughout the Ethics that we must learn how to distinguish between that which 
only the intellect can comprehend from that which can also be apprehended by both the intellect 
and the imagination together to create greater affects. The main reason is that “its parts cannot be 
equated with or explicated by any number, although we may know its maximum and its 
minimum.”243  
 The point about what can be comprehended by the intellect alone is very important here. 
Letter 12 states that the imagination cannot adequately comprehend the nature of Substance or 
Eternity. In other words, there is no real representation of reality possible if examining only 
imaginative ideas. This is important because for Della Rocca's interpretation to be correct, that 
all ideas are representations of the affections of our bodies, he would have to say that these 
representations then do not, in any way, involve imaginative ideas when thinking through the 
nature of Substance or Eternity. In other words, he would have to show that no part what-so-ever 
of imaginative knowledge is used when comprehending the true definition of Substance or 
Eternity in his reading, a position I demonstrated is not possible to maintain. 
 In addition, in this same letter Spinoza notes that the concepts of “number,” “measure,” 
and “time” are simply “aids to the imagination” and, therefore, cannot be conceived as truly 
infinite by definition. I believe Della Rocca needs, at the least, the concept of measure for both 
his explicability thesis and number for his numerical identity arguments to be true. Explicability 
is a concept of measure, that relies on the nature of words to explain what was previously 
thought unexplainable (i.e., to measure and understand “facts” about Nature). The concept of 
“facts” is a numerical concept in many ways, as well. But modes of Substance, Spinoza 
                                                 
242 Spinoza, Letter 12: 787. 
243 Ibid., 787. 
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continues, cannot be fully understood using these kinds of concepts. Direct adequate application 
of the knowledge of reality as natural phenomena is what we experience with stronger rational 
affects. We learn that there is also a difference between “mental constructs” and “real things” for 
Spinoza, something that I believe Della Rocca does not pay enough attention to. For him mental 
constructs are real things, they are facts about Nature. The problem with “facts” is that many of 
them change over time with shifting paradigms of knowledge and methods of investigation, 
hence the requirement that reason be able to defer to others (for democratic fluidity in a state for 
example) or suspend its assertions of certainty when needed. Furthermore, some things may be 
explainable about any one complex thing, while other aspects or properties of that same thing 
may never be explainable, as Spinoza also addresses in Letter 60 later in his life.244 
 Therefore, in conclusion, as substance can be understood as one, eternal, self-causing, 
organic whole alongside an adequate understanding that the attributes of thought and extension 
are separate (in the sense that they can be conceived through themselves and are only modally 
distinct), we can then understand how we are both individuals and collective assemblages of 
desire and power with other bodies. Affects are something other than emotions. They are real 
expressions of natural phenomena and they increase and decrease in force. This is clearly stated 
in 5p39s where we read that a mind becomes more capable the more it is conscious of its own 
ideas, of God, and of things.245 Our feelings and our ideas give rise to variations in affects, but 
also to reflective awareness. We find more evidence of this in E2p19-23 and 2p31. There is 
always more to learn. Such an awareness of this law of thought in reflection makes more 
                                                 
244 Spinoza writes in Letter 60, “...I assert absolutely that from certain properties of a thing (whatever be the given 
idea) some things can be discovered more easily and others with great difficulty – though they all concern the 
nature of the thing.” 
245 Spinoza, Ethics, 5p39s: 178-179. “And really, he who, like an infant or child, has a body capable of very few 
things, and very heavily dependent on external causes, has a mind which considered solely in itself is conscious of 
almost nothing of itself, or of God, or of things. On the other hand, he who has a body capable of a great many 
things, has a mind which considered only in itself is very much conscious of itself, and of God, and of things.”  
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learning possible.246 We are allotted these experiences in duration, but the laws of Nature operate 
in the same way structurally for all. But the variations in power that affects create is an organic 
combination of both knowledge and affections. Our singular imagination, memory, and language 
use can only take place if our body endures, but our expressions can cause effects in series of 
relations with other ideas and bodies for eternity. Singular reflective awareness requires some 
sense of organic identity. This is why Spinoza writes in 3p53 and p54, “When the mind considers 
itself and its power of acting, it rejoices, and does so the more distinctly it imagines itself and its 
power of acting.” We then read, “The mind strives to imagine only those things which posit its 
power of acting.”247 Spinoza draws a direct reference in the final thoughts of the Ethics for us to 
reflect back on 2p40s again, the well-known epistemological proposition. Why? Because the 
more we learn, the more we understand that there is more to learn. This brings us joy in both 
ways, bodily and as energy given, as well as by having three kinds of ideas to use and 
experience.  
 Our power of thought, or reflective thought as action, is diminished when we experience 
the sad affects. As we learn in the list of affects in E3, an affect of sadness can be an action, but it 
is an action as “a passing to a lesser perfection.”248 It is similar to what we might think of as a 
slowing down of a motion or not putting all of one’s energy into something when we are aware 
that we could. Do you call this action less motion or do you call it a coming to rest? For Spinoza, 
it is simply a shift in the intensity of motion and rest as a ratio. So an affect can be understood as 
always in action in this way. It is an action that increases our power to act or that which 
                                                 
246 One can refer back to E2p13 lemmas 1, 2, 3, 5, and 7 for continued support of this chapter's conclusions. 
247 Spinoza, Ethics,  3p53-55: 98-99. 
248 Ibid. 3AffIII: 104. Further, in the preface to E4 we read, “For nothing belongs to the nature of anything except 
what follows from the necessity of the nature of the efficient cause. And whatever follows from the necessity of the 
nature of the efficient cause happens necessarily.” In my reflective action, that is, I become an expression of the 
efficient cause of Nature immanently and understand myself as an adequate cause. 
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decreased our power to act as an increase or slowing down of our motion. Therefore, both the 
imagination and reason are needed to work together to reflect on one's power of thought and 
motion. This new affect includes adequate thinking about our power of acting, which is then 
increased by such understanding. This is Spinoza's proto-physics of motion and dynamic 
epistemology of ideational force. It is an ethic because, when we understand how the mind can 
reflect on itself in its actions and on the body and mind in its affects, it is nothing more or less 
than a “strength of character” with tenacity according to BdS.249 E4Def8 reads, “By virtue and 
power I understand the same thing...” and virtue is “nothing but acting from the laws of one's 
own nature.”250 I believe this is directly related to what is stated in 2p7, 2p11, and 2p40. The first 
idea of the mind is the body because “The striving to preserve oneself is the first and only 
foundation of virtue. For no other principle can be conceived prior to this one (by P22) and no 
virtue can be conceived without it (by P21).”251 This is why suicide would not be permitted in 
such a system as well. Reason strives “for nothing but understanding,” its essence is one's mind 
“insofar as it understands clearly and distinctly...” and “this striving for understanding (by P22C) 
is the first and only foundation of virtue...”252 But affirming one’s increase in power can also be a 
sad passion. Affirming one’s increase in power when one errors in reasoning is an example of a 
sad passion. The power is not increased, though, in the same intense proportion and causal 
influence if it were a joyous passion or a series of adequate common notions.  
 There is not an identity between thought and extension because they are substance – 
substance just expressed in two different ways infinitely. Although common notions are adequate 
                                                 
249 Spinoza, Ethics, 3p58-59: 102. It is also clear in 3p58 that we can have both joyous passions and joyous actions 
as an affect. 
250 Ibid. 4D8: 117. Recall, at the end of E3 we read that an affect that is a passion is “a confused idea, by which the 
mind affirms of its body…a greater or lesser force of existing than before, which…determines the mind to think of 
this rather than that…” This is the key to understanding all of Spinoza’s system. 
251 Ibid. 4p22c: 127. I believe you cannot read the infamous 2p7 and 2p11 without relating them to this proposition. 
252 Ibid. 4p25-26: 128. Further, to have adequate ideas is simply to be capable of reasoning with force. 
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ideas we all share (as they are the common properties of things which are true), imaginative 
knowledge is highly singular in its internal processes (and it involves ratios and proportions). 
One reason why it is beneficial to us and our survival and use of energy includes, by necessity, 
that we must work towards understanding more about this process. That is, a regular aspect of 
our daily ways of living and knowing, of understanding and doing, includes strengthening 
reasoning, and allowing ourselves to use certain imaginative ideas to do so as well. 
 For Spinoza, every idea we have does not represent its “counterpart bodily mode and also 
the external cause of that bodily mode,” as Della Rocca concludes is necessary, and which 5p4s 
demonstrates is not where we should direct our attention and reflection.253 As 3p56 and p57 
make so clear, the more we are affected in a way in which what we imagine involves both 
ourselves and bodies external to us, the more we are acted upon. But the more we imagine our 
own power of thought regardless of temporality and external causes, combined with reasoning 
about the laws of thought themselves, the more we act and the less we are acted upon. “It is 
enough, I say, for us to understand the common properties of the affects and of the mind, so that 
we can determine what sort of power, and how great a power, the mind has to moderate and 
restrain the affects.”254 If affects were only “special kinds of ideas,” why would Spinoza develop 
Books 3 and 4 of the Ethics in the ways cited here? “No life, then, is rational without 
understanding, and things are good only insofar as they aid man to enjoy the life of the mind, 
which is defined by understanding...all those things of which man is the efficient cause must be 
good...”255 Spinoza's ethics are clear: 
I do not say these things in order to infer that it is better to be ignorant than to know, or 
that there is no difference between the fool and the man who understands when it comes 
to moderating the affects. My reason, rather, is that it is necessary to come to know both 
                                                 
253 Spinoza, Ethics, 5p4s: 164. 
254 Ibid. 3p56-57: 100-101. 
255 Ibid. 4 App V: 155-156. 
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our nature's power and its lack of power, so that we can determine what reason can do in 
moderating the affects, and what it cannot do... Since reason demands nothing contrary to 
Nature, it demands that everyone loves himself, seek his own advantage, what is really 
useful to him, want what will really lead a man to greater perfection, and absolutely, that 
everyone should strive to preserve his own being as far as he can. This, indeed, is as 
necessarily true as that the whole is greater than its parts...256 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
256 Spinoza, Ethics, 4p17s, p18: 124-125, emphasis added. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
PROPORTIONS AND MAGNITUDES OF SINGULAR ESSENCES: 
 
JOY AS THE PASSAGE TO GREATER PERFECTION 
 
 
 
“I may desire absolutely and forever a revelation of a moment.”   
-Simone de Beauvoir 
 
“A body can be anything; it can be an animal, a body of sounds, a mind or an idea.”   
-Gilles Deleuze  
 
 “...the greater complexity of the human body does not 'causally' explain consciousness in the 
mind. This would violate the causal and explanatory separation that exists between the attributes 
of Thought and Extension in Spinoza's parallelism; no mode of Thought can be causally affected 
by a mode of Extension, and no state or property of a mode of Thought has its causal explanation 
in a state or property of a mode of Extension. 'The modes of each attribute have God for their 
cause only insofar as he is considered under the attribute of which they are modes, and not 
insofar as he is considered under any other attribute' (IIP6). ...what I am claiming is that for 
Spinoza, human consciousness just 'is' the greater complexity of the human body as this is 
manifested under the attribute of Thought.”   
-Steven Nadler 
 
The Intellectual Love of God and Nature 
 
 The title of this chapter is a reference to the third kind of knowledge (intuition) that we 
find in Spinoza's genetic epistemology. Intuitive knowledge is conceived both as something 
eternal in its truth and as the singular intellectual love of God. As we read in the opening 
definitions and axioms of E1, all things are either in themselves or in something else.1 From a 
given determinate cause(s) there follows an effect(s).2 The knowledge of an effect depends on 
and involves the knowledge of its cause (or at least some partial or proximate knowledge of its 
cause).3 Things that have nothing in common with one another cannot be conceptually 
                                                 
1 Spinoza, Ethics, 1D3, 1D5, and especially 1Ax1 and Ax2: 1-2. 
2 Ibid. 1Ax3: 2. 
3 Ibid. 1Ax4: 2. 
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understood through each other, nor can they be the cause of each other.4 This is also applicable 
for the process of combining an immanent system with other elements important to rational 
beings – rational beings who contemplate their immanence as expressions of that system. A true 
idea must agree with that of which it is an idea (have something in common with the object of 
the idea).5 Finally, if a thing can be conceived as not existing, its essence cannot involve 
existence.6 Therefore, substance is one organic and eternal expression of itself as its attributes. 
Their effects or modifications (modes) are conceived through substance as expressions of it. We 
are an expression of substance as “bodies conceived as complex patterns of movement,” and 
intuitive knowledge is both the direct awareness of the laws of our attributes (of which we are an 
expression) and also an open possibility to combine with and understand other singular essences. 
 This chapter focuses on one way to interpret the third kind of knowledge in Spinoza's 
dynamic epistemology. In the scholarship, the nature of intuition in Spinoza’s system is one of 
the most challenging concepts to unpack and one of the most controversial. As we've seen, the 
necessity of the laws of Nature do not absolve the rational capacity to speak about a “God.” 
Spinoza writes that, “...the inevitable necessity of things does not do away with either divine or 
human laws.”7 Using reason alone does not allow for intuitive knowing or Spinoza would have 
only needed to identify two types of knowledge instead of three. Intuitive knowing is its own 
kind of knowledge but we use ideas of both the imagination and reason to develop it. This is 
apparent as we use language, words, and calculative deductions in order to understand and 
explain what we are reflecting on. Spinoza was, in many ways, myopically focused on thinking 
about what a God might be. For instance, he writes the following: “...Nature's bounds are not set 
                                                 
4 Spinoza, Ethics, 1Ax5, 1p3: 2-3. 
5 Ibid. 1Ax6: 2. 
6 Ibid. 1D1: 1. 
7 Spinoza, Letter 43: 879, italics added. We can refer to the end of E1p15, 1p16 and 2p9c for more support. 
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by the laws of human reason which aim only at man's true interest and his preservation, but by 
infinite other laws which have regard to the eternal order of the whole of Nature, of which man is 
but a particle.”8 At the least, we can conclude that he believed there was “one Being which 
subsists through its own sufficiency or force. This I not only affirm, but undertake to prove from 
the basis, that its nature involves necessary existence.”9 To have beliefs is one disposition and to 
use common notions regularly is another disposition. However, the expression of intuitive 
understanding is in the act of combining rational beliefs, regular habitual practices, and increases 
in the power of thought and activity with others.10 For Spinoza, these human expressions are as 
close to God as we'll ever express (as he makes clear in E1p25c, 5p24, and 5p25).11 In this way, 
we are God or Nature. As Steve Nadler writes, “The knowledge of God just is the knowledge of 
Nature in its broadest dimension.”12  
 As we'll see, intuitive knowing is “difficult and rare.” When we achieve intuitive 
knowing we have the clearest knowledge we can have without the need to rely on “hearsay, or 
experience, or the art of reasoning, because by [one’s] penetration [one] sees the proportion in all 
such calculations immediately.”13 Yet, this immediacy does not last. Singular imaginative sense 
perceptions and memories, for example, are always shaping our affects continuously as well. 
Intuitive knowing will include more than “our being convinced by reasons,” but it will also 
include “our feeling and enjoying the thing itself...”14 You cannot feel and enjoy any theory, 
person, event, encounter, relation, affect, or knowledge without applying it directly to your own 
                                                 
8 Spinoza, TTP, chapter 16: 528. 
9 Spinoza, Letter 35: 855. This letter specifically addresses Spinoza's logical understanding of a God. I find it adds 
striking evidence that he felt he was not an atheist or a materialist. 
10 Spinoza, Ethics, 5 preface: 160. Spinoza writes that “much practice and application are required” for restraining 
the power of regular affects which we experience daily. This too is a form of operational knowledge. 
11 Ibid. 5p24, 5p25: 173. 
12 Nadler, Spinoza: A Life, 189. 
13 Spinoza, KV, chapter 2:1: 63. 
14 Ibid. chapter 2:2: 63. 
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life and experiences “because when we know and enjoy what is best, that which is worst has no 
power over us.”15 At the least, intuitive knowledge overrides those proportions of motion and rest 
we experience singularly that decrease our power to exist by enhancing those elements in us 
(proportionally) that increase our power to exist. 
 Intuition is joyous, instantly applicable, and useful in its expression for singular 
individuals.16 It is the direct awareness (alertness) in conscious reflection of our conatus (and not 
only of our existence). It is adequate knowledge and, therefore, knowledge of the essence of 
singular things. It is both an intellectual intuition coupled with a sensuous felt action and 
effect(s) in the form of an affect(s). This knowledge is crucial because, as we read in E2p24, it is 
the communication of motion between the parts of one whole, thus involve essence.17 Singular 
things are understood in E1p28 as finite things with a determinate existence, as that which is 
capable of producing effects by another finite cause.18 The awareness of the power of our 
singular essence (conatus) includes the intellectual love of God. However, as each singular thing 
has its own determinate essence, we can, therefore, not always hold that the concepts of “cause” 
and “essence” are easily inter-changeable (as demonstrated in Chapter 4). For example, even 
though we express two of God’s infinite attributes, God’ essence differs from our own in many 
ways. 
Martial Gueroult's famous essay on Spinoza's letter(s) on the infinite is helpful for 
                                                 
15 Spinoza, KV, chapter 2:19: 87, footnote 16. 
16 Spinoza, Ethics, 5p33: 175. In 5p38s, Spinoza writes that the “greater the mind's clear and distinct knowledge,” 
the “more the mind loves God.” Therefore, all three types of knowledge are both immanently and metaphysically 
related. The same “rules of reason” apply to us even if we are not yet aware of the eternal nature of our capacities for 
comprehension, as is evident in 5p41. Therefore, becoming aware of this must include an automatic increase in the 
power to reason itself. 
17 Ibid. 2p24: 49. 
18 Ibid. 1p28: 19: “...all modes (by P25C) are nothing but affections of God's attributes.” Add this to the 
opening proposition of the Ethics that substance is prior to its affections and we can deduce that the best logical way 
to understand Spinoza’s system requires that one adequately understand what substance and attributes are before 
addressing the nature of modes. 
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understanding Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge. On the infinity of substance and indivisibility 
of modal expressions as substance, Gueroult concludes that both can logically derive from 
substance as self-caused. He writes, “Indeed, whatever necessarily exists of itself cannot, without 
contradiction, be deprived of any part whatever of its existence; consequently, it is necessarily 
infinite and excludes any partitioning.”19 This deductive conclusion also applies both to the 
concept of eternity and magnitude, rationally understood, “insofar as it is conceived as the 
extension of bodies.”20 In other words, the infinite divisibility of modes is the same as the eternal 
indivisibility of substance with infinite attributes expressed modally in infinite ways. This is not 
a numerical distinction. Gueroult continues, “Indeed, just as modes, qua modes are conceivable 
only through substance...so, too, the endless divisibility of the continuous, which is that of 
modes, is conceivable only through the indestructible subsistence in them of an indivisible 
absolute...”21 Both reason and the imagination are needed to understand the inter-relatedness of 
both. In our adequate knowledge we conceive that it is the attributes which are understood as 
eternal because they are, like substance, conceived through themselves.22 Gueroult writes that the 
divisible and finite cannot explain the indivisible and infinite, but “being explained by them, are 
henceforth reconciled with them.” In this way we can conceive of the infinite indivisibility of 
substance as already complete in each modal expression.23 Why? Because, as definitions are very 
important in Spinoza's system, the definition of that which is indivisible is always complete and 
is “equally in the part as in the whole,” as Spinoza writes. This is how Gueroult can then deduce: 
...Hence, every mode, whether small or large, envelops within itself the indivisibility of 
infinite substance... But, after the understanding has been returned to its authentic 
                                                 
19 Gueroult, “Spinoza's Letter on the Infinite,” 182, 184 (as found in Marjorie Grene's anthology Spinoza: A 
Collection of Essays). 
20 Ibid. 184. 
21 Ibid. 193. 
22 Ibid. 194. 
23 Ibid. 195. 
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constitution, substance, by the same stroke, is restored to its true nature, and since its 
infinity as well as its indivisibility are grasped genetically from its necessary existence, 
they are imposed upon us in their full intelligibility. In this way light penetrates 
Metaphysics. ...The antinomy regarding the divisibility of matter is then resolved in favor 
of the Infinite. Thus, light penetrates Physics as it penetrates Metaphysics. ...My duration 
is my existence posited by the immanent and eternal act of substance...24 
 
As we read in the TTP, “This is the point we have demonstrated above, namely, that our 
intellect and knowledge depend solely on the idea or our understanding of God, and spring from 
it and are perfected by it.”25 As Steven Nadler cites in one of his works, “...what is most 
advantageous to a rational being is the perfection of its proper and 'better' part, that is, the 
rational faculty or intellect. And what prefects the intellect, bringing it to its ideal condition, is 
knowledge. ...to know God is ultimately to have an adequate causal understanding of natural 
phenomena.”26 Clearly, though, it is also to have the rationally efficient capacity to comprehend 
logical deductions about both substance and modes as found above in Gueroult's insights. Finite 
things cause other finite things within each respective attribute to produce effects as natural 
phenomena, but as God's affections (modes) are the direct expression of substance God must be 
conceived as “the proximate cause of the things produced immediately by him, and not [a 
proximate cause] in his own kind...”27 The intellectual love of God, or “blessedness,” is defined 
most directly in E5p32: “Whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledge we take 
pleasure in, and our pleasure is accompanied by the idea of God as a cause.” He ends by saying 
that this is called the amor intellectus Dei.28 This may be close to what Lucretius writes in De 
                                                 
24 Gueroult, “Spinoza’s Letter on the Infinite,” 210, 211. 
25 Spinoza, TTP, chapter 4: 434. 
26 Nadler, A Book Forged in Hell, 147. 
27 Spinoza, Ethics, 1p28s: 20. Our ideas must agree with their objects as “what is contained objectively in the 
intellect must necessarily be in Nature” and, therefore, any intellect (finite or infinite) “must comprehend God's 
attributes and God's affections, and nothing else.” 
28 Ibid. 5p32: 175. We also read in 5p36s that “the essence of our mind consists only in knowledge, of which God is 
the beginning and foundation.” Therefore, to intuitively understand the essence of ourselves as a singular thing is to 
express God and the intellectual love of God with as much force as a human being is capable.  
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Rerum Natura regarding the power to understand causes or vivida vis animi.29 In introducing one 
of Gilles Deleuze's works on Spinoza and intuitive knowing, Robert Hurley references Deleuze's 
reading of the intellectual love of God as a type of understanding which is “'performed with the 
maximum perspective possible',” and in which one doesn't necessarily need to follow the 
deductive method exactly as it is found in the Ethics. In point of fact, “the intuitive of affective 
reading may be more practical anyway.”30 Why? Because our “units of understanding are not 
propositions but acts.”31 In his larger work on Spinoza, Deleuze writes, “The production of all 
ideas, starting from the idea of God, is of itself a reproduction of all the things in Nature; the 
sequence of ideas has no need to copy the sequence of things… An adequate idea is thus an 
expressive idea… Method leads us to the highest thought, that is, leads us as quickly as possible 
to the idea of God.”32 
E2p1 states that our singular thoughts are modes. When we rationally regard something 
as “good” we find a certain kind of confidence and perspective “unmixed with any sorrow” 
regardless of context.33 Although we may not call it “good,” this also applies when we 
understand that something could not have been otherwise. But we have to be careful because 
what human beings decide is good relates to what they desire: “By good here I understand every 
kind of joy, and whatever leads to it, and especially what satisfies any kind of longing, whatever 
that may be.”34 Surely not everything we desire is good for us so how does Spinoza develop what 
                                                 
29 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975, 1992).   
30 Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, iii. 
31 Ibid, ii. In the anthology Spinoza Now there is a debate regarding the nature of 'joyful passions' in Deleuze's 
reading of Spinoza that I have already commented on earlier in this thesis and in my book review of this anthology 
appearing in the journal Critical Horizons. To add to this debate, I find Deleuze's comment in the work cited here to 
be telling when he writes, “So the conatus is an effort to augment the power of acting or to experience joyful 
passions... (101).” 
32 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, 138-139. This entire work deserves more scholarly attention. 
33 Spinoza, KV, part 2:9, 74. 
34 Spinoza, Ethics, 3p39s: 91. What we name as 'good' might include more a common usage of the term to generalize 
many things instead of what Spinoza feels is more important which is knowledge of affects (3p52s). 
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are better goods for us when speaking about the intellectual love of God?  
As we read in 2p17s, our bodies exist “as we are aware of them” and, therefore, as we 
reflect on our affects, we can rearrange our affects and compare various ideas we are having with 
a stronger understanding of the relations between types of knowledge.35 As we accomplish this 
level of reflection, our conatus increases and we are, as Spinoza says, ready for anything. In 
loving our own increase in power in rational comprehension and action, God (Nature) is 
expressing itself in its perfection. However, decreases in power are also a part of Nature's 
perfection (just to a lesser degree of force). In The God of Spinoza Richard Mason summarizes 
one interpretation regarding the intellectual love of God on a singular level:  
The system is meant to be self-propelling. Knowledge of nature – of our nature – can lead 
to virtue because we will correctly understand our interests as part of our nature, and we 
want such knowledge because our nature also includes a positive drive towards activity – 
an accumulation of truths and a diminution of falsehoods. We want knowledge not 
because truth is attractive – that would be teleology – but because the positive side of our 
nature has a drive towards it... We may think that a way of life, a religion, is based on all 
sorts of human needs, wishes, hopes or desires. It is certainly based on an historical and 
social position. People can and do act well without what he sees as true beliefs. But if 
they cultivate the positive part of their natures they will seek true beliefs about 
themselves and about their location in nature. The reason or cause to do that is to be 
simplified in the basic drive of conatus. Why be religious? means the same as, why live a 
life of piety and virtue? With suitable research, we will see that this is our nature, it is in 
our interest. How do we know that? Because that is how we are. We cannot look further.36 
 
Some may argue that we are not naturally disposed towards virtue. In contrast, a 
Spinozist would respond in a twofold manner. First, she would agree with you in part, as Spinoza 
writes in both the TTP and the TP, men are not, on average, disposed towards using reason well. 
However, that does not include additionally that such behavior (not thinking well) increases our 
conatus. Two, if reasoning well was not inclined toward more education for those who do use it 
                                                 
35 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p1, 2p17s: 33, 46. 
36 Richard Mason, The God of Spinoza, 145-146. We can look to Letter 76 here also where Spinoza writes that he 
knows that he has discovered the truest method of rational contemplation as clearly as he knows the three sides of a 
triangle. 
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with more strength (or desire to), then one would have to adequately address what it is disposed 
towards. This is because we have this positive aspect in our nature that drives us towards 
understanding our shared natures. This simultaneously includes the following insights: 1) 
understanding that we have diverse singular desires, 2) learning about human psychology, 3) 
necessary social interactions, and 4) the necessity of social-emotional collectives. This is evident 
in E4p73 and the 4 appendix.37 As we will see, we are to “accommodate” ourselves “in ways 
nearly infinite” according to the guidance of reason and continuous understanding of all things 
human and humanly perceivable; this is something we also read about repeatedly prior to books 
4 and 5 of the Ethics. If we are to seek the highest “human good,” then using adequate thinking 
is something “good” which makes human beings their own efficient cause.38 This is also stated 
clearly in 5p39 where we read the following: “He who has a body capable of a great many things 
has a mind whose greatest part is eternal.”39 With understanding such things more freedom 
follows. Stuart Hamshire writes, “The mind is active and free when, and only when, the 
argument is strict, when the conclusion of a passage of thought is internally determined by the 
thinking process itself.”40 Hampshire writes elsewhere, “...for at the highest level of knowledge 
Nature is presented sub specie aeternitatis; Nature must be understood, not as a temporal 
sequence of events, but as a logical sequence of modifications necessarily connected with each 
other... In so far as the ideas which constitute my mind add up to such a logical sequence of 
ideas, reflecting the true order of Nature, my mind becomes part of the infinite idea of God 
                                                 
37 Spinoza, Ethics, 4p74, 4 appendix: 154-160: “For this reason, he strives most of all to conceive things as they are 
in themselves...” 
38 Ibid. 4 appendix II: 155. In Letter 60 Spinoza also writes, “...I follow this one rule, that the idea or definition of 
the thing should express its efficient cause.” Sam Shirley notes at this point of his translation of this letter is more 
evidence that, like Hobbes, Spinoza was concerned with generative and constructive definitions that express Nature. 
39 Ibid. 5p39: 178. It should be noted here that Piet Steenbakkers has written about the problem with translating 5p40 
correctly. This is primarily because there is evidence of this part of the Ethics being edited potentially during the 
months leading up to and after Spinoza's death by friends within his publishing circle who also cared deeply about 
his work. It is important because 5p40 involves the nature of intuitive knowing, activity, passivity, and perfection.  
40 Hampshire, Spinoza and Spinozism, 177. 
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(infinita idea Dei)…41 
 When we are dealing with material and efficient causes then we can also say that we are 
talking about physics, whereas when discussing formal or final causes, traditionally speaking, the 
topic was usually referred to as metaphysics. Spinoza invented a new way to think about both 
simultaneously, but without the use of teleological concepts. This claim is why we can return in 
this chapter to the infamous epistemological proposition E2p40s2 where, regarding intuition 
specifically, we learn, “And this kind of knowing proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal 
essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things.”42 He 
proceeds to explain all three kinds of knowledge through one example regarding understanding 
proportionals. And what is the essence of singular things, but humana natura as communem 
hominum conditionem?43 This idea about the nature of essence is reinforced in E5p31 where we 
read about becoming the formal cause of the third kind of knowledge that we can have: 
“Therefore, the more each of us is able to achieve in this kind of knowledge, the more he is 
conscious of himself and of God, that is, the more perfect and blessed he is.”44 Steve Nadler adds 
to this writing about intuitive knowing, “In fact, Spinoza's intellectual love of God is the key to 
dispelling fear and hope, not generating them... It involves not passivity but activity and an 
appreciation of one's own powers and their cause. It is, in Spinoza's view, the proper 
accompaniment of virtue.”45 This is true, but it does not exactly square with other relevant 
                                                 
41 Hampshire, Spinoza and Spinozism, 132, “…so far and under these conditions, my mind is itself eternal.”  
42 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p40s2: 57. In addition, 2p45 makes clear the distinction between the second kind of knowledge 
as common notions and the third kind of knowledge which is about singular essences, and, therefore, not composed 
of only common notions shared by all. 
43 As found in a footnote of Sam Shirley's translation of TP (11:6). Human nature is understood as “a general set of 
individual properties.”  
44 Ibid. 5p31s: 175. 
45 Nadler, Spinoza, 152. Nadler is considered one of the world's foremost biographers on Spinoza in history. I trust 
his scholarship. I only ask if we might pay closer attention to the sentiment by Gilles Deleuze which began this 
thesis where we learn that reading Spinoza can be done by anyone and is for everyone, or rather, anyone can walk 
away with new knowledge after reading the Ethics. 
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interpretations, such as that of Stuart Hampshire for example. The latter writes, “We know that 
some of our movements are actions, some are the effects of external forces acting upon us, and 
some of them are the outcome of a mixture of forces, internal and external. The active-passive 
distinction is prominent in all our self-awareness and in awareness of our own activities.”46 
 This position or trajectory in interpretation taken in this chapter is supported by, among 
other places, what is written about being in the present with one's understanding (remaining there 
clearly) as often as possible in E4p62 and especially p62s. There we read that we are determined 
by nature to discover if what is in front of us on a daily basis is good for us or not. We can call 
this our natural biological tendencies for summary purposes, but what is most important is that 
Spinoza ties this to our evaluations of “good” and “evil.” He finds it highly problematic that we 
believe we can have continuous adequate knowledge of the duration of things because we 
cannot. He warns that the reason we cannot is a natural one regarding the powers of singular 
things who have access to both thought and extension writing: 
If we could have adequate knowledge of the duration (by IIP31), and we determine their 
times of existing only by the imagination (by IIP44S), which is not equally affected by 
the image of a present thing and the image of a future one. That is why the true 
knowledge we have of good and evil is only abstract, or universal, and the judgment we 
make concerning the order of things and the connection of causes, so that we may 
determine what in the present is good or evil for us, is imaginary, rather than real.47 
  
 Although we can focus more on the physics (natural laws) involved with intuitive 
knowing, it is important to note that Spinoza did not believe himself an atheist in any sense, once 
writing that atheists “are usually inordinately fond of honours and riches...”48 Adequate 
knowledge through the observation of natural phenomena as the intellectual love of God are the 
“supreme good.” This brings up an interesting point which has been written about my Michael 
                                                 
46 Hampshire, Spinoza and Spinozism, xli. 
47 Spinoza, Ethics, 4p62: 149. 
48 Spinoza, Letter 43: p. 878. 
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Mack. Blessedness is a level of joy we can experience while interacting with our environment 
that waxes and wanes in intensity and homeostatic balance, but orienting ourselves towards an 
unselfish type of preservation is also an element of the intellectual love of God and Spinoza's 
understanding of eternity. If this is true, and I believe it is at least partially, then those who 
conclude Spinoza's system is an egoistic ethics are not warranted in their critique. Although it is 
our singular essence and existence of which we are continuously aware, and this good is that 
which can be shared by all, it is not only that which is enjoyed by us alone or only to our own 
benefit.49 This is also evident in E4p51. Comparing the sentiments of Goethe in relation to 
Spinoza's conception of intuitive knowing and blessedness, Mack writes: 
Deepening and developing Spinoza's notion of the intellectual love of God, Goethe 
proclaims that we are only universal by remaining subjective [singular]... What governs 
the logic of Spinoza's conatus is the seemingly paradoxical formula according to which x 
can only be x by not merely being x... This type of love is intellectual, because it 
presupposes that we realize what keeps nature or God from destruction and self-
destruction. As such it keeps the selfish passions in check... Keeping the passions in 
check is not an end in itself. Rather it is a means for  performing a new kind of self-
preservation: a Spinozist one where the boundaries of the self turn porous so that selfhood 
overlaps with the life of the other and of others...50 
 
New forms of self-preservation are acutely possible when we are also consciously rationally 
reflecting on our continually changing passions, especially as we are also aware of how the laws 
of thought and extension operate as one organic whole while shifting in ratios of motion and rest. 
This level of awareness allows for more rationally intense interactions with others, something we 
know is good for us, which also constitutes the feeling of freedom and a joyous affect. 
 Speaking about the love of God, Spinoza is very clear in the TTP what his conception of 
                                                 
49 “Everyone's true happiness and blessedness consists solely in the enjoyment of good, not in priding himself that 
he alone is enjoying that good to the exclusion of others. He who counts himself more blessed because he alone 
enjoys well being not shared by others...knows not what is true happiness and blessedness...a man's true happiness 
and blessedness consists solely in wisdom and knowledge of truth, and not in that he is wiser than others, or that 
others are without true knowledge...” 
50 Mack, Spinoza and the Specters of Modernity..., 146-149 (intermittently). 
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theology is noting, “Theology thus understood, if you consider its percepts and moral teaching, 
will be found to agree with reason; and if you look to it purpose and end, it will be found to be in 
no respect opposed to reason, and is therefore valid for all men.”51 This is the nature of what 
Spinoza, at times, calls blessedness. Salvation and blessedness “consist in the true contentment 
of mind and we find our true peace only in what we clearly understand...”52 The logical 
deduction does not include the abolition of all organized religion as Spinoza felt the creation and 
destruction of varieties of religion was a historical and social process, at times as necessary as 
any other social phenomena, and he practiced toleration for the varieties of religious ideas of his 
time in many respects. He was a critic of the historical construction and content of the Bible and 
other religious texts, and the many uses and abuses of imaginative knowledge for obedience and 
ritual. 
 At times, the problem for the philosopher was the concepts used and practices done in the 
name of salvation. Salvation, in the religious sense, required “simple obedience” and this is one 
main reason why he rejected it, for it did not require the use of reason and understanding. In 
addition, as we read in E4p8, there is not a real thing as “evil,” and any knowledge about good or 
evil “is nothing but an affect of joy or sadness...”53 Note that our knowledge of what is good for 
us is an affect of joy. Our feeling of joy brings more strength. Further, as Nadler writes: 
On Spinoza's view, then, the divine law includes no historical content, no metaphysical 
doctrines, and no prescriptions of ceremonies. It does not require the belief in any 
narratives of events in the past, the assent to any philosophical claims about God's nature 
                                                 
51 Spinoza, TTP, chapter 15: 523. 
52 Ibid. chapter 7: 467. Richard Mason writes in a footnote to the work noted above that part of the origin of the term 
salvation includes the term salus which can mean “health,” “well-being,” or as a specific religious connotation. He 
writes that the term, therefore, was perfect for Spinoza to employ in his own way in his system (161, note 53). 
53 Spinoza, Ethics, 4p8: 120. It is particularly interesting to read what Henry Oldenburg writes to Spinoza in Letter 
61 as late as 1675 (as the latter is preparing to print and distribute the Ethics): “But on considering the whole matter 
more closely, I find much that convinces me that, so far from intending any harm to true religion and sound 
philosophy, on the contrary you are endeavoring to commend and establish the true purpose of the Christian religion, 
together with the divine sublimity and excellence of a fruitful philosophy.” 
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or about the cosmos and its origins, or the performance of any devotional rituals...54 
 
 The force of ideas is substance as that which is eternally in existence, something that 
Gueroult was also noting in the passage referenced that began this chapter. Ratios of motion and 
rest in extension become ratios for motion and rest in practice. We are passionate beings and our 
levels of power for action often depend on external influences, but if we are conceiving 
substance adequately, then we understand that we can become the adequate cause of how we 
conceive things and why. Ideas about ideas “involve knowledge about God insofar as [God] is 
considered under the attribute of thought, and not under any other attribute.”55 The above 
passage shows that all references to motion are left to the realm of the laws of extension. Also, it 
shows that our ideas involve not only some knowledge of God (or Nature), but are also 
expressions of God's ideas determined in a certain (modal) way. Spinoza did not desire to 
eliminate theology. As Warren Montag writes, “Spinoza sought not to convince his readers to 
abandon theology...but instead to show them how to think rationally within it, in its terms, in a 
way that not only accepts the premises of any theology, but which even offers itself as theology's 
strongest defense, thereby turning it against itself.”56 Indeed scholars such as Neal Grossman and 
Charlie Huenemann go so far as to conclude Spinoza's primary epistemological aim was to 
demonstrate how to properly think about God so in order to increase our power to exist. 
Huenemann writes: 
Spinoza's goal, in other words, is to find something divine in the world... The naturalists 
among  us face a critical decision about how to regard nature. Is it as an arbitrary lodging 
or a kind of sanctuary? That is a question as alive for us as it was for Spinoza. It is 
perhaps, in the end, the deepest question anyone can ask... Every understanding of God is 
set against a backdrop of metaphysics. This backdrop is what makes it an understanding, 
                                                 
54 Nadler, 156. 
55 Spinoza, Letter 64: 918-919. 
56 Montag, Bodies, Masses, Power, 3-4. This is yet another way to think about ways Spinoza's genetic and dynamic 
epistemology can be used to invent a type of modern revolutionary politics for rationally powerful actions between 
bodies. 
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as an explanation is always a  broader context into which we project the phenomena being 
explained...  57 
 
Spinoza is very clear about his deductions regarding God in the opening propositions of E1. 
E1p17 and p18 read: “God acts solely from the laws of his own nature, constrained by none” and 
“God is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things.”58 This immanence, on a singular 
level, has to do with our modal expressions of power in varying degrees of intensity (potestas) 
and our interactions with other bodies in our environment (potentia), and, therefore, as 
God/Nature.59 By the time we get to Book 5 of the Ethics, we have already learned that we have 
to combine both of these aspects while continuing to investigate natural phenomena. With this 
understanding and use of common notions about the essence of singular things we automatically 
strive to understand more.60 This increase in our striving involves much more than just a 
tendency to persist in existence. It also involves more knowledge about God, or Nature. In E5p25 
we learn, “The greatest striving of the mind, and its greatest virtue is understanding things by the 
third kind of knowledge.” We read next in the demonstration of this proposition that this is 
because intuitive knowledge “proceeds from an adequate idea of certain attributes of God to an 
adequate knowledge of the essence of things...and the more we understand things in this way, the 
more we understand God.”61 This knowledge cannot derive from imaginative knowledge alone, 
but it does involve the first kind of knowledge significantly. Even further, this chapter provides 
support for the interpretation that what Spinoza was most interested in, however rare, is the 
                                                 
57 Huenemann, Spinoza's Radical Theology, preface, 32. 
58 Spinoza, Ethics, 1p17, p18: 13, 16. 
59 A fun reference for more support are the short, lucid chapters in the Spinoza issue of the Funambulist Pamphlets. 
60 We can also look at propositions like E4p64 to understand that this concept of essence is necessary for 
understanding anything adequately at all. Dan Selcer's work is also helpful in understanding how and why this is the 
case. And if we follow this logical train of thought, we see that ideas about ideas become a crucial concept for 
understanding Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology adequately; a point Spinoza emphasizes in Letter 64 when he writes, 
“Therefore…the idea of the idea involves knowledge of God insofar as he is considered under the attribute of 
thought, and not under any other attribute.” 
61 Spinoza, Ethics, 5p25: 173. 
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productive powers in activity between collectives and within singular individuals as the way to 
know God and what it is to be human. That is, we learn how to enter into more relations with 
others in ways that enhance our joy, understanding, and collective productive powers. This is the 
position Daniel Selcer takes, referring to Spinoza's intellectual debt to the work of Francis 
Bacon. In his most recent essay from 2014, we learn: 
Baconian scientia operativa does not consist in the injunction to generate particulars 
through experiment simply so that they may be known, but so that something may be 
done... The aim of experiment, for a surprisingly Baconian young Spinoza, is the 
discovery of true natures or forms... [Spinoza's] essence can no longer designate a formal 
account of what a thing is (Aristotle), let alone an independent substantial form through 
which it is actualized (Scholastic Aristotelianism). Instead, the essence of a thing must be 
fully immanent to it and bound up in the particular ways it manifests its primary 
qualities... This essence may be conceived relationally, from the perspective of a finite 
thing immersed in a broader realm of duration and extended relationships; or, sub specie 
aeternitatis, from the perspective of its cause...62 
 
 So what is the passage from a lesser to a greater perfection as the strength of our bodies 
and minds increase towards that which is affirmative, creative, and effective in the application of 
adequate knowledge? Stuart Hampshire writes, “...pleasure and pain always represent a change 
in psycho-physical state; they are mental reflection of the rise or fall in the power of activity of 
the organism.”63 As we read in E2p1s the patterns of thought that endure in one's mind will help 
determine which affects one continues to be affected by.64 That is, we become more aware in 
conscious reflection of ourselves as an adequate cause that can produce powerfully rational 
affects. In this way, we are the one doing the determining and are not being acted upon. And in 
                                                 
62 Selcer, “From scientia operativa to scientia intuitiva: Producing particulars in Bacon and Spinoza,” 42, 45, 46. 
Selcer concludes, “To reason, for Spinoza, is certainly not to leave the 'imaginative' realm of sensation, language, 
memory and experiment behind. It is to do something new with the materials those forms of knowing provide...” In 
support of this position, Chapter Two and the conclusion of this thesis address how Selcer’s reading is accurate and 
works in conjunction with strengthening both creativity and reason. We can also look to the works of George Eliot 
and Moira Gatens for more support. For example, Simon Calder, in his essay “Georeg Eliot, Spinoza and the Ethics 
of Literature,” writes, “[Eliot's] fictions were 'simply a set of experiments in life – an endeavor to see what our 
thought and emotion may be capable of – what stores of motive, actual or hinted as possible, give promise of a better 
after which we may strive.'” 
63 Hampshire, Spinoza and Spinozism, 101. See also the work of Neal Grossman on Spinoza here. 
64 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p1s: 33. 
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this way we are truly free, as free as we can be within the laws of Nature, because we are acting 
from our necessary nature according to our essence: “I call him free who is led by reason 
alone.”65 The above is mentioned at the start of the Ethics in 1p24 when we read that intuitive 
understanding is acting from our essence as singular things and not according to only our 
existence, that is, in accordance with our conatus and knowledge of it. In addition, 4p1s tells us 
that “imaginations do not disappear through the presence of the true insofar as it is true...”66 And 
in 5p24 we read, “The more we understand singular things, the more we understand God.”67 As 
early as the KV we also read, “...the whole only consists of and [exists] through its parts, and so it 
comes that you represent the thinking power as a thing on which the Understanding, Love, &c., 
depend. But you cannot call it the Whole, only a Cause of the Effects just named by you.”68 In the 
KV we can continue to gather support for Spinoza's consistency in some main systematic ideas 
over his texts early and late, even if he did abandon the KV around 1662. Yet, as we learn 
throughout the Ethics, the organic whole is always more powerful than any of its parts.69 
 What has been demonstrated so far includes a rationally understood proto-physics of 
power, force, proportion, and motion of the intellect and of our actions. Ideas affect other ideas 
through their force or lack of force. As ideas have their own essence they can combine in powers 
to become an organic body of their own creating multiple effects at once instead of only a few. 
Rationally understood common notions are the universal properties of things that all rational 
minds have access to by way of recognition in reflection, but not all can use this capacity with 
                                                 
65 Spinoza, Ethics, 4p68: 151. A free man “strives to join other men to him in friendship (by P37)...” 
66 Ibid. 2p1s, 4p1s: 33, 118. 
67 Ibid. 5p24: 173. 
68 Spinoza, KV, Wolf, trans. “Between the Understanding, Love, Reason, and Desire,” 34. Importantly, we then read, 
“And that is why I called the understanding...a cause; and on the other hand, since it consists of its ideas, a whole: so 
also God is both an Immanent Cause with reference to his works or creatures, and also a whole, considered from the 
second point of view.” 
69 This concept is important because, as we read in E4p44s, when we are torn by daily affects (not affections but 
affects) this is because it is related to only certain parts of us and our bodies more than other parts or the organic 
whole, the latter which is our combined body and mind striving for continued existence regardless. 
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the same force of ideational power, creativity, and action. Therefore, we might have to seriously 
consider here if such ideas can be said to be innate?70 Common notions lead us to the increased 
capacity to apply what we have understood in ways that bring great joy, a sense of peace and 
harmony, and a feeling of continued striving for more understanding, but the latter are singular 
experiences of our individual essence. As we know from E2p45, the third kind of knowledge is 
specific to individual essences and not only to or as common notions.71 If it were only about 
common notions then there would not be a need for a third kind of knowledge to be 
distinguishable as its own kind of knowledge. 
 This increased capacity for reasoning leads us to understand more than general things in 
Nature, something Spinoza comments on in 2p13s, but the essence of particular things more 
immediately. Essence is wholly related to both God as cause and to our conatus as striving to 
exist. In E1p25 we read that from each of the previous propositions certain logical conclusions 
are required, including “that from the given divine nature both the essence and the existence of 
things must be inferred.”72 And in Chapter 5 of the TTP we read that “intellectual axioms” are 
that in which our adequate conclusions are drawn “from the force of the intellect and its orderly 
apprehensions.”73 The necessity by which each attribute expresses itself is part of God's 
necessity, that is, what each attribute expresses in its own ways is both all we can know logically 
at that time and all that is possible for that attribute in power.74 In the KV, in the chapter “That 
                                                 
70 In his recent work supporting a theory of human consciousness in Spinoza already noted in this thesis, Eugene 
Marshall concludes that adequate ideas are innate. In my reading, he is both correct and incorrect. Even if adequate 
ideas are innate, the definition we give of adequate knowledge is important at this point because clear and distinct 
knowledge requires, by necessity, that it maintains the capacity to be developed and combined with additional 
adequate knowledge.  
71 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p45: 60. 
72 Ibid. 1p25s: 18, as noted by Richard Mason in The God of Spinoza (59). 
73 Spinoza, TTP, chapter 5: 441. This is also a passage where it is crystal clear we can rely on both sense data and 
observation of natural phenomena and the use of reason at once to draw such necessary conclusions. 
74 Spinoza, Ethics, 1p29s: 52, Mason, 59. This is also related to the references already made in previous chapters to 
the interpretive conclusions of Pierre Macherey. 
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God Exists,” Spinoza has a wonderful footnote where he writes that “it belongs to the essence of 
a mountain that it should have a valley, or the essence of a mountain is that it has a valley; this is 
truly eternal and immutable, and must always be included in the concept of a mountain, even if it 
never existed, or did not exist now.”75 In this vein he also writes in the TTP “...everything in 
Nature involves and expresses the conception of God in proportion to its essence and perfection; 
and therefore we acquire a greater and more perfect knowledge of God as we gain more 
knowledge of natural phenomena.”76 
 Logical error in reasoning diminishes our capacity to strive just as much as something 
overtaking us physically that has more power or is stronger than us externally.77 But the rational 
use of creativity brings us an experience of physical and mental joy and pleasure. Therefore, the 
stronger our capacity to think about an immanent God of which we are both expression and 
effect, the more power of thought we will have.78 Spinoza writes, “They say also that God has no 
knowledge of particular and transient things, but only of the general, which, in their opinion, are 
imperishable. We have, however, rightly considered this to be due to ignorance. For it is 
precisely the particular things, and they alone, that have a cause, and not the general, because 
they are nothing.”79 It is particular things of a singular experience “that have a cause.” This 
deduction concerns the essence of singular things only. Most important to recognize and reflect 
on again is how we confuse concepts of understanding if we ascribe anthropomorphic 
characteristics to God: 
...while we are speaking philosophically, we ought not to use the language of theology... 
But in philosophy, where we clearly understand that to ascribe to God those attributes 
which make a man perfect would be as wrong as to ascribe to a man the attributes that 
                                                 
75 Spinoza, KV, chapter 1: 15. 
76 Spinoza, TTP, chapter 4: 428. This deduction is similar to what we find in E2p13s as well. 
77 See Letter 23 for another example. It was the impetus for a fractured relationship with van Blyenburgh to come.  
78 This is Dan Selcer’s point in footnote 59 above. We can learn how to use imaginative knowledge more rationally. 
79 Spinoza, KV, trans. Wolf,  part 1:6, italics added. 
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make perfect an elephant or an ass, these and similar words have no place, and we cannot 
use them without utterly confusing concepts. So, speaking philosophically, we cannot say 
that God wants something from somebody, or that something is displeasing or pleasing to 
him. For these are all human attributes, which have no place in God.80 
 
Later, in Letter 60, Spinoza writes to friends about how God cannot be ascribed any 
characteristics that are applicable to human expressions with complete identity. This is why the 
nature and function of definition is so important. He continues, “So too, when I define God as a 
supremely perfect being, since this definition does not express the efficient cause...I shall not be 
able to extract therefrom all the properties of God as a being, etc.”81 When we are talking about 
efficient causes, our definitions need to remain within the purview of sets of ideas that are true 
properties of objects, that is, we follow the rule “that the idea or definition of the thing should 
express its efficient cause...” Spinoza, in other words, does not equivocate on the concept of 
necessity.82 The adequate idea of God expresses all of God's causal models. At its core, God (or 
Nature) is the immanent expression of itself in all its possible manifestations. It is its own cause 
at all time for all expressions and effects. 
 If so, what are we to make of our intellectual love of God and acquiring more perfection 
in accordance with God as a thinking thing if we cannot ascribe human characteristics to that 
God? In other words, how do we relate directly to such a metaphysical concept and reality in our 
immanence (as physical human bodies and minds)? Perfection and imperfection are “only modes 
of thinking.”83 Affects are involved on this level because they are the passage from greater or 
lesser degrees of perfection or “certain modes of thinking.” In the TP and the TTP we learn that 
we endeavor to understand everything about human nature as natural phenomena, and in this 
                                                 
80 Spinoza, Letter 23: 833. 
81 Spinoza, Letter 60: 913. 
82 Morgan Laerke, “Spinoza's Cosmological Argument in the Ethics, 440, footnote 6. 
83 Spinoza, Ethics, 4 preface: 115. In the same preface we also read, “Finally, by perfection in general I shall, as I 
have said, understand reality, that is, the essence of each thing insofar as it exists and produces an effect, having no 
regard for its duration.” 
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desire we are closer to expressing God with more perfection. We learn, as Richard Mason writes, 
that “Even human passions such as love, hatred and envy are seen as phenomena which are 
necessary, having 'causes by means of which we endeavor to understand our nature.'”84 In the 
TTP we read:  
...we must unreservedly conclude that we get to know God and God's will all the better as 
we gain better knowledge of natural phenomena and understand more clearly how they 
depend on their first cause, and how they operate in accordance with Nature's eternal 
laws. Therefore, as far as concerns our understanding, those events which we understand 
clearly and distinctly have far better right to be termed works of God, and to be referred 
to God's will, than those of which we are quite ignorant...85  
 
As we also read in chapter two of this thesis, we can have clear and distinct ideas about the ways 
in which the imagination operates, which can be utilized to enhance our singular power of 
reasoning. In Letter 36, Spinoza is clear that the concept of “imperfection” includes that which 
lacks something, and substance does not lack anything in this system.86 He also writes, 
“...perfection consists in being, and imperfection in the privation of being.”87 Our method of a 
rationally powerful understanding includes the following: 
So a good method will be one which shows how the mind is to be directed according to 
the standard of a given true idea. Again, since the relation between two ideas is the same 
as the relation between the formal essences of those ideas, it follows that the reflexive 
knowledge of  the idea of the most perfect Being will be more excellent than the reflexive 
knowledge of other ideas. That is, the most perfect method will be one which shows how 
the mind should be directed according to the standard of a given idea of the most perfect 
Being. From this one can readily understand how the mind, as it understands more 
things, at the same time acquires other tools which facilitate its further understanding.88 
 
In addition, as Piet Steenbakkers (noting passages from the TEI) concludes, “The most perfect 
                                                 
84 Mason, The God of Spinoza, 54. The phrase in Latin reads “causas, per quas eorum naturam conamur.” This is 
one place where I differ from systems such as Spinoza's and even Alan Badiou in contemporary philosophy. Love is 
not calculable in advance, regardless of how many variables one can account for or measurements/data collected. 
85 Spinoza, TTP, chapter 6: 446-447. 
86 Spinoza, Letter 36: 859. 
87 Ibid. 858. 
88 Spinoza, TIE, paragraphs 38 & 39: 242, italics added. 
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method will start from the idea of a most perfect being.”89 
 Ed Curley has asked what the definition of “rationality” becomes within relations 
involving human intuitive knowing? How, in light of the above emphasis, might the definition 
alter? One might also ask: what is the phenomenal experience of intuitive knowledge? E1p31d 
demonstrates Spinoza's belief in our capacity to rationally examine the phenomenal nature of 
more intense forms of overlapping certain knowledge.90 We can do this not only as thought, but 
also understood as the nature of our knowledge about extension. The question is what are the 
types of equivalent actions (physically) when we are intellectually loving God intuitively 
(mentally)? If the intellectual love of God involves intuitive knowing, and intuitive knowing is a 
combination of both rationality and imagination in a way in which our conscious reflection 
grasps the laws of thought while strengthening our imaginings to aid rational processes, then a 
question arises about what rational love would consist of when we have enhanced intuitive 
knowing? It also involves what it is for some ideas of our mind to be understood as eternal. Early 
Modern scholar Ursula Renz notes, “The notion that there is some part of our mind which is 
eternal can, for instance, be equated with the claim that in principle all our subjective experience 
can be expressed in terms of completely true, i.e. eternal truths. Understood in this way, the term 
‘eternity’ is denoting a possible epistemic achievement.”91 Neal Grossman would agree with this 
sentiment writing: 
Philosophers for ages have wondered how something mental can cause something 
physical and vice versa; how can there be an interaction between mind and body. Some, 
like Descartes, give up on the problem and conclude that it is one of those mysteries that 
we humans cannot hope to grasp. Others, like the materialist philosophers who dominate 
the academic scene today, also give up on the problem and conclude that minds do not 
                                                 
89 Steenbakkers, Spinoza's Ethica..., 153. He ends this work stating, “Form always matters when a philosopher has 
something important to say.” True, but what expression these forms take can be rationally creative and diverse. 
90 Ibid. 1p31: 21. 
91 Ursula Renz, “After Spinoza: wiser, freer, happier,” interview by Richard Marshall, 3:AM Magazine, September 
17, 2012, http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/after-spinoza-wiser-freer-happier/2/ 
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exist (or to put it more charitably, that what we call conscious experience is entirely 
produced by the brain). For Spinoza, the mental and the physical are distinct 
manifestations of a single Divine Being and there is no causal influence from one to the 
other. The consequences of this metaphysical picture, when applied to ourselves, are 
enormous.92 
 
 Recall that ideas are modifications of substance which exist along with their cause. 
Together with their affections they create affects. It is the affects we are patterning our thought in 
response to. We need the concept of modes and modifications of substance because, as one 
example, we cannot say that God is the cause of a specific number of things but only of all things 
(singularly expressed) by definition.93 I have already demonstrated that rationally understood 
processes of imaginative knowledge can transform our reflective awareness and habits of thought 
in ways that create stronger, more useful imaginings, which reason can then better recognize as 
aids to its own capacities and power. From this we were able to deduce that one is capable of 
enhancing their power for reflective awareness in ways that influence (as effects) the power of 
rational thinking and bodily movement and capability. This is an expression of God's (or 
Nature's) power. As Spinoza makes clear in the TTP, it is through love for others, both 
intellectual and in our actions, that we can recognize how God can be our expression: “It is only 
through this love [of one's neighbour]...that every man is in God, and God in every man.”94 This 
same sentiment is shared throughout the Ethics. Recall that E1p14 reads, “Except God, no 
substance can be or be conceived” and in 5p14 we read, “The mind can bring it about that all the 
body's affections, or images of things, are related to the idea of God.” In addition, 5p16 reads, 
“The love towards God must engage the mind the most.”95 The mind, in its rational ordering of 
adequate ideas about how our reflection can increase or decrease our power also understands 
                                                 
92 Neal Grossman, The Spirit of Spinoza, 125, emphasis added. I am indebted to Grossman’s friendship and insight. 
93 See Letter 34 here for more elaboration. 
94 Spinoza, TTP, chapter 14: 161. 
95 Spinoza, Ethics, 1p14, 5p14, 5p16: 9, 168, 169. 
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how to use imaginative visualization, for example, to our increased efficient ways of conceiving. 
 Why the above is so important to reflect on and use as a method to understand intuitive 
knowledge further includes the crucial importance of E5p10, p11, p15, and p20 taken together. In 
5p10 we learn just how important tenacity and habitual readiness are for the strengthening of 
conatus. Spinoza writes that a “greater force” is required to order our ideas and affects on a daily 
basis then is required for “uncertain and random” affects. If a greater force is required in order to 
increase our capacity for habitual readiness and rational tenacity, then how might this occur and 
why is Spinoza writing about it as late as E5? He writes, “The best thing, then, that we can do, so 
long as we do not have perfect knowledge of our affects, is to conceive a correct principle of 
living, or sure maxims of life, to commit them to memory, and to apply them constantly to the 
particular cases frequently encountered in life. In this way our imagination will be extensively 
affected by them, and we shall always have them ready.”96  
In this way, memory and imaginative knowledge become crucial for strengthening the 
force required for ordering our ideas about our affections as regular affects. That is, imaginative 
ideas work to help reason create the “greater force” required. This method guarantees that we 
will act from affects of joy and power. E5p11 demonstrates that the more we have a certain 
image in our mind the more power it has over our other ideas. In fact, previously in 4p17s we 
learn that there are times when reason cannot control all one's affects all the time: “My reason, 
rather, is that it is necessary to come to know both our nature's power and its lack of power, so 
that we can determine what reason can do in moderating the affects, and what it cannot do.”97 In 
other words, sometimes even reasoning is not enough because of what it cannot do. We need to 
be aware of what reason cannot accomplish, which is an affirmative use of reasoning. 
                                                 
96 Spinoza, Ethics, 5p10: 166-167. 
97 Ibid. 4p17s: 124, emphasis added. 
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 Why is Spinoza returning so often to the importance of imaginative knowledge again and 
again? Images (as ideas) will continue to affect us in reflection and gain more force the more 
present they are, that is, the more we use a certain image and relate it to other ideas the stronger 
its force becomes. This is because “there are more causes by which it can be aroused and 
encouraged.”98 What we imagine is what is engaging our mind in reflective awareness. The more 
we imagine something the more we start to connect it to other ideas, but in E4 we have already 
learned that affects and the imagination work together to create stronger affects of various kinds. 
E4p11 demonstrates that if we imagine something as necessary (the eternal nature of one organic 
substance for example) the affect will be more powerful than if we imagine something as 
contingent.99 This demonstration is coupled with a discussion on salvation and knowledge of 
human created concepts such as good and evil. The best method we can employ is to use our 
memories and imagination in ways in which we know will guarantee strengthening our habitual 
readiness from affects of joy. Affects (as ideas about the state of our body) are a way for the mind 
to “affirm of its body a greater or lesser force of existing than before...” Our increased force of 
action (ratio of motion and rest) and power of adequate thinking are derived in this way from 
internal causes, and we are aware of this process and its effects directly if we conceive the laws 
of thought adequately. As we read in the KV, an intelligent soul “uses the body as a tool.”100 This 
is another way to understand the direct application of intuitive knowing. When individual 
humans who use visualizations to attain more knowledge of “God” or Nature, they are still using 
reasoning to order their thoughts and meditations appropriately to the more efficient degree. 
 Spinoza writes that we can relate our images to the idea of God. If we add to this what is 
said specifically in 5p15 and p20 we get a very strong picture and more clear understanding, 
                                                 
98 Spinoza, Ethics, 5p11: 168. 
99 Ibid. 4p11: 122. 
100 Spinoza, KV, 2:19, 89, footnote 18. 
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including why this is related to the intellectual love of God. In these propositions we read, “He 
who understands himself and his affects clearly and distinctly loves God, and does so the more, 
the more he understands himself and his affects.”101 Not only is this love “joined to all affections 
of the body,” but the more we understand how this process works adequately the more joy and 
power are produced. This is a singular experience and expression, but it involves the collective 
because the laws of thought and extension work the same for all humans. As the power of our 
mind “is defined by knowledge alone,” we can imagine many individuals joined together in the 
same ways as we are understanding our affects. Spinoza writes that we desire this activity with 
more force once we understand it: “...the more men we imagine to enjoy it, the more it must be 
encouraged... So we can conclude that this love is the most constant of all the affects, and insofar 
as it is related to the body, cannot be destroyed...”102 This works to increase our affects of joy and 
strengthen the force required to order our daily affects in new ways.  As Spinoza lists, we have a 
greater (adequate) understanding of our own affects, we relate those affects to an intrinsic cause 
(the power of our singular mind) and not an external cause, what we understand with greater 
clarity increases our capacities to act with more power and motion (parallelism between the 
attributes), we understand God (substance) as the cause but because it is our understanding 
expressing itself we also know that we are the cause of this greater force and joy, and as a result 
we have a greater power to order our affects. And we all know that the affect of love is the most 
powerful, which is why the intellectual love of God too, as we'll see, is what Spinoza 
concentrates on in the last parts of the Ethics. External causes will be very important for our 
experience of love and joy.103 This coheres with what we learned in E5p20 above because the 
effects created by our rationally loving Nature and our expressions of it add to the overall 
                                                 
101 Spinoza, Ethics, 5p15: 169. 
102 Ibid. 5p20: 170. 
103 Ibid. 4p44: 139. 
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homeostasis of Nature as eternally affirmative.    
Next, Spinoza refers back to E4p5 and writes, “the force of each affect is defined by the 
power of the external cause compared with our own. But the power of the mind is defined by 
knowledge alone...”104 The key common notion relied on is our ability (as knowledge) to 
compare ideas with greater force of thought and, therefore, increase our powers of both thought 
and action as the effect of such comparisons. This is also stated very clearly in 4p33 where we 
read, “The nature, or essence, of the affects cannot be explained through our essence, or nature, 
alone (by IIID1 and D2), but must be defined by the power, that is (by IIIP7), by the nature of 
external causes compared with our own. That is why there are so many species of each affect as 
there are species of objects by which we are affected (by IIIP56).”105 For example, we learn in 
4p66 that it is rationally powerful to desire a greater future than settle for a lesser present 
circumstance. Note that such a desire must use the imagination as well. In the appendix of E4, 
we are reminded to meditate on the varying degrees of power of our affects. Our highest 
happiness (blessedness) is the result of perfecting our powers of reasoning because we are then 
able to rearrange our affects accordingly with more force and increased activity. The habitual 
readiness we acquire is the increased capacity to understand that although we are affected by 
things external to us regularly, our affects can be ordered according to reason, and we are the 
cause of that understanding. As well, if we surround ourselves with others who act rationally, we 
increase our ability to survive and thrive in a way where we are “capable of affecting, and being 
affected by, external bodies in a great many ways,” and “the more the mind is capable of 
thinking...”106 This lends itself to a kind of freedom of thought which is in relation to what 
Spinoza calls blessedness. As we can never exhaust continuing to understand Nature’s possible 
                                                 
104 Spinoza, Ethics, 5p20: 170-171. 
105 Ibid. 4p33: 131. 
106 Ibid. 4 appendix: 155-160. 
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modal modifications and expressions, so too does rational thought require a type of freedom. 
Individual human beings are actual things existing in Nature with their own essence. 
Quoting the Apostle John, Spinoza agrees that “God is love.” As he points out in the TTP, the 
Hebrew word Jadah can be translated as both “to know” and “to love.” To know is to love, to 
love is to know. The word Jehova can also include the meaning “to be,” that is, to exist. In other 
words, to know is to love and to love is to both exist and to understand with more power. There is 
evidence for this series of ideas as their own web of relations in Spinoza's correspondence in 
Letter 21.107 Thus, the intellectual love of God or Nature is how we “acquire a virtuous 
disposition” using reason, which includes what it is to love oneself, others, and a God conceived 
logically and felt as joy. In Letter 23, Spinoza writes “For by a righteous man I understand one 
who has a steadfast desire that each should possess his own, which desire I show in my 
Ethics...arises necessarily in the pious from the clear knowledge they have of themselves and of 
God.”108 Note the emphasis on clear knowledge of both oneself and of the intellectual love of 
God. What we are observing and comparing is the natural phenomena of knowing and living 
both singularly and collectively. This does not include conceiving finite things in abstraction as 
parts or as good or evil, at least not for Spinoza. What it is to have an affect of the intellectual 
love of God includes our understanding of expressions of substance in its power as our 
expressions. Substance cannot be divided: ex quo sequatur, substantium posse dividi.109 In other 
words, God (or Nature), in its effects, has the power to express itself in infinite ways.110  
Intuitive knowledge includes (or just is) the singular intellectual love of God. As Spinoza 
                                                 
107 As noted by Charlie Huenemann in his work Spinoza's Radical Theology, Letter 21 reads, “My intellect does not 
extend so far as to embrace all the means God possesses for bringing men to the love of himself, that is, to 
salvation.” 
108 Spinoza, Letter 23: 834. 
109Spinoza, Ethics, 1p12: 9, as noted by Richard Mason in The God of Spinoza (58). 
110 In this respect Dan Selcer writes, “If I am particularly astute, I may even begin to engineer encounters in order to 
generate and test such commonalities; that is, I may begin to experiment (49).” 
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writes in the KV, “...if we use our understanding aright it will be impossible for us not to love 
God.”111 Amor erga Deum (I am here and I am expressing a love towards...) becomes amor 
intellectualis Dei (the intellectual love of God).112 We experience ourselves as an expression of 
the eternal when we adequately grasp what the rational concept of Eternity (and love) can be for 
a human mind, as Spinoza writes about in E5p31 and 5p39s for example.113 We can adequately 
conceive the difference between finite modes and that which is eternal. Although every finite 
idea is a real expression of Nature, finite modes are not (by definition) eternal. It is only 
immediate, infinite modes and mediate, infinite modes which are conceived as eternal. Thus, as 
we increase our rational comprehension of what Eternity is and how it gets expressed the more 
we experience the profound joy of that which is both unified as one organic whole and conceived 
as our own degree of power. What could be more fun than experimenting with creative 
combinations of rational sets of ideas along with others which not only benefits all involved, but 
also produce experiences with unexpected or novel powerful effects? As Deleuze writes, “…the 
third kind of knowledge has as its formal cause nothing but the soul or understanding itself. It is 
the same with the idea of God: what is expressed is infinity, but what expresses itself is the 
absolute power of thinking.”114 
                                                 
111 Spinoza, KV, chapter 5: 69. As I interpret Spinoza's “God,” it is not the traditional Christian conception of God, 
although there are several citations Spinoza makes that he approves of certain elements of Christianity. One reason I 
believe we can leave the Christian conception of God behind is expressed by Spinoza in Letter 54 where he writes to 
Hugo Boxel that it is silly for anyone to believe that God is defined as something masculine. 
112 I thank Piet Steenbakkers for this particular reference and emphasis made in his courses on Spinoza at Erasmus 
University and Utrecht University in the fall term of 2009 (Netherlands). Errors in reasoning are what I’m most 
interested in, especially as they involve Spinoza’s system. 
113 Spinoza, Ethics, 5p31, 5p39s: 174, 178. 
114 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, 141. What would prevent, I have been asked, a group of Nazis 
claiming the same thing in strength of power? Spinoza’s system is not one of over-powering sad passions, violence, 
and power through domination. In fact, his system demonstrates that such things are not conducive to Nature’s 
power of survive. Those activities will contribute to the destruction of those balancing factors and elements that 
allow for human beings to thrive. We need the Earth is another way to say this and those who destroy the Earth, 
themselves, and others will lose their strength in power and numbers when a more rational body of individuals takes 
over. Spinoza’s point is that large groups of rational individuals are smart enough to be aware of such facts and act 
accordingly when needed. This too is a form of survival. 
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We understand that it is necessary to separate, when needed, the logical series of concepts 
connected to our rational understanding about the relationship between the finite and the infinite. 
Letter 54 clearly reads, “This I do know, that between the finite and the infinite there is no 
relation, so that the difference between God and the greatest and most excellent created thing is 
no other than that between God and the least created thing.”115 In the KV we also read that 
“...human understanding is immortal, because it is a product which God has produced in 
himself.”116 Many years earlier in Spinoza's correspondence in Letter 12 he also writes on 
infinity. Something can be infinite by virtue of its cause or by virtue of its essence. Spinoza 
strictly distinguishes between the two when needed.117 In Letter 64 he does not want to define 
God, substance, or Nature as part of any numerical (or mathematical) distinction. Spinoza calls 
all three the same thing and eternal or of the nature of that which is “an absolutely infinite 
Entity.”118 He addresses the concept of the infinite in the same way again in 1676 in Letter 81, 
one year before his early death. He writes that when we speak about “parts” of Nature, we are 
not then inclined to deduce “an infinity of parts.” This is primarily so because it would include a 
spatial concept and no such spatial concept about an infinity of parts can be clearly and distinctly 
perceived by us when thinking adequately about infinity.119  
Spinoza's conception of a God is not an anthropomorphic idea, which is another reason 
not to name it as something that is “one” thing (as the use of numbers is a tool for human minds 
only).120 Daniel Selcer writes, “...Spinoza's mature metaphysics will reject entirely the notion 
that God, as the sufficient reason for the existence of the world, can be radically separated from 
                                                 
115 Spinoza, Letter 54: 899. For more support how the finite and the infinite are inter-related see Noa Shein's lucid 
and excellent paper “Necessarily Always a Bit Confused,” Spinoza Research Network, June 2012. 
116 Spinoza, KV, 49. 
117 Spinoza, Letter 12: 787. Also http://piratesandrevolutionaries.blogspot.com/2009/07/spinozas-foci-for-deleuzes-
contraction.html. 
118 Spinoza, Letter 64: 919. 
119 Spinoza, Letter 81: 956. 
120 See Letter 56 for more support. 
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it. Instead, he advances an immanent monism that identifies God, substance, and nature (with all 
its immanent expressions) as the same thing, distinguishing them only with respect to whether 
they are grasped in terms of their productive power (natura naturans) or in terms of their 
expression in the dispersed totality defined by the infinite modes that follow in infinite ways 
from God (natura naturata)...”121 We might also turn briefly to the work of George Eliot, the first 
writer (author) to translate Spinoza’s Ethics into English even though her work was suppressed 
from publication. Eliot interprets E3p2 as adequate and intuitive knowing including the ability to 
“retain the impressions or vestiges of objects”122 needed in order to pass into greater perfection. 
Spinoza confirms such a position in some of his earliest work. For example, in the KV we read, 
“...for, as the Understanding is that in us which must know God, and as it stands in such 
immediate union with him that it can neither be, nor be understood without him, it is 
incontrovertibly evident from this that nothing can ever come into such close touch with the 
Understanding as God himself can. It is also impossible to get to know God through something 
else.”123 The only way one can know anything at all is through observation of natural 
phenomena. And this is how one also knows God, but it is not conceived as understanding God 
through something else. Therefore, the understanding of natural phenomena and the immanent 
expression of one’s singular understanding are (logically) the understanding and expression of 
God (or Nature). 
 It is quite common that the importance and coherence of Book 5 of Spinoza's Ethics is 
continuously debated among scholars much more than other books.124 The last book is where we 
                                                 
121 Selcer, Philosophy and the Book, 167. I am indebted to Dr. Selcer for a decade of mentorship and lessons. 
122 Spinoza, Ethics, trans. George Eliot, Saltzburg Studies in English Literature. For more support on how this kind 
of interpretation might work in productive ways one can turn to the work of Warren Montag. 
123 Spinoza, KV, 2:24, 98. 
124 In her otherwise incredibly helpful, lucid, and accessible work on Spinoza's Ethics, Beth Lord concludes that 
intuitive knowledge is impossible for Spinoza. I have to disagree with this aspect of her reading. If it were 
impossible he would not have written that it was difficult yet rare, nor would he have expended so much rational 
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learn about beatitude. To aid our understanding, Spinoza writes, in response to questions put to 
him by Hugo Boxel, “To your question as to whether I have as clear an idea of God as of a 
triangle, I reply in the affirmative. But if you ask me whether I have as clear a mental image of 
God as of a triangle, I reply in the negative. We cannot imagine God, but we can apprehend him 
by the intellect. Here it should be observed that I do not claim to have complete knowledge of 
God, but that I do understand some of his attributes...”125 The imagination is of assistance to the 
understanding when thinking about our singular expressions and interactions with other ideas 
and bodies. The concept of an attribute is not possible without the distinction between that which 
is indeterminate and determinate being in a unified relationship.126 God is conceived as an 
eternal indefinite reality with infinite attributes. We can only know and experience the actions 
and ideas of two as our own expressions. 
It would do well for us at this point to briefly examine some of Nancy Cartwright's work. 
In “The Limits of Exact Science, from Economics to Physics,” Cartwright not only summarizes 
the processes relied on within the science of her time, but she also demonstrates that most likely 
we will never have an exact science about all the possible natural phenomena of Nature. In other 
words, there is no end to particulars and their combinations in the universe. This logical and 
reasonable conclusion effects how we construct our models of measurement. Cartwright's 
position does not damage any of Spinoza's epistemology. Her reading on how we use and express 
human scientific practices only strengthens our possibilities for continued democratic leanings, 
identifications, methods, and enjoyment. In reviewing the “iron law of probability” as “an 
association generated by particular social and economic structures and susceptible to change in 
                                                                                                                                                             
energy explaining what it is. 
125 Spinoza, Letter 56: 905. 
126 Ibid. Letter 36: 859. Both that which is determinate in its determinateness, and that which is indeterminate in its 
indeterminateness, are perfect. If they were not, they would lack something and, therefore, not be distinct in their 
determinateness or indeterminateness respectively. I believe Hegel found one impetus for his work here. 
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these structures,” which apply to the natural phenomena of social interactions, and Cartwright 
concludes:  
The same, I claim, is true of all our laws, whether we take them to be iron – the typical 
attitude towards the laws of physics – or of a more flexible material, as in biology, 
economics or psychology. I repeat the lesson about the dual nature of frequencies and 
propensities: probabilities make sense only relative to the chance set-up that generates 
them, and that is equally true whether the chance set-up is a radio-active nucleus or a 
socio-economic machine.127 
 
 All of our knowledge is an expression of substance and its power, but as we have already 
noted in previous chapters that a clear and distinct conception of God does not include a 
reduction of what we know to that of material substance only. Instead, we are to try and 
understand all that we can about the force of thought and the movements of extension. We cannot 
do this in isolation. Both attributes interact within series of causal actions and reactions 
continuously. There is a necessary conceptual and metaphysical relation between our singular 
expressions of “true ideas” and God (or Nature) in its eternal nature. In Chapter 19 of the TTP, 
we read that our true ideas are “the very percepts of God.”128 Spinoza is not an occasionalist in 
the strict sense where the force of extension is located somewhere outside our ratios of motion 
and rest (or direct effects caused by the power of an attribute would not be possible). Spinoza's 
system is the perpetual self-causing immanence of one substance with infinite modifications in 
the form of the expressions of attributes that are God.129 As we read in E5p24, to truly know 
                                                 
127 Cartwright, “How the Laws of Physics Lie,” 323. “The view of course only matters if the kind of knowledge that 
we need to understand the operation of a socio-economic machine is not itself more knowledge of 'deeper' 
probabilistic and causal laws...the knowledge we need here is knowledge not of laws but of capacities... In the 
simplest sense these capacities can be thought of as probabilistic propensities.” I think Spinoza would agree with 
this sentiment completely.  
128 Spinoza, TTP, chapter 19: 558. 
129 See Dan Garber's “Descartes and Occasionalism” in the edited work Causation in Early Modern Philosophy 
where he tries to demonstrate that Descartes is closer to the ancients than just a precursor for occasionalism. Garber 
concludes, “How God grounds the laws of motion is illustrated in the proofs that Descartes gives for them. These 
proofs are grounded in the celebrated doctrine of continual re-creation... Clearly such a power is not in us; if it were, 
then, Descartes reasons, I would have also been able to give myself all of the perfections I clearly lack...it must be 
God that creates and sustains us... But though the conservation principle may constrain God's activity, it does not in 
any way constrain ours; in our mutability and imperfection, we are completely free to add or subtract motion from 
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singular things well is to know God in the best way possible. Also, to know God well is to know 
singular essences. The infinite is, in this way, an aspect of finite expressions of adequate 
knowledge, which is Spinoza’s point in Letter 64 as well. The infinite and the finite cannot have 
a direct relation to each other conceptually otherwise. This is the only way. If our true ideas, 
expressed in our own singular, determinate ways, are the very percepts of a God, and the former 
is finite whereas the latter is infinite, demonstrating a direct relation is not needed in order to 
comprehend the difference.130 E5p20s explains that this idea is also an affect. It “is the most 
constant of all the affects” and 5p26 explains that our conatus is increased for understanding 
more particulars through the third kind of knowledge the more we experience what that kind of 
knowledge is and can do.131 
 Piet Steenbakkers writes that Book 5 (in both the Latin and the Dutch translations) had 
multiple variations and interpretations added by its publishers and editors: “My hypothesis is that 
Spinoza himself had not written out the final parts of the demonstrations fully and systematically, 
but contented himself with a summary indication...”132 Knowing that Spinoza may not have 
written the exact full demonstrations of the last part of the Ethics (at least not without editorial 
suggestions from friends), and realizing that the majority of the disputes revolving around Book 
5 include its inconsistencies, we can still examine what the eternal parts of our mind might be. 
True intuitive knowledge is possible for a finite mind, but it is a complex issue how to describe 
                                                                                                                                                             
the world... Indeed, it is through our own ability to cause motion in our bodies that we have the understanding we do 
of God and angels as causes of motion.” As an aside, this otherwise excellent collection of essays jumps completely 
over any reference to Spinoza on causality. 
130 This reminds me of work done on Spinoza's radical theology by Charles Huenemann who writes that Leibniz 
helped Spinoza with this formulation when he visited him in the Hague. Huenemann notes, when discussing how 
Leibniz tried to prove we can only logically conceive one God, “Since the proposition that two perfections are 
incompatible cannot be demonstrated to be true, Leibniz infers that it cannot be necessarily true (since, if it were, it 
would be demonstrable). Therefore, it is possible for there to be a being with all perfections... The reason for going 
into these considerations about the compossibility ('being possible together') of attributes is that, for Spinoza, as 
with any geometer, showing the intelligibility of a conceptual entity is sufficient for showing its existence. In logical 
space, to be is to be conceived (39).” 
131 Spinoza, Ethics, 5p20s, 5p26: 170, 173. 
132 Steenbakkers, From manuscript to print..., 136. 
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exactly what it is, although I believe Daniel Selcer’s reading is the most accurate. Spinoza 
already prepared us for the deductions of E5 in earlier sections of the Ethics, particularly within 
E2, of which E5 is intimately connected. 
 Intuitive knowledge includes (finite) rational understanding and enjoyment of singular 
essences in their capacity to increase their powers of thought and action. Intuitive ideas are 
always affirmative and giving us pleasure, and, as stated in E3p54, this type of knowledge uses 
imaginative ideas.133 The power and striving of our mind, as its essence, “affirms only what the 
mind is and can do, not what it is not and cannot do.” Spinoza continues, “So it strives to 
imagine only what affirms, or posits, its power of acting...”134 Next, in 3p55s, a very important 
passage for understanding the entirety of the Ethics, we read, “For whenever anyone imagines 
his own actions, he is affected with joy (by P53), and with a greater joy, the more his actions 
express perfection, and the more distinctly he imagines them, that is (by IIP40s1), the more he 
can distinguish them from others, and consider them as singular things.”135 We have the most 
power of thought and action when our mind is composed more of these types of ideas in 
proportion (adding to the power of our joy as a singular thing). As we learned in previous 
chapters (using E3p17s for support), when the mind has two contrary affects, it tends to vacillate 
instead of having the right force to think in clear chains of adequate ideas. In E4p45s we read, 
“On the contrary, the happier we are, the higher the perfection we rise to...”136 We cannot always 
act in moderation continuously because of unforeseeable external causes, for example, nor is it 
always enjoyable to do so (i.e. joyous passions and passionate joys are a part of human living). 
There are times of great inspiration, for example, where one feels compelled to act, not only 
                                                 
133 Spinoza, Ethics, 3p54: 98. 
134 Ibid. 3p54: 98. 
135 Ibid. 3p55s: 99. 
136 Ibid. 3p17s, 4p45s: 80, 140. 
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because of the joy and energy involved, but also because the original rational ideas being 
experienced and played with. But what are new ideas if they are not put into action but figments 
of one’s imagination? 
 The above passages explain, as does Letter 54, that the effects created in us by our 
perceptions and by our ideas determine how we judge something as beautiful or perfect. Spinoza 
writes, “Beauty...is not so much a quality in the perceived object as an effect in him who 
perceives... So things regarded in themselves, or as related to God, are neither beautiful or ugly... 
Perfection and imperfection are designations not much different from beauty or ugliness.”137 This 
deduction is also expressed in 2p49 as another example. Affirmations, as concepts, are about the 
singular essences of things, and Spinoza has just written that ideas are “concepts of thought.”138 
The key is to become an affirmation of singular essence and, therefore, of the existence of 
substance in its power and expression. Expression is a critical conceptual dynamic for 
understanding Spinoza’s epistemology correctly. As Deleuze writes, “The notion of expression is 
essentially triadic: we must distinguish what expresses itself, the expression itself and what is 
expressed [i.e. the effects]. The paradox is that ‘what is expressed’ has no existence outside its 
expression, yet bears no resemblance to it, but relates essentially to what expresses itself as 
distinct from the expression itself.”139 The increase in our power of affirmation involves being 
able to compare our internal ideas and affects with knowledge of how the laws of thought and 
extension work. More specifically, intuitive knowing includes the intellectual love of God and 
Nature as they are conceived together where our adequate comprehending of ourselves as cause 
                                                 
137 Spinoza, Letter 54: 898-899. 
138 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p48s: 63. See also E2p49. These deductions add to what philosopher Ruth Chang lectures about 
regarding making hard choices. Chang works on moral theory and in a recent TED talk she notes that what we 
perceive individually as really hard choices between two seemingly equal options are actually opportunities to shape 
our character and be creative about who we are and what we want. 
139 Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, 333. 
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of the ideational and extensive effects we experience are recognized and reflected on. The 
concepts and experience of love and enjoyment are very important for this kind of 
epistemological system. As early as the KV, Spinoza writes, “True belief is good only because it 
is the way to true knowledge, and awakens us to things which are really lovable.”140 Indeed, 
when we learn something true that cannot be denied we are awakened to things lovable. Spinoza 
writes in Letter 54 that “beauty” is more an effect than a real thing or even just an idea. It has a 
real effect on us that we incorporate as an affect with our bodily affections (pleasure etc.). Love 
and knowledge are intimately intertwined for Spinoza.141 He claims as much in the opening 
pages of his interpretation and commentary on Descartes's philosophy in the PCP when he 
distinguishes between that which is really difficult and that which is impossible. It is important to 
be capable of thinking well (with more rational force in reflection) so to be able to know the 
difference. In the KV, we read, “As man has not been in existence from eternity, is finite, and is 
like many men, he can be no substance; so that all that he has of thought are only modes of the 
attribute thought which we have attributed to God. ...without God no thing can be or be 
understood. That is, God must first be and be understood before these particular things can be 
and be understood.”142 
 Immediately preceding E2p11, Spinoza emphasizes that although God “does not pertain” 
directly to the essence of singular things, nonetheless, “singular things can neither be nor be 
conceived without God...”143 In the same proposition we also read, “From this it follows that the 
human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God. Therefore, when we say that the human 
                                                 
140 Spinoza, KV, part 2:4, 66, footnote 11 and comment on p. 67. Spinoza will condense what he writes in the KV 
and the TEI by the time of the Ethics in ways that involve more strongly combining rational power with the 
“immediate union with the thing itself” as intuitive knowing. I do not understand Spinoza’s notion of “immediate 
union” as that which is innate. 
141 For a beautiful demonstration on how inseparable these two concepts are in Spinoza see the work by Amile Rorty 
in Feminist Interpretations of Spinoza edited by Moira Gatens. I hold this article close to my heart. 
142 Spinoza, KV, part 2, preface:. 61. 
143 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p10s2: 38. 
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mind perceives this or that, we are saying nothing but that God, not insofar as he is infinite, but 
insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human mind, or insofar as he constitutes the 
essence of the human mind, has this or that idea.”144 I suspect that this is also why, in 2p13s, we 
read that everything prior to this specific proposition has been composed of general statements 
about such important things as a God and human expressions of Nature.145  
 We already read that God does not constitute the essence of any one human mind, but 
singular things cannot be (nor be conceived) without God. God, as a rationally understood idea 
of the attribute of thought, is that concept which modal modifications are also conceived through. 
The idea of me as a thinking thing cannot exist without its relation to God conceived as a 
thinking thing (which has adequate ideas common to all things) and also as Substance itself. Ed 
Curley writes: 
Whatever happens according to the laws of nature is an expression of the power of nature, 
but it is equally, and by that very fact, an expression of the power of God, for the laws of 
nature just are God's decrees regarding nature. To think of them as expressions of a power 
which nature has independently of God is to limit God's power. If God were to act 
contrary to these laws, he would act contrary to his own will, intellect, and nature, which 
is absurd.146 
 
 Right at that point in the Ethics where we learn that we cannot adequately understand our 
own mind without the concept of God, Spinoza asks us to pause and wait for him to fully explain 
the other important elements of his deductive system.147 In other words, our method should 
include that we are to defer our judgment about God until we have as much information about 
                                                 
144 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p11c: 39. 
145 I have recently come to realize that Spinoza is very clear and purposively serious in E2p13s when he writes that 
he has only generalized all major concepts up to that point, and is now prepared to be much more specific about both 
God and about human expressions as modes of thought and extension. This method coheres with working more 
rigorously through E1 to E5.  
146 Curley, “I Durst Not Write So Boldly…,” 554. 
147 I believe this sentiment supports what Spinoza also demonstrates in E2p13s. 
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how the mind forms adequate ideas as is logically possible.148 He knows that we will reject what 
he has so far attempted to demonstrate (as it is not yet adequate enough). It is our singular 
attempts to comprehend the connections between adequate ideas about God as intuitive 
understanding in application to our own lives. Demonstrations by others are not enough...one 
has to experience and understand common notions in the regular application to their own lives. 
This is also why, as we'll read in the next chapter, Spinoza's system is still relevant for us today. 
In the KV Spinoza uses the example of bees to illustrate this point. The activity of bees are about 
preparing for winter, responding to natural sunlight in their dance, and all related, but they are 
also used by man for their honey. In the KV, we read, “So also is it with man, insofar as he is an 
individual thing and looks no further than his finite character can reach; but, insofar as he is also 
a part and tool of the whole of Nature, this end of man cannot be the final end of Nature, because 
she is infinite, and must make use of him, together also with all other things, as an 
instrument.”149 With more understanding about how thought works, the stronger our thinking 
becomes. This is not a performance, but the necessary result of using our affects with power. 
 Spinoza emphasizes the same sentiment in E2p11s when he asks us to use patience and 
“continue on with me slowly, step by step, and to make no judgment on these matters until they 
[we] have read through them all.”150 Whereas in the opening of the Ethics, the generative 
definitions Spinoza uses include the phrase “in so far as we wish to know...,” by Book 5 he relies 
solely on the phrase in so far as we “ought to know.” By the end of the Ethics we have learned 
what it is we ought to know regarding the laws of Nature. Our desire to know more and 
capacities for acquiring more adequate knowledge become enhanced and are more efficient by 
                                                 
148 Of course, if one can demonstrate that they have knowledge of some aspect of God without knowing all of how 
such knowledge is possible, they deserve the opportunity to provide such evidence in a way that can be repeatable. 
149 Spinoza, KV, 2:24: 97. Note the reference to Nature as a gendered “she” as well, which is problematic. 
150 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p11s: 39. 
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using Spinoza’s method. The ways in which we order our ideas according to the nature of our 
conscious reflection and disposition alters in a way that combines rational power between ideas. 
What matters is the regular disposition we learn to acquire more regularly. In Letter 19 Spinoza 
defines those who partake in rational understanding according to this method as expressing the 
intellectual love of God as “conscious.” The “wicked” move about existence “unconsciously.”151 
Clearly, this is a deductive conclusion that requires human consciousness and reflection. Human 
joy is a passage to greater perfection, as noted in the definition of the affects at the end of E3. We 
need conscious awareness and reflection in order to experience such passages.152 Yet, joys can be 
excessive as well, and we learn in 4p63c where we read that joy that is excessive cannot produce 
an increase in desire from the use of reason.153 The desire for continuous learning remains. Our 
motions and ideas regarding Nature's necessity are now more quasi-automatic and more habitual. 
It is not just that reason produces joy; it is also that rational affects can only arise from adequate 
understanding and ideas of reason.154 These passages to greater perfection are included in the 
intellectual love of God. 
 E1p15 states that whatever is, is in God.155 God is conceived as substance, therefore 
whatever is expressed by the universe must, by necessity, be conceived through God as one 
organic whole. The laws of human thought are God's ideas expressed as those laws, but only if 
God is rationally conceived as a thinking thing because this is the only chain of ideas we can 
rationally have about something eternal. God has infinite attributes and one of them is thought. 
Thought is all we have access to as our mind and awareness. God is not conceived as having 
                                                 
151 Spinoza, Letter 19: 807-810. I also believe this is even further support for positions taken on Spinoza and 
consciousness in the work of Eugene Marshall. This letter also shows Spinoza’s fascinatingly acute perception 
regarding the human psychology of animal behaviors in comparison with what we dislike about human behavior. I 
believe that set of comments alone can be used to support a theory of human consciousness as well. 
152 Spinoza, Ethics, 3 definition of affects II: 104. 
153 Ibid. 4p63c: 150.  
154 For how joy can produce a power of the mind see also E3p11, 3p14, and 3p15c, among many other places. 
155 Ibid. 1p15: 10. 
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ideas about the affections of human finite bodies. Our affects are the ideas about our singular 
affections. In other words, we can say that our affects, as ideas about our bodies, are unique to 
our singular expressions, but the laws the attributes abide by are God’s expressions. The latter is 
solely about the nature of what it is to be an expression of one substance that has infinite 
attributes. The human mind is not identified with only one idea (i.e. of only the body as one 
idea). The mind is identified according to both the increasing complexity of the body in relation 
to other bodies (potentia) and its disposition, as well as the increasing habits of reason in relation 
to other ideas expressed by the laws of thought. That is, the mind and the body, in all its causal 
interactions with its environment and other bodies, is the attribute of thought and extension being 
expressed (potestas) in their respective determinate ways. 
 The importance of ideas of the imagination rationally understood in Spinoza's dynamic 
epistemology at this point cannot be overlooked. Inadequate ideas (partial knowledge) are not 
always false or inaccurate; they are merely incomplete knowledge. Imaginative ideas are the only 
source of falsity, but the emphasis here is on the nature of a source. In other words, just because 
they are the only source of falsity does not also entail that they always produce false ideas. Yet, 
none of God's knowledge can be conceived as partial or inadequate. Therefore, there must be an 
element to all our ideas that can be understood under the conceptual and expressive rubric of that 
which is infinite and perfect in one sense and finite and imperfect in another. This is the nature of 
what it is to use (human) logical deduction and adequate ideas about what a finite mind is 
capable, and how infinite substance expresses itself. The example is that we are only one mind 
and body and yet, we can think about what it entails for something to be eternally in existence. 
 Spinoza scholars Herman De Dijn and Richard Mason (noted above) summarize what is 
required when tackling Spinoza's epistemology from the perspective of his ontological 
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deductions. Mason writes that we must take into account the first premise of Spinoza's ontology 
in order to comprehend either his epistemological or ontological system adequately. Mason 
extracts from the TTP quoting directly, and writes that, in our chain of adequate ideas about both 
ourselves and about Nature, “God or nature comes first, the mind second: 'our intellect and 
knowledge depend solely on the idea or knowledge of God, and spring from it and are perfected 
by it.'”156 This must occur after we learn that there is only one substance (logically) and then 
defer judgment until we learn how the laws of thought and ratios of motion and rest (extension) 
work with greater perfection for us singularly. It is then that we can return again to the 
intellectual love and knowledge of God, as Spinoza does by ending the Ethics in this exact way. 
The Ethics is structured with knowledge about how there is only one substance with infinite 
attributes and includes how finite individuals express two of those attributes, but leads to the 
nature of human (finite) ideas and bodies, the power of human affects, and the intellectual love 
of God. In this way we realize that all modes are not to be conceived as only finite. This is 
because our adequate idea of God includes an identity with what we understand as an infinite, 
immediate mode of thought, that is, as the laws of Nature of human thought that are necessarily 
and eternally expressed.157 Mason continues: 
 In response to the question, how does God exist? Spinoza's thought was that God exists in 
infinite ways as one substance. That was not an answer or a solution – just as the 
'question' was never put so directly. It was not an answer because the basic thought that 
God exists in infinite ways as one substance advances a discussion hardly at all in itself. 
It helps only in so far as we understand that Spinoza meant to take his assumptions as 
literally as he stated them, and in that he intended to pursue them consistently. There 
were, he believed, different ways in which nature – things in nature – can be conceived... 
What Spinoza needed was a framework to capture the notion that God or nature could be 
characterized in the most basic sense, in an unlimited number of ways. And he could not 
have wanted to interpret that notion so that it might impute to God any kind of 
unintelligibility...158 
                                                 
156 Mason, The God of Spinoza, 106. 
157 For support see Spinoza's Ethics 1p17s, 1p21-23, 1p29s, and 1 Appendix. 
158 Ibid. The God of Spinoza, 47, 49. 
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 Recall that, as E2p11c notes, it is not that God constitutes our essence as something 
necessary but only in relation to the fact that all of our ideas are expressions of the attribute of 
thought. And yet, because we are finite, every idea we have can also be understood from the 
perspective of a finite mode. In fact, it must be understood in that way. Not only does this not 
destroy Spinoza's parallelism, but what appears to be a contradiction is actually a chain of 
deductive arguments which, at one point, are understood according to the relation of every idea 
alongside the idea of a God conceived as a thinking thing, and then, in another way, can be 
understood in relation only to the ideas a finite mind had prior that led to the ideas in reflective 
awareness. This awareness though cannot be completely deduced or described within any 
arrangement of concepts of human temporality other than the way in which Spinoza has 
understood finite duration. Actual time and space cannot exist as logical dimensions within a 
system that is an eternal and organically expressive unified whole with infinite expressions in 
infinite ways.159 In E4p62s we read, “But we can have only a quite inadequate knowledge of the 
duration of things (by IIP31), and we determine their times of existing only by the imagination 
(by IIP44S), which is not equally affected by the image of a present thing and the image of a 
future one.”160 
 Because duration is always in relation to what it is to be finite (our sense of time being a 
part of imaginative knowledge), we need to train our mind to strive towards a rational 
disposition about laws of Nature of both thought and extension and about the nature of cause and 
effect. These laws are conceived through themselves as part of what attributes are, and each 
attribute’s parallel causality can be enhanced to produce more powerful effects by adequately 
                                                 
159 We read in Plato's Parmenides (lines 141 a-e, 934) that all that is One cannot be understood using human 
conceptions of temporality. So this is not a new concept in Spinoza, but he develops monism in new ways. 
160 Spinoza, Ethics, 4p62s: 149. 
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comprehending what it is for Nature to be self-caused and eternal. As expressions of one organic 
substance, we also express a degree of eternity in our own determinate ways. Your ways are 
different, perhaps more effective or powerful, than my ways. That is, we can express the 
adequate conception of the intellectual love of God, or Nature, depending on the perspective 
(disposition) we hold, as well as the deductive chain of adequate ideas used to create the effects 
of understanding. This is why the concept of singularity and individual subjectivity cannot be 
completely done away with in Spinoza. 
 Reasoning about the laws of the attributes of thought and extension will include 
concentrating, in reflective awareness, on that which is sub specie quadum aternitatis from the 
perspective of a finite, singular essence. This leads to the logical conclusion that ideas about the 
affections of our bodies, that is, of a human mind as the idea of its body, must be understood in 
at least two different ways. For Spinoza, there is no true opposition here, only difference in 
degrees of ideational complexity and expressive power or capacity. In other words, we are God 
in our expressions as substance, just to a lesser degree of power. We are substance, but we are not 
all of substance. Beth Lord writes, “Because it is part of the infinite intellect, the essence of 
every finite mode is eternal.”161 
Necessarily Finite in Our Expressions of Eternity 
 
 The concept of freedom is an important part of Spinoza system, particularly as it relates 
to the last two books of the Ethics. As noted in previous chapters, freedom is understood as 
acting from one's determined singular essence while entering into relations with others and 
discovering (through reflective awareness) the causes of the effects we experience as our own 
increases or decreases in power. In other words, we can select which perspective and disposition 
we hold in our reflective awareness based on our understanding. Our bodies and ideas change as 
                                                 
161 Lord, Spinoza's Ethics: An Introduction, 147. 
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we come into contact with the forces of other bodies and ideas. We can engage in rational 
thinking, but we interact with these laws through our singular reflection, awareness, sense 
perceptions, and habitual dispositions or habits. Effects are the product of the coming-together 
and decomposition of relations between bodies and ideas, but the interaction with imaginative 
ideas when one alters their disposition is an internal process experienced singularly. Nonetheless, 
this recomposition between ideas has already been affected by previous ideas that we have had, 
both internally and externally, in causal chains.  
 Consider how many combinations, rearrangements, and decompositions are occurring in 
an eternally existing substance. In the first part of the KV Spinoza writes about the distinction 
between the concepts of generation and creation, composition and decomposition. He writes, 
“...men are not created, but only begotten, and that their bodies already existed, but in a different 
form.”162 He clearly states that we also cannot think of ideas as “created.” They are merely 
unique expressions (ways) of the laws of thought (laws of Nature which are causal). We must 
think of our ideas as continually “generated” and rearranged, and new combinations are always 
possible through conceptual blending. When something is conceived as that which is “created,” 
we immediately posit both its existence and its essence. This is why, logically, positing the 
existence of an eternal God must also include that it is self-caused and continually self-creating 
in essence. But the meaning of that which is continually “generated” (or regenerated) involves 
positing only the nature of existence.163 That is why we are concerned with our singular conatus 
as a way to express our power in existence. 
We can possibly deduce that, depending on which of the three types of knowledge we are 
reflecting on, the mind can be conceived as both representational and non-representational. This 
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outcome, if possible, is still up for debate. Ed Curley writes, “Persons must be mind-bodies, an 
indissoluble unity which can be considered from two points of view, and with two distinct 
vocabularies and two distinct kinds of causation.”164 Curley's point is that there is not a logical 
possibility of a causal relationship between thought and extension. The result is that we cannot 
say that one attribute represents the other. What, then, is the equivalent of bodily action when we 
are adequately comprehending the intellectual love of God and how can a human mind 
adequately describe such a thing? Part of this answer is made clear in the TTP when Spinoza 
writes that we should join with others of like mind in friendship, love our neighbors, practice 
charity, and continue to strive towards understanding. Such experiences enhance our powers of 
thinking and acting with more affirmative effects. In this way of expressing human desires, 
capacities, needs, and use of rationality we are expressing the intellectual love of God (and 
Nature). When we are happy we are free. 
 Potentia Mentis is more than this as well. This term and concept was referenced in 
Chapter Three. We must first understand the meaning of what it is for the human mind to be the 
idea of its body prior to truly understanding Spinoza's claims about the mind and body being one 
and the same thing, that is, as expressions of the power of Nature, or God. The following quote 
by Spinoza bears repeating in this respect: “When you say that by making men so dependent on 
God I reduce them to the level of elements, plants, and stones, this is enough to show that you 
have completely misunderstood my views and are confusing the field of intellect with that of the 
imagination.”165 What this statement also demonstrates is that Spinoza clearly feels human 
consciousness, thinking, and acting are not the same as the animated activity of the extension of 
plants or stones. The “elements” don’t imagine with joy. 
                                                 
164 Spinoza, Ethics, introduction: xv. Further, we can locate some evidence for David Hume's indebtedness to certain 
aspects of Spinoza's system expanded upon in the work of Wim Klever. 
165 Spinoza, Letter 21: 825. 
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 The deduction that human conscious experience is real and includes certain 
characteristics and laws is not problematic for Spinoza’s system because we cannot understand 
the power of either substance or how we express substance in finite ways unless we also 
understand the laws of thought and extension as two points of view of the same thing. One 
conceptual effect includes the new knowledge that Spinoza's epistemology and ontology are 
collapsed into one while continuing to understand that each can also be understood separately. In 
other words, what we logically realize is that our finite mind and body are one and the same 
thing and were all along, but each must be described in completely different ways. They are 
comprehended as God and Nature. The definition of affect is important here yet again. Curley 
writes, “We may think of a particular thing (animal or person) as having an aim and appetite of 
its own, which explains its behaviour...as a desiring and perceiving creature; or we may explain 
the thing's behaviour as the effect of external causes, and this is the model of a mechanical 
explanation.”166 Both ways should be explored separately, but they are always one and the same 
thing. It takes the training of the mind to clearly differentiate between these sets of ideas in their 
separateness and as the same thing without falling into contradiction or negation. As Spinoza 
writes in E1p25c, “Particular things are nothing but affections of God's attributes, or modes by 
which God's attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way...”167 Therefore, to 
understand intuitively is to realize the above deduction’s validity (and subsequent consequences) 
in the ontology of the everyday. It is also to understand why “substance” is always logically prior 
to its affections. 
 If our starting point is that we have a mind inside our bodies spatially, a mind that has 
ideas, then it is not logical to also say that the mind is ideas. Yet, instead, if we begin from the 
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understanding of what it logically entails for all of Nature to be both one substance with 
infinitely connected causal interactions and that this whole is continually expressing itself 
according to degrees of power that exist as the separate laws of Nature of its attributes, then the 
non-spatial notion that the mind is ideas is logical. This is why Spinoza spends Book 1 of the 
Ethics on his ontological argument before appealing much more specifically to his epistemology 
and the nature of affects in later books. It’s true that substance, as a logical concept, must be 
understood adequately before the affections of substance, but this is also not even possible until a 
human mind understands how human minds and bodies think and act according to their laws. In 
other words, as evident in the opening proposition of the Ethics, ontology precedes epistemology 
for Spinoza. It is also another reason why several Spinoza scholars have written about Spinoza's 
method and/or form as such an important topic. This debate includes the need for analysis 
between sets of ideas in relation to each other and only then acts of conceptual synthesis about 
what has been deduced (along with its logical implications afterward). Referencing the process 
of analysis and synthesis, just as this thesis began referencing, Piet Steenbakkers writes, “For 
Spinoza method [as in the ordo geometricus]...involves both moments...”168 In my reading, 
therefore, such a method requires human consciousness. As Spinoza writes in the TEI, the reason 
for conscious reflection about the types of ideas and power between them is “...so that we may 
thereby come to know our power of understanding and may so train the mind that it will 
understand according to that standard all that needs to be understood laying down definite rules 
and aids... From this we may conclude that method is nothing but reflexive knowledge, or the 
idea of an idea.”169 This is another clear indication why readings such as Della Rocca’s do not 
work. Such readings do not take seriously enough the affects in creating our most efficient and 
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169 De Dijn, Spinoza: The Way to Wisdom, 67, 69. 
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rationally creative effects in our expressions as substance. 
 In the same set of adequate ideas used to distinguish between understanding laws of 
Nature from understanding that which is partial, abstract, or in error rationally, we can also 
recognize how reason alters our affects. Anthony Paul Smith writes, “There is no strict separation 
between reason and affects [in E5], for reason can act on an affect and change it from a passion 
to an action when we form a clear and distinct idea of it (Evp3), and an affect can arise from or 
be aroused by reason (Evp7).”170 Yet, as we have learned, rational knowledge is composed of 
ideas, and affects are both an idea and an affection together. Affects are not ideas, but ideas help 
shape affects into new affects. The body matters, but Spinoza's deductive order starts with God's 
essence as concept in book 1 of the Ethics and proceeds for all other concepts from there 
derivatively.171 Nonetheless, naturally, we cannot adequately realize the complete synthesis of his 
argument until we first understand the laws of human thought and action as well. All of this leads 
to the singular expression of the intellectual love of God if we have worked through the system 
deductively and synthesized it adequately. It is only after we understand the nature of rational 
analysis, the priority of specific concepts which result as ideational effects of such analysis, and 
the synthesis that also results that we realize what our reflective processes involve and how they 
express more powerful affects as God (as Nature). Affirmative affects that we are the adequate 
cause of are actions. As Spinoza writes in both E2p7 and earlier in the TEI, what is necessary is 
that we deduce what we know “from physical things...” He writes: 
As to the ordering of all our perceptions and their proper arrangement and unification, it 
is required that […] we should ask whether there is a being – and also what kind of being 
– which is the cause of all things so that its essence represented in thought is also the 
cause of all our ideas. Then our mind […] will reproduce Nature as closely as possible; 
for it will possess in the form of thought the essence, order, and unity of Nature. Hence 
we can see that it is above all necessary for us always to deduce our ideas from physical 
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things, i.e. from real beings, advancing, as far as we can, in accordance with the chain of 
causes from one real being to another real being.172 
 
 The ordering of perceptions is the ordering of our ideas through the reflective lens of 
conscious awareness and adequate understanding about both the essence of God and our essence 
as conatus. Chapter 3 of the TTP can be directly correlated, in my reading, with two of the most 
important propositions of the Ethics, 2p7 and 2p11: 
By God's direction I mean the fixed and immutable order of Nature, or chain of natural 
events; for I...have already shown elsewhere, that the universal laws of Nature according 
to which all things happen and are determined are nothing but God's eternal decrees, 
which always involve eternal truth and necessity. So it is the same thing whether we say 
that all things happen according to Nature's laws or that they are regulated by God's 
decree and direction.173 
 
Therefore, the intellectual love of God, or intuitive knowing, can be an awareness of our chains 
of ideas and actions as laws of Nature or as that which is “regulated by God's decree and 
direction.” All natural phenomena involve eternal truth. The important point here is that we have 
already learned that a substance monism of one organic and eternal whole is that which is 
immanently expressed.174 Even errors in our awareness are substance in expression in their own 
determinant way. To recognize errors in reasoning we need to develop the habits of a rational 
method already understood as remaining aware of the laws of thought and extension. It is one 
thing for something “to be” and another thing “to be conceived.” 
 Although the attributes of thought and extension are ontologically identical, they have 
separate types of determinate effects that have already been described as three different kinds of 
modes. Related to this are the three categories of modal modifications to describe how substance 
is immanently expressed by each attribute. These are the infinite immediate modes, infinite 
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mediate modes, and finite modes already discussed in previous chapters. To have an idea about 
what an infinite, mediate mode is is to understand that such modes express the totality of all 
possible ideas mediated by substance as a modification of itself. This expression is a true idea 
that we can understand about the nature of infinite, mediate modes, even when we cannot 
express all the ideas that are possible in a substance that is eternally expressing itself. The 
infinite, immediate modes are the actual laws of each attribute, and they can be read about in 
E2p21, p23, and p31, among other places. Because expressions of the laws of Nature occur 
continuously and in infinite ways, we cannot possibly have a singularly complete experience of 
them, but we can have adequate knowledge about what an infinite, immediate modal 
modification is by definition. Each thing is caused by its own laws of Nature in an infinite and 
immediate way continuously because God (Nature) is eternally in existence. The adequate idea 
of God that we can have is also the infinite, immediate mode of thought conceived through an 
attribute of substance. That is, it is the idea of God as action, as immanently expressed, and not 
any idea of a “representation” of a God as external to us. As we’ve read in E1p25, “God is the 
efficient cause, not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence.”175 Spinoza 
continues to write that all modes are “nothing but affections of God's attributes.”176 Therefore, 
substance is logically the cause of all modal modifications as effects, but we are expressing 
substance at all times. Our expressions can be understood as both causes and effects. We can, for 
example, conceive ourselves as an adequate cause of the effects of substance determined in a 
singular way. 
Recall that, for Spinoza, we cannot attribute anthropomorphic concepts to God, so why 
would we attribute to God an interest in human affairs and desires? We express God conceived as 
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a thinking thing and a thing whose existence is eternal in an immediate way. Spinoza writes: 
 Since certain things had to be produced by God immediately, namely, those which follow 
 necessarily from his absolute nature [infinite immediate modes], and others (which 
nevertheless can neither be nor be conceived without God) had to be produced by 
mediation of these first things [infinite mediate and finite modes], it follows: I. That God 
is absolutely the proximate cause of the things produced immediately by him, and not a 
proximate cause in his own kind, as they say. For God's effects can neither be nor be 
conceived without their cause (by P15 and P24C)... II. That God cannot properly be 
called the remote cause of singular things... For a remote cause we understand one which 
is not conjoined in any way with its effect...177 
 
Notice the separation in conceptual thinking and categories here. God is to be conceived as the 
proximate cause of things produced immediately, but is the immediate cause of itself because it 
is of its own kind. If this is true, and it is in a logically deductive sense, then this system requires 
different versions of modal modifications. No effect of substance can be adequately conceived 
without involving its cause. A true effect always involves its cause in Spinoza’s system. Any 
singular awareness or expression of this is an effect of its cause. If we are using human logic to 
understand such a system, then we have to find ways to separate what a cause is from its effects 
and expressions with the knowledge that all effects involve their cause(s).  
Infinite, mediate modes, by contrast, maintain a much more nuanced and controversial 
interpretation. You can read about how they operate in E2p22 and 2p23, as well as Letter 64 and 
other places. Spinoza writes that they are “the face of the whole universe.” Ed Curley translates 
this as “...those features of that individual which enable it to retain its identity through change, 
that is, the contrast relationships between its parts... The mediate infinite mode of the attribute of 
extension is supposed to follow from the absolute nature of the attribute of extension, timelessly, 
logically, and without the need for any other cause.”178  
An adequate idea is recognized by the way in which that idea is determined, but also in 
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its truth by definition. Ideas can be felt as an element of our affects. To have an adequate idea is 
also to have a mental action that is non-physical yet composed of power and force. The brain’s 
actions that parallel are a part of extension. Ideational affective responses include an awareness 
that one is thinking with rational force (as we read in previous chapters). That expression is 
singular, but the action can also be defined as that which is the immanent action of God (or 
Nature) conceived as a thinking thing. The mediated aspect is that we have to include all possible 
expressions of the singular sort of that attribute, but all possible expressions of substance are also 
defined as logically infinite as well. To have adequate ideas about other adequate ideas is an 
action as well. They are ideas in relation to each other within their own series of logical 
relationships that are both finite and infinite. The same applies to the singular actions of the 
attribute of extension. The series of fixed and eternal things includes “that if we really want to 
understand the series of singular changeable things, we must attend to the series of fixed and 
eternal things.”179  
The above reading coheres with what I have emphasized about the imagination in 
Chapter Two and brings us to finite modes. A finite imaginative idea used with more rationally 
understood power by a singular individual can be classified in two different ways, as both active 
and passive. To think rationally and intuitively includes not only conscious awareness of what it 
is to understand necessary truths (common notions) more clearly and distinctly (or be used with 
more power), but it also includes understanding how the ideas of the imagination operate in a 
form of conceptual blending. Susan James notes, “The passionate life might be perfectly ok most 
of the time...but it is insecure...it could turn out you are mistaken.”180 To understand the laws by 
which imaginative knowledge is produced is another type of rational common notion, as we 
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learned in previous chapters. Our rational and imaginative ideas effect other ideas in series 
continually connected to their respective type of knowledge. We can use our powerful series of 
ideas to cause effects in the minds of others as well. Yet, as Beth Lord writes, “No matter how 
rational a person becomes, he will never be able to avoid the affects altogether: they interrupt the 
flow of rational ideas and determine our thinking and acting.”181 This is where Spinoza’s system 
differs significantly from many other Western philosophical systems. As we enhance the power 
of conscious reflection, our combined knowledge becomes more useful and enjoyable for us. We 
become more consciously aware of what it is to have shifting registers of ideational power and 
usefulness with a method that recognizes that ratios of motion and rest run parallel with our 
reasons for our motions. Spinoza writes, “It is enough, I say, for us to understand the common 
properties of the affects and of the mind, so that we can determine what sort of power, and how 
great a power, the mind has to moderate and restrain affects.”182  
This brings us back to the nature of affects and is how I will end this thesis. Affects, as 
we've already read, are at the core of Spinoza's dynamic epistemology. Ideas of intuition 
(knowledge of the essence of singular things) are real, natural things. They are ideas involving 
knowledge about other ideas of the first and second kinds, and act as a type of knowledge that 
can be put to use. This can become easily confused when, for example, we believe we have free 
will. I may prefer coffee in the morning and you may prefer tea, but our separate decisions are 
not acts of free will. There is a cause for the affect I have which I associate with other ideas and 
actions, while your associations are different but still related to each other by the laws of thought 
and extension in the same way as are mine. Spinoza writes, “For of each thing there is 
necessarily an idea in God, of which God is the cause in the same way that he is of the idea of 
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the human body. And so, whatever we have said of the idea of the human body must also be said 
of the idea of any thing.”183 It is singular adequate thinking that understands the difference. All 
things, in their own determinate way, strive to continue to exist. E1p17c2sII reads, “Hence, they 
can agree entirely according to their essence. But in existing they must differ.”184 Because 
everyone does not use reason regularly, this insight demonstrates that human essence agrees in 
being made of degrees of power but existence differs on a singular level. Perhaps this would 
have been a great proposition to begin this chapter with, but it logically synthesizes with other 
important ideas currently to create more ideational power. As Antonio Negri writes, “The realm 
in which singularities are immersed, the phenomenological fabric of existence, is in fact a fabric 
of hard relations...”185 Hard relations require individuals with reflective consciousness. Negri 
often refers to Spinoza's system as that which has “personality,” and as a realistic ethics for 
living; as that which lucidly describes the nature of true human experiences. And, as Anthony 
Uhlmann writes in Spinoza Now, “Intuition, then, also involves affect...”186 Spinoza confirms this 
when he writes in Chapter 4 of the TTP that what it entails for us to have knowledge of an effect 
through its cause “is nothing other than the knowledge of a property of that cause...”187  
The best we can do is adequately conceive of the cause of our effects which is both 
involved in those effects and stronger than them. Spinoza, in discussing the impossibility of 
miracles, writes: 
For since a miracle is an event of a limited nature, expressing a power that is never other 
than fixed and limited, from such an effect we could not possibly conclude the existence 
of a cause whose power is greater than that effect. I say 'the most' because an event can 
also be the result of several simultaneously concurring causes, the force and power of the 
result being less than all the causes taken together, but far greater than the power of each 
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separate cause.188 
 
 The adequate idea of God is an eternal expression. The Hebrew term for both thought as 
deliberation and for vigilance is mezima. Spinoza wrote a compendium for Hebrew grammar so 
he was highly familiar with the language and its many uses. As already noted, the Hebrew word 
for what it is to know something can also be defined as what it is to love. In addition, the Hebrew 
word for God can also be defined as “to be.” Thus, to know is to deliberate and to have vigilance 
in doing so. It is also to love, just as we see in Spinoza’s definition of blessedness, and to love 
can also be understood as what it is to exist. In an absolutely beautiful and modern passage, 
Spinoza summarizes these deductions in E4p45s. I quote the passage at length as no element can 
be left out. The passage is at the heart of Spinoza's dynamic proto-physics of thought and action 
and a theory of human affects: 
Nothing forbids our pleasure except a savage and sad superstition. For why is it more 
proper to relieve our hunger and thirst than to rid ourselves of melancholy? My account 
of the matter, the view I have arrived at, is this: no deity, nor anyone else, unless he is 
envious, takes pleasure in my lack of power and my misfortune; nor does he ascribe to 
virtue our tears, sighs, fear, and any other things of that kind, which are signs of a weak 
mind. On the contrary, the greater the joy with which we are affected, the greater the 
perfection to which we pass, that is, the more we must participate in the divine nature. To 
use things, therefore, and take pleasure in them as far as possible...this is the part of a 
wise man. It is the part of a wise man, I say, to refresh and restore himself in moderation 
with pleasant food and drink, with scents, with the beauty of green plants, with 
decoration, music, sports, the theater, and other things of this kind, which anyone can use 
without injury to another. For the human body is composed of a great many parts of 
different natures, which constantly require new and varied nourishment, so that the whole 
body may be equally capable of all the things which can follow from its nature, and 
hence, so that the mind also may be equally capable of understanding many things at 
once.189 
 
The transitions to greater degrees of perfection are discussed in the preface to E4, and they bring 
us greater and greater joys of all types. Spinoza explains that perfection is the adequate 
                                                 
188 Spinoza, TTP, chapter 6: 448. This is also why a theory of representation will not work applied to Spinoza’s 
system. 
189 Spinoza, Ethics, 4p45s: 140-141, emphasis added. 
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understanding of “reality.” Yet, not all knowledge of reality is joyous. Our greater disposition 
towards understanding reality involves intuitive knowing because it is the understanding of “the 
essence of each thing insofar as it exists and produces effects” without regard to its duration.190  
We can have an idea that is conceived both as constituting God's idea and as not 
constituting it.191 It is here, among other places, that I feel theories of representation will not 
work to fully capture Spinoza's system. For example, Della Rocca writes, “Similarly, the fact that 
a given idea has one content relative to God's mind and a different content relative to the human 
mind must be explained by some difference between the two minds.”192 But the point is that we 
can never know God's mind fully or we would be God. We can only know our mind as ideas, and 
we understand that its power of adequate expression is God conceived as a thinking thing 
expressing itself as natural phenomena. We, therefore, have no real need to distinguish between 
this difference Della Rocca points to. We can investigate with more depth human phenomena as 
expressions of God (or Nature’s laws). 
 Rationality can recognize the truth of the limits of human finiteness while also 
maintaining a disposition towards its own continued activity as an expression of an eternal 
substance. In E4p18s we read, “Since reason demands nothing contrary to Nature, it demands 
that everyone love himself, seek his own advantage, what is really useful to him, want what 
really leads a man to greater perfection...This, indeed, is as necessarily true as that the whole is 
greater than its part...”193 But one's mind cannot operate in isolation. If a mind and body did not 
understand anything but itself it would be imperfect and there is nothing imperfect in Nature. 
                                                 
190 Spinoza, Ethics,  4 preface: 116: “For no singular thing can be called more perfect for having persevered in 
existing for a longer time.” 
191 Spinoza, Ethics, 1p21: 16-17. E1p16 also reads that we can infer more properties about a thing “the more the 
definition of the thing expresses reality, that is, the more reality the essence of the defined thing involves.” 
192 Della Rocca, Representation..., 68-69. 
193 Spinoza, Ethics, 4p18s: 125. 
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Spinoza continues, “There are, therefore, many things outside us which are useful to us, and on 
that account should be sought. Of these, we can think of none more excellent than those which 
agree entirely with our nature...”194 These activities aid in our capacity to produce more powerful 
effects, especially when we combine with others of a similar nature and disposition to form a 
larger body of action. As Richard Mason summarizes so well: 
The system is meant to be self-propelling. Knowledge of nature – of our nature – can lead 
to virtue because we will correctly understand our interests as part of our nature, and we 
want such knowledge because our nature also includes a positive drive towards activity – 
an accumulation of truths and a diminution of falsehoods. We want knowledge not 
because truth is attractive – that would be teleology – but because the positive side of our 
nature has a drive towards it...195 
 
As we read in E4p66, a proposition which is key to the adequate understanding of the Ethics, 
when we are acting from reason “we want a greater future good in preference to a lesser present 
one, and a lesser present evil in preference to a greater future one.”196   
 Virtue was discussed as part of reason in Chapter Three, but it must also include the 
nature of affect and power in intuitive knowledge as well. Virtue is a part of our rational use of 
imaginative knowledge to enhance our power and expressions of thought and extension. Yet, if 
so, then as we read in E4p17s earlier, affects and the use of reason are different, as reason cannot 
control all of our affects. Spinoza reminds us that we have to learn about the power of reason so 
we can distinguish what reason can and cannot do in relation to our affects. In this way, what is 
written in books 4 and 5 of the Ethics on virtue and power is critical to evaluate correctly. For 
example, 4p20 states that virtue is “human power itself, which is defined by man's essence 
alone...,” and in 4p22c we read that our self-preservation “is the first and only foundation of 
                                                 
194 Spinoza, Ethics,  4p18s: 125. 
195 Mason, The God of Spinoza, 145, emphasis added. This is also another way to understand how Spinoza differs 
From Stoic philosophy. Mason writes, “Spinoza believed that the stoics made the emotions subject to the will. He 
could not accept that. We are not made that way. That is not our true nature. How we are – our nature – is that we 
are part of nature as we are, with the drives that we have, having the power that they have (141).” 
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virtue.”197 Recall, in the TTP, that a man can strive to preserve his or her nature without the use 
of reason. If affects are also about power, and not everyone uses reason well, then virtue is 
conceptually about more than that which involves only adequate ideas. This is also why, I 
believe, Spinoza injects another idea about what it is “to be blessed” right between these two 
propositions in 4p21. In 4p21 we learn one has first to desire “to be, to act, and to live, that is, to 
actually exist” before they can then desire “to act well and to live well.”198 This is also why 
suicide cannot be a justified rational action according to this system. You have to desire to exist 
before you can also desire to live and act well. Even so, we still learn that all of Nature benefits 
and we increase our own advantage by using reason. By reasoning well our desire to understand 
more is strengthened, but this leads us to understanding that God and Nature are identical, at 
least in the sense of what a human mind can rationally comprehend: “Knowledge of God is the 
mind's greatest good; its greatest virtue is to know God.”199 And we could not exist nor be 
conceived if we “did not have the power to enjoy this greatest good.”200 We might ask at this 
point if a phenomenological account of temporality is required? One example to explain why we 
have to include some temporal concerns (even though duration is only partial knowledge) is 
found at the start of E4 in the preface: 
 But here it should be noted in addition that just as we can distinctly imagine distance of 
 place only up only up to a certain limit, so also we can distinctly imagine distance of time 
only up to a certain limit. ...we imagine to be equally far from the present all those 
objects whose time of existing we imagine to be separated from the present by an interval 
longer than that we are used to imagining distinctly; so we relate them, as it were, to one 
moment in time.”201 
 
 The dynamics of force and power involved in the expressions of Nature are infinitely 
                                                 
197 Spinoza, Ethics, 4p20, 4p22c: 126, 127. In chapter 3 of the unfinished PT we read that the most essential feature 
of a human being is “to preserve themselves” and that this preservation is a “striving.” 
198 Spinoza, Ethics, 4p21: 127. 
199 Ibid. 4p28: 129. 
200 Ibid. 4p36s: 133. 
201 Ibid. 4 D6: 117, emphasis added. 
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more complex than any one body.202 Our tendency towards both understanding and doing many 
things at once is a type of stability that increases in strength. The complexities are actually that 
which can be combined in order to become more useful, more powerful in its effects, and thus 
more joyous and pleasurable. This level of power in ideational awareness is directly correlated to 
an individual's increase in reflective awareness and intuitive knowledge. Our method of 
investigating the object of our ideas as other ideas is an effect of being capable of better 
recognizing and using true ideas about knowledge and things. This is why we need to investigate 
and pay more attention to the importance of imaginative knowledge in understanding Spinoza’s 
dynamic epistemology. Beth Lord writes, “Passive joys are important in increasing our power to 
act and think, just as imagination is important in increasing our rational knowledge...”203 
The more you read the Ethics and other works, the more you understand the nature of 
your own ideas, which causes more joy and desire for knowledge. The Ethics becomes a tool for 
growth in personal self-awareness and further understanding of laws of Nature (which apply to 
all things), but also of continuous understanding about the environments that we influence and 
are influenced by. The increased knowledge we gain through reason coincides simultaneously 
with an increase in the ways in which our body is affected and can affect others, including the 
ways in which we can experience joy and develop better methods for understanding. This is why, 
as Dan Selcer notes, experimentation is a part of intuitive knowledge for Spinoza. Note what is 
written in the TEI that aligns with what will later be systematized in the Ethics in this respect: 
“...they [we] have reached a point where they can make very many complex things with little 
labour. In just the same way the intellect by its inborn power makes intellectual tools for itself by 
                                                 
202 Recently a Chronicle of Higher Education article, dedicated to fairly assessing Tom Nagel's 2012 now heretical 
work Mind and Cosmos, noted the following: “The chemist Addy Pross...argues that life exhibits 'dynamic kinetic 
stability,' in which self-replicating systems become more stable through becoming more complex – and are therefore 
inherently driven to do so (Michael Chorost, May 13, 2013).” I wonder how this might apply to our ideas? 
203 Lord, Spinoza's Ethics, 101. 
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which it acquires other powers for other intellectual works, and from these works still other tools 
- or capacity for further investigation...”204 Just as it is of God, as a thinking thing, who can 
conceive an idea of its own essence and all which follows from that essence, we too, in our own 
degree of rational power can formulate an adequate series of ideas about our essence and what 
can (and cannot) follow from that essence. And in this way, thought and extension, or God and 
Nature as one substance, are one and the same thing.205 
 Between ideas of the first kind and ideas of the second and third kinds there is a 
significant ontological and epistemological shift of emphasis. Spinoza writes: 
Men have been so mad as to believe that God is pleased by harmony... All of these things 
show sufficiently that each one has judged things according to the disposition of his 
brain; or rather, has accepted affections of the imagination as things... For although 
human bodies agree in many  things, they still differ in very many. And for that reason 
what seems good to one, seems bad to another; what seems ordered to one, seems 
confused to another... We see, therefore, that all notions by which ordinary people are 
accustomed to explain Nature are only modes of imagining...206 
  
Experiencing real joy includes the ideas of the imagination, but the intellectual love of God is 
also a type of joy. This is more than just bodily pleasure. It is not only the knowledge of 
harmony, as is also written in the PT, but this level of joy involves homeostatic conatus with 
increased energy, peace, and seeking environments which allow us to thrive. Spinoza emphasizes 
this aspect of conatus specifically in E3p1. As an idea “in itself is nothing but a certain kind of 
awareness,”207 if ideas are also actions, then conscious reflection on a singular level must be part 
of the ontological equation we seek in our understanding. In Chapter 8 of the PT we learn, “For 
he who swears by God puts at stake a private good of which he alone knows the value, but he 
who by his oath puts at stake the freedom and welfare of his country is swearing by the common 
                                                 
204 Spinoza, TEI, 9-10. 
205 See Spinoza, Ethics, 2p3: 33. 
206 Ibid. 1App: 30-31, emphasis added. 
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good of all, the value of which is not set by him [but by as many equally rational collective 
interests as compose the body of the state]...”208  
 The knowledge of the essence of things comes with adequate thinking, which can 
transform understanding into intuitive knowledge. When we have true knowledge of the causes 
of our ideas and actions, we have more knowledge about ideational and extensive effects. This 
includes a rational process that is the understanding of the scientific principles of thought 
(common notions) and our relations to the environment.209 This is also why Spinoza writes in 
several places: 
...the more the mind understands of Nature, the better it understands itself...the more 
things the mind knows, the better it understands both its own powers and the order of 
Nature. Now the better it understands its own powers, the more easily it can direct itself 
and lay down rules for its own guidance; and the better it understands the order of Nature, 
the more easily it can restrain itself from useless pursuits.210 
 
Another way to explain this level of intellectual love and affection is to consider that if there is a 
God, the best we can do as expressions of laws of Nature is to better understand those laws. This 
will bring us closer to a better understanding and stronger expression of God. The sentiment is 
about understanding the nature of one's essence and its power to reproduce its natural force, and, 
therefore, to express Nature with more power. These registers of degrees of power of thought and 
action is why I read Spinoza’s system as a proto-physics of force. The continuous increases in 
power is not caused by our knowing the adequate reason or true cause alone, although this does 
add to that power. It is also about the simultaneous process that is cause and effect at once, 
understood as one and the same thing, as substance itself in its nature as self-caused. This 
transforms our adequate understanding about what causes and effects are and can do. 
Maintaining the force and intuitive understanding of power and virtue as a common disposition 
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takes more than habit formation, especially because such knowledge is “both difficult and rare.” 
It also requires what was described in previous chapters as habitual readiness, for such 
knowledge is strengthened the more we understand the mechanics involved. Our strengthened 
habitual readiness is what Spinoza is referring to with the meaning and use of the term quatenus 
or “in so far as...,” a term relied on often throughout the Ethics related to which perspective one 
can acquire according to type(s) of knowledge being relied on. If you are focused on only your 
sensations, for example, then you are too reliant on imaginative ideas and lack understanding. 
 Care for our ideas and actions involves how we use ideas accompanying our actions, 
what affects we experience, access, and produce for ourselves and others, and how much these 
ideas increase the power to produce related ideas that include more creative and effective actions. 
You can engage in activities with others, but still lack the true understanding of the laws of 
Nature that your actions are abiding by, that is, of the causes of your affects that increase and 
decrease your power of thought and action. The more rationality understands the laws of thought, 
the more it can use the imagination to its benefit. If our circumstances are limited by external 
causes, the power to imagine those things that we have already rationally experienced that 
brought us joy becomes particularly important for our peace of mind and overall homeostasis. 
 If we govern everything from our affects, what we can learn how to do is act with a level 
of rational and intuitive force which expresses the intellectual love of God. This is because we 
can both imagine what causes real happiness and power in us and use reason to reflect with 
regular awareness on the causes of those particular affects in their laws of force and motion. 
When we imagine what we love we also imagine that it is preserved, for example.211 The 
stronger the affect of joy and love, the stronger our desire arises from such joy.212 What we can 
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learn how to do is “apply one's zeal to those things which help to bring men together in harmony 
and friendship.”213 This level of love and nobility requires “skill and alertness” which varies for 
each of us in degrees of power. It requires so much alertness that Spinoza writes in the KV that 
we should not even speak of such things to others unless they too are of a rational and alert 
disposition: “I do not want to say that you should absolutely keep them to yourselves, but only 
that if ever you begin to communicate them to anybody, then let no other aim prompt you except 
only happiness of your neighbour, being at the same time clearly assured by him that the reward 
will not disappoint your labour.”214 Spinoza is interested in the ways in which we conserve and 
use our energies, aiming as often as possible to add to the joyous affects of others.215 
 Because of the variation in levels of power and experience, a method is employable for 
all to understand how to use in Spinoza’s system, but it still “requires a singular power of mind 
to bear with each one according to his understanding...”216 Not only according to each of our 
levels of individual understanding, but also, as we read in the KV, “we could not exist without 
enjoying something with which we become united, and from which we draw strength,” that is, 
love and knowledge are “a union with the object which our understanding judges to be good and 
glorious; and by this we mean such a union whereby both the lover and what is loved become 
one and the same thing, or together constitute one whole.”217 In other words, through the 
intellectual love of God we become one with God (Nature). 
 To summarize, this chapter has demonstrated that adequate reasoning, including 
reasoning about how to access imaginative knowledge in ways that aid reasoning, are required 
for the increased capacities to think and act with more force, as well as for the intellectual love of 
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God (and Nature). As we move into the last book of the Ethics we learn that conscious 
awareness, reflection, and alertness are continually required. Joy can be excessive “unless reason 
and alertness are present.”218 As Stuart Hampshire writes, in adequate thinking we move from 
using reason to understanding that we are not a “particular standpoint and location in time,” but 
intuitively we know that we are “parts of the eternal framework of Reality.”219 That which is an 
expression of an eternal reality is an absolute affirmation. Right at the start of the Ethics in 1p11s 
Spinoza is already preparing us for how this level of conscious alertness works. We can only take 
the perspective of a singular finite individual, but we understand rationally that we are also an 
expression of substance, and substance is an eternal affirmation of itself: 
For things that come to be from external causes – whether they consist of many parts or 
of few – owe all the perfection or reality they have to the power of the external cause; and 
therefore their existence arises only from the perfection of their external cause, and not 
from their own perfection. On the other hand, whatever perfection substance has is not 
owed to any external cause. So its existence must follow from its nature alone; hence its 
existence is nothing but its essence. Perfection, therefore, does not take away the 
existence of a thing, but on the contrary asserts it.220 
 
In the same proposition we also learn that human beings can create each other in existence 
(procreation of the species), but we cannot create another individual's essence. Spinoza writes, 
“because whatsoever exists in Nature, if we entertain any wish about it, then we must always 
improve it, whether for our sake or for the sake of the thing itself. And since a perfect man is the 
best thing for us that we know of all that we have around us and before our eyes, it is by far the 
best both for us and for all people individually that we should at all times seek to educate them to 
this perfect state.”221 Thus, Spinoza’s Ethics involves human education. The nature of our 
essence and existence in transformation involves increased capacities for true knowledge and 
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powerful (creative) activities, and includes the alertness of such passages to greater perfection. 
That which is our striving, that is, “the better part of us,” agrees with what is most beneficial and 
joyous for us and for a rational collective. This is the love of God, an awareness of one's essence 
in-so-far-as it acts. As self-caused and self-causing, God is always in action (an absolute 
affirmation). To be free is to join in continuous and creative democratic collectives with others, 
but not without enjoying one's own singular ways of being. Because a rational collective is aware 
of their shared experience, we can rejoice in the joy of others. Spinoza writes, “Indeed 
blessedness is nothing but that satisfaction of mind which stems from the intuitive knowledge of 
God.”222 Intuitive knowledge is as important for correctly interpreting Spinoza’s system as are 
the first two kinds of knowledge, imaginative and rational. 
 In the conclusion of this thesis, I address some weaknesses of Spinoza’s dynamic 
epistemology, but end with an emphasis on using such a system to strengthen our creativity. In 
the KV, Spinoza writes, “For it is precisely the particular things, and they alone, that have a 
cause, and not the general, because they are nothing.”70 Intuitive and operational knowledge aid 
not only the rational collective, but also singular joy and expressions of creativity. In the preface 
to his translation of Spinoza’s works in 1982, Samuel Shirley writes: 
Can the essence of God be seen as the source of the ill-understood phenomena that we 
call artistic creativity? In the ‘conatus’ of human beings, a conatus that derives from 
God’s potential, do we see a shadow, an image, of God’s creativity, finding expression 
most markedly in the process of artistic creativity?223 
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CONCLUSION 
 
SPINOZA TODAY 
 
“Curiosity about the object of knowledge and the willingness and openness to engage theoretical 
readings and discussions is fundamental. However, I am not suggesting an over-celebration of 
theory. We must not negate practice for the sake of theory… By the same token, to negate theory 
for the sake of practice, as in the use of dialogue as conversation, is to run the risk of losing 
oneself in the disconnectedness of practice. It is for this reason that I never advocate either a 
theoretic elitism or a practice ungrounded in theory, but the unity between theory and practice. 
In order to achieve this unity, one must have an epistemological curiosity – a curiosity that is 
often missing in dialogue as conversation.” 
“But action is human only when it is not merely an occupation but also a preoccupation…” 
 -Paulo Freire 
 
“To have work that promotes one's liberation is such a powerful gift that it does not matter so 
much if the gift is flawed... When our lived experience of theorizing is fundamentally linked to 
processes of self-recovery, of collective liberation, no gap exists between theory and practice... 
Theory is not inherently healing, liberatory, or revolutionary. It fulfills this function only when 
we ask that it do so and direct our theorizing towards this end.”  -bell hooks 
 
“Human activity dignifies the song.”  -Leonard Cohen 
 
 
Spinoza’s Dynamic Epistemology and the Enhancement of Creativity  
 
 In A manifesto for cyborgs, philosopher Donna Haraway writes about the legitimacy of 
understanding and using various forms of epistemology today. Echoing Paulo Freire, Haraway 
writes, “In the consciousness of our failures, we risk lapsing into boundless difference and giving 
up on the confusing task of making a partial, real connection. Some differences are playful; some 
are poles of world historical systems of domination. Epistemology is about knowing the 
difference.”1 There are multiple ways to evaluate, theorize about, and utilize the methods and 
applications found in theories of knowledge. The term “epistemology” has a questionable history 
in Western philosophy in the ways in which it normalizes certain terminology and concepts that 
apply only to a privileged group of thinkers (typically male for example). But I believe we can 
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say how much this term and concept changes throughout the epochs depending on what we learn 
and the new kinds of knowledge we gain. What is involved in the examination of various forms 
of knowledge can be summarized as a variation on what it is “to know,” and what types of 
knowledge are rationally legitimate, as well as what we take as our objects of knowledge. We can 
explore theories of knowledge without falling back into the dangerous and often destructive 
ground of placing more value on theory or traditional problems of the concept of what is 
considered “objective.”2 As Alison Baily writes, we need to be careful what we value (and how 
often, thus repetition takes on new meaning as a method of investigation) when discussing the 
nature of true ideas; that is, we need to recognize when we hold an idea as more valuable than 
the actual experiences of human beings and our relationships with each other: “Sometimes [in 
philosophy] we hold concepts so tightly that our love for them replaces our love for one another. 
We care more for the coherence of our arguments than for the coherence of our relationships.”3 
 I have used the chapters of this thesis to provide more rigorous and systematic evidence 
that we can rely on Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology to apply to our everyday lives and 
(methodologically) to larger social, scientific, theological, and philosophical debates today. The 
laws of thought and action read as a proto-physics of ideational force and motion can be accessed 
with greater ease, efficiency, and creativity by each of us, and used collectively to create 
affirmative changes with stronger results. 
One reason we can access such a system today as Spinoza's includes that there is infinite 
room for the development of creativity, novel concept creation, and various applications in ethics 
and human psychology, for example, by understanding this kind of dynamic epistemology. As 
                                                 
2 For a good discussion on this history see the work An Introduction to Feminist Epistemologies by Alessandra 
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Beth Lord writes, “Experimental art is, like experimental science, based on combining ordered 
thought with affective experience; it explores processes of making and relating things together in 
order to understand the world more clearly.”4 In this way, Spinoza’s epistemology can be 
demonstrated through the arts.5 For purposes of this chapter, that epistemological art is learning 
and teaching philosophy specifically, or what we might do to strengthen philosophical thinking. 
We are also free to use philosophical systems in new ways that apply to our current 
context.6 It is also worth noting that one of the feminist pioneers to write against the theoretical 
Western “Man of Reason” (MOR), Genevieve Lloyd, was also a Spinoza scholar. She advocated 
for using his system to address on-going social issues and epistemological concerns, including 
the problem of gender and meaning in the philosophical systems we chose to emphasize and 
repeat. Lloyd writes: 
Taking temporal distance seriously [between old systems as compared to how we think 
today] demands also of course that we keep firmly in view what the thinkers themselves 
saw as central to their projects. This exercise involves a constant tension between the 
need to confront past ideals with perspectives drawn from the present and, on the other 
hand, an equally strong demand to present fairly what the authors took themselves to be 
doing. A constructive resolution of the tensions between contemporary feminism and past 
Philosophy requires that we do justice to both demands.7 
 
 Not only can Spinoza's proto-physics of ideational force and activity enhance individual 
and collective (rationally powerful) uses of creativity and strategies for problem solving, it can 
also be understood as an alley for philosophies of race which address on-going problems of 
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racism that persist today, including in the ways in which we “do” philosophy. Spinoza's system is 
not without critique.8 I will briefly address some of the weaknesses of his system before ending 
this thesis on the productive uses of a proto-physics of force and motion that can enhance 
creativity and understanding. 
 To have an increased capacity for reflection on not only one's knowledge but also the 
methods of construction of that knowledge only allows the development of a better capacity to 
use knowledge in powerful and collective ways. What is the difference between words on a page 
and paint on a canvas or actors on a stage if all of these arts can produce similarly powerful, 
affirmative effects? As Moira Gatens writes, “Spinoza's non-dualistic metaphysics offers 
interesting possibilities for conceiving of the transformation of social and political life.”9 Of 
course, Spinoza was very interested in the production of material effects through reading and 
writing, or what we might understand as the arrangement of words in a certain order so to create 
real effects.10 He was also highly invested in what a rational political life consists of. In the TTP, 
we read, “Furthermore, as we have a better understanding of a person's character and 
temperament, so we can more easily explain his words.”11 In this way, as problematic as it may 
be to categorize people by temperament (because as we learn we can change the ways in which 
we live, think, and act etc.), both imaginative and rational knowledge work together with the 
capacity to produce real material (ethical) effects. Warren Montag writes:  
The meanings (both literal and metaphorical) of a word or phrase must be determined by 
reference to established linguistic usage alone. Language is not a reservoir of possible 
                                                 
8 The term “womanism” was first used by Angela Davis. I will define womanist epistemology in more detail as we 
proceed. 
9 Gatens, “Feminism as ‘Password’...,” 61. 
10 As Warren Montag writes in Bodies, Masses, Power, relying on the philosophy of Lucretius and Spinoza’s 
affinity for it, “Lucretius in De Rerum Natura describes not only speech as a subtle matter that produces the effects 
of meaning by impinging upon the auditory sense organ but writing itself as a disposition of material elements, 
letters, whose arrangement determines meaning...” This is also one significant point of Dan Selcer’s work already 
well documented. 
11 Spinoza, TTP, chapter 7: 459. 
 366 
meanings waiting to be realized, although it is this in the case of poetry and related of 
course. On the contrary, meaning always exists in an actualized state and the set of 
meanings attached to a given phrase is finite, limited to those meanings actually in use...12  
 
Again, repetition becomes an important theme to pay attention to. The above insight becomes 
especially powerful if the limited contexts in use that are recognizable to reader and writer can 
overlap each other in diverse and meaningful ways creating new affirmative effects as affects. 
 I believe there is another question about the definition of subjectivity in philosophy that 
can be addressed from a Deleuzian perspective in support of Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology 
being applicable today. One aspect includes that Deleuze makes an excellent case for the notion 
of subjectivity when he identifies what he calls the “plane of organization” and the “plane of 
immanence.” Planes of organization in our social, political, biological, and personal language are 
not the only elements of idea formation and physical motion we are capable of. We are also 
planes of immanence which are continually “deteritorialized” on a daily basis, and this includes 
“lines of flight” and dynamic intensities created by our ideas and action that cannot be 
completely categorized, classified, or closed off by any definition or theory of knowledge. In 
other words, continuous understanding and the processes of the ontology of the everyday are 
open ended. Our experience of the plane of immanence includes several layers of flows, 
transformations, and the unnamable between the myriad of shifting ideas and actions we produce 
and encounter. Nonetheless, this does not mean we cannot evaluate such lines of flight.13 
Deleuze’s philosophy becomes even more interesting when combined with Spinoza’s dynamic 
epistemology because he relied on the latter’s system in massive ways in his own work and 
education in philosophy, especially involving the ideas and actions of creativity, concept 
                                                 
12 Montag, Bodies, Masses, Power, 9-10. 
13 See Gilles Deleuze’s A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1987). Also, poetry is a good example of such evaluation, for example. 
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creation, and experimentation.14 More importantly for this thesis, Deleuze used and relied on the 
idea of “ethology” as the study of human (animal) behavior. Moira Gatens describes the 
implications of a Spinozist ethology in thinking and acting in her work well. In an essay titled 
“Feminism as 'Password': Re-thinking the 'Possible' with Spinoza and Deleuze,” Gatens 
describes Deleuze’s version of a Spinozist ethology as follows: 
'Ethology is first of all the study of the relations of speed and slowness, of the capacities 
for affecting and being affected that characterizes each thing.' If we understand a rule-
based morality as one which addresses itself to molar subjects, then ethology may be 
understood as offering an ethics of the molecular, a micropolitics concerned with the 'in-
between' of subjects, with that which passes between them and which manifests the range 
of their possible becomings... An ethological evaluation will not select subjects, animals, 
or persons categorized according to species and genus, but rather will individuate 
according to principles of compossibility, sets of fast or slow combinations, the range of 
affects and degrees and affectability... A Spinozist will insist that to think differently is, 
by definition, to exist differently: one's power of thinking is inseparable from one's power 
of being and vice versa.15 
 
 Note that the above reference is both for singular human subjects and about the forces 
and power between humans and other bodies (both human and non-human) in Nature. As we've 
read in the last five chapters, Spinoza’s system can be applied in ways that better strengthen our 
capacities for creatively powerful thought and actions. Placing together the various ways that this 
kind of system can be applied across disciplines will have more powerfully affirmative effects 
then if we were to remain only within our respective disciplines. Gatens continues, “Creation 
displaces the command function of language, it expresses a new action, it calls upon the 
'commander' to react or flee because it shows his world as one possible world rather than the 
world.”16 In other words, as an action creating can be revolutionary. In this vein, I diverge from 
the usual way of writing a doctoral thesis for a moment and embrace my creative side: 
                                                 
14 See, for example, the new work by Anne Sauvagnargues Deleuze and Art (2013) and David Cole’s essay “Matter 
in Motion: The educational materialism of Gilles Deleuze,” Educational Philosophy and Theory (2012). 
15 Gatens, “Feminism as Password’...,” 62, 63, emphasis added. 
16 Ibid. 72, emphasis added. 
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“What is truly Spinozist about this architecture is the fact that 
one is forced to develop the second degree of knowledge 
(the one that makes your body compose harmonious relations 
with your physical environment) that can ultimately flirt 
with the third one (a perfect reading of the material assemblages 
in their movement of speed and slowness). The outcome 
of such a conquest is an increase of power (potentia), 
hence the joy to which I was referring in the original text. The 
joy is quite literal in the case of the playgrounds... 
In a society of idols and comfort that 
serve the exact opposite purpose, we absolutely need more 
architectures of Spinozist joy.”17 
  
 There are significant aesthetic, social, ethical, and intellectual conditions of various 
kinds that apply to innovative problem solving in a modern, technological age and Spinoza’s 
dynamic proto-physics of thought and action can aid our problem solving capacities with 
rational force and efficiency. Another way to summarize the point can be expressed by the writer 
Saul Bellow in his novel Humboldt’s Gift: 
He wanted to be magically and cosmically expressive and articulate, able to say anything; 
he wanted also to be wise, philosophical, to find the common ground of poetry and 
science, to prove that the imagination was just as potent as machinery, to free and to bless 
humankind.18 
 
This is why things become even more interesting when we are discussing what it is a body can 
do, or rather, what a body can become, such as Deleuze writes when he states, “Spinoza offers 
philosophers a new model: the body.”19 Innovative thinking is critical in so many aspects of our 
lives. To be regularly creative and original is virtually impossible to enact (although I have met 
individuals who try to live this as a daily ethic, creating powerfully affirmative effects 
continuously), but various levels and types of creative thinking through ideational fluidity in the 
ontology of the everyday is possible for anyone using reason and understanding with increasing 
force. One of the most difficult aspects of creative thinking includes the risk it involves, as any 
                                                 
17 The Funambulist Pamphlets, Vol. 1, chapter 7 (40). 
18 Saul Bellow, Humboldt’s Gift. (London: Penguin Books, 1973), 120. 
19 Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 17. 
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experiment might. There is no teleology to look forward to and the range of outcomes are 
virtually unknown. Yet, if you have a method that guarantees an increase in understanding and 
reasoning capacities, then the potential harmful risk and margin for error significantly 
diminishes. One example I use involves how to relieve the more taxing elements of creative, 
critical thinking to include “contagious,” joyous affects while helping to eradicate some of 
society's challenging problems (such as racism or sexism for example). When it comes to 
invention, creatively powerful, rational groups of ideas can be immensely joyous, reaching more 
than just a few individuals. I like how Alexis Philonenko describes the act of writing, innovation, 
and affecting others using a good method: 
The creative flashes of writing are a spattering of dirty and dangerous mud…the writer-
philosopher is an energumenos, a person possessed… To write is to dirty one’s hands, to 
give over that ultimate thought by which one is possessed to anyone and everyone, and to 
risk not being understood…one must be prepared to be invaded in every part by 
writing… Man writes everywhere – in his churches, in his ships, in his fortresses, in his 
houses, in his paintings, in his gardens. The field of writing is immense… Innovation, 
repeated but not imitated, allows us to plunge into myth, into the essence of things – their 
power of renewed presence…20 
 
 As we’ve already read, understanding the essence of singular things in the present is 
using intuitive knowledge in the application of our understanding with more effective force. 
What Spinoza teaches us is that by understanding the process of thinking in these ways more 
adequately, we are better able to cope, experience joy, and have the greater part of our mind 
enhanced by continued adequate thinking. This is what a body can do. As Deleuze writes, “To 
think is to create – there is no other creation – but to create is first of all to engender 'thinking' in 
thought.”21 We combine with others to create and manifest new things, but each individual body 
                                                 
20 Philonenko, “Reason and Writing,” 182-183, 186-187. “Reason is necessity… One cannot not think; one can not 
write.” On the work of Paulo Freire, Richard Shaull writes, “Then this happens in the process of learning to read, 
men and women discover that they are creators of culture, and that all their work can be creative (Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed, 33).” 
21 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 147. 
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is necessary in those instances for producing greater effects. This is why there is no need for a 
theoretical erasing of the concepts of “subject” and “object.” To do so would disavow the 
subjective experiences of others which differ from our own, a point made in Chapter Five by 
Ursula Renz about Spinoza’s epistemology. In this respect, we can return to the practice of a 
Spinozist ethology to further our understanding while remaining critically aware of the dangers 
of repeating forms and methods that can be problematic and biased. Gatens continues: 
One cannot predict merely from the form of a body all the relations and affects of which 
it is capable... From the standpoint of ethology, sex, gender, race, and class distinctions 
appear as coagulations of molecular combinations, strata of more or less stable 
configurations that are held in place by a complex variety of practices that are at once 
discursive (for example, the human sciences), normative (for example, medical and legal 
'codes'), and subjectifying (subjects designated as 'woman,' 'native,' 'mentally ill')... On 
the ethological view, ways of being both implicate and explicate ways of knowing, that 
is, both the power of thought and the power of existing express a mode of embodied 
life...22 
 
 By enhancing our diversity of experiences, we increase our reflective awareness of cause 
and effect processes in Nature, but we also enhance our capacities to gain new knowledge (and 
then use that knowledge in novel and enjoyable ways). This is why it is quite amusing to read 
Spinoza’s fairly extensive list of human affects at the end of E3. For example, at one point we 
read about how important it is to experiment with cooking and food in order to enhance the 
diversity of our levels of possible joy and adding to our knowledge. Recall that it is also in E3 
that Spinoza writes that we define as good “every kind of [rational] joy, and whatever leads to it, 
and especially what satisfies any kind of longing, whatever that may be.”23 
 Yet, even if we accept Spinoza's position on the necessity of laws of Nature, what we 
have learned is that there are several different ways to reflect on and use one's ideas, actions, 
preferences, and alterations in habitual readiness in more creative ways. In a recent anthology of 
                                                 
22 Gatens, “Feminism as 'Password'...,” 65, 66. 
23 Spinoza, Ethics, trans. Curley, 3p39s, 91. 
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interdisciplinary essays on the history of the concept of habit in the Western canon, philosophers 
Tom Sparrow and Adam Hutchinson write, “...habit is never simply an aspect of what people do 
or what occurs in their bodies, and it is much more than a name for what happens when humans 
mimic machines.”24 Habit, in other words, is not only something physical. Spinoza's system 
allows for creatively powerful applications across interests and disciplines as well. Beth Lord 
writes, Spinoza's system is inter-disciplinary in two ways: “...his thought, while expounding a 
complex metaphysics and epistemology, ventures into physics, politics and hermeneutics, and 
while Spinoza is studied mainly as a philosopher today, he is widely read and cited by many 
others. Categorizing his work as 'philosophy' is restrictive, for he is interested in truth, wherever 
that may be found.”25 
 It is those with the courage to be vulnerable in informed ways who enjoy true happiness, 
are genuinely open to gaining real and continuously altering forms of knowledge or knowing 
(especially for new experiences, new ways of learning, or true aspects of reality that they 
previously thought were not possible etc.), and so forth.26 Spinoza advocates for rationally 
exploring in experimental ways in order to gain both new knowledge and have new experiences. 
When we are habitually ready to learn more, opening ourselves up to being wrong or 
understanding something through another's lens, we become more interested in learning as an 
aspect of our essence and of Nature. In such practices, our tendencies towards more education 
and uses of reasoning are enhanced, and we desire to understand more about how the effects of 
learning involve pleasurable experiences and outcomes, both bodily and intellectually, and on 
                                                 
24 Tom Sparrow and Adam Hutchinson, ed. A History of Habit: From Aristotle to Bourdieu. (New York: Lexington 
Books, 2013), introduction. 
25 Lord, Spinoza Beyond Philosophy, introduction: 3. 
26 These ideas are not generalized although they are, of course, not without exceptions. For current sociological and 
psychological evidence on the massive problem of vulnerability in our society, one can turn to the work of 
sociologist Brene Brown. Her first TED talk is the most viewed TED lecture in all of TED talk history. One has to 
wonder why that is? http://www.ted.com/talks/brene_brown_on_vulnerability 
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both collective and individual levels.  
This is exactly what philosopher George Yancy will describe as included in his teaching 
pedagogy in the philosophy classroom; that is, for all involved in a learning environment to 
allow a space for the validity of real, lived experiences, including subjective reports (personal 
narratives) as legitimate forms of knowledge. This involves altering some of the ways in which 
philosophy has traditionally been done in the classroom. Yancy writes, “It is necessary to rethink 
the ways in which philosophy speaks to the mind and the heart.”27 The idea of fearless speech, 
and what Yancy also calls fearless listening, are practices that we can all engage in when learning 
about different types of knowledge, experience, and ways of knowing.28 In this respect, the 
following bears repeating. Pierre Macherey writes: 
...the power of the intellect is not determined a priori by conditions that would limit its 
 activity...the reflexive knowledge that has for an 'object' the power of the intellect, is not 
the condition of the manifestation of the true but on the contrary, its effects, its results. 
The method does not precede the development of knowledges, but it expresses or reflects 
it. What this implies is that it is necessary to produce real ideas before being about to 're-
cognize’...the conditions of their understanding.29 
 
Therefore, experimentation and imaginative knowledge in learning will be crucial for new ways 
of being.30 Spinoza’s system, in my reading, cannot be adequately understood, used, or 
developed without the inclusion of imaginative knowledge in the importance of rational 
capacities. In this is another powerful ideational tool or methodological device we can access 
which Spinoza refers to as levity. There is much work to be done on Spinoza and the experience 
                                                 
27 Yancy, Look, a White!, 58. “So-called safe classrooms are those that suppress serious and probing questions that 
interrogate ‘sacred’ boundaries. Safe classrooms are those that do not interrogate pedagogical approaches that refuse 
to value the whole person in terms of her multiple standpoints and how these standpoints shape knowledge claims. 
Indeed, safe classrooms are those that teach us to conform through false choices (65).” 
28 Ibid. 71. The “funkiness of existential pain,” and lived experience as legitimate forms of knowledge, Yancy 
writes, humanizes theory. I believe, in this way, Spinoza’s system read as a dynamic proto-physics of ideational 
force and power can humanize many of our theories today.  
29 Macherey, Hegel or Spinoza, 43. 
30 For Michael Della Rocca’s Spinoza “the rational is the real,” but as already demonstrated, there are other ways to 
express knowledge that can be beneficial for us all.  
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of levity. For Spinoza, when we experience levity we are also the most open to forming 
powerfully creative, rational groups of ideas and actions with others. Is it not the case that when 
we genuinely laugh together we are the closest, and that we might say, in that moment of levity 
we are in union with each other as one body of thought and experience?31 
 Ursula Renz has noted that to read Spinoza well is to read his ethics in conjunction with 
anthropology, among other areas.32 This is yet another aspect of Spinoza’s system in its 
interdisciplinary applications. As demonstrated in the previous chapters, an understanding of 
how affects work are prior to any real understanding of effective ethical relations with others, 
something demonstrated throughout this thesis. In this way, I appeal to how Stuart Hampshire 
summarizes Spinoza's contemporary systematic possibilities when he writes, “Nothing is more 
useful to a person, [Spinoza] claims, than the added strength that comes from the union with 
other persons in a community, which then becomes itself an individual thing, with its own drive 
to self-preservation.”33 Spinoza’s system has also been used in the advocacy for green politics 
and environmental philosophy, as another example of its interdisciplinary applications. Although 
his works can be and are tools of motivation, inspiration, understanding, rigorous scholarship, 
art, science, philosophy, psychology, ethical and political theory, and theological criticism, one 
friend turned foe critiqued Spinoza's character and ideas in an exchange of letters, stating: 
You claim to have finally discovered the true philosophy. How do you know that your 
philosophy is the best out of all those that have ever been taught in this world, are at 
present being taught, or will ever be taught in the future? To say nothing of possible 
future philosophies, have you examined all those philosophies, throughout the entire 
world? And even if you have  examined them properly, how do you know that you have 
                                                 
31 In his biography on Spinoza, Steve Nadler points to a note by someone who knew about Spinoza’s overall 
personality, wit, intelligence, and charm with all who he came into contact with, writing, “Lucas tries to convey just 
this when he writes that… ‘He had a wit so well seasoned that the most gentle and the most severe found very 
peculiar charm in it (196).’” 
32 In a 3:AM MAGAZINE interview from September 2012, Renz comments, “Following a widespread view of 
Spinoza, one of the basic claims of the Ethics is that ethics, as a philosophy discipline, has to rely on anthropology.” 
http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/after-spinoza-wiser-freer-happier/ 
33 Spinoza, Ethics, introduction by Stuart Hampshire, xiii. 
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chosen the best? ...Come to your senses, philosopher, acknowledge the folly of your 
wisdom, and that your wisdom is madness.34 
 
 Certainly, not all communities with increasing strength are beneficial to the larger whole 
of humanity, such as white supremacist organizations like the Klu Klux Klan, for example. 
Regardless of their strength in numbers, the pathological ideals, lack of the use of reason, and 
continuous violent actions of such groups are harmful to society at large. For example, the types 
of sad passions such groups might engage in will end up being more destructive than beneficial 
to the larger whole, will not last as long, will use up more energy to the point of lacking the 
motivation to think with reason and community. To address one way Spinoza countered his 
critics, we can refer back to an early and beautiful passage where Spinoza confesses in Letter 19: 
For my part, of all the things that are not under my control, what I most value is to enter 
into a bond of friendship with sincere lovers of truth. For I believe that such a loving 
relationship affords a serenity surpassing any other boon in the whole wide world. The 
love that such men bear to one another, grounded as it is in the love that each has for 
knowledge of truth, is as unshakable as is the acceptance of truth once it has been 
perceived.35 
 
In addition, we can turn to E3p46, a proposition that encourages the joining with others from 
another nation or class.36 In the unfinished TP, we also read about how to allow marriages 
between countries (nations) and account for their children as equal citizens in their country of 
birth as a democratic action. This is why Debra Nails writes that Spinoza demonstrates that he 
was “...the philosopher [of the Early Modern and Modern periods] who provokes the deepest and 
most difficult philosophical questions about race...”37 Spinoza did accomplish what Nails 
suggests with his overall system if you place together several of his texts, but he did so in a 
limited sense. For example, there are other elements to the otherwise unfinished TP which 
                                                 
34 Spinoza, Letter 66: 922, 928. 
35 Spinoza, Letter 19: 807-808. 
36 Spinoza, Ethics, 3p46: 94. 
37 Nails, “Metaphysics at the Barricades: Spinoza and Race,” 57. 
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continue to support the position that Spinoza's overall ethic can be applied to the philosophy of 
race as a white ally, but there are also comments made in this text which are negative 
assessments of both women and those known as “slaves” in the Seventeen Century.38 
Nonetheless, Spinoza offers a distinction between what it means to be free as compared to what 
it is to be a slave. Charlie Huenemann writes, “A community of Spinozists sages would establish 
a harmonious social order with ease.”39 In other words, we would work to help everyone be free. 
 What is so striking is the way Nails puts together Spinoza's larger system in the Ethics 
with the issue of his philosophy being accessible enough to counter racism as a philosophical and 
social problem. Nails notes that Spinoza's ontology is what “undermines all forms of racism 
while preserving the right of a race to do what is within its power.”40 Spinoza wrote in Latin, for 
example, in order to avoid censorship and discrimination, and this demonstrates that he was 
acutely aware of such issues as discrimination. She continues to examine such a system as that 
which addresses issues of racism by pointing out several key ontological and epistemological 
structural formulations found in the Ethics. For example, “right” (jus) and “power” (potentia) 
can be read as co-extensive, and they are co-extensive in ways that make Spinoza a political 
philosopher to the core: 
Spinoza argues that 'whatever an individual thing does by the laws of its own nature, it 
does with sovereign right...'...he admits no 'distinction between men and other individuals 
of nature' (TTP 16, par. 3). With this statement, the necessity of examining Spinoza's 
metaphysics, rather than his political theory, should be clear: no distinction between men 
and other individuals of nature. Thus there is no reason a priori to take the citizen, or the 
state, or the worker, or the cell, or the race, class, or gender to be one's fundamental unit 
of analysis across a variety of contexts; for to take any of these – or some other – as 
fundamental is to distort the interconnections among them that are characteristic of them. 
                                                 
38 There is literature combining Spinoza's epistemology and certain elements of the philosophy of race only recently. 
To add to this, in his biography of Spinoza, Steven Nadler writes that Van den Enden, one of Spinoza’s greatest 
teachers, insisted on “civil, political, and legal equality between all members of the state, absolute freedom of 
speech, religion, and opinion; and freedom of ‘philosophizing.’”  
39 Huenemann, Spinoza's Radical Theology, 113. 
40 Nails, “Metaphysics at the Barricades: Spinoza and Race,” 57. 
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Human beings exist as parts of ever more encompassing systems, and yet are themselves 
contexts in which other individuals (viruses,  freckles) are embedded. Yet our human 
distinctions are not merely arbitrary, for some inhibit, and others promote, our ability to 
persevere in existence (conatus). What is a person? A web of relations. A race? A web of 
relations.41 
 
Racism, sexism, classism are also a webs a relations. Nails continues to examine Spinoza's 
ontology in this way. I have placed more emphasis on human consciousness and singularity on 
an individual basis for understanding Spinoza’s system than Nails has, but perhaps this is a way 
to also incorporate important phenomenological considerations about race and epistemology. 
One cannot deal adequately with race and racism without allowing for the legitimate 
philosophical categories of subjectivity, phenomenal experience, and singular imagination. Nails’ 
account of Spinoza's notion of an “individual” is still relevant. She writes that an individual, for 
Spinoza, is “that which has a natural disposition to cohere in existence, so each molecule of my 
cup is likewise an individual.”42 These are brute facts about the nature of existing. That my and 
Debra's coffee cups can also be called individuals in similar ways as we can call human beings 
individuals is because Spinoza includes within his ontology ways for bodies and minds (as one 
and the same thing) to express laws of Nature in varying complexities and with multiple types of 
degrees of power and intensity and still both be expressing the same identical laws. This applies 
to all animated bodies of Nature. The way Spinoza gets away with then making human emotions, 
experiences, affects, dispositions, challenges, and types of knowledge (which can be creatively 
accessed, used, applied, and experimented with) as something specific to human subjectivity is 
by continuing to show that what it is to use imaginative knowledge is distinctly particular to 
human essence in a singular way. It also shows that to use human reason well is correlated with 
what it is to experience, clearly and distinctly, human consciousness in reflection. That is, 
                                                 
41 Nails, “Metaphysics at the Barricades: Spinoza and Race,” 60. 
42 Ibid. 60. 
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although a pebble and a human being are both “individuals” by Spinoza's definition, I do not 
know what it is like to be a pebble and the pebble does not know what it is like to be a human, 
but we are a web of relations interconnected to each other expressing the same laws nonetheless 
and sharing environments. If the pebble is with me in my pocket for years, inspiring me to 
continue to write philosophy, a pebble over two thousand years old that carries a world of 
inspiration for me personally, as well as has many beautiful lines of sedimentation (lines of 
flight) and was a gift from a close friend in love and support as a pen pal, then the pebble in my 
pocket and I are even more causally connected within a web of relations than any other stone I 
may come into contact with. Nails continues, “To speak curiously again, but not incoherently, my 
cup has exactly as much right to exist as it has power to persevere (conatus) against the 
onslaught of heavier and sharper objects, the effects of my clumsiness, and the pressures of style 
to exchange mugs for dainty teacups.”43 That is also why it will become important for us to be 
capable of imagining something that increases our power to exist as present to us (as our 
personal web of relations and causal meaning) in rational ways. 
 What Nails writes next on Spinoza and race is worth noting extensively, especially within 
the context that I work (both on epistemology in Early Modern philosophy and the philosophy of 
race). As “race” is a web of relations or what Spinoza calls a finite mode of substance expressed 
in a certain and determinate way, it can be explained under the attribute of thought and its laws 
within the rubric of how the three types of knowledge operate together. Under the attribute of 
extension and its laws, race can be explained as perceived, embodied, and acted out according to 
interactions with other bodies of similar and different races which effect its ratios of motion and 
rest. Therefore, an informed, compassionate, and humble white body can add to the power of a 
black body as much as another knowing black body can. At the least, they can combine in 
                                                 
43 Nails, “Metaphysics at the Barricades: Spinoza and Race,” 63. 
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rational understanding to form one body of effective force. 
The only element of this description Nails provides that can be questioned is when she 
equates all thought with sets of mathematical descriptors, as she calls it: “The descriptors are to 
the race as the mind is to the body – the expression of an idea of what is physically 
perceptible.”44 In addition, a race can continue to exist and persevere in its existence because, as 
she writes, “a race depends for its continued existence on the free identification and participation 
of its members. Rational voluntary association is the only legitimate form of solidarity. Thus one 
of the potentially oppressive uses of race is precluded – at least metaphysically.”45 I agree in part, 
but there may be a problem with this definition of race when we consider that an element of the 
most violent forms of racism include that bodies and minds of one race, typically those with dark 
skin visually, cannot escape being seen as lesser human beings by those of another race (typically 
those with white or lighter skin). In other words, where “rational voluntary solidarity” may apply 
easily to white people (although as part of a racist culture I might continue to question the 
“rational” aspect of this description), being forced into a category of a race which is understood 
as sub-human, irrational, animal like, and criminal is not a voluntary association by any stretch 
of the imagination. Such limits force “rational” categories on some as natural and on others as 
unnatural.  
Perhaps what Nails writes next can clear up some confusion for us. Race qua race cannot 
act independent of its collective members, their web of relations with each other, and their 
various environments according to Nails. Although I agree that this analysis applies in many 
respects, especially for those of the white race, it may not completely apply to all of those with 
darker skin tones in a racist nation. In a passage that speaks to more than Spinoza on race, Nails 
                                                 
44 Nails, “Metaphysics at the Barricades: Spinoza and Race,” 63. 
45 Ibid. 63. 
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continues, “Imagine rounding up all the philosophers, or all the redheads, and announcing that 
they are a separate race. Like a colony that grows into a state, the redheads might come to view 
themselves as a race. But, for Spinoza, there is no individual state and no individual race until 
each has conatus to unify and preserve it.”46 
 We learn that what it is to be a human being, as I stated above, is not the same kind of 
web of relations as what “race” is for Spinoza. That is, humans have an acute awareness 
(consciousness) of their conatus, but just as a school of fish, as Nails references, is not aware of 
their conatus in the same way as human beings, “race,” as an individual thing, is also not 
conscious of its conatus.47 Nails writes, “Whereas a person has a mind that is complex and is 
conscious of its own existence, a race (like a state) can be severally conscious of its existence of 
the whole but has no distinct consciousness of its own.”48 Therefore, a state, as an individual 
body, is different from a person as an individual body (even as both abide by the same laws of 
Nature). What Nails is referring to is that a race, a sports team, a classroom, a group of trees and 
so forth can come together to create a larger group as one “body” of force and motion, and can 
be conceived as a Spinozian “individual,” but each of these bodies coheres with “no [real] fixed 
existence in space time.”49 Nails writes: 
...racial bias is a species of bias, and all bias is for Spinoza a refusal of the counsel of 
reason; and reasoning validly from true premises is the business of all persons who would 
be free... Spinoza takes issue at the most fundamental ontological level with claims that 
race exists independently, claims that will, a century later, fuel the rise of the 
physiological basis for modern racism. In our day, those same arguments from 
ontological principles against the concept of group consciousness, against the organicist 
notion of collective social entities, and thus against the very idea of the black experience, 
or the mind of the ancients... There is no collective consciousness, according to Spinoza, 
                                                 
46 Nails, “Metaphysics at the Barricades: Spinoza and Race,” 64. Nails notes Chapter 3 of the TTP where Spinoza 
speaks lucidly against the persecution of Jewish people, as a group as well as some of the customs of the Chinese. 
47 Ibid. 63. 
48 Ibid. 63-64. 
49 Ibid. 64. 
 380 
only the consciousness of persons...50   
 
 Yet, there is a different problem with Spinoza’s deductions on human consciousness and 
rational capacity. One might ask how, in such an extensive and dynamic epistemology, a system 
with such verve and capacity to empower us, can we still have an epistemological problem 
involving gender? Spinoza appears, on the surface, to believe that women cannot reason as well 
as men. He is not exempt from a line of male thinkers of his time (and in the history of Western 
philosophy) whose systems we continue to use as our examples of excellence in thinking while 
simultaneously allowing for their ideas on female thinkers to be ignored or neglected.51 Feminist 
epistemological concerns cannot and do not separate issues of acquiring knowledge, race, and 
gender, although, as bell hooks has written on, even the history of Western feminism has a 
problem with being primarily white. Note what Elizabeth Spelman writes in her essay “Gender 
& Race: The Ampersand Problem in Feminist Thought,” when she concludes, “...thinking 
differently about women and about sexism might lead to thinking differently about Blackness 
and about racism.”52 Clenora Hudson-Weems has written regularly about the need to understand 
black female writers as holding a special epistemological category of their own in order to 
address the very real concerns which face African American women. She writes that female 
philosophers who identify as Womanists, for example, have only recently been able to create a 
space within academia, having prior adapted to traditional Feminist discourses and language in 
order to navigate the academic community.53 Hudson-Weems concludes, “…more and more 
African women today in the academy and in the community are reassessing the historical 
realities and the agenda for the modern feminist movement. These women are concluding that 
                                                 
50 Nails, “Metaphysics at the Barricades: Spinoza and Race,” 65-66. 
51 As noted above, Genevieve Lloyd has written extensively on this problem in our history in this respect. 
52 Spelman, “Gender & Race...,” in The Feminist Philosophy Reader, 276. 
53 For support of this claim, see bell hooks’ Feminism is for Everybody: Passionate Politics. 
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feminist terminology does not accurately reflect their reality or their struggle…”54 
So we need to talk about gender and its relationship to epistemology. It is clear, by the 
end of the unfinished PT, as Margaret Gullan-Whur, in her article “Spinoza and the Equality of 
Women,” also notes, that Spinoza's views on women are inconsistent with his larger 
epistemological and political project at the end of his life.55 Yet, she writes that in this last text, 
Spinoza’s views on women are both peculiar in a negative sense and also striking in an 
affirmative sense considering their metaphysical import. I agree with her, especially if we take 
seriously what is said in the TTP in Chapters 15 and 20. In these two chapters we learn that 
freedom of judgment and of thought itself (within a safe environment) is the aim for every 
individual who resides in a state, male and female. As already noted, Chapter 3 also states that 
we might have to yield some of our natural rights to others, including some of our own rationally 
justified reasons for things, if it can benefit the larger whole (majority). This is only a hypothesis, 
but one that can defend Spinoza’s system in the face of some of his otherwise irrational views on 
women.56 In addition, in Chapter 7 of the TP, we learn that what is to our advantage as a whole 
depends “on the general welfare and the peace of all.”57 This conclusion would be applicable, for 
example, to general safety of all members of a community. Gullan-Whur writes, “...his refusal to 
allow that any woman's intellect could match a man's, is odd.”58 But because of this fact, and 
because we read it in the latest of works, it “is an argument claiming to affirm a metaphysical 
principle that justifies a strong type claim about the class 'human female'. It thus warrants neither 
                                                 
54 Hudson-Weems, “African Womanism,” 44. She also writes, “There is a general consensus in the African 
community that the feminist movement, by and large, is the White woman’s movement…” As Patricia Hill Collins 
also writes, “African American women’s efforts to distinguish between womanism and black feminism illustrates 
how black women’s placement in hierarchical power relations fosters different yet related allegiances to a black 
woman’s self-defined standpoint (65).”  
55 Margaret Gullan-Whur, “Spinoza and the Equality of Women,” Theoria 68 (2002). 
56 Spinoza, TTP, chapters 3, 15, 20. 
57 Spinoza, TP, chapter 7: 710. 
58 Gullan-Whur, 92. 
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charity nor neglect.”59 In the same essay, Gullan-Whur later concludes, “Spinoza's indictment of 
female mentality could be construed as meaning that women have the same chance at 
recognising common notions as men, but just are more likely than men to let them be confused 
by sensual or emotional ideas.”60 Although somewhat helpful, this conclusion is still highly 
problematic for obvious reasons. And to combine insults, according to Whur, the Dutch 
scholarship condemns the last page of the TP, calling it...the black page.61 “If the ‘black page’ 
claim is accepted then Spinoza the political pragmatist has proved the Spinoza of Ethics 
wrong.”62 The condemnation is necessary, but the title given to it, from the perspective of 
philosophers of race, as another example, is problematic as well. 
I certainly feel some of the unfinished ending (and possible editing) of the TP is 
problematic. Yet, consider the claim in the TTP in Chapter 15, which also shows us how much 
Spinoza cared deeply about keeping ourselves open to new ideas, open to new ways for 
expressing those ideas in a civil society, when Spinoza writes, “And again, I ask, who can give 
mental acceptance to something against which his reason rebels? For what else is mental denial 
but reason's rebellion?” He continues, “I am utterly astonished that men can bring themselves to 
make reason, the greatest of all gifts and a light divine, subservient to letters that are dead, and 
may have been corrupted by human malice...”63 These are Spinoza’s own words and, on that 
note, I will try to utilize his methods in ways that lead me on to authors, philosophers, ideas, and 
systems of thought other than only those found only in the Ethics. 
 As a way to speak about our more contemporary and practical needs or societal problems 
today, Spinoza's system can be useful for anyone. Spinoza would encourage you to take what 
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61 Ibid. 96. 
62 Ibid. 97. 
63 Spinoza, TTP, chapter 15: 521. 
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you learn and find affirmatively creative ways to both singularly express what you know and to 
also form more rationally powerful collective bodies of which you can participate in. I will not 
make allowances for the very real systematic issues involving comments about women and 
rationality. I simply believe Spinoza would have been in agreement with our pointing out this 
flaw in his system. I can draw this assumption based on the temperament found in his letters to 
friends where he is repeatedly open to being shown any errors in his reasoning, but this does not 
excuse the problematic deductions nonetheless. 
The problems regarding his choice of description on the matter leads me to believe that 
the issue of female intelligence is the largest epistemological weakness of his corpus, but it may 
be something we can still work on through a better understanding of human affects. As Gillan-
Whur notes, when we understand the nature of our own ebbs and flows of affects, the more 
easily it is to control or override one affect with another (more rational) affect. Regarding the 
nature of women, Whur continues, “Can Spinoza legitimately claim that women are as a class 
more subject to the passions than men? ...induction does not vindicate a Spinozistic claim that 
women tend, more than men, to blur the boundaries of purely rational thought. Instead, it gives 
grounds for belief in a sex-differentiated shackling of reason in some, even most, males and 
females. This coheres with Spinoza's principle that all people are subject to the passions...”64 
Being subject to our passions, both sad and joyous, are something many if not most of us 
experience fairly regularly. The key is to reduce the sway of the sad passions by adequately 
determining one’s more powerful affirmative affects and understanding oneself as the cause. 
We learn that there are ways to demonstrate the coherence of the Ethics and other works 
by Spinoza while still understanding the last page of the TP as a “philosophical abberation.” Yet, 
even this otherwise helpful description, that the black page is an aberration, can be shown by 
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philosophers of race to be a highly problematic choice of terms. Dark skinned individuals have, 
throughout time, been labeled as human abberations. Luckily, Whur writes, “I conclude...that the 
argument of the last page of the Political Treatise is inconsistent with Spinoza's general Ethics 
doctrine...”65 In added support of her reading, we can turn to Chapter 7 of the TP where Spinoza 
writes that when civil order turns to natural order “...sovereignty reverts naturally to the people, 
which therefore has the right to enact new laws and repeal the old.”66 I read statements like this 
as inclusive ways for rational groups of individual citizens who are equal in all rights to change 
their laws and ideals as needed, including abolishing practices of slavery and allowing women to 
enter the political arena, for example. 
That being said, as is found in works like the “Combahee River Collective” in Home 
Girls: A Black Feminist Anthology, issues of oppression for African American females in 
particular cannot separate race, class, and gender. So even if we can rely on Spinoza's system as a 
white alley, those in Womanist epistemology may not be able to rely on such a system in the 
same ways as other groups of females might be able to. In the “Combahee River Collective,” we 
read, “This focusing upon our oppression is embodied in the concept of identity politics... We 
believe that sexual politics under patriarchy is as pervasive in Black women's lives as are the 
politics of class and race. We also often find it difficult to separate race from class from sex 
oppression because in our lives they are most often experienced simultaneously.”67 With similar 
sentiments, Vanessa Sheared writes, “The Africentric feminist perspective is not just about the 
voices that have been silenced on the grounds of race or gender but instead considers the 
simultaneous effects of race and gender... The womanist perspective acknowledges the 
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intertwining realities that human beings experience within society. Race, gender, and class are 
interwoven.”68 I am acutely aware, for example, that my white privilege can skew the way I 
interpret womanist or Black Feminist epistemologies, but in being continually and reflectively 
conscious of this fact, I can grind my epistemological lens to greater socio-emotional clarity. As 
Patricia Hill Collins writes, “Self-defined Black diasporic feminisms require links among U.S. 
Black feminisms and feminisms expressed by women of African descent as well as ties with 
transnational women's rights activism.”69 Individual rights for all were the concern of much of 
the unfinished TP for Spinoza. These were also the concerns, among others, of the TTP. Spinoza 
writes in Chapter 8 of TP that even an aristocracy with a council who has absolute power would 
never cause a fear that the citizens would become slave like in any manner if it were behaving as 
one elected rational body; a body with one voice that speaks for all its people and their ruler.70 
After reading passages such as these, that all voices are represented as one body and one voice if 
they are being rationally represented, I wonder how anyone can question that Spinoza was a 
philosopher who wanted his system to be included within a future politics of fairness, justice, 
peace, and democracy? 
 There is yet a further problem. As a philosopher of race writing on Spinoza, I am 
continually calling into question my own white privilege. To borrow the words of philosopher 
Emily Lee regarding her work within professional academia today, “I cannot escape the 
ambiguous circumstances of the current socio-historical influences—including my own 
education—within which I think. Moreover, I must admit that the structure of my analyses—
pointing to a conceptual difficulty in race and turning to the work of another dead white man for 
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a solution—is problematic.”71 These same concerns apply to my own work of which I must 
continually aim to understand better, balancing both tradition with honesty about the systems I 
study and rely on to live a better life. Rosalyn Diprose, in an article about feminist philosophy 
from 2000, writes that she is forced to rely repeatedly and, at times, heavily on male 
philosophers because that is what the discipline is primarily composed of and concerned with. 
Diprose also considers, rightly, that she reads various philosophers and philosophical texts in the 
realm of “the other,” as in all others, and, in this way, she can attempt to understand an author's 
philosophy regardless of their race or gender. But this attempt has its limits.72 I understand these 
same potential critiques are applicable to my thesis in many respects. In a recent essay, Audrey 
Thompson notes, “As Michael Hanchard points out, 'there has been a popular and academic 
tendency to diminish, deny, or neglect the impact of African peoples, practices, and civilizations 
have had on the West's development, as well as to forget the extent to which these populations 
have sought paths that have veered away from Western modernities even while being interlocked 
with them.'”73 It may help to refer to what Spinoza scholar Sam Shirley writes in a footnote to his 
translation of Letter 76 of Spinoza’s correspondence. Shirley writes, “In fact, no philosophy (his 
or any other) can claim completeness on Spinoza's own account; since philosophy by its very 
nature is a finitary activity and deals at most with a finite number of the divine attributes. No 
matter how adequate or true a philosophy should be, infinite orders of nature will lie beyond its 
range of understanding.”74 This analysis is consistent with Spinoza’s system and philosophy. 
 To read Spinoza is to enhance both our creative capacities and our regular use of reason. 
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To enhance reason with natural power is to become more virtuous. This virtue, in turn, benefits 
others, as we are also always in need of our environment and other finite ideas and bodies to 
interact with. Therefore, we can use our imaginative and rational understanding to help others. 
Continually working to enhance our rational capacities yields the greatest and most joyous, most 
powerful effects, shared benefits, and singular experiences with greater knowledge and enhanced 
affirmative affects. When we are more consciously aware of this process as it unfolds, in addition 
to whatever else we are considering topic wise, it adds to our joy, gives confidence and courage, 
and thinking with rational force becomes easier. Perhaps a theory of temporality that addresses 
what we know in today’s context can be combined with Spinoza to explain these processes even 
better? If so, it must take into account other forms of knowing, such as Feminist and Womanist 
epistemologies, for example. As Patricia Hill Collins writes, “Thus the significance of Black 
feminist epistemology may lie in its ability to enrich our understanding of how subordinate 
groups create knowledge that fosters both their empowerment and social justice... Black feminist 
thought addresses ongoing epistemological debates concerning the power dynamics that underlie 
what counts as knowledge.”75 If Spinoza's dynamic epistemology is going to be beneficial in 
these other areas, it needs to account for singular, subjective experiences that are both real and 
valid. This makes a theory of human consciousness even more important than was already 
addressed in this thesis. 
 In Black Bodies/White Gazes, philosopher George Yancy explains why “subjective 
narratives” and related phenomenological considerations are so important for any philosophical 
system that overlaps with topics in epistemology. Speaking about different races is not the same 
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as speaking about the oppression of certain communities and groups of individuals based on their 
skin tone. Race, according to Yancy, is “...a contingent social category, but the persistently real 
bodily-cum-material-institutional-symbolic effects of race are profoundly devastating, to which 
the history of racism attests... Although race is not real, this does not mean that race is not 
'objective' or that it does not affect how we actually see ourselves, comport ourselves, transact 
with each other, and assess each other morally, aesthetically, and ontologically.”76 So something 
that is not “real” (in the sense that the sun and the universe and humans are real) is still a valid, 
sound, and relevant category of human experience. Recall that for Della Rocca the “real” is what 
is rational. Yet, human perception becomes the key indicator of how people with different skin 
tones are treated in this world. Individuals with lighter skin tones might believe they are acting 
well, with good intentions, and with objectively real knowledge, but actually end performing 
their “whiteliness” (and thus dominant status and privilege) within their assessments and 
descriptions of the way the world is or the objects of their knowledge. It is a privileged position, 
for example, to believe that there is nothing to worry about regarding race today. Yancy writes, 
“Whites develop a form of immunity that enables them not to be 'mindful' of that from which one 
is exempt...'”77 That immunity enables many environments to perpetuate racist behaviors, 
including within institutions of higher learning. As Yancy has recently written, “…the problem is 
that blackness is pre-marked and pre-nominated as a site of 'deviance' vis-a-vis white racist 
epistemic and axiological frames of reference.”78 And this applies to everyone, but the problem 
for philosophers is what counts as “epistemic,” and how to address it in our contemporary 
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philosophical circles? In this way, I am reminded of a passage written by Patricia Hill Collins in 
her womanist epistemological project, Black Feminist Thought (already noted above), when she 
writes about our methods of explanation moving more towards paradigms and, what philosopher 
of science, Sandra Harding, calls, standpoints: 
Distinguishing among epistemologies, paradigms, and methodologies can prove to be 
useful in understanding the significance of competing epistemologies (Harding 1987). In 
contrast to epistemologies, paradigms encompass interpretive frameworks such as 
intersectionality that are used to explain social phenomena. Methodology refers to the 
broad principles of how to conduct research and how interpretive paradigms are to be 
applied. The level of epistemology is important because it determines which questions 
merit investigation, which interpretive frameworks will be used to analyze findings, and 
to what use any ensuing knowledge will be put.79 
 
 As it turns out, this is yet another reason why we can support Spinoza as a white alley, by 
combining his most valuable insights with other more contemporary theories of social change, 
when examining those changes through certain paradigms found both within traditional and more 
current epistemological frameworks. Spinoza's system is highly adaptable and his methodology 
is applicable to several different types of epistemological paradigms today. Further, many forms 
of mild resistance can accomplish moments of “re-narrating the self” for any person oppressed of 
any race or gender as well. Re-narrating the self is directly involved in how we describe and 
understand our lives and interactions with others. Yancy continues, “...the white oppressors' 
narrative [about raced bodies] is not faithful to Blacks' hermenutics of self-understanding...the 
discourse of workable and unworkable narratives replaces the logic of metaphysical essentialism 
regarding racial identities, and dispenses with the correspondence theory of truth.”80 
 The above is not a problem of essentialism, as Yancy states and as is often the criticism 
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made against philosophers of race. It is an ontological and epistemological, “socio-historical, 
political, and deeply embedded psychological problem,” and Yancy continues:  
On my view, some material-cum-axiological/epistemological framework first must exist 
that 'justifies' the valorization and sovereignty of whiteness, and, by extension, the 
denigration of Blackness. ...the ideological norms informing the white self as all seeing 
and all knowing, forms the larger unthematized sociovisual epistemology that militates 
against the slippages between 'seeing' and 'knowing,' at least with respect to the enslaved 
African body.81  
 
Yancy also writes, “Through the process of rendering the Black body hypervisible, white bodies 
became invisible.”82 How would a philosophy of “the real is rational” address these facts? In this 
way, white privilege is able to dominate social relations, institutions, various systems of power, 
what we call legitimate systems of knowledge, and many other areas of life. How, then, does 
white (male) privilege structure, unconsciously or otherwise, traditional systems of Western 
epistemology? As Alessandra Tanesini, in defense of naturalized epistemologies, writes, 
“Feminists have criticized traditional epistemology for its disregard of the situatedness of the 
knower, and of the specific circumstances in which knowledge is acquired.”83 I would agree and 
argue that unless we allow for singular human consciousness and reflection as a part of Spinoza’s 
epistemology, his system only partially addresses what it’s like to be a human being. And as 
Chikwenye Okonjo Ogunyemi writes, Womanism includes those who have to answer to both 
their racial and sexual predicaments. There is a version of womanist thinking which simply 
means a woman “who is ‘committed to the survival and wholeness of the entire people, male and 
female.’”84 
 As Shannon Sullivan also suggests, if we all derive from a history of the cultural 
oppression of individuals with dark skin, as well as from the continued oppression of women, 
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then we maintain a culture of these oppressive feelings, ideas, choices of preference, blind spots, 
and behavioral responses.85 How does one re-signify the racist, sexist, or classist unconscious 
tendency towards oppressive ideas and behaviors when it is already so difficult to recognize such 
things in the conscious mind? What role can reasoning play in situations where the very 
functioning of reason can be persuaded by racist or sexist affects? Further, Tanesini writes that 
“Women belonging to different social classes, race, and sexual orientations face very different 
problems, and encounter different forms of oppression.”86 Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology is 
not reducible to scientism or naturalized epistemology as often found in some North American 
interpretations. Tanesini writes that the social practices of scientists today can be understood as 
just that, practices, and not as the only model for one to hypothesize about, experiment with, or 
describe how human beings get and use knowledge. She writes, “Social factors can be 
constitutive of knowledge.”87  
The changes needed have to start with oneself, and with regular rational and imaginative 
conscious reflection. One way is to retrain the imagination in order to create greater rationally 
constructed, informed affects for oneself and between groups of people in innovative ways. We 
would also have to find more ways to interact spontaneously and creatively with each other in 
order to re-signify one’s socially embedded beliefs.88 Spinoza’s system works well with the 
issues of the philosophy of race in this respect. For example, in Chapter 7 of the TP we read, 
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“For freedom and slavery do not go well together.”89 Indeed, in the work of Warren Montag in 
Bodies, Masses, Power, we read that Spinoza’s entire corpus of work can be read as a way for all 
to free themselves from any form of oppression and strive towards liberation. 
 The trajectory of themes in this thesis have supported, assisted, perplexed, moved, 
frustrated, and transformed me throughout the last decade. In the words of Hegelian Katrin Pahl, 
“The ability to stay with torn, restless, trembling transports is of great value to me.”90 It is an act 
of courage to spend years with Spinoza’s system. We all have experienced such transports and 
transformations, of course, but the phenomenological and ontological-epistemological problem 
here is clear. How can we rely on Spinoza's system as one among many possible aids to better 
understand and deal with racism and sexism if oppressed individuals are already being torn 
regularly in ways they cannot escape? In this way, Yancy writes, “My Black embodiment, after 
all, should solicit whites to self-interrogate their certainty, to re-cognize, to know otherwise, to 
look yet again, to wonder and to stand in awe of my shared humanity. Yet, it is precisely my 
humanity that has been questioned and denied within white North America.”91 As a visibly white 
individual I have some power, and I try to use it to raise awareness about others who are 
marginalized or have less power. Yet, as a woman I have to continually manage the 
predominately male terrain which, directly or indirectly, believes I am less capable of reasoning 
than my (male) interlocutors. 
 As we read in E4p52 on the nature of self-esteem, Spinoza writes, “Next, while a man 
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considers himself, he perceives nothing clearly and distinctly, or adequately, except those things 
which follow from his power of acting (by IIID2), that is (by IIIP3), which follow from his 
power of understanding. And so the greatest self-esteem there can be arises only from this 
reflection...”92 Here is one instance where Spinoza clearly writes that our power of acting has 
more to do with our power of understanding. Regarding a more collaborative understanding of 
all three forms of knowledge, Susan James writes: 
By cultivating and sharing our capacity for philosophical understanding, [Spinoza] 
claims, we can learn how to live in ways that avoid the psychological and social conflicts 
that are usually so prevalent, and approach an ideal of maximal harmony and 
empowerment. Achieving this ideal is a difficult process, which always remains 
incomplete, but its rewards are such that we  have every reason to work towards it and get 
as far as we can.93 
 
Although there are singular essences as part of Spinoza’s system, we are social beings 
and, as we learned in E2p40s and 2p47, certain common notions are formed differently for each 
person depending on their past experiences and recollections. Therefore, although common 
notions are the true ideas about the nature of things, how we come to that knowledge and apply it 
varies greatly. 
 Just as we need certain conditions in order to experience a variety of different foods in our 
lives (I cannot try all the new foods of the world unless I have the financial means to travel for 
example), we also need a certain type of environment for affirmative and adequate sets of ideas 
to grow and develop. We cannot develop our understanding alone. This is applicable at least in 
the sense that those ideas will have the opportunity to develop with more force and creativity in 
conjunction with many other ideas and individuals if the conditions are conducive to such 
growth. But, in many ways, we might say that we can always find other methods of gaining 
knowledge on an individual level as well. We will just be limited to our personal experiences and 
                                                 
92 Spinoza, Ethics, 4p52: 143. 
93 James, Spinoza on Philosophy, Religion, and Politics: The Theologico-Political Treatise, 2. 
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recollections when doing so. Yet, working through Spinoza’s system teaches us how to develop 
our ideas in such a way that they are conceived as internally determined, that is, our adequate 
ideas become understood as self-caused (and not as the effects of external causes).  
 As Hasana Sharp notes in her work on the politics of renaturalization, Spinoza's system 
“encourages us to consider which practices, associations, and relationships might strengthen 
and care for emerging, fragile, and challenging ideas... Favorable ideas are those that enable a 
mind better to understand the conditions of its power and activity and thus to aid its 
perseverance... One must gather the forces of ideas compatible with one's striving.”94 This 
involves all our appetites, but especially individual capacities to thrive based on knowledge of 
the operation of affects. What would it entail to “gather the forces of ideas” compatible with our 
conatus? Could this process include a method of enhanced creativity, for example? In support of 
the position that there is a substantial theory of singular consciousness in Spinoza in this respect, 
Peg Rawes, in “Spinoza's Architectural Passages and Geometric Comportments,” writes that 
Spinoza's Ethics is “a kind of architectural passage because of the diverse figures and passages of 
comportment that his geometric thinking enables.” She continues to combine values found in 
architecture with similar values in Spinoza, writing, “Geometric thinking in the Ethics is 
therefore aligned with life, and the reader's journey towards fulfillment or joy reflects this 
process as they make the step-by-step movement through the text's different elements, its 
axioms, definitions, corollaries, propositions and scholia.”95 This produces the transformation of 
our affects and an emphasis on the third kind of knowing in the development of rational 
individuals and collective democracies. Rawes continues, “…Spinoza inaugurates a diverse 
                                                 
94 Sharp, Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization, 74, emphasis added. 
95 Rawes, Spinoza Beyond Philosophy, 67, 73. 
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living geometry through which multiple, transformative subjects live out life.”96 Rawes’ reading 
also supports Dan Selcer’s interpretation about the meaning of dynamic materiality, learning, and 
ideational and bodily transformations found in Spinoza’s philosophy. 
 One concern becomes how difficult it is to care for the development of our ideas (and the 
experiences of our bodies) in the midst of rapidly changing social norms, expectations, 
institutional power, technological advancement, external influences (racism, sexism, classism), 
or other challenging factors and dynamics. If this thesis is going to end on a more 
phenomenological note, which I would like it to because of the importance of individual 
conscious awareness and the affects, discussing how we move about our environments, how we 
comport ourselves in our many dimensions with each other and with objects, how we work and 
how we have fun, all of this is phenomenologically one's own. Reflection is not possible for a 
singular mind without an enveloped environment of which it (we) are a part. In addition, we all 
have many different kinds of communities of which we are engaged in our lifetime. From those 
different types of communities, we draw different variations in power and vitality, energy and 
levity. In these ways, creative thought and action becomes an important skill to develop. 
 It is on the nature of creativity that I would like to end this thesis. Consider what Berys 
Gaut writes in a recent article “The Philosophy of Creativity” when he notes that there has been 
little philosophical work on the nature of creativity between the years of 1950-2000: “Yet given 
its importance and the number of interesting philosophical questions it raises, it should be a 
major topic in philosophy.”97 Creativity is a regular topic in areas of Continental philosophy, but 
its epistemological elements can be taken up more systematically through Spinoza as well. The 
science of creativity includes incredibly exciting and lucid research begun in the past decade, but 
                                                 
96 Rawes, Spinoza Beyond Philosophy, 81. 
97 Berys Gaut, “The Philosophy of Creativity,” 1034. See also Irving Singer’s Modes of Creativity: Philosophical 
Perspectives (MIT Press 2011) for more recent work. 
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any sustained examination and experience of the history of great aesthetic works will also add to 
our education about the rationally powerful uses of creative ideas in a philosophically systematic 
manner. Spinoza's philosophy is deductively rigorous, creative (the scholia alone could be a 
humorous book on human psychology and sarcasm), and intense in its ontological and 
epistemological conclusions. It encourages both moderation, deliberation, and seeking varied 
intensities in living and new experiences. In other words, moderate pleasures and “gentle 
motions of the body” or ataraxia are not the only things we seek in our dynamic transformations 
for Spinoza.98 The element of favoring creativity and experimentation also certainly separates 
Spinoza from previous influences, such as Thomas Hobbes, who felt creativity should be 
classified as a weak sense.  
In work on emotion and creativity, Mike Radford references Antonio Damasio’s books on 
human development, neuroscience, psychology and philosophy (not to mention on Spinoza) to 
elaborate on the role of rationally developed emotions and the use of creativity. Teachers know 
how this works. In the classroom, good teachers can read their student’s emotions well and adjust 
the class presentation or discussion as needed, adding unexpected questions, art, or a sense of 
humor. Teachers are also very creative in the many ways in which knowledge is transmitted 
effectively and with inspiration.99 Radford notes that Damasio includes the creative process as an 
aid to reasoning, writing that it is “‘a ceaseless process of creation which is what reasoning and 
deciding are all about.’”100 Using imaginative knowledge well was also the focus of Chapter Two 
of this thesis. Radford continues that we can access both language and non-verbal cues from the 
store of memory. We do this regularly, and such a mechanism allows us to also rearrange 
powerful ideas in ways that can positively affect others. This process also includes “a self-
                                                 
98 Noted from the edited student reader ethics: contemporary readings, James Swindal ed. (2004). 
99 For an excellent resource on this topic see Andrea Kenkmann’s edited volume Teaching Philosophy. 
100 Radford, “Emotion and Creativity,” 60. 
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regulatory character” and, as we consider more complex decisions and how to act in our nuanced 
and varied circumstances, we also realize through rational reflection that the many possible 
outcomes “might be complex, multiple, or uncertain.”101 From this, individual subjectivity is 
both aware of its uniqueness and that it is a social being in constant interaction in its web of 
relations. Both are required for enhanced uses of creative rationality and actions such as 
composing good art. Our intuitive knowledge accesses these insights and puts them to use. 
Experience and emotional intelligence: 
…put emotional feelings at the heart of intelligent action. They influence the way we 
select to process that information and account for the differences that we experience in 
different people’s perceptions and interpretations of reality. They are at the heart of 
individual subjectivity. At the same time, having been acquired through our acculturation, 
it might be suggested that they are also shared.102 
 
This is what, in Early Modern circles, is called thinking in Spinoza. Notice how it involves the 
use of understanding to create positive affects for oneself and for others in joyous ways, but also 
for the environment in which one interacts and needs to survive. Radford concludes:  
Genuinely creative efforts are accompanied by intense feelings of emotional commitment 
and great excitement upon their realization, but the argument goes further than this. The 
actual guidance mechanisms that lead us to choose one path over another or that nudge us 
into the realization of a particular theoretical explanation or inspirational artistic 
construction are informed by non-rational, emotional markers, a taste for some particular 
informational items, or lines of connections over others. We are, in a non-reflective sense, 
guided by our feelings.103 
 
Again, those who believe only the rational is real will run into problems with this version 
of Spinoza. It is also true that feelings and emotions are not affects, but it becomes increasingly 
important to find ways for rational reflection to focus on which emotion we are having and why. 
                                                 
101 Radford, “Emotion and Creativity,” 60. 
102 Ibid. 62. Radford continues, “The sense of excitement, of the ‘rightness’ of a particular expression of judgment 
and the way the creative act enables everything to fall into place might address a basic emotional tension that is 
embedded in the psychology of human beings. This tension takes the form of an impulse toward self-understanding 
and understanding of one’s relationship with the external world (62).” 
103 Ibid. 63. 
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In this process of reflection we are transformed in multiple ways. We may be able to enhance the 
use of reason and use it both well and creatively often, but there are times when we are overcome 
with emotions in unexpected ways that decrease our power to exist. It is just not the case that 
Spinoza’s epistemology, in all its capacities to help us enhance our reasoning about laws of 
Nature, will comfort me immediately upon the unexpected passing of a loved relative or friend. 
This kind of evaluation and serious contemplation about the use of kinds of knowing in Spinoza 
is very similar to what we find in the naturalized epistemology debates in feminism that have 
been occurring for decades. But I believe Spinoza was well aware of just how human we all are. 
As the above research also notes, to “‘play’ at the boundaries of sense” is what rational 
creativity also demands. It is not a static, solitary, or even gentle process. Our capacities to use 
reason with increasing force and effect are dynamic, and this includes understanding how to use 
creativity well. To use creativity well, as anyone who has ever experienced the power of amazing 
works of art understands, is an intensely affective event. The process of creativity may also 
contribute to the relief of natural tensions between singular interests and a collective interest. 
Such a collective transformation comes with the experiences of joy in recognizing we are using 
reason creatively with more power. Emotions are part of the thinking process and our on-going 
experiences. Natural tensions create an environment for the mind and body which are an 
“impetus to creative development…the reconciliation of such tensions is an emotionally 
satisfying experience.”104  
Spinoza gave the title of Ethics to a work combining important questions about 
metaphysics and epistemology, including a rigorous evaluation of human psychology. I believe 
the title is an indicator that Spinoza was adept at human interactions and psychology, enough to 
write a proto-physics mechanics of interactions between force, motion, and bodies. “In order to 
                                                 
104 Radford, “Emotion and Creativity,” 54. 
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be creative, the original and novel outcomes of generation within the system must be perceived 
to be of some value. It is quite possible for individuals to generate new perspectives, new 
combinations of elements within a system, and produce something that is attractive or interesting 
to a particular group.”105 As Alexis Philonenko writes, “Reason is what gives essence to 
innovation.”106 This is another reason the philosophy of George Yancy can be applied in 
combination with Spinoza’s system. Yancy writes, “Not only am I excited by ideas, but I also feel 
the transformative dimensions of wrestling with them. Furthermore, this excitement is deeply 
embodied; it is not captured in a ‘pure’ moment of abstract contemplation, but induces 
shuddering and ecstasy.”107 Spinoza’s philosophy does the same when both understood and put 
into use to create more powerfully affirmative effects (and affects).108 
In this way, Hasana Sharp has the right intuition when she concludes that ideas have real 
force. Ideas are what change, transform, combine, alter, negate, compare, contrast, inspire, re-
imagine, and express reality. The use of creativity cannot, therefore, entail only the act and 
concept of mere production or creation of some object or experience. Artistic creativity can be 
applied to the use of ideas arranged in a powerfully affective manner. It includes many different 
types, kinds, and expressions of human activity and uses all three kinds of knowledge. It can also 
be read as an affirmative force or affect which occurs not only as an effect of thinking with 
rational force, but also as the natural consequence of our immanent expression of Nature. 
Benjamin Dalton writes, “…all action, whether defined creatively, rationally, normatively, or in 
another or an eclectic fashion, involves physical and symbolic relationships to objects in the 
                                                 
105 Radford, “Emotion and Creativity,” 57. 
106 Alexis Philonenko, “Reason and Writing,” 188. The author ends, “So the task of philosophy is to save writing…” 
107 Yancy, The Philosophical I…, 65. 
108 This is not a Medieval concept of God or Being as good because Spinoza alters the meaning of the definition of 
concepts such as “substance,” “attribute,” “mode,” “power,” and even in many ways eternity. 
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environment.”109  
In addition, rational uses of creative thinking and acting have political and social import 
as production and as expression. If we adequately understand such increases in our joy, power, 
and possibilities to affect others affirmatively (rationally), then we also will be inclined to agree 
that the concept and practice of creativity can and does enhance human conditions for increased 
happiness, freedom of thought, and peace between various groups of individuals with diverse 
interests. In other words, it can act as a social cohesive. The use of creativity “…identifies a 
significant set of concerns that macrotheoretical approaches must take into account when 
considering social change. This would add to my reading that Spinoza’s system can be used as 
support of certain aspects of the philosophy of race. Further work in this direction, then, might 
consider how social and cultural structures systematically manage the constant introduction of 
creative accomplishments produced in action and thereby influence the direction of historical 
change.”110 Spinoza’s descriptive epistemology in its dynamism creates lasting impressions in 
one’s mind and as one’s bodily affections. In the practice of working through such a system, one 
is transformed by the work. This is Dan Selcer’s reading of materiality conceived dynamically 
and the material book as rhizomatic, a Deleuzian term. Selcer concludes: 
Instead, it demands a perspective that understands the book as the locus of causal power. 
The rhizome, in other words, is the figure for a book that is what it is insofar as it 
produces a regime of singular effects. The rhizome-book is a dynamic individual that, on 
the one hand, maintains a consistent, complex pattern of motive action while 
simultaneously undergoing profound transformations with respect to its elements or parts 
(up to and including the limit-point of its own destruction when it can no longer maintain 
the integrity of its nature)… This concept of the dynamic unity of an individual whose 
                                                 
109 Dalton, “Creativity, Habit, and the Social Products of Creative Action…,” 617. He continues, “Thus, creativity 
implies not simply the overcoming of practical or strategic problems or the reestablishment of the capacity for 
practical activity through the refinement of habit and is not only social in the direct judgments and environments in 
which creative action is embedded, but it also involves creating material and symbolic objects that exist in a social 
space and that have implications for the embodied existence and practice of other agents (618).” 
110 Dalton, “Creativity, Habit, and the Social Products of Creative Action…,” 619. 
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parts undergo constant flux is also…precisely the key to Spinoza’s account of the body.111 
 
Selcer uses the terms “individual” and “body” to include something in addition to a human 
individual, but the processes undergone by both a person and the book (which needs an audience 
to be known, a reader with subjective consciousness in my reading) can be described in similar 
ways. What is a book without the fact that such an object requires consciously reflecting subjects 
as both author and audience or reader?  
In an edited work on creativity, J. P. Guilford, in his article “Traits of Creativity,” writes 
that the primary trait for creative thinking is fluency of thinking (both associational and 
expressional). I am not certain we can describe a book as being creative in the same way as a 
human according to this description. Perhaps that factor, of how creativity is used, is the 
difference between a human body and other types of bodies. Guilford notes, “A trait of probably 
much wider usefulness is fluency in the production of ideas, or the factor of ideational fluency. 
We cannot necessarily say that a book, such as a philosophical system, has immediate ideational 
fluency for all readers. Ideational fluency is the ability to produce ideas to fulfill certain 
requirements in limited time.”112 Creative fluency also includes spontaneous flexibility (which is 
adaptive and original). Does a text, as a body, have such spontaneous flexibility? Perhaps works 
of literature and related can, but can we say, for example, that Immaneul Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason has the same capacity? Guilford notes: 
                                                 
111 Selcer, Philosophy and the Book…, 201. Selcer continues that the implications of the importance of examining 
“the mobilization of material figures of inscription” in the early modern period which includes reading Spinoza’s 
conception of materiality “on a dynamic model directly connected with figures of material inscription.” It also 
includes that “conceptualization and embodiment can be understood to be one and the same thing differently 
expressed.” Selcer includes in this, drawing from Epicurus and Lucretius, the importance of “images, arguments, 
concepts, and metaphors” for reading Spinoza in this way. Yet, how I live is not always the same as my thinking. 
It’s my conclusion that this is too general of a categorization. We think about much more than we can do… 
112 Vernon, Creativity, 171. The article first appeared in the work Creativity and Cultivation. Ideational creativity 
also includes things like a tolerance for ambiguity, the manipulation of symbols and symbolic symbols, and a use of 
divergent thinking (including a sensitivity to problems and their nuances). This includes an enhanced social 
intelligence. What is striking was that the authors also found that things like temperament and motivation were 
minimal factors in enhanced creative acts. I wonder if motivation isn’t of more need and use though, as perhaps 
Spinoza’s system demonstrates for us. 
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There are many, no doubt, who would look for the chief secrets of creative performance 
outside the modality of aptitudes. There is no denying that traits of motivation and of 
temperament should be expected to have significant determining effects upon whether or 
not an individual exhibits creative performance… There has been little rigorously 
obtained information regarding the roles of such traits in creative performance, however. 
In her studies of leading artists and of leading scientists in several fields, Anne Roe found 
only one trait that stood out in common among individuals. This was a willingness to 
work hard and to work long hours…113 
 
Art is hard work, science is hard work, philosophy is hard work, but I’m not so sure we can 
extend this description to texts. Human conscious reflection and transformation is needed to add 
the hard work factor to the book. Guilford replies that this trait is also found in any successful 
profession or endeavor. What is most striking about the use of ideational fluidity and flexibility 
for creativity is “…a freedom from perseveration, which is one form of rigidity, and that adaptive 
flexibility appears to be a freedom from a persistence in using previously learned, futile methods 
of solution, another form of rigidity.”114  
 For the sense of our creativity and ideational flexibility to become enhanced, a general 
feeling of freedom is required, and, as we know, this involves the affirmative uses of the 
imagination for Spinoza. This kind of freedom must be free of continuous evaluation/observation 
by others, for example, but not free from responsibility and reason. Reason is aware that the laws 
of thought and action (cause and effect) are also at work. This recognition is not a problem, for 
the imagination loves to play and, for that matter, to imagine all those things which increase 
one’s power to exist (real or not). The understanding and intuition access the imagination and put 
it to work with more force and rational deliberation. As we read in the article “Moral Freedom 
and Artistic Creativity” by L. P. Chambers, “Belief in determinism implies freedom no less than 
freedom implies belief in determinism.”115 Spinozists Moira Gatens and Susan James have 
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deduced the same. Chambers continues:  
If I once grant the futility of human effort will I not refrain from further hard endeavor? I 
may continue to act and think in terms of habit; but when habitual belief and behavior fail 
to function I will not enter upon the difficult quest for more efficient conduct and 
adequate theory, but will assume that the limits of human capacity have probably been 
reached. If I am to persist in my endeavors I must have some hope of their success, some 
confidence in man’s capacity to discover truth.116 
 
As already noted, Spinoza is clear that his system aids in our more adequately understanding not 
only the uses of imaginative and rational capacities, but also in being able to better recognize the 
limits of reason. On enhancing levels of artistic expression in these ways, Chambers continues, 
“But the musician’s reason for thus acquiring habits is not that habits are preferable to voluntary 
acts, but in order that the mechanical performance of acts already proved useful by trial and error 
may leave the creative spirit of the musician free to rise to higher levels of achievement 
undreamed of and indeed impossible before.”117 Now, when we read about Spinoza’s insistence 
on developing habitual readiness through the use of both the imagination and reason, we may 
better understand the level of enhanced creative thought and action Spinoza edges us towards. As 
Berys Gaut notes in his recent work on creativity, the philosophy of creativity goes “beyond 
aesthetics” and is in its infancy in philosophy.118 Thus, as Dan Selcer notes, experimentation with 
reason is an excellent way to enhance both the affirmative uses of imaginative knowledge, 
experience, and rational ideational force.  
 Throughout my project I have been discussing an enhanced form of understanding found 
in Spinoza’s epistemology that includes learning how to express more efficient power in our 
                                                 
116 Vernon, Creativity, 171. 
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rational thoughts and actions. This includes the powerful and affirmative use of imaginative 
knowledge in many aspects. But there is a further aspect of his proto-physics of force and motion 
that benefits our communal nature, and that is Spinoza’s concept of love. In our enhanced 
understanding, we transition to more powerful forms of affirmative expression in our love of 
Nature. As there are infinite ways for the attributes to express themselves relationally, we are 
drawn, through the understanding, to feel more power, joy, and striving in our affects and actions, 
including a general tendency towards effective and creative uses of such knowledge. Martha 
Nussbaum writes that Spinoza, in some ways, can be compared to Plato, but on the notions of 
creativity, enhanced knowledge, and love Spinoza goes beyond Plato. Nussbaum writes:  
As we are, we need many things. We therefore attend closely to our transitions – that is, 
to the significance of external things for the status of our own project… Emotions are our 
recognitions to these significant relations to external things… Where in all of this is love? 
Love, Spinoza argues, is an awareness of a significant transition in the direction of greater 
flourishing, combined with the idea of an external cause of that transition. In other words, 
it is both a necessary and sufficient condition of love that we find a person (or thing) 
extremely helpful to us in preserving our being. Indeed, love just is nothing other than the 
recognition of such significance.119 
 
My working through Spinoza’s dynamic epistemology has been a greater transition towards more 
enhanced flourishing combined with the adequate understanding of the external causes which I 
have combined with to form a more powerful body of understanding and action. As we read in 
E5p24, if we continue to understand better the essence of particular things, the more we are 
expressing them with increased power sub specie aeternitatus: “The more we understand 
particular things, the more we understand God.”120  
In a recent article on the creative aspects of being human, writer Maria Popova, in citing 
R. M. Rilke, reflects that we are pushed out of the use of creativity by the familiar, by routine, 
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because the familiar allows us to become increasingly more habitually passive in our ideas. This 
occurs in our “inability to ‘live the questions.’”121 We are inclined in the direction of enhanced 
forms of the use of both the imagination and reason the more we understand about how to “live” 
both, but also the more we understand how to live the questions remaining, the expressions yet 
possible. This includes an element of uncertainty or ambiguity that we allow for because we 
understand that there is always more to learn, always more to understand, always new ways to 
express our understanding, actions, and joy. We are experiencing love and an increased force of 
power when engaged in such understanding and, therefore, our activity and energy for more 
activity automatically increases. Using Spinoza’s system to critically analyze the intellectual and 
artistic aspects of Proust’s writing about the experience of human beings impacting each other, 
about living the questions, Nussbaum writes, “This love is not contingent on any particular state 
of the body, or on any external event. Therefore it need not come to a halt at any time… Nor is it 
tarnished by ambivalence… And since it is the common property of all human beings, [an 
individual] will not envy in anyone else this understanding, but will realize that the 
understanding is made the more complete the more people enjoy it…”122 It is as aspect of our 
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life, but also throughout many lives past and many more to come. We thunder in oneness and we are one thunder. 
We have free will, it is a gift, and we are more than mechanical bodies in motion reducible to physical components. 
We are our ideas, but this includes an aspect of spirituality that often goes unrecognized in scientific circles and 
philosophies of immanence. Consciousness needs the physical brain and body, but it is not reducible to it. It holds 
the property of extension and, as Nikola Tesla once wrote, “If you wish to understand the universe, think of energy, 
frequency, and vibration.” Our ideas and intentions are energy, frequency, and vibrations. Spirit is real. 
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conatus that we realize this brute fact with joy. Such realizations add to our “energy, beauty, and 
wonder.” It is a human ethology, a Spinozist ethology, a delight of and in the expressions of 
natural phenomena sub specie aeternitatus. 
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